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Abstract
What explains the pace at which militaries adopt new technology? We argue that the hierarchical structure and unique expertise requirements of military organizations combine to empower select individuals as ‘gatekeepers’ of innovation. These individuals acquire beliefs throughout their military careers regarding the nature and means of warfare that act to shape their attitudes towards new military innovations. By filtering, sidelining, and ignoring competing sources of advice and information, these officers actively inhibit the adoption of new, often advantageous, innovations. We develop this argument through the analysis of two cases: the delayed acquisition of breech-loading and repeating rifles by the Union Army during the American Civil War, and the failure of the US Army to adopt an adequate heavy-type tank in World War II.
Notes
2 Senior civilian leaders, ‘maverick’ members of the officer corps, and senior service chiefs have all been highlighted as innovation promoters and as agents of change. See for example Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP Citation1984); Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP Citation1991); and Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change (London: Lynne Rienner Citation2002).
3 Innovations that do not increase combat effectiveness are technologies and ideas driven by what van Creveld calls ‘nonutilitarian factors.’ See Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press 1989), 67.
4 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (Oct. 2006), 907.
5 Farrell and Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’, 7–8.
6 Theo Farrell, ‘World Culture and Military Power’, Security Studies 14/3 (2005), 448–88; Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army’, European Journal of International Relations 7/63 (2001), 63–102. Elizabeth Kier also presents a cultural argument to explain variation in French and British doctrine between World Wars I and II. See Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP Citation1997).
7 See Stephen P. Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation’, International Security 13 (1988), 134–68; and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Pearson 1999).
8 Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, American Political Science Review 63/3 (Sept. 1969), 689–718.
9 James Lebovic, Foregone Conclusions: US Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Citation1996).
10 Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP Citation1994).
11 This interest in identifying the conditions ripe for innovation has recently been extended to a number of cases of foreign military innovation. See for example Robert T. Foley, ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/6 (Dec. 2012), 799–827; Lazar Berman, ‘Capturing Contemporary Innovation: Studying IDF Innovation against Hamas and Hizballah’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (Feb. 2012), 121–47; Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 299–323; Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 325–54; and Kevin Pollpeter, ‘Upward and Onward: Technological Innovation and Organizational Change in China’s Space Industry’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 405–23.
12 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 22.
13 Ibid., 22–3.
14 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 55–9; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 23. For recent work on military innovation and adaptation during war, see Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–09’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 567–94; and James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (Aug. 2010), 595–624.
15 Rosen, Winning the Next War.
16 Rosen, ‘New Ways of War’, 142.
17 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
18 See Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice (Washington DC: Georgetown UP Citation2000); Michael Mintrom and Phillipa Norman, ‘Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change’, The Policy Studies Journal 37/4 (2009), 649–67; and John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: HarperCollins Citation1995).
19 See Michael Mazarr, ‘The Iraq War and Agenda Setting’, Foreign Policy Analysis 3/1 (2007), 1–23; and Julia M. Macdonald, ‘Eisenhower’s Scientists: Policy Entrepreneurs and the Test-Ban Debate, 1954–58’, Foreign Policy Analysis (2013), doi: 10.1111/fpa.12018.
20 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52/4 (1998), 887–917; Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines’, International Organization 52/3 (1998), 613–44; and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1998).
21 K. Lewin, ‘Frontiers in Group Dynamics II: Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research’, Human Relations 1/2 (1947), 145.
22 Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Gatekeeping: A Critical Review’, Annual Review of Information Science and Technology 43/1 (2009), 1496–7.
23 See Alexander George, ‘The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly 13/2 (1969), 190–222; Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP Citation1993); and Elizabeth Saunders, Leaders At War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornel UP Citation2011).
24 Evidence suggests that information stemming from visceral first-hand experiences generally outweighs information derived from memoranda, reports, and other second-hand experiences. See Tami Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP Citation2002), 5. Robert Jervis also notes the tendency of individuals to select information that accords with pre-existing beliefs. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP Citation1976). On an interesting discussion of the conservative nature of senior military officers, see Barton C. Hacker, ‘The Military and the Machine: An Analysis of the Controversy over Mechanization in the British Army, 1919–1939’, PhD dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 1969. For a contrasting view see Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, ‘Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes Towards Innovation’, International Security 28/2 (2003), 112–48.
25 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 45–6.
26 Since this paper is designed as a theory-building exercise, it evaluates only cases of gatekeepers as innovation inhibitors. In other words, this project is not engaging in a controlled case comparison to test this theory, and thus the findings are not necessarily intended to be generalizable outside of these defined conditions. Instead, we hope through the course of this analysis to lay the groundwork for new avenues of research that build on these initial findings.
27 Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill 1956), 27.
28 Gerald L. Earley, The Second United States Sharpshooters in the Civil War: A History and Roster (Jefferson, NC: McFarland 2009), 20.
29 William H. Hallahan, Misfire: The History of How America’s Small Arms Have Failed Our Military (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1994), 118.
30 Ripley was promoted to Brigadier General in August 1861.
31 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 69.
32 Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP 1973), 134–5.
33 Ibid., 101.
34 Ibid., 104–5.
35 Hallahan, Misfire, 123, 129–32.
36 Clint Johnson, Civil War Blunders (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair Citation1997), 48. For an excellent analysis of this same debate in the British context see Matthew Charles Ford, ‘The British Army and the Politics of Rifle Development’, PhD dissertation, King’s College London 2008. To read the views of the British traditionalists in particular, see 37–42.
37 Ripley engaged in similar behavior in a number of other notable cases, including the Marsh and Sharps breech-loading rifles. He succeeded in preventing the Marsh rifle from reaching the battlefield, but was less successful in preventing the introduction of the Sharps rifle largely due to the advocacy efforts of Colonel Hiram Berdan (Hallahan, Misfire, 160–1).
38 Using a Spencer repeater, an ordinary marksman could discharge seven loads of ammunition in 12 seconds and a platoon could fire at the rate of one every three seconds.
39 John Walter, The Rifle Story: An Illustrated History from 1776 to the Present Day (London: Greenhill Publishing 2006), 67. On the merits of breech-loading repeating rifles versus muzzle-loaders in the context of the Austro-Prussian War, see Max Boot, War Made New: Technology and Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: Gotham Books 2006), Ch. 4.
40 Roy M. Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms (Rochester, NY: Rowe Publications 1983), 29.
41 Joseph G. Bilby, A Revolution in Arms: A History of the First Repeating Rifles (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing 2006), 76–7.
42 Ibid., 77.
43 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 34.
44 Ibid.
45 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 116; Hallahan, Misfire, 114.
46 Stuart C. Mowbray and Jennifer Heroux, Civil War Arms Makers and Their Contracts: A Fascimile Reprint of the Report by the Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, 1862 (Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Inc. 1998), 422.
47 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 34–5.
48 Hallahan, Misfire, 144–5.
49 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 37.
50 Mowbray and Heroux, Civil War Arms Makers, 427–8.
51 Wiley Sword, ‘Those Damned Michigan Spencers’, Man at Arms 19 (1997), 23–37.
52 Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 85.
53 Ibid., 91.
54 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 253.
55 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 52.
56 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 252.
57 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 51.
58 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 254–5; Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 51–3.
59 Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 119.
60 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 65.
61 Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 134–5.
62 Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 220. Max Boot notes in his discussion of the Union Army’s delayed adoption of the Spencer repeater that ‘seldom has there been a more egregious example of an army failing to take advantage of readily available technology that might have shortened the war.’ Boot, War Made New, 129.
63 Marcot, Spencer Repeating Firearms, 28–30; Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 76–7.
64 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 106.
65 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 252.
66 Ibid.,106.
67 Hallahan, Misfire, 174.
68 Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War, 106.
69 Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 38.
70 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert Palmer, and Bell Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Green Book) (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History Citation1987), 262–70.
71 United States War Department, Armored Force Field Manual 17-32: The Tank Company, Light and Medium (Washington DC: Government Printing Office Citation1942), 35–47.
72 Steven Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt: The US Army Sherman in World War II (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books 2008), 330.
73 Lesley James McNair, ‘Antitank Doctrine and Development: Memo to Adjutant General Washington DC from Commandant US Command and General Staff School (29 July 1940)’, War Department (Fort Leavenworth 1940), 2. Accessible at US National Archives at College Park, MD.
74 Tank destroyer (TD) vehicles like the M10 Wolverine and the M18 Hellcat were tasked with eliminating enemy armor by using cover and concealment. When encountering enemy tanks TD forces were to use their superior speed and maneuverability to out flank and ambush the enemy. They were not to engage in a ‘slugging match’ with enemy tanks as they did not possess adequate armor protection for a prolonged head on engagement. See United States War Department, Tank Destroyer Field Manual (18-5): Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyer Units (Washington DC: Government Printing Office Citation1942), 17–21.
75 McNair’s preference for anti-tank guns was vindicated in pre-war maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas. In these simulated engagements the anti-tank gun proved a huge success by accounting for 91 per cent of tanks ‘destroyed.’ See Lesley James McNair, ‘Critique of the First Phase, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, Carolina Area, November 16th to 21st, 1941’, War Department (Fort Leavenworth 1941), 2. Accessible at US National Archives at College Park, MD. The fact that the rules of engagement seriously biased the results against the tank did not seem to temper McNair’s enthusiasm. On this point see Christopher Gabel, ‘World War II Armor Operations in Europe’, in George Hofmann and Donn Starry (eds), Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press 1999), 15–17.
76 Emory Dunham, The Tank Destroyer History: Study No. 29 (Washington DC: Historical Section – Army Ground Forces Citation1946), 4.
77 The Army’s Field Manual 18-5 was produced in early 1942 for just this purpose.
78 Gabel, ‘World War II Armor Operations in Europe’, 26.
79 Alexander Ludeke, Weapons of World War II (London: Parragon Books 2011), 135.
80 George Lynch, ‘Antitank Doctrine and Development: Memo to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 from Office of the Chief of Infantry (July 3, 1940)’, War Department (Washington DC 1940). Accessible at US National Archives at College Park, MD. Also, the specialized nature of tank destroyer units meant that strict doctrinal adherence was crucial. Failure to conform to the instructions outlined in the official field manual by pursuing enemy tanks beyond the range of supporting infantry, was not only unsound but near suicidal. See Gabel, ‘World War II Armor Operations in Europe’, 42.
81 Jonathan House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press 2001), 145.
82 Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry Thomson, and Peter Roots, The Technical Services: The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War (Green Book) (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History Citation1990), 237.
83 The relative shock to American forces in North Africa was particularly troubling given that American military intelligence gathering efforts on German armored doctrinal and technological developments in the inter-war period had been relatively successful. In the immediate pre-war period ‘US estimates of German tank technology, doctrine, and organization had compared favorably with those of the other intelligence services.’ Thomas Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP Citation2002), 114.
84 Ibid., 280.
85 Charles Baily, Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II (Hamden, CT: Archon Books 1983), 75–8.
86 Green et al., The Technical Services, 280.
87 Robert Cameron, Mobility, Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence of the US Army’s Armor Branch, 1917-1945 (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History Citation2008), 419.
88 MG John Lucas, once a strong tank destroyer advocate, admitted that in Tunisia ‘the tank destroyer [had] failed to prove its usefulness’ MG Ernest Harmon, commander of the 2nd Armored Division in North Africa, personally witnessed the debacle at Kasserine Pass and came away despondent. He professed prophetically: ‘there is no need for tank destroyers. I believe the whole organization and development of the tank destroyer will be a great mistake of the war.’ See Christopher Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Citation1985), 43.
89 Roman Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Citation2001), 259.
90 Bailey, Faint Praise, 92; Green et al., The Technical Services, 269.
91 Cameron, Mobility, Shock, and Firepower, 400.
92 Green et al., The Technical Services, 283.
93 Baily, Faint Praise, 94–5.
94 Lesley James McNair, ‘Memo to Tank Destroyer Center Commander MG A.D. Bruce (February 19, 1943)’, War Department (1943), 1. Accessible at US National Archives at College Park, MD.
95 Baily, Faint Praise, 94.
96 George Forty, United States Tanks of World War II in Action (Poole, UK: Blandford Press 1983), 136.
97 David Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the US Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1998), 195.
98 LTC Matthew Kane solemnly noted, ‘our M4 tank is woefully lacking in armor and armament … our crews recognize the deficiencies in our tanks, and know that success on the battlefield is attributable to our superiority in numbers of tanks, and resolve to sustain heavy casualties in men and tanks in order to gain objectives.’ See Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, 199. Also, in the summer of 1944 Sgt. Leo Anderson reported that ‘many times I’ve seen our tanks engage German tanks in tank duels. Their tanks have the ups on us … give us tanks that compare with the Jerry’s tanks.’ See Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics, 261.
99 Ian Hogg, Tank Killing: Anti-Tank Warfare by Men and Machines (New York: Sarpedon 1996), 159.
100 See ‘Death of a Myth’, Washington Post, 22 March, 1945, 6; and Hanson Baldwin, ‘The German Blow-III: New German Tanks Prove Superior to Ours-Inquiry by Congress Urged’, New York Times, 5 Jan. 1945, 4.
101 S.D. Badsey, ‘The American Experience of Armour 1919–53’, in J. P. Harris and F. H. Toase (eds), Armoured Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1990), 142.
102 Green et al., The Technical Services, 284.
103 Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, 200–1.
104 Gabel, ‘World War II Armor Operations in Europe’, 157.
105 The M1 Abrams, Challenger II, Leopard 2, and Leclerc are all examples of the MBT concept in action.
106 The notion that the 90mm ammunition used by the Pershing would have presented an unnecessary logistical burden is false. The Pershing’s 90mm M3 cannon was derived directly from the standard American heavy anti-tank cannon deployed throughout Europe. Once in theater M26 tanks could have easily relied on 90mm field gun ammunition caches for both high explosive and armor-piercing rounds. In any case, the fact that M4 Sherman tanks were produced in large numbers with two different types of cannon requiring different, incompatible types of ammunition (75mm and 76mm), neither of which were interchangeable with the 3 inch or 90mm ammunition used by American anti-tank guns, meant that the Sherman presented a logistical burden at least equal to that of the Pershing in terms of ammunition supply.
107 Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 180.
108 This would have been most efficient solution in that the advantages of the Sherman (easier to transport, maintain, and repair) would have been retained while the armored corps would have also acquired additional anti-tank capability. The British ratio of one up-gunned Sherman Firefly for every five standard Shermans could have been used as a reference.
109 Zaloga, Armored Thunderbolt, 287.
110 Lida Mayo, The Technical Services: The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront (Green Book) (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History Citation1991), 334.
111 Ibid. 335.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Adam M. Jungdahl
Adam Jungdahl is a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at George Washington University and a Research Associate in the Office of Academic Affairs at the National Defense University. His research focuses on the diffusion of military innovations across international borders and the influence of technology on national security strategy, civil-military relations, and military effectiveness. Adam holds an MA in International Relations from George Washington University and a BA in History and Political Science from Miami University.
Julia M. Macdonald
Julia Macdonald is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University and a PhD Candidate-in-Residence at the Elliot School of International Affairs’ Institute for Security and Conflict studies. Julia’s research focuses on signaling and threat credibility during crises and explores the importance of varying domestic political environments in shaping leaders’ assessments of threat. Julia holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago and a BA(Hons) from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.