Red Teaming the Rebalance: The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy

ABSTRACT

What specific forms of reasoning underlie the US approach to Asia, what downside risks do they imply, and to what extent can they be mitigated? This article examines the theoretical underpinnings of the US “rebalance” to Asia by categorizing US policies according to three types of logic: military power; economic liberalism; and institutionalism. It then uses international relations theory as a diagnostic tool to assess risks in these approaches. Recent efforts toward improving transparency in contested maritime areas and capacity-building of local allies and partners may address the strategy’s most acute risks, while inevitably generating more in the process.

KEYWORDS:

• Rebalance
• Strategy
• Risk
• Asia
• International Relations Theory
• Uncertainty
• Trends

Notes

¹ Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Ch. 4: How Asians View Each Other,” in Global Opposition to US Surveillance and Drones but Limited Harm to America’s Image (Washington DC: Pew Research Center 2014), 37–41.

² Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 14/3 (2014), 331–56; Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32/3 (2007/8), 113–57.

³ US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington: US GPO 2013).

⁴ Van Jackson, “The Rise and Persistence of Strategic Hedging across Asia: A System-Level Analysis,” in Ashley Tellis, Abraham Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (eds), Strategic Asia 2014–15: U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research 2014), 316–42; Richard Bitzinger, “Military Modernization in Asia,” in Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal (eds), Strategy in Asia: Past, Present, and Future (Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press 2014), 162–84.

⁵ Egle Murauskaite, “North Korea’s cyber capabilities: deterrence and stability in a changing strategic environment,” 38 North, 12 September 2014, <http://38north.org/2014/09/emurauskaite091214/>.

⁶ Van Jackson, Drone Warfare on the Korean Peninsula: Paradigm Shift or Paradigm Risk? (Washington: Korea Economic Institute of America 2015).

⁷ US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Washington: US GPO 2013).

⁸ Obama administration officials claim the rebalance to Asia began in 2009, even though no mention of it occurred until 2011. See Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, Explaining the U.S. “Pivot” to Asia (London: Chatham House 2013); Evan Medeiros, keynote speech at the Strategic Asia 2014–15 book release event, National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, 2 December 2014.

⁹ The rebalance as a strategy reflects continuity with and an extension of the Bush administration’s approach to Asia. See Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, Timothy J.A. Adamson, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Deepa Ollapally, Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia–Pacific Stability (Washington: George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs and Sigur Center for Asian Studies 2013).

¹⁰ Hillary R. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189/1 (2011), <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/Americas-pacific-century/>.

¹¹ US DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for ^21st Century Defense (Washington: US GPO 2012), 2.

¹² Samuel J. Locklear III, “A Combatant Commander”s View on the Asia–Pacific Rebalance: The Patch-Work Quilt,” speech to the Asia Society,New York, 6 December 2012; Herbert Carlisle, “PACAF Strategy in the Asia–Pacific Region,” presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, 5 May 2014; Jonathan Greenert, “The Navy’s Rebalance to Asia: Challenges and Opportunities,” presentation at CSIS, Washington, 15 May 2014.

¹³ Clinton, “America”s Pacific Century.”

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Leon Panetta, “The U.S. Rebalance toward the Asia–Pacific,” remarks delivered at the 11th International Institute of Strategic Studies Asian Security Summit, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 2 June 2012.

¹⁷ Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia–Pacific in 2013,” remarks delivered at the Asia Society, New York, 11 March 2013.

¹⁸ Dennis C. Blair, “Military Power Projection in Asia,” in Ashley Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble (eds), Strategic Asia 2008–9: Challenges and Choices (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research 2008), 390–420.

¹⁹ Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38/4 (2014), 115–59.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Panetta, “The U.S. Rebalance toward the Asia–Pacific.”

²² Chuck Hagel, “Developing a Third, Game-Changing Offset Strategy,” keynote address at the Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance, Newport, RI, 3 September 2014; Robert Work, “A Technological Edge over Our Adversaries,” remarks at the National Defense University, Washington, 5 August 2014.

²³ Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42/3 (1988), 485–507; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15/1 (1990), 5–56.

²⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18/2 (1993), 44–79.

²⁵ Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1970); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), chapter 6.

²⁶ Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century;” Donilon, “The United States and the Asia–Pacific in 2013.”

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference, Beijing, 12 November 2014.

³⁰ Joseph Y. Yun, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, 25 April 2013.

³¹ Donilon, “The United States and the Asia–Pacific in 2013.”

³² Jane Perlez, “U.S. opposing China’s answer to World Bank,” New York Times, 9 October 2014.

³³ White House Office of the Press Secretary, remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Canberra, 17 November 2011.

³⁴ Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”

³⁵ US Department of State, “GIST Initiative Launches Innovation and Entrepreneurship Programs,” media note, Washington, 18 June 2011.

³⁶ Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”

³⁷ Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: Cosimo Classics 2007).

³⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown 1977).

³⁹ Ibid.; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

⁴⁰ Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1994).

⁴¹ Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 99/3 (2005), 463–66.

⁴² Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53/1 (1959), 69–105.

⁴³ Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon 1966); Gary Marks and Larry J. Diamond (eds), Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset (Newbury Park CA: Sage 1992).

⁴⁴ Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Growth in East Asia,” Studies in Comparative International Development 38/4 (2004), 53–81.

⁴⁵ Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32/4 (1988), 379–96.

⁴⁶ Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century;” Medeiros, keynote speech at the Strategic Asia 2014–15 book release event.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Donilon, “The United States and the Asia–Pacific in 2013.”

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Yun, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.

⁵² Andrew Yeo, China, Japan, Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics and Order (Seoul: East Asia Institute 2013).

⁵³ The United States applied for membership of the SCO and was rejected in 2006.

⁵⁴ Nazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, “Welcome to the world without the West,” National Interest, 12 November 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-the-world-without-the-west-11651>.

⁵⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20/1 (1995), 39–51; James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” International Organization 46/3 (1992), 599–632.

⁵⁶ Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.”

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52/4 (1988), 645–85.

⁵⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21/1 (1988), 66–94.

⁶⁰ G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of America’s World Order (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 2012).

⁶¹ Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the International Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984).

⁶² Keohane, After Hegemony; Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory;” Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan.

⁶³ Keohane, After Hegemony.

⁶⁴ Keir Leiber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense–Defense Balance and International Security,” International Security 25/1 (2000), 71–104.

⁶⁵ Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

⁶⁶ Tan, Andrew T.H., The Arms Race in Asia: Trends, Causes, and Consequences (New York: Routledge 2014).

⁶⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36/4 (1984), 461–95.

⁶⁸ Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34/3 (2010), 158–96.

⁶⁹ Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization 69/2 (2015), 473–95; Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US–North Korea Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016).

⁷⁰ White House Office of the Press Secretary, remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Canberra, 17 November 2011.

⁷¹ Yong-soo Kim, “GI pullout harms US national interest,” Korea Herald, 26 September 1978, 5.

⁷² Rebecca C.K. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” Nonproliferation Review 13/3 (2006), 539–53.

⁷³ David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54/1 (1998), 54–60.

⁷⁴ Van Jackson, “Raindrops Keep Falling on My Nuclear Umbrella,” Foreign Policy (2015); Michael Cohen and Andrew O’Neil, “Doubts Down Under: American Extended Deterrence, Australia, and the 1999 East Timor Crisis’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 15/1 (2015), 27–52. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclear-umbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/>.

⁷⁵ Jackson, Rival Reputations, chapter 7; Sang-Woo Rhee, Deterrence and Dialogue: The Korean Peninsula after the Cheonan Incident (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies 2010).

⁷⁶ Parameswaran Ponnudurai, “Will China use Russian-style tactics to settle territorial disputes in Asia?” Radio Free Asia, 20 April 2014, <http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/ukraine04202014053612.html>.

⁷⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Power and Interdependence,” Survival 15/4 (1973), 158–65.

⁷⁸ James Reilly, “China’s Unilateral Sanctions,” Washington Quarterly 35/4 (2012), 121–33.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36/2 (1982), 379–415.

⁸¹ David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).

⁸² Robert A. Manning, “The Asian Paradox: Toward a New Architecture,” World Policy Journal 10/3 (1993), 55–64.

⁸³ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19/3 (1994), 5–49.

⁸⁴ Bhaskar Chakravorti, “China’s new development bank is a wake-up call for Washington,” Harvard Business Review, 20 April 2015, <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington>.

⁸⁵ Subsequently and partly as a consequence of liberal states embracing it, the AIIB now has a higher likelihood of being part of, rather than apart from, the global liberal institutional landscape. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

⁸⁶ Mireya Solis, “The Geopolitical Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: At Stake, a Liberal Economic Order,” Order from Chaos, 13 March 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/13-geopolitical-importance-transpacific-partnership>.

⁸⁷ Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).

⁸⁸ US DoD, Asia–Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense 2015).

⁸⁹ Kristin Lord, The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency (New York: SUNY Press 2007).

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Van Jackson

Van Jackson is an associate professor at the Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, and is the author of the book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US–North Korea Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His research focuses on East Asian security, reputations, historical institutionalism, US foreign policy, and military trends. The views expressed in this article are his own.