The view from somewhere: lessons from the intelligence failure in Iran

ABSTRACT

Why do intelligence estimates sometimes fail to prepare policymakers for change? Some explanations suggest the fault lies with insufficient data collection, weak analysis, or unreceptive audiences. But while more data and better analysis would always be welcome, they may not materially reduce uncertainty; and explanations centering on the intelligence-policymaker relationship offer no systematic critique of the orthodoxy that keeps intelligence and policymakers at arm’s length. This paper argues that some cases of estimative failure – including the case of the 1979 Iranian revolution – are the result of a flawed orthodoxy of intelligence-policymaker relations, which overlooks the policymaker’s actual and potential impact on the target. In contrast, this paper introduces the concept of “the view from somewhere”, which places the customer’s policy and preferences at the center of the intelligence problem. In the Iran case, estimates adopting the view from somewhere could have warned Washington of critical decision points while it still had leverage to act, explained how US policy had inadvertently shaped the Shah’s ineffectual response to unrest, and assessed opportunities for effective policy alternatives.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Stephen Marrin, several members of the Australian intelligence community, as well as participants of roundtables at the RAND Corporation and the 2018 International Studies Association conference, and three extremely constructive anonymous reviewers, for invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. Estimative intelligence usually seeks to understand unbounded complex “mysteries,” as distinct from the “puzzles” that compromise most other intelligence functions, such as: current intelligence, which seeks to interpret the significance of recent events; foundational intelligence, which seeks to build encyclopedic knowledge of a target; or scientific and technical intelligence, which seeks to understand the parameters and performance of target technologies.

^2. In this paper I use estimative intelligence as a generic intelligence function, of which U.S. National Intelligence Estimates are only one example. See Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, especially pp67-88.

^3. Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane.”

^4. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

^5. Donovan, “National Intelligence.”

^6. There is a prodigious literature on the underlying causes of intelligence failure, covering factors ranging from institutional structure, to organizational culture, to cognitive biases. See, for example: Zegart, Flawed by Design; Zegart, Spying Blind; Knorr, “Failures”; Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision”; Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment.

^7. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, and Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy.

^8. For example, Davis, “Facts, Findings”. A rare exception is Kerbel and Olcott, “Synthesizing with Clients.”

^9. Nagel, View from Nowhere.

^10. Sick, All Fall Down, p90.

^11. Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran.”

^12. Connelly et. al., “New Evidence and New Methods.”

^13. Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane.”

^14. Dina Rezk, although not analyzing the Iran case, makes a broader argument about western intelligence agencies’ cultural blindness of the Middle East – see Rezk, Arab World and Western Intelligence.

^15. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, and Cancian, Coping with Surprise.

^16. McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence.”

^17. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack.

^18. Nakashima and Warrick, “Collect it all.”

^19. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle.”

^20. Symon and Tarapore, “Defense Intelligence Analysis.”.

^21. Frank, “Computational Social Science.”

^22. Anderson, “End of Theory.”

^23. Rogers, “Cambridge Analytica Data Apocalypse.”

^24. Friedman and Zeckhauser, “Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence.”

^25. Jervis, System Effects.

^26. Blankshain and Stigler, “Applying Method to Madness.”

^27. Donovan, “National Intelligence,” pp143-45, Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran,” pp462-64.

^28. Donovan, “National Intelligence.”

^29. Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran,” pp458-59.

^30. For an overview, see Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, pp.21-36.

^31. Kendall, “Function of Intelligence,” p550.

^32. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, pp49-52.

^33. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

^34. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p152.

^35. CIA, “Tradecraft Primer.”

^36. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, pp110-111.

^37. Artner et. al., “Assessing the Value.”

^38. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p3. Emphasis added.

^39. In the Iraq case at least, policymakers would have been unlikely to heed that caution – they had too much invested in their policy settings and were reluctant to change course, regardless of the intelligence advice they received. See Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, especially pp13-68.

^40. Marrin, “Why intelligence analysis has limited influence.”

^41. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p155.

^42. Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran,” p460.

^43. Sick, All Fall Down, pp41-42.

^44. See, for example, Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, and Rovner, Fixing the Facts.

^45. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence.”

^46. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, pp66-103.

^47. Marrin, “At Arm’s Length,” and Betts, Enemies of Intelligence.

^48. Kent, Strategic Intelligence.

^49. Kent, “Estimates and Influence.”

^50. Kendall, “Function of Intelligence.”

^51. Davis, “Kent-Kendall Debate.” Another framing of debates over proximity counter-poses Kent with Robert Gates, who advocated for more “actionable” intelligence. This more modest and pragmatic call for intelligence-policymaker closeness was more often realized in the US intelligence community; although it was still considered unorthodox and elicited robust bureaucratic resistance. See Westerfield, “Inside ivory bunkers.”

^52. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, pp186-201.

^53. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, pp97-98, Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp121-74.

^54. McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence.”

^55. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy.

^56. Rovner, Fixing the Facts; Faini, Spies and their Masters.

^57. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, Hastedt, “”Politics of Intelligence,” and Gookins, “Role of Intelligence.”

^58. Rover, Fixing the Facts.

^59. Rubin, “Temptation of Intelligence Politicization.”

^60. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence. p81.

^61. Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?”.

^62. Woodard, “Tasting the Forbidden Fruit.”

^63. Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy.

^64. Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment,” p646.

^65. Faini, Spies and their Masters; Bar-Joseph, “Politicization of Intelligence.”

^66. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p203.

^67. Fournier, “Why Putin Plays our Presidents for Fools.”

^68. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp.96-120.

^69. Marrin, “Why intelligence analysis has limited influence.”

^70. Lowenthal, “Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship,” pp440-41.

^71. Davis, “Challenge of Opportunity Analysis.”

^72. Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, p32.

^73. Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment.”

^74. Quoted in Westerfield, “Inside Ivory Bunkers,” p27.

^75. Nagel, View from Nowhere.

^76. Nagel, View from Nowhere, p6. Nagel goes on to say “But since we are who we are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely.” That is, pure objectivity is asymptotic, unachievable – but still a worthy aspiration.

^77. Kendall, “Function of Intelligence,” p549.

^78. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p180. Emphasis added.

^79. Mahnken (ed.), Net Assessment and Military Strategy.

^80. Treverton and Miles, Unheeded Warning of War.

^81. Miller, “Lessons for Intelligence Support.”

^82. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, p78.

^83. Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment.”

^84. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, pp68, 77.

^85. Marrin, “At Arm’s Length or At the Elbow?”.

^86. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p182.

^87. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence,” pp66-68.

^88. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p193.

^89. CIA, “Notes from the Director.”

^90. Takeyh, “Did the US Intelligence Community Lose Iran?”.

^91. For background on the US policy debate during the crisis, see Bill, Eagle and the Lion, Bayandor, The Shah, Emery, US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution, and Sexton, Wages of Principle and Power, pp308-53.

^92. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp69-75.

^93. Sick, All Fall Down, p42.

^94. Quoted in Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p144.

^95. Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane,” p729.

^96. James Bill, quoted in Bill, Eagle and Lion, p245.

^97. Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p147.

^98. Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran,” p461.

^99. Quoted in Guerrero, Carter Administration, p93.

^100. Bill, Eagle and Lion, pp257-58.

^101. Bill, Eagle and Lion, p258.

^102. Sick, All Fall Down, p4.

^103. INR report dated 2 November 1978, quoted in Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p150.

^104. Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p150.

^105. Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p152.

^106. This claim was made by Klaus Knorr, an academic consultant to CIA. But his views were echoed by senior CIA officials, who stressed that the outcome was not inevitable, or that intelligence could have better informed policy decisions. See Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp113-17.

^107. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p180.

^108. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, p81.

^109. For example, the 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 largely due to international pressure, and a mix of such pressure and inducements could prolong the halt. National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.

^110. Bill, Eagle and Lion, p234, and Sexton, Wages of Principle and Power, p326.

^111. Donovan, “National Intelligence,” pp145-46.

^112. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp30, 72. James Bill notes that the regime’s response was in fact extremely deadly – see Eagle and Lion, pp236-37. But it was still ineffective.

^113. CIA, “Drfat Iran NIE,” pp7-8.

^114. As recalled by the former National Intelligence Officer for the region, David Blee, quoted in Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p112.

^115. Quoted in Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p160.

^116. Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash.”

^117. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p107.

^118. INR report dated 2 November 1978, quoted in Donovan, “National Intelligence,” p150.

^119. “Iran NIE.”

^120. These recommendations were made by former Under Secretary of State George Ball – see Donovan, “National Intelligence,” pp156-57.

^121. Marrin, “Limited influence,” pp730-31.

^122. Daugherty, “Intelligence Failure in Iran,” p468-69.

^123. Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, p183.