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Abstract
This article questions the predominantly pessimistic assessments over the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After analysing available evidence on states’ interests and interactions within the NPT’s framework, it argues that several negative expectations are unwarranted. Conversely, the article identifies three potentially threatening scenarios. Therefore, it scrutinizes the likely impact of reactive nuclear proliferation; analyses the probability of significant actors challenging the existent nuclear architecture; and explores whether the treaty’s enforcement might soon be diluted. The article concludes the NPT is unlikely to face fundamental threats in the foreseeable future.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Stephen Aris, Eliza Gheorghe, Jonas Hagmann, Mark Daniel Jäger, Ulla Jasper, Roland Popp, Jan Ruzicka, Aglaya Snetkov, Andreas Wenger and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and advice.
Notes
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this discrepancy between the literature and privately held views within the nuclear policy community.
2 Among dozens of reviewed diplomatic statements, political speeches, policy-oriented contributions, and scholarly articles, all published by a diverse group of people over a few decades, only a handful reached optimistic conclusions regarding the NPT’s future – all are cited in the subsequent sections of this article. Examples of pessimistic analyses include Camille Grand, The Non-Proliferation Treaty in an Era of Proliferation Crises (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies 2010); Graham Allison, ‘Nuclear Disorder’, Foreign Affairs 89/1 (Feb. 2010), 74–85; Richard Falk, ‘Nuclear Weapons Proliferation As a World Order Problem’, International Security 1/3 (Jan. 1977), 79–93; Richard Butler, Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense (Council on Foreign Relations 2001); Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The Impending Demise of the Postwar System’, Survival 47/4 (July 2006), 7–18; Joachim Krause, ‘Enlightenment and Nuclear Order’, International Affairs 83/3 (May 2007), 483–99; George Perkovich, ‘Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation’, Foreign Affairs 82/2 (April 2003), 2–8; Mario E. Carranza, ‘Can the NPT Survive? The Theory and Practice of US Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy after September 11’, Contemporary Security Policy 27/3 (Dec. 2006), 489–525; Michael Wesley, ‘It’s Time to Scrap the NPT’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 59/3 (Sept. 2005), 283–99; Michael MccGwire, ‘The Rise and Fall of the NPT: An Opportunity for Britain’, International Affairs 81/1 (Jan. 2005), 115–40; Richard Price, ‘Nuclear Weapons Don’t Kill People, Rogues Do’, International Politics 44/2 (2007), 232–49; Christopher Daase, ‘Der Anfang vom Ende des Nuklearen Tabus: Zur Legitimitätskrise der Weltnuklearordnung’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 10/1 (June 2003), 7–41; Marianne Hanson, ‘The Future of the NPT’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 59/3 (Sept. 2005), 301–316; Jed C. Snyder, ‘The Nonproliferation Regime: Managing the Impending Crisis’, Journal of Strategic Studies 8/4 (Dec. 1985), 7–27; Sergio Duarte, ‘Keeping the NPT Together: A Thankless Job in a Climate of Mistrust’, Nonproliferation Review 13/1 (March 2006), 1–16; Joyantha Dhanapala, ‘Fulfill and Strengthen the Bargain’, Arms Control Today 38/5 (June 2008); Paul Meyer, ‘Saving the NPT: Time to Renew Treaty Commitments’, Nonproliferation Review 16/3 (Nov. 2009), 463–72; Alexander Kmentt, ‘How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT’, Arms Control Today 43/10 (Dec. 2013).
3 Francis J. Gavin, ‘Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s’, International Security 29/3 (Jan. 2005), 100–35; or Hal Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT’, Cold War History 7/3 (Aug. 2007), 389–423.
4 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA INFCIRC 140, 22 April 1970.
5 ‘Pessimism’ is used throughout this article in regard to the NPT’s survival prospects, and not in the more established ‘proliferation pessimism’ manner, suggesting the further spread of nuclear weapons would be dangerous.
6 For another optimistic assessment, see Jeffrey Fields and Jason S. Enia, ‘The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Returning to a Multidimensional Evaluation’, Nonproliferation Review 16/2 (July 2009), 173–96.
7 Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Terminating Treaties,’ in Duncan Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford: OUP 2012), 634–49; Michael J. Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’, Georgetown Law Journal 93/3 (March 2005), 939–91.
8 For example, in 1934 Japan announced its intention to terminate the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. By the end of 1936, all five members were freed from the treaty’s limits on naval construction. Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia UP 1994).
9 As a case in point, the 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was supplanted by the 1991 Two Plus Four Agreement granting a united Germany full sovereignty. Condoleezza Rice and Philip D. Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Boston: Harvard UP 1995); Mary E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton UP 2009).
10 Athanassios Vamvoukos, Termination of Treaties in International Law: The Doctrines of Rebus Sic Stantibus and Desuetude (Oxford: OUP 1985).
11 Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’. For instance, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war. By the outbreak of World War II, it had been ratified by 63 states. It is nonetheless hard to argue that it had significant constraining power upon its members. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: CUP 2005), 83–5.
12 T.V. Paul, ‘Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16/1 (Nov. 2003), 135–54.
13 William Walker, ‘Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment’, International Affairs 83/3 (May 2007), 431–53; Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman, ‘Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Working Paper (2013).
14 George Bunn, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems’, Arms Control Today 33/10 (Dec. 2003), 4–10.
15 For instance, the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change warned bluntly: ‘We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation’. See ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations 2004, A/59/565) para. 111.
16 Jonathan Schell, ‘The Folly of Arms Control’, Foreign Affairs 79/5 (Sept. 2000), 22–46; Harald Müller, ‘Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime’, Strategic Analysis 34/2 (March 2010), 189–201.
17 William C. Potter, ‘India and the New Look of US Nonproliferation Policy’, Nonproliferation Review 12/2 (July 2005), 343–54; George Perkovich, ‘The End of the Nonproliferation Regime?’, Current History 105/694 (Nov. 2006), 355–62.
18 Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar, ‘Leaders and Laggards: When and Why Do Countries Sign the NPT?’ Working Paper 16 (Montreal: Research Group in International Security 2005).
19 Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959–1979, Vol. 2 (New York: Oceana 1980), 555–648.
20 Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington MA: Lexington Books 1987), 353–70; Dane Swango, ‘The United States and the Role of Nuclear Cooperation and Assistance in the Design of the NPT’, International History Review (Forthcoming 2014).
21 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament : How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (Manchester: Manchester UP 1977).
22 William Epstein, ‘Nuclear Proliferation: The Failure of the Review Conference’, Survival 17/6 (Nov. 1975), 262–9; Paul F. Power, ‘The Mixed State of Non-Proliferation: The NPT Review Conference and Beyond’, International Affairs 62/3 (July 1986), 477–91; Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Taking a Walk on the Supply Side’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (April 2009), 181 –208; Matthew Kroenig, ‘Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance’, American Political Science Review 103/1 (Feb. 2009), 113–33.
23 Michael D. Beck, ed., To Supply or to Deny: Comparing Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key Countries (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003).
24 George H. Quester, ‘The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency’, International Organization 24/2 (April 1970), 168.
25 This argument is supported both by the scarcity of nuclear programmes, and by numerous theoretical arguments of all strands. See Zachary Davis, ‘The Realist Nuclear Regime’, Security Studies 2/3 (Sept. 1993), 80–2; Paul, ‘Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation’, 141; Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: CUP 2006); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton UP 2007); Daniel Verdier, ‘Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime’, International Organization 62/3 (July 2008), 439–76.
26 Lewis A. Dunn, ‘Four Decades of Nuclear Nonproliferation: Some Lessons from Wins, Losses, and Draws’, Washington Quarterly 13/3 (Summer 1990), 5–18.
27 Richard K. Betts, ‘Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism’, in Victor A. Utgoff (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World Order (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2000), 68–70; Ursula Jasper, ‘The Ambivalent Neutral’, Nonproliferation Review 19/2 (July 2012), 267–92.
28 Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules’, Foreign Policy No. 25 (Winter 1976), 88–179; Bradley A. Thayer, ‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, Security Studies 4/3 (Spring 1995), 463–519; Ariel E. Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’, International Security 27/3 (Jan. 2003), 59–88. For the US government considering this issue during the NPT negotiations, see Richard N. Rosencrance, ‘After the NPT, What?’ Department of State Policy Planning Council (28 May 1968), available from the GWU National Security Archive.
29 Matthew Fuhrmann and Jeffrey D. Berejikian, ‘Disaggregating Noncompliance: Abstention Versus Predation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/3 (April 2012), 356 and 360.
30 Helfer, ‘Terminating Treaties’; and Daniel H. Joyner, ‘What If Iran Withdraws from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?’, ESIL Reflections 1/5 (Dec. 2012).
31 Ian Bellany, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Inequality of States’, Political Studies 25/4 (Dec. 1977), 594–8; Joseph S. Nye, ‘NPT: The Logic of Inequality’, Foreign Policy No. 59 (July 1985), 123–31; Lawrence Scheinman, ‘Does the NPT Matter?’, in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley (eds), Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime (New York: Plenum 1990), 53–64; Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2007); Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Examining the Linkage Argument’, International Security 37/3 (Dec. 2012), 93.
32 See Joseph S. Nye, ‘Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime’, International Organization 35/1 (Winter 1981), 31.
33 Tim Geiger, Atlantiker Gegen Gaullisten: Außenpolitischer Konflikt Und Innerparteilicher Machtkampf in Der CDU/CSU 1958–1969 (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2008), 485–95; and Leopoldo Nuti, ‘Negotiating with the Enemy and Having Problems with the Allies: The Impact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on Transatlantic Relations’, in Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou, and Basil Germond (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security, (New York: Routledge 2010), 97.
34 Douglas Selvage, The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation 1963–1965, Working Paper, Cold War International History Project (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2001).
35 Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 229–45.
36 Eliza Gheorghe, ‘Atomic Maverick: Romania’s Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970’, Cold War History 13/3 (April 2013), 373–92; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’, Diplomatic History 29/1 (Jan. 2005), 149–77.
37 Murat Laumulin, ‘Nuclear Politics and the Future Security of Kazakhstan’, Nonproliferation Review 1/2 (Winter 1994), 61–5.
38 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press 1989); and Maria Rost Rublee, ‘Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness’, International Studies Review 10/3 (Sept. 2008), 420–50.
39 Hedley Bull, ‘Rethinking Non-Proliferation’, International Affairs 51/2 (April 1975), 175–89; Richard K. Betts, ‘Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited’ in Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds), The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results) (London: Frank Cass 1993), 101.
40 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (New York: Brookings Institution Press 1987); and Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail’, International Organization 67/1 (Jan. 2013), 173–95.
41 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1991); Jeffrey W. Knopf (ed.), Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford UP 2012).
42 Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1946); Charles L. Glaser, ‘The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament’, Survival 40/1 (Spring 1998), 112–28; Stephen van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1999), 240–54.
43 Müller, ‘Between Power and Justice’, 196; Andrew Grotto, ‘Why Do States That Oppose Nuclear Proliferation Resist New Nonproliferation Obligations: Three Logics of Nonproliferation Decision-Making’, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 18/1 (Winter 2010), 1–44; Jeffrey R. Fields (ed.), State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Atlanta: Univ. of Georgia Press forthcoming 2014).
44 Nina Tannenwald, ‘Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Ethics & International Affairs 27/3 (Fall 2013), 299–317; Kristen R. Monroe, Adam Martin, and Priyanka Ghosh, ‘Politics and an Innate Moral Sense: Scientific Evidence for an Old Theory?’, Political Research Quarterly 62/3 (Sept. 2009), 614–34; Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, ‘The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, Nonproliferation Review 13/2 (July 2006), 227–52; Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2001), 181–214.
45 Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, ‘Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade’, International Organization 53/4 (Autumn 1999), 631–68.
46 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, ‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International Studies Quarterly 40/4 (Dec. 1996), 451–78; Joshua William Busby, ‘Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly 51/2 (June 2007), 247–75.
47 Thanks are due to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this caveat.
48 Jana von Stein, ‘The Engines of Compliance’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2012), 477–501.
49 Raymond L. Garthoff (ed.), The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Brookings Institution Press 1994).
50 Thomas Graham, Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press 2002); Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, ‘After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime’, Nonproliferation Review 3/1 (Fall 1995), 28–42; Susan B. Welsh, ‘Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference’, Nonproliferation Review 2/3 (Spring 1995), 1–24; John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, ‘The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995’, International Security 19/1 (Summer 1994), 41–71.
51 Lewis A. Dunn, ‘High Noon for the NPT’, Arms Control Today 25/6 (July 1995).
52 Miguel Marin Bosch, ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Future’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: CUP 1999), 375–89.
53 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy no. 2 (Spring 1971), 161–82; Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliances in a Unipolar World’, World Politics 61/1 (Jan. 2009), 86–120.
54 Yvonne Yew, ‘Diplomacy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Navigating the Non-Aligned Movement’, Harvard Kennedy School Discussion Paper (June 2011).
55 Knopf, ‘Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation’, 115; and Betts, ‘Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited’, 101.
56 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and William C. Potter, Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement (London: Routledge 2012).
57 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52/4 (Autumn 1998), 887–917; Daniel Deudney, ‘Unipolarity and Nuclear Weapons’, in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth (eds), International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: CUP 2011); and Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, ‘Logic of Zero - Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons’, Foreign Affairs 87/6 (Nov. 2008), 80–95.
58 Liviu Horovitz, ‘Why Do They Want American Nukes: Central and Eastern European Positions Regarding US Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons’, European Security 23/1 (Feb. 2014), 73–89.
59 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1971), 479.
60 Agreements do get reinterpreted and minor concessions can become important in subsequent framing. See Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton UP 2001). Thus, some states might currently assign higher value to their NPT ratification. However, this still raises the question what these states would be willing to sacrifice now that they were unwilling to give up in the past.
61 For the theoretical background, Iver B. Neumann and Erik F. Øverland, ‘International Relations and Policy Planning: The Method of Perspectivist Scenario Building’, International Studies Perspectives 5/3 (2004), 258–77.
62 Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, Annual Review of Political Science 14 (June 2011), 225–44.
63 Mitchell B. Reiss, ‘The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States’, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2004), 3–5.
64 William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay’, International Security 33/1 (Summer 2008), 139–69.
65 Nicholas L. Miller, ‘Nuclear Dominos: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?’ Security Studies 23/1 (March 2014), 33–73.
66 Coe and Vaynman, ‘Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’.
67 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP 2010).
68 See the contributions by Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Jim Walsh, Ibrahim al-Marashi and Jessica Varnum in the above mentioned volume. Also, Shashank Joshi and Michael Stephens, ‘An Uncertain Future: Regional Responses to Iran’s Nuclear Programme’, Whitehall Report 4 (London: Royal United Services Institute Dec. 2013).
69 Contributions by Etel Solingen, Scott Snyder, Monte Bullard, and Jong-dong Yuan in the above volume. Thanks are also due to an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions.
70 Roger K. Smith, ‘Opaque Proliferation and the Fate of the Non‐Proliferation Regime’, Journal of Strategic Studies 13/3 (May 1990), 96–8; Laura Rockwood, ‘The IAEA’s Strengthened Safeguards System’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7/1 (June 2002), 123–36.
71 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W.W. Norton 1978), 91–110; Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action (Cambridge: CUP 1993); and David A. Siegel, ‘Social Networks and Collective Action’, American Journal of Political Science 53/1 (Jan. 2009), 122–38.
72 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP 1983).
73 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993), 44–79; Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security 17/4 (April 1993), 5–51; or Benjamin Frankel, ‘The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, Security Studies 2/3–4 (1993), 37–78.
74 Barry R. Posen, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security 28/1 (Summer 2003), 5–46.
75 Michael Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge will Endure’, International Security 36/3 (Dec. 2011), 41–78; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?’, International Security 37/4 (April 2013), 7–48.
76 Robert A. Pape, ‘Soft Balancing Against the United States’, International Security 30/1 (Summer 2005), 7–45; Kai He, ‘Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War’, Security Studies 21/2 (2012), 154–91.
77 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton UP 2008).
78 Steven E. Miller, ‘Proliferation, Disarmament and the Future of the Non-proliferation Treaty’, in Sverre Lodgaard and Bremer Maerli (eds), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security (London: Routledge 2007), 50–69.
79 For the raw data, see Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (2013).
80 Davis, ‘The Realist Nuclear Regime’, 94.
81 Nye, ‘Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime’, 16.
82 Alexander Thompson, ‘Coercive Enforcement of International Law’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: CUP 2012), 502–23.
83 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2012).
84 Matthew Kroenig, ‘Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy’, Security Studies 23/1 (March 2014), 1–32.
85 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989); Robert J. Art, ‘A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, International Security 15/4 (Spring 1991), 5–53; also Francis J. Gavin, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation During the Cold War’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2 (Cambridge UP 2012), 395–416.
86 Barry R. Posen, ‘US Security Policy in a Nuclear‐armed World or: What If Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons?’, Security Studies 6/3 (Spring 1997), 1–31; Michael Horowitz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?’,Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (Jan. 2009), 234–57.
87 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton 2013).
88 Matthew Kroenig, ‘Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation’, Managing the Atom Working Paper Series (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Nov. 2009).
89 William C. Potter, ‘The NPT and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint’, Daedalus 139/1 (Jan. 2010), 68–81.
90 Jim Walsh, Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-Proliferation (Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 2005), 38–47; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance,’ International Organization 47/2 (Spring 1993) 175–205.
91 Thayer, ‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, 507.
92 Barry R. Posen, ‘Pull Back,’ Foreign Affairs 92/1 (Feb. 2013), 116–28.
93 Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment’, International Security 37/3 (Dec. 2012), 7–51; Zachary Selden, ‘Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony’, Security Studies 22/2 (2013), 330–64.
94 Robert Jervis, ‘International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?’, International Security 17/4 (April 1993), 52–67; Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think)’, International Security 38/1 (July 2013), 52–79.
95 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home, America’.
96 Posen, ‘Pull Back’.
97 Nuno P. Monteiro, ‘Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful’, International Security 36/3 (Winter 2011), 9–40; Kroenig, ‘Force or Friendship?’
98 Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?’, International Studies Quarterly 40/2 (June 1996), 209–33.
99 Patricia M. Lewis, ‘A Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons: Possible, Probable or Pipe-dream?’, International Affairs 89/2 (March 2013), 433–50.
100 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘Rough Seas Ahead: Issues for the 2015 NPT Review Conference’, Arms Control Today 44/3 (April 2014), 20–6.
101 Campbell Craig, ‘American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution’, Review of International Studies 35/1 (Jan. 2009), 27–44; Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, ‘The Nonproliferation Complex’, Ethics & International Affairs 27/3 (Fall 2013), 329–48.
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Liviu Horovitz
Liviu Horovitz is a PhD candidate at the ETH Zurich. Prior to his PhD studies, he held a research position within the nuclear-policy working group at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, was a consultant for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna, and worked as a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey. His research has been printed, for example, in European Security, The Washington Quarterly, The Nonproliferation Review, The International Spectator, The RUSI Journal, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.