The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

ABSTRACT

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.

KEYWORDS:

• Military Adaptation
• Learning Organisations
• Counter-Insurgency
• Norwegian Army
• ISAF

Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my thanks to the reviewers of this journal and my colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Defence studies, in particular Lene Ekhaugen, Elin Gustavsen, Sven Holtsmark, Ida Oma, Kristine Offerdal, Rolf Tamnes, and Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer at the University of Oslo, whose comments helped me expand and clarify my arguments. The work on this article was supported by funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

Disclosure Statement

I have no financial interests or benefits from the application of this research.

Notes

¹ Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, speech given at Oslo Militære Samfund, 26 November 2007, <http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/oms_arkiv/2007/2007-11-26%20Forsvarssjefen.html>.

² Archives of the Norwegian Armed Forces (ANAF), FERDABALL (electronic lessons-learned database), PRT XVIII, undated.

³ Stephen Grey, ‘Cracking on in Helmand’, Prospect Magazine, 27 August 2009, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/cracking-on-in-helmand>. See also Anthony King, ‘Why we are getting it wrong in Afghanistan’, Prospect Magazine, 9 September 2009, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/getting-it-wrong-in-afghanistan>.

⁴ Todd Greentree, ‘Bureacracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimensions of Strategy in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/3 (2013), 338.

⁵ Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (2006), 905–34.

⁶ For an excellent overview of the most recent developments in military innovation literature, see Nina A. Kollars, ‘War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 529–33.

⁷ Some significant contributions to the debate are James A. Russell, ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 595–624; Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010), 311–32; Raphael D. Marcus, ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/4 (2015), 500–28; Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2014), 30–64; Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 513–39; Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin, and Helen McCartney, ‘“Transformation in Contact”: Learning the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 253–70.

⁸ Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 569.

⁹ Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 31.

¹⁰ Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs 87/2 (2011), 271–96.

¹¹ Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 579.

¹² King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign’, 330.

¹³ Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan’.

¹⁴ Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 31–32.

¹⁵ Ibid., 59.

¹⁶ Daniel A. Levinthal and James G. March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, Strategic Management Journal 14 (Winter 1993), 96.

¹⁷ Barbara Levitt and James G. March, ‘Organizational Learning’, Annual Review of Sociology 14/3 (1988), 319–40.

¹⁸ Berndt Bremer, ‘In One Word: Not from Experience’, Acta Psychologica 45/1–3 (1980), 223–41.

¹⁹ Levinthal and March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, 101.

²⁰ Linda Argote, Organisational Learning: Creating, Retaining and Transferring Knowledge (New York: Springer 2013), 31–32.

²¹ Levinthal and March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, 97.

²² Linda Argote and Ella Miron-Spektor, ‘Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge’, Organizational Science 22/5 (2011), 1131.

²³ The article has been declassified by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. No changes were made in the original manuscript.

²⁴ Ida Marie Oma, ‘Small States and Burden-Sharing in Allied Operations Abroad. The Case of Norway in ISAF’, PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 2015, 90.

²⁵ Roy Andersen, Fra Grøtavær til Ghormach. Kystjegerkommandoen (Lysaker: Dinamo 2011), 162–71.

²⁶ See Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012’, International Affairs 89/4 (2013), 845–79.

²⁷ ANAF, TRADOK/Seksjon for militære erfaringer [Division for military experiences], Operasjon Harekate Yolo II (undated).

²⁸ ANAF, Operasjon Haretake Yolo II.

²⁹ ANAF/FERDABALL, 2 (NOR) BN/QRF ISAF XII – Erfaringsrapport ved kontingentslutt (D+180) (undated).

³⁰ ANAF/FERDABALL, Operasjon Haretake Yolo II.

³¹ ANAF/FERDABALL, OMLT 4 SAF XII, Kontingentrapport – Erfaringsrapport (undated); Emil Johansen, Brødre i blodet: i krig for Norge (Oslo: Kagge 2012).

³² ANAF/FERDABALL, Erfaringsrapport TMBN (NOR)/QRF 5/ISAF XII (undated); [ANAF/FERDABALL] TMBN (NOR)/QRF 5/ISAF XIII, Erfaringsrapport etter operasjon Karez i Nord Afghanistan, 1 June 2008.

³³ ANAF/FERDABALL, ISAF XII PRT 11, D180 – Erfaringsrapport (undated).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ ANAF/FERDABALL, ISAF 2009, PRT 12 (D+180) (undated).

³⁶ Author’s interview with Brigader Ivar Knotten, Commander PRT 12, 7 May 2015.

³⁷ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 12; Brig. Knotten, May 2015.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Brig. Knotten, May 2015.

⁴⁰ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 12.

⁴¹ Author present at lessons-learned seminar on Operation Tufan by Hærens våpenskole, Sessvollmoen camp, 13 March 2011.

⁴² ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 12.

⁴³ ANAF/FERDABALL, Norwegian Kandak Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 1 (NOR KDK OMLT 1) (29 June 2009).

⁴⁴ Author’s interview with Lt Col. Svend Arne Hokstad, Commander NOR KDK OMLT 1. Large parts of the wheat crop in Ghowrmach were accidently set on fire during the fighting in Operation Tufan (Svend Arne Hokstad, ‘Erfaringer med utvikling, oppsetting og gjennomføring av Norges første Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) for den Afghanske hæren på bataljonsnivå’, lecture, 15 February 2010, <http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/oms_arkiv/2010/2010-02-15_Hokstad.html>).

⁴⁵ Brig. Knotten, May 2015.

⁴⁶ NATO/ISAF, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 2009, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf>. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a strategy paper in June 2009, emphasising the need for a comprehensive approach. It also stated that the military operation should focus increasingly on training and mentoring of ANSF. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Strategi forhelhetlig norsk sivil og militær innsats i Faryab-provinsen i Afghanistan’, June 2009, <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/sikkerhetspol/faryab_strategi0906.pdf>.

⁴⁷ ANAF/FERDABALL, D+180 rapport PRT XIII (26 November 2009).

⁴⁸ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 13.

⁴⁹ Author’s interview with Col. Ivar Omsted, Commander PRT 13, 16 April 2015.

⁵⁰ Col. Omsted, April 2015.

⁵¹ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 14.

⁵² Marianne Johansen, Gunn Kari Hegvik, Rune Thomas Ege, and Mats Andersen, ‘Mener å være i kamp er bedre enn sex’, Verdens Gang, 27 September 2010, p. 6–7; Gunn Kari Hegvik, Rune Thomas Ege, and Mats Andersen, ‘Slik poserer majoren. – Forsvarssjefen: -Dette er bare trist’, Verdens Gang, 28 September 2010, p. 6–7.

⁵³ Author’s interview with Col. Rune Solberg, Commander PRT 15, 13 June 2015.

⁵⁴ Henning Mella, For konge og fedreland: 150 dager i Afghanistan (Oslo: Kagge 2013), 181.

⁵⁵ ANAF/FERDABALL, D+180 – erfaringsrapport for PRT 15 (undated).

⁵⁶ Rune Solberg, June 2015; Erik Elden, Krig og kjærlighet (Oslo: Kagge 2012).

⁵⁷ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 14.

⁵⁸ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 15.

⁵⁹ Interviews conducted in PRT 14 in April 2010. Raphael S. Cohen’s examination of polling data from Iraq suggests that there is some merit to this: it was only after the insurgency was defeated, and the population felt secure, that it was possible for the counterinsurgents to win hearts and minds (‘Just How Important Are “Hearts and Minds” Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/4 (2014), 609–36).

⁶⁰ PRT 15, interview with Commander PRT 15.

⁶¹ Brig. Knotten, 2015, ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 14,

⁶² ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 14.

⁶³ Brig. Knotten, 2015.

⁶⁴ Mella, For konge og fedreland; Col. Solberg 2015; author’s interview with Col. Gerhard Larsen, Meymaneh, April 2010.

⁶⁵ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 14.

⁶⁶ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 15.

⁶⁷ ANAF/FERDABALL, D+180 – erfaringsrapport (PRT 16).

⁶⁸ Author’s interview with Col. Fred Arne Jacobsen, Commander PRT 16, 20 April 2015.

⁶⁹ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 16.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 17: D+180 – Erfaringsrapport (undated).

⁷² ANAF/FERDABALL, ibid.

⁷³ ANAF/FERDABALL, PRT 18.

⁷⁴ Argote, ‘Organizational Learning’, 37.

⁷⁵ FOH (Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter) is the abbreviation used for Norwegian Joint Headquarters, which has operational command of all military activity in Norway and command of Norwegian military personnel abroad.

⁷⁶ Argote, ‘Organizational Learning’.

⁷⁷ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen also found that the adapation process in the Danish battalion in Helmand was characterised by limited autonomy, describing their adapation process as ‘second order adapation’ (‘The Military Metier: Second Order Adapation and the Danish Experience in Task Force Helmand’, in Theo Farrell, Francis Osinga, and James A. Russell [eds], Military Adaptation in Afghanistan [Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2013], 136–58). The Danish forces primarily adapted to changes initiated by the much larger British Task Force Helmand. The German command in RC North (see for instance Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe, ‘Mission Command without a Mission: Geman Military Adaptation in Afghanistan’, in Theo Farrell, Francis Osinga, and James A. Russell [eds], Military Adaptation in Afghanistan [Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2013], 192–218) never obtained such a leading role in relation to the Norwegian PRT. Furthermore, cooperation and negotiations with Afghan civilian and military partners, a significant feature of the Norwegian adapation process, has received scant attention in the military adapation/innovation litterature.

⁷⁸ Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan’, 48. The same observation is made in Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 583.

⁷⁹ David Ucko, ‘Beyond Clear–Hold–Build: Rethinking Local-Level Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan’, Journal of Contemporary Security Policy 34/3 (2013), 572. See also David Ucko, ‘The Five Fallacies of Clear-Hold-Build’, The RUSI Journal 158/3 (2013), 54–61.

⁸⁰ Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘Still Homeland Defenders at Heart? Norwegian Military Culture in International Deployments’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 17/4 (2010), 539–53.

⁸¹ King, ‘Understanding the Helmand campaign’.

⁸² Elden, ‘I krig og kjærlighet’; Johansen, ‘Brødre i blodet’; Mella, ‘For konge og fedreland’.

⁸³ Author interview with Col. Fred Arne Jacobsen, Commander PRT 16.

⁸⁴ Some reports, such as those of PRT 15 and PRT 18, mention needing better-skilled personnel in order to conduct information operations, which are of course non-kinetic.

⁸⁵ When the Norwegian forces withdrew from Meymaneh, the Norwegian Chief of Defence was quoted declaring ‘Mission accomplished’ by a major Norwegian news paper - a statement that seemed strikingly at odds with the deteriorating security situation on the ground at the time. (Sveinung Berg Bentzrød, ‘Mission accomplished’, Aftenposten, 11 September 2012, p. 12).

⁸⁶ Chaudhuri and Farrell, ‘Campaign Disconnect’.

⁸⁷ Author’s interview with Col. Torger Gillebo, Commander PRT 18.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the The Norwegian Ministry of Defense.

Notes on contributors

Torunn Laugen Haaland

Torunn Laugen Haaland is Head of Research at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo and an assistant professor at the Norwegian Armed Forces University College. Email: [email protected]