The view from somewhere: lessons from the intelligence failure in Iran

Bibliography

• Anderson, C. “The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete.” Wired (2008). Accessed July 17, 2022. https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/.
   Google Scholar
• Artner, S., R. S. Girven, and J. B. Bruce. “Assessing the Value of Structured Analytic Techniques in the Intelligence Community,” RAND Corporation, 2016. Accessed July 17, 2022, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1408.html.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 5 (2013a): 718–742. doi:10.1080/01402390.2012.742009.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “The Politicization of Intelligence: A Comparative Study.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26, no. 2 (2013b): 347–369. doi:10.1080/08850607.2013.758000.
   Google Scholar
• Bayandor, D. The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
   Google Scholar
• Betts, R. K. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable.” World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978): 61–89. doi:10.2307/2009967.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Betts, R. K. “Politicization of Intelligence Costs and Benefits.” In Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, edited by R.K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken, 70–89. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
   Google Scholar
• Betts, R. K. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
   Google Scholar
• Bill, J. A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
   Google Scholar
• Blankshain, J. D., and A. Stigler. “Applying Method to Madness: A User’s Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis.” Summer. Texas National Security Review 3, no. 3 (2020): 76–89.
   Google Scholar
• Cancian, M. F. Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018.
   Google Scholar
• Central Intelligence Agency. “Draft Iran NIE,” c. September 1978, available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18201-national-security-archive-doc-06-central.
   Google Scholar
• Central Intelligence Agency. “Notes from the Director .” No. 39, 7 February 1979, CREST, CIA-RDP05S00620R000601400023-6. Accessed July 17, 2022. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp05s00620r000601400023-6.
   Google Scholar
• Central Intelligence Agency. “A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis.” March 2009, available at: https://www.cia.gov/static/955180a45afe3f5013772c313b16face/Tradecraft-Primer-apr09.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Commonwealth of Australia. 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, June 2017, available at: https://pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/2017-Independent-Intelligence-Review.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Dahl, E. J. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Daugherty, W. J. “Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 4 (2001): 449–484. doi:10.1080/08850600152617119.
   Google Scholar
• Davis, J. “The Challenge of Opportunity Analysis: An Intelligence Monograph.” Center for the Study of Intelligence, July (1992a): 92–003U.
   Google Scholar
• Davis, J. “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949.” Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992b): 91–103.
   Google Scholar
• Davis, J. “Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortune-telling.” Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 3 (1995): 25–30.
   Google Scholar
• Donovan, M. “National Intelligence and the Iran Revolution.” Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (1997): 143–163. doi:10.1080/02684529708432403.
   Google Scholar
• Emery, C. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Et. Al, C., R. Hicks, R. Jervis, and A. Spirling. “New Evidence and New Methods for Analyzing the Iranian Revolution as an Intelligence Failure.” Intelligence and National Security 36, no. 6 (2021): 781–806. doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1946959.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Faini, M. Spies and their Masters: Intelligence-Policy Relations in Democratic Countries. PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Fingar, T. Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security. Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Fournier, R. “Why Putin Plays our Presidents for Fools.” The Atlantic (2014). AccessedJuly 17, 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/why-putin-plays-our-presidents-for-fools/461055/.
   Google Scholar
• Frank, A. “Computational Social Science and Intelligence Analysis.” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 5 (2017): 579–599. doi:10.1080/02684527.2017.1310968.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman, J. A., and R. Zeckhauser. “Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 6, December (2012): 824–847. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.708275.
   Google Scholar
• Gookins. “The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2008): 65–73.
   Google Scholar
• Grabo, C. M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002.
   Google Scholar
• Guerrero, J. G. The Carter Administration and the Fall of Iran’s Pahlavi Dynasty: U.S.-Iran Relations on the Brink of the 1979 Revolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
   Google Scholar
• Hastedt, G. “The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience.” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 5–31. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749062.
   Google Scholar
• Hulnick, A. S. “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle.” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–979. doi:10.1080/02684520601046291.
   Google Scholar
• Jervis, R. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
   Google Scholar
• Jervis, R. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010a.
   Google Scholar
• Jervis, R. “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash.” Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 2 (2010b): 185–204. Summer. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2010.tb00672.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kendall, W. “The Function of Intelligence.” World Politics 1, no. 4, July (1949): 542–552. doi:10.2307/2008837.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kent, S. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1949), 1966.
   Google Scholar
• Kent, S. “Estimates and Influence.” Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (1968). Summer. Accessed July 17, 2022. https://www.cia.gov/static/8ec70f79adc993822d94987612151fe5/estimates-and-influence.pdf.
   Google Scholar
• Kerbel, J., and A. Olcott. “Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers.” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 4 (December, 2010): 11–27.
   Google Scholar
• Knorr, K. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis.” World Politics 16, no. 3 (1964): 455–467. doi:10.2307/2009582.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lowenthal, M. M. “The Policymaker-Intelligence Relationship.” In The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 437–451. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
   Google Scholar
• Net Assessment and Military Strategy: Retrospective and Prospective Essays. edited by T. G. Mahnken, New York: Cambria Press, 2020.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. “At Arm’s Length or At the Elbow? Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (2007): 401–414. doi:10.1080/08850600701249733.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. “Intelligence analysis and decision-making: Methodological challenges.” In Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, edited by Peter Gill, S. Marrin, and M. Phythian, 131–150. London: Routledge, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S., and P. H. J. Davies. “National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968-80: An American Experiment in a British Style of Analysis?.” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 5 (2009): 644–673. doi:10.1080/02684520903209407.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. “Why intelligence analysis has limited influence on American foreign policy.” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 6 (2017): 725–742. doi:10.1080/02684527.2016.1275139.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McConnell, M. “Overhauling Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 ( July/August, 2007): 49–58.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, P. D. “Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking during Crises.” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (2010), June.
   Google Scholar
• Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
   Google Scholar
• Nakashima, E., and J. Warrick. “For NSA chief, terrorist threat drives passion to ‘collect it all’.” Washington Post (14 July 2013).
   Google Scholar
• National Intelligence Council. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 2007, available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Pillar, P. R. Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Rezk, D. The Arab World and Western Intelligence: Analysing the Middle East, 1956-1981. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017.
   Google Scholar
• Rovner, J. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.
   Google Scholar
• Rovner, J. “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?.” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 55–67. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749065.
   Google Scholar
• Rubin, M. “The Temptation of Intelligence Politicization to Support Diplomacy.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 29, no. 1 (2016): 1–25. doi:10.1080/08850607.2015.1083309.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sexton, M. D The Wages of Principle and Power: Cyrus R. Vance and the Making of Foreign Policy in the Carter Administration. PhD Diss., Georgetown University, 2009.
   Google Scholar
• Sick, G. All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Random House, 1985.
   Google Scholar
• Symon, P. B, and A. Tarapore. “Defense Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Big Data.” Joint Force Quarterly 79 , no. 4th Quarter (2015): 4–11.
   Google Scholar
• Takeyh, R. “Did the U.S. Intelligence Community Lose Iran?.” Survival 63, no. 2, April/May (2021): 155–170. doi:10.1080/00396338.2021.1905999.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tetlock, P. E. Expert Political Judgment: How Good is it? How Can we Know?. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
   Google Scholar
• Treverton, G. F., and R. Miles. Unheeded Warning of War: Why Policymakers Ignored the 1990 Yugoslavia Estimate. CIA, 2015 rev. 2016 Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, .
   Google Scholar
• Westerfield, H. B. “Inside ivory bunkers: CIA analysts reject managers’ “pandering” – part II.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 10, no. 1 (1997): 19–54. doi:10.1080/08850609708435332.
   Google Scholar
• Woodard, N. “Tasting the Forbidden Fruit: Unlocking the Potential of Positive Politicization.” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 91–108. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.749066.
   Google Scholar
• Zegart, A. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
   Google Scholar
• Zegart, A. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
   Google Scholar