Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI): adaptive evolution in the interaction between collection and analysis

ABSTRACT

This article details the reforms conducted in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) over several decades, leading to a new concept coined multidisciplinary intelligence', which challenges several assumptions of the traditional 'intelligence cycle' model. It focuses on collaboration of collection and analysis in joint processes and organizations, exploiting advanced technologies. The logic of this concept was initially applied for tactical and targeting intelligence and gradually evolved as 'innovation through adaptation', with practice preceding theory. The article augments the study of Israeli intelligence and more broadly of intelligence systems outside the 'Anglosphere'.

Introduction

Israel’s Defense Intelligence (IDI; in Hebrew, Agaf Hamodi’in or AMAN) is the intelligence directorate of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) general staff, and the largest organization in the Israeli intelligence system.¹ Despite being a military organization, the IDI also has defense-level and national-level roles.² In the last decades, the IDI has gone through fundamental reforms, leading toward an implementation of a new concept framed as ‘multidisciplinary intelligence’.³ Yet while these reforms have received much attention in the Israeli professional literature,⁴ they have been the object of little scholarly research in the broad field of intelligence studies.

Israeli intelligence, and specifically the IDI, has been researched by many scholars – such as Bar-Joseph, Handel, Ben-Zvi, Shlaim, Hershkovitz, Kahana, Shpiro, Barnea, Gelber, Adamsky, Libel, Leslau, Sheffy, Pascovich, Magen, Jones, and others.⁵ This work is complemented by professional and academic writings of former Israeli intelligence practitioners – such as Harkabi, Ze’evi-Farkash, Gazit, Yadlin, Brun, Amidror, Kupperwasser, Asher, Lapid, Gilbo’a, Even, Zohar, Granit, Siman-Tov, Shapira and others.⁶ It is also complimented by memoirs of former senior Israeli intelligence practitioners.⁷ Professional work about current challenges faced by the IDI is also emerging in recent years, often written by acting Israeli practitioners, albeit anonymously and only in Hebrew.⁸

These works study different perspectives of Israeli intelligence. These include the intelligence failure in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, historical events, organizational matters, espionage and special operations, analytical methods such as ‘devil’s advocacy’, early warning, intelligence support to counterterrorism, the interaction between intelligence and policy, the role of military intelligence in national decision-making, the interaction with civilian establishments and the media, and others. Extant research also studies the contribution of intelligence to specific challenges Israel faces – ranging from weapons of mass destruction, through political and military aspects, to ‘lone wolf’ terrorism – in different geographical arenas. Research about Israeli intelligence has even begun studying the support for fighting global pandemics.⁹

However, the broad field of intelligence studies rarely engages current matters of Israeli intelligence practice – such as the interaction between emerging technologies, collection, and analysis. For instance, intelligence studies have rarely researched the current Israeli implementation of the ‘intelligence cycle’ – the accepted sequential model for intelligence process, relying on a differentiation between collection and analysis.¹⁰ Intelligence studies have therefore not studied the ways in which Israeli intelligence challenges this model, and have not compared the Israeli reforms regarding the intelligence cycle to similar ones conducted in other national intelligence systems.

The current article aims at addressing these gaps. We argue that the IDI has gradually created a new concept which challenges the ‘intelligence cycle’, blurring the lines between collection and analysis. This concept, coined multi-disciplinary intelligence, creates new collaborative processes and organizations which integrate collection and analysis. It is underpinned by a mission-focused rather than a traditional discipline-focused rationale regarding the intelligence process, product, and organization. The logic of this new concept has evolved over several decades, in an adaptive and incremental manner, implemented initially for targeting and tactical intelligence.

The article’s main contribution lies in augmenting the research of Israeli intelligence. It does so by providing an empirical foundation about the interaction between collection and analysis in the IDI, and about the way reforms in this field have evolved, while discussing these issues through the theoretical lens of the ‘intelligence cycle’ and ‘intelligence innovation’. Additionally, the article contributes to the growing study of intelligence systems beyond the ‘Anglosphere’ (American and British intelligence systems)¹¹ . It can enable comparative research between national intelligence systems and enrich the theoretical study of intelligence reforms and of alternatives to the ‘intelligence cycle’.¹²

The article has a limited scope. It focuses solely on the IDI and not on the whole Israeli intelligence community: public information about the two other Israeli intelligence agencies, Mossad (in charge of foreign intelligence and special operations) and Shabak (in charge of domestic intelligence and special operations) is scarce due to their covert nature. The article discusses processes and organizations rather than the nature or quality of intelligence products, since public information about the latter issues is also scarce. Finally, the article focuses on reforms and innovations in the intelligence system itself, rather than on the interaction of intelligence with decision-makers and operators.

The article proceeds as follows. We start by providing a theoretical background about two major frameworks used throughout the article: the ‘intelligence cycle’ model and its consequences for the interaction between collection and analysis, and ‘intelligence innovation’. We then describe emerging challenges for intelligence systems and the IDI in recent decades, as the context for the reforms conducted in the IDI. We go on to detail the genealogy of these reforms which took place since the early 2000s, focusing on the interaction between collection and analysis. We conclude by applying the theoretical frameworks described in the first chapters to understand the essence of these reforms and the way they have evolved. Finally, we point at potential areas for future research.

Theoretical background

The ‘intelligence cycle’

The interaction between collection and analysis is one of the cornerstones of the traditional approach towards intelligence process, product, and organization.¹³ It is best reflected through the framework of the ‘intelligence cycle’, which is one of the most heavily studied topics in intelligence studies.¹⁴ Although many scholars and practitioners claim that the ‘intelligence cycle’ has become obsolete as a normative as well as a descriptive model, the ‘cycle’ is still a powerful construct for intelligence practice, education and training. It creates a coherence between intelligence processes, products, and organizations: collection organizations produce collection products, i.e., raw information, through unique collection processes; while analytical organizations produce finished analytical products through a unique analytical process. This model therefore enables a professionalization of each discipline, based on well-defined and distinct doctrines.

Although several alternatives have been offered for the ‘intelligence cycle’ along the years,¹⁵ no structured theoretical framework has been developed to fully supersede it.¹⁶ However, partial practical alternatives are already being implemented in many intelligence systems around the globe. The American intelligence community, for instance, underlines integration, all-source analysis, and fusion as a means to break the silos between collection, analysis and operations – and hence, to create an alternative to the linear ‘intelligence cycle’ model.¹⁷ Methods such as ‘activity-based intelligence’, ‘object-based production’¹⁸ and ‘mission centres’¹⁹ have already integrated collection, analysis, and operations.²⁰ In British intelligence, for instance, ‘fusion centres’ already integrate collection and analysis,²¹ while the production of targeting intelligence has also challenged the intelligence cycle.²² In NATO, intelligence for operational missions has begun to bridge the gap between collection and analysis.²³

However, these alternatives still use the traditional terminology of ‘collection’ versus ‘analysis’ as framed by the ‘intelligence cycle’. Although they challenge the linear and sequential interaction between collection and analysis, and even create new organizations which combine several components of the ‘cycle’, they hardly undermine the differentiation between collection and analysis as reflecting different disciplines with different products and organizations. Yet they reflect a mindset of reforms and transformations.

Intelligence innovation and transformations

Intelligence scholars and practitioners have been advocating for reforms and transformations in the face of emerging challenges,²⁴ acknowledging that traditional models and frameworks often fail.²⁵ The ‘intelligence cycle’, as mentioned above, is one of the issues being challenged. Scholars and practitioners, for instance, have been discussing the need for a ‘revolution in intelligence affairs’ (RIA) and a ‘revolution in military intelligence’, as reflecting substantial required transformations.²⁶

Such transformations are sometimes discussed through the framework of ‘intelligence innovation’. Although a comprehensive theory about this concept, which describes the way reforms evolve and are manifested, is still absent, several studies have already addressed it.²⁷ The current article builds on these writings and discusses intelligence innovation by adopting conceptual frameworks from the field of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) and military innovations.

We differentiate in this article between ‘innovation through adaptation’, where practice precedes theory and concepts are developed inductively through experience; and ‘innovation through anticipation’, where theory and reflection deductively guide practice.²⁸ Intelligence innovation through adaptation experiments with current challenges and allows practice to guide theory. Intelligence innovation through anticipation develops concepts and capabilities based on theorizing about future external and internal challenges.²⁹

This framework will be used later in this article to describe the reforms in the IDI, which among other things were required because of new external and internal challenges.

Evolving challenges for national intelligence systems

The strategic, operational, organizational, and technological environments which Western intelligence organizations face are becoming increasingly complex.³⁰ While reducing uncertainty for decision-makers has remained a core role,³¹ additional ones have been added. Some of the new challenges include non-traditional threats,³² emerging information and data technologies³³; and the growing prominence of open-source information.³⁴

External challenges for intelligence systems are constantly changing. On top of traditional political-military aspects which are still relevant, as illustrated in the crisis between Russia and Ukraine in early 2022,³⁵ intelligence must also tackle issues such as climate change,³⁶ global pandemics,³⁷ cyber threats,³⁸ and foreign interference in democratic elections.³⁹ Military intelligence organizations must still perform traditional roles of supporting conventional warfighting,⁴⁰ but must also support grey-zone, hybrid, and irregular warfare⁴¹; contribute to non-kinetic operations⁴²; and enable competition short of war.⁴³

Internal challenges for intelligence systems are also increasing – mainly stemming from the way decision makers use and consume information, data, intelligence, and analysis.⁴⁴ Government intelligence no longer has a monopoly on analysis,⁴⁵ and must face the phenomenon of ‘truth decay’.⁴⁶ Intelligence organizations must therefore prove their added value and their ‘epistemic authority’.⁴⁷ These challenges are augmented by developments in data science, and by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.⁴⁸ They are also underpinned by the emergence of the cyber domain, which has implications for intelligence in terms of collection, analysis, and operations.⁴⁹

Israeli intelligence is influenced by these new challenges faced by intelligence systems worldwide, while engaging unique challenges stemming from the Israeli strategic and internal environments.

Evolving challenges for Israeli intelligence and specifically for the IDI

The Israeli intelligence system consists of three major organizations: The IDI, which is the focus of the current article, formally subordinate to the IDF chief of general staff; Mossad, in charge of foreign intelligence and special operations, subordinate to the prime minister; and Shabak, in charge of domestic intelligence and special operations, counterintelligence, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and counterespionage, also subordinate directly to the prime minister.⁵⁰

Intelligence plays a major role in Israeli national security⁵¹ and is sometimes described as Israel’s ‘first line of defence’⁵²: in 2018, for instance, ‘intelligence superiority’ was mentioned as a major component of the IDF strategy.⁵³ Moreover, intelligence has a crucial role in the implementation of Israel’s national security doctrine, which was formulated in the 1950s although never formalized, and relies on four pillars: early warning, deterrence, battlefield decision, and defence (the latter one added only circa 2006).⁵⁴

Early warning for a surprise military attack has been the cornerstone of the IDI’s role for decades.⁵⁵ This was the core intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur war (1973),⁵⁶ and is one of the most heavily studied topics in intelligence studies. The trauma of the Yom Kippur war, which took Israel by surprise and brought it on the verge of a military defeat, has become part of the IDI heritage enduring into the 21^st century.⁵⁷

The scenario of a surprise conventional military attack has gradually lost its relevance for the IDI, due to the changing strategic and operational environment.⁵⁸ However, only in the early 2000s did the IDI acknowledge that early warning could no longer serve as its main framework, and that recovering from the Yom Kippur trauma is an imperative.⁵⁹

The issues of strategic surprise and early warning gradually received additional contexts, some of them already engaged by the IDI in the past. Such issues included adversary nuclear projects – such as the Iraqi one, foiled by Israel in 1981,⁶⁰ the Syrian one, foiled by Israel in 2007,⁶¹ and in recent years the Iranian one⁶²; stability of regimes, such as the implications of the upheaval in the Middle East since 2010⁶³; covert adversary operational enterprises, such as Hizballah’s project of underground tunnels crossing into Israeli territory, foiled by Israel in 2018⁶⁴; and others.

The IDI was also required to adapt its support for battlefield decision, considering several changes in its operational and internal environment. The emergence of advanced technologies has enabled better exploitation of information, which could thus allow intelligence to provide high-resolution and real-time intelligence to warfighting.⁶⁵ Additionally, hybrid conflicts evolving into unintended escalations – such as those with Hizballah in Lebanon (2006) and with Hamas in the Gaza Strip (2014, 2021) – have become the cornerstone of the IDF’s force design and ‘theory of victory’.⁶⁶ They required dedicated intelligence capabilities, as well as high-resolution targeting and tactical intelligence, on all domains of warfare.

The ‘campaign between the wars’ (CBW) conducted by Israel mainly since 2013, employing diverse tools but mainly kinetic airstrikes in Syria to counter Iranian influence and proliferation in the Middle East, conducted under the threshold of war, also required constant high-resolution and high-quality intelligence.⁶⁷ The IDI needed to provide targeting and tactical intelligence to enable effective operations, while disclosure of intelligence was even used as a tool in this CBW.⁶⁸ Additionally, the IDI was required to assess the effectiveness of this campaign and potential adversary responses – thus effectively becoming a crucial component of constant national and strategic risk management, on top of providing operational and tactical intelligence.⁶⁹

These challenges were augmented by the rise of the cyber domain, which had implications for different IDI roles.⁷⁰ The IDI, therefore, has been in a constant state of reforms and adaptations to address diverse challenges, whether external or internal.

The genealogy of reforms in the IDI since the early 2000s regarding the interaction between collection and analysis

Background

Following its formation as a directorate in the IDF general staff in 1953, the IDI focused on providing strategic and operational early warning for a surprise military attack.⁷¹ The interaction between collection and analysis was acknowledged as one of the major challenges at the time, as depicted by the IDI chief between 1955 and 1959, Harkabi.⁷²

The IDI’s organizational structure in its early years was substantially influenced by the concept of the ‘intelligence cycle’. Thus, an organizational distinction between collection and analysis units was made, and a headquarters organization was dedicated to mediating between these through a mechanism of prioritizing research questions and assessing the value of collection sources. However, in the 1960s, tensions between collection and analysis began to emerge, due to the lack of direct contact between analysis and collection units, and because of strict compartmentalization which made the analytical process cumbersome.⁷³

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the failure of the IDI to provide early warning for a surprise military attack by Egypt and Syria, tensions between collectors and analysts once again intensified. The commander of the IDI’s SIGINT (signals intelligence) unit, for instance, claimed that analysis was flawed since the analysts were not familiar with Arab language and culture. He even went further and concluded that strategic intelligence analysis is inherently flawed, and hence the IDI should focus on collection of valuable and intimate raw information rather than on improving analysis.⁷⁴ This tension between collection and analysis seemed to endure for decades.⁷⁵

At the same time, close interaction between collection and analysis was manifested for intelligence supporting operational and tactical levels of warfare. This was reflected, for instance, as in the cooperation during the 1960 between the SIGINT unit and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) intelligence⁷⁶; intelligence for operations conducted by the IAF in the First Lebanon War in 1982⁷⁷; and the assigning of collection officers to intelligence staffs of ground army divisions in the late 1990s and early 2000s.⁷⁸

Asymmetrical challenges and the Second Intifada in 2000

Israel’s strategic and operational environment dramatically changed in the early 2000s. The main driver for this was the Second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising which required Israel to cope with a protracted series of terrorist and suicide attacks.⁷⁹ High-resolution intelligence was required for real-time counterterrorism (CT) operations – conducted through cooperation of military intelligence, the Israeli Air Force, combat IDF ground forces, Border Guard, and Shabak.⁸⁰ These counterterrorism campaigns manifested a close cooperation between collection, analysis, and operations – and more broadly, a collaboration between different agencies in the context of a specific operation.⁸¹

In 2003, under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Ze’evi-Farkash (2001–2005), the IDI conducted a transformational process, assisted by ‘change agents’ such as the Institute for Intelligence Research, the IDI think tank.⁸² A main theme for this transformation was the adoption of systemic thinking, a tool also used more broadly in the IDF at the time for systemic operational design.⁸³ The IDI effectively acknowledged that the current terminology used in the organization, much of it focused on early warning for a military surprise attack, was no longer adequate for current challenges. Therefore, the IDI adopted new theoretical concepts and terminologies – such as ‘relevant national intelligence’, ‘strategic intelligence superiority’, and ‘operational intelligence dominance’.

These reforms aimed, among other things, at improving the interaction between collection and analysis units.⁸⁴ The IDI strived at formulating ‘intelligence strategies’ and ‘intelligence campaigns’, binding together collection, analysis, and operational elements.⁸⁵ However, this transformation was only practiced on managerial levels and did not have a profound effect on the core IDI process, organization, or product. The IDI did not develop, nor did it implement, a new overarching model for the collection-analysis interaction.⁸⁶

The Second Lebanon War (2006) and its implications

The Second Lebanon War in 2006 was a 34-day conflict between Israel and Hizballah, where Israel confronted a sophisticated hybrid adversary.⁸⁷ Following the war, a state commission of inquiry (the Winograd Commission) pointed at failures and deficiencies in the IDI. It emphasized the responsibility of intelligence to integrate its insights in the decision-making process and stressed major gaps in operational-level and tactical-level intelligence.⁸⁸

The lessons from this war were the focus of attention for the IDI under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Yadlin (2006–2010). Some of the major lessons were the need to strengthen the integration between the IDI’s analysis and collection units, to improve the cooperation between IDI and IDF ground forces and to improve the IDI’s targeting capacities.⁸⁹ The IDI therefore established a new staff organization, named ‘the operational division’ and headed by a brigadier general, to implement these lessons.⁹⁰

One manifestation of an improved integration between collection and analysis was manifested through the establishment of a joint collection and analysis unit, which started operating in 2008. This unit used a deductive intelligence approach, fully integrating collectors and analysts in the same facility, all of whom had access to raw information which was used for refuting or affirming specific hypotheses.⁹¹ It was guided by a specifically defined intelligence question.

The first decade of the 2000s also brought a new emphasis within the IDI on the cyber domain.⁹² The chief of the IDF’s general staff at the time, for instance, established a new cyber headquarters, headed by the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit (8200). After retiring from active duty, the former IDI chief Yadlin explicitly discussed the cyber domain as a potential platform for intelligence operations.⁹³ This engagement of the cyber domain might have also affected the IDI in terms of collection-analysis interaction.⁹⁴

Upheaval in the Middle East and its aftermath (since 2010), military conflicts with hamas in the gaza strip (2012, 2014)

The upheavals in the Middle East which erupted in the last months of 2010 gave impetus to another set of reforms in the IDI, which was then headed by Maj. Gen. Kochavi (2010–2014).⁹⁵ Kochavi led a comprehensive process of transformation, constructed around the new strategic and operational environment.⁹⁶ This process engaged the potential embedded in new technologies, the potential for offensive cyber operations, the nature of covert warfare, and the integration of intelligence in tactical warfighting. It also engaged the nature of intelligence analysis and collection in the ‘big data’ age.

The IDI thus acknowledged the need to adopt new approaches based on jointness and networking, and specifically, to challenge the ‘intelligence cycle’ by providing analysts with access to raw data.⁹⁷ One manifestation of this was the digital platform developed in the IDI, coined ‘Tracebook’, inspired by Facebook, and designed to facilitate the creation of ‘knowledge communities’ comprised of both analysts and collectors.⁹⁸ However, tensions emerged in the IDI regarding the use of this platform, as it undermined traditional intelligence concepts and methods, and implicitly blurred the line between collectors and analysts.⁹⁹

One of the highest priorities for the IDI during those years was the production of accurate and high-resolution tactical and targeting intelligence, relevant and accessible, for operators in all domains of warfare. Thus, the concept of ‘intelligence-based warfare’ has emerged.¹⁰⁰ A dedicated directorate was established in the IDF, as a cooperation between the IDI and the Ground Forces Headquarters, to implement this concept. Dedicated collection sources and intelligence assets were developed for tactical intelligence, accessibility of intelligence to the tactical level was improved, and IDI general-staff units increasingly participated in ground forces exercises. The IDI also formed a technological unit, whose role was to develop information systems for ground forces intelligence.¹⁰¹ These changes were mainly aimed to improve military effectiveness in hybrid conflicts with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and with Hizballah in Lebanon.¹⁰² They were operationally tested during the IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in 2012 and 2014.¹⁰³

Data exploitation, advanced technologies, and the emergence of the ‘campaign between the wars’ (CBW) since 2013

Under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Halevy (2014–2018), the IDI conducted additional reforms. Halevy claimed that ‘intelligence superiority in the digital domain’ would be the major shaper of the IDI for the forthcoming decades.¹⁰⁴ The IDI, according to Halevy, would need to increasingly combine humans and machines to cope with the blurring lines between physical and virtual reality.

Exploitation of advanced technologies was also a major theme for the reforms at the time. A former senior IDI officer, for instance, argued that many traditional analytical crafts were becoming obsolete and should be replaced by a new intelligence role, ‘information intelligence officer’, who would integrate quantitative and qualitative analysis and regulate relevant databases.¹⁰⁵ The IDI, accordingly, recognized the value of data extraction tools, such as statistical models and social network analysis.¹⁰⁶

On the strategic and operational level, the year 2015 saw an unorganized wave of Palestinian terrorism from the West Bank. To conduct successful and precise counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the IDF established a joint intelligence-operational-technological enterprise, combining the databases of different organizations – the IDF, Shabak, the Israeli Police, and the Israeli Border Guard – while exploiting advanced technologies. This was another manifestation of an evolving practice integrating collection and analysis in a specific tactical concept, but the potential for a new intelligence method and concept broader than the tactical level has begun to surface.¹⁰⁷

Another driver for reforms was the CBW, already mentioned earlier.¹⁰⁸ The IDI was required to provide high-resolution and real-time tactical and targeting intelligence, mainly for precise airstrikes. Close collaboration between collection and analysis was once again needed, while the IDI was even put in charge of specific operational aspects comprising the CBW.¹⁰⁹

Multi-disciplinary intelligence, and integration of artificial intelligence

Under Maj. Gen. Hayman’s leadership (2018–2021), the IDI continued its transformations, discussing among other things the interaction between collection and analysis. Hayman recognized that over the years, whenever the IDI encountered a complex issue, it found that integration of analysis and collection produced novel insights.¹¹⁰ To ensure that this collaborative concept would become a standard model, the IDI saw the need for joint facilities, connecting collectors and analysts on a permanent basis. This reflected the IDI’s attempt to become more ‘mission-focused’, through the manifestation of a concept coined multidisciplinary intelligence .¹¹¹ Such a conceptual change, according to Hayman, ‘requires experimentation and friction’.¹¹² The IDI has concluded that this concept can potentially become applicable as the organization’s overarching operating concept.

As a former head of the IDI’s Research and Analysis Division (RAD) has claimed, the IDI acknowledged that it must ‘industrialize’ the platform and method already used along the years for tactical and targeting intelligence, in which different disciplines – such as collection, analysis, and operations – collaborated while working in a joint facility to solve a well-defined intelligence problem. Specifically, the IDI acknowledged the need for jointness between different collection disciplines (such as signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, etc.), different analytical perspectives (such as a general-staff level and a regional command level), and between collection and analysis.¹¹³

To implement this multi-disciplinary concept, the IDI sought to create new organizational structures. The first is called a ‘red core’ and focuses on acquisition of data and production of intelligence about the adversary in a specific context. The second is called a ‘red-blue core’, integrating operations and intelligence personnel to produce tactical and targeting intelligence which enables operations at real-time.¹¹⁴ The third is called a ‘blue core’ and focuses on providing intelligence to support strategic decision making and operations, while knowledge is developed in close interaction with the decision-maker.

The ‘red core’ facility is reliant on acquisition of information regarding the adversary (hence ‘red’), acts in a deductive manner while guided by a pre-defined analytical question, and reaches initial insights rooted in close interaction with raw information. Analysts and collectors work together to transform an analytical question into a collection plan, exploiting advanced technologies and data science capabilities. The ‘blue core’ facility is mostly underpinned by analytical methodologies, guides the action of the relevant ‘red cores’, acts in an inductive manner while creating hypotheses based on diverse findings, and relies on close interaction with an operator or decision maker (hence ‘blue’).¹¹⁵

The doctrine guiding the operation of these facilities made use of a new terminology. The ‘red core’ facilities, for examples, would produce ‘factual and inference’ through a collaborative process of analysts and collectors. The ‘blue core’ ones focus on abstraction, creating hypotheses, and production of ‘holistic intelligence’ about the topic at question. This new terminology illustrated the IDI’s need for new and updated frameworks and methods, since traditional ones were no longer adequate for current and emerging challenges and for the potential embedded in advanced technologies.¹¹⁶

As of early 2022, public information indicates that the multi-disciplinary concept and its organizational manifestation were effectively implemented for targeting and tactical intelligence.¹¹⁷ For example, a multi-disciplinary facility combining collection, analysis and was operationalized during Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip in May 2021¹¹⁸; while a ‘red core’ facility has been operated circa 2021 to engage Iran’s nuclear program.¹¹⁹

These reforms also had implications for the IDI personnel’s skills and training. Analysts, for instance, have become more involved in the collection and exploitation process. Collectors were able to focus on operational aspects of acquiring information, and at the same time on extracting and indexing information based on data science skills. New challenges of command and control and of leadership also emerged through the operations of these facilities since they no longer worked according to the traditional organizational hierarchy in the IDI.¹²⁰

Complementing these reforms was a structured initiative for exploitation of advanced data science technologies.¹²¹ The IDI, for instance, augmented the production of targeting intelligence by integrating artificial intelligence systems: an IDF targeting directorate was established, integrating IDI analysts and collectors with operations, planning, and legal advisory officers.¹²² The IDI used advanced technologies for statistical machine translation based on neural networks, developed by collection units, thus providing the analytical units with direct access to raw data and reducing dependence on human translators.¹²³

Conclusion

The strategic and operational environment which the IDI faces, the organizational environment inside the IDF and the Israeli intelligence community which influences the IDI, the technological landscape, the phenomenon of big data, and the emergence of the cyber domain – have all required the IDI in recent decades to transform and adapt.

One of the main reforms conducted circa 2020, as a crux of earlier ones, was the institutionalization of the collaboration and jointness of collection and analysis through a new concept and doctrine, coined multi-disciplinary intelligence. This concept and practice challenge the ‘intelligence cycle’ model by blurring the lines between collection and analysis and creating new intelligence organizations. It views intelligence through a mission-focused lens rather through a disciplinary one. However, it has yet to fully supersede the ‘intelligence cycle’ or to become the overarching concept for the IDI’s practice. Moreover, it has yet to dramatically change the organizational structure of the IDI which still differentiates between collection and analytical units, and it is still unclear how it has affected the nature and quality of IDI products.

The multi-disciplinary concept is implemented in recent years through the creation of new organizations which operate as joint IDI facilities. In these facilities, analysts access and exploit raw information, collectors are an integral contributor to the finished analytical product, while both collectors and analysis use advanced data science technologies. Accordingly, the IDI has begun to use new terms and frameworks.

The multi-disciplinary approach gradually diffused along the years from tactical and targeting intelligence to other fields and echelons, while the IDI gradually acknowledged that it could become an overarching rather than an ad-hoc operating concept. Some of the lessons of this collaborative approach were gained through combat experience, whether in the CBW through airsrtikes in Syria or in the hybrid conflicts with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The reforms leading to this new concept of multi-disciplinary intelligence have evolved as ‘innovation through adaptation’, with practice preceding theory. This type of adaptive evolution and of innovation is also typical of Israeli strategic and military culture.¹²⁴

The manifestation of the multi-disciplinary intelligence concept in the IDI reflects a process of conceptual and organizational reforms, underpinned by an adoption of advanced technologies and methods, and by the change of focus from early warning of a surprise military attack to many other roles. Specifically pertaining to the interaction between collection and analysis – the IDI has gone a long way since the tensions between collection and analysis units in the 1960s, the clash between senior collectors and analysts after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the reliance on the ‘intelligence cycle’ as an overarching concept. The IDI is gradually broadening the collaboration and jointness between collection and analysis, acknowledging that new circumstances and challenges require new methods and concepts, and therefore developing a practical and conceptual alternative to the ‘intelligence cycle’.

In conclusion, we highlight some aspects which may be addressed by future studies. First, since the article did not study IDI products, future research might assess whether the reforms described in this article have indeed improved the IDI’s performance. Second, future research might study whether the nature of intelligence innovation described in the article has also been manifested in reforms pertaining to other aspects of intelligence – such as covert operations or the cyber domain. Third, future research might study whether reforms like those described in the article also took place in the other intelligence agencies in Israel: Mossad and Shabak. And finally, future research might compare the theory and practice of the IDI reforms with similar ones conducted in other national intelligence communities.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Itai Shapira

Itai Shapira is a PhD candidate at the University of Leicester, studying Israeli national intelligence culture. Itai has served for more than 25 years in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI), in various intelligence analysis and management roles on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—including the Deputy Head of the Research and Analysis Division (RAD). Itai has published articles about intelligence and strategy on Intelligence and National Security, War on the Rocks, Defense One, Strategic Assessment, The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, RUSI Commentary, and RealClear Defense. He holds a BA in economics and philosophy and an MBA from Tel-Aviv University and is a graduate of the Israeli National Defense College (INDC). The author can be contacted at [email protected]

David Siman-Tov

David Siman-Tov is deputy head of the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence (IRMI) at the Israeli Intelligence Community Commemoration and Heritage Center and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He holds a master’s degree in political science from Tel Aviv University. He served in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) for twenty-five years, and has published widely about intelligence, cognitive warfare and cyber. He is the co-editor of the journal Intelligence in Theory and in Practice, and co-author of a book on the first decade of the Intelligence Corps in the IDF. The author can be contacted at [email protected]

Notes

1. For the IDI website see: https://bit.ly/3tRtfcc (in Hebrew).

2. For several examples of such roles see: Bar-Joseph, ‘Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel,’ 505–25; Pascovich, ‘Military Intelligence and Controversial Political Issues: The Unique Case of the Israeli Military Intelligence,’ 227–61.

3. Hayman, ‘Chief of Military Intelligence’s Introduction,’ 4–5 (in Hebrew).

4. Colonel D., Lt. Col. A., and Command Sgt. Major (res.) R., ‘Introduction to “Intelligence Superiority”,’ 195–210 (in Hebrew); Siman-Tov and Alon, ‘The Cybersphere Obligates and Facilitates a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs,’ 73–92; Siman-Tov and G, ‘Intelligence 2.0: A New Approach to the Production of Intelligence,’ 31–51.

5. Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies); Adamsky and Bar-Joseph, ‘“The Russians Are Not Coming”: Israel’s Intelligence Failure and Soviet Military Intervention in the “War of Attrition”,’ 1–25; Handel, ‘The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,’ 461–502; Ben‐Zvi, ‘Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,’ 227–42; Shlaim, ‘Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,’ 348–80; Kahana, ‘Reorganizing Israel’s Intelligence Community,’ 415–28; Shpiro, ‘No Place to Hide: Intelligence and Civil Liberties in Israel,’ 629–48; Barnea, ‘Israeli Intelligence, the Second Intifada, and Strategic Surprise: A Case of “Intelligence to Please”?,’ 1–25; Hershkovitz, ‘“A Three-Story Building”: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,’ 765–84; Sheffy, ‘Early Warning of Intentions or of Capabilities? Revisiting the Israeli–Egyptian Rotem Affair, 1960,’ 420–37; Gelber, Roots of the Lily: Intelligence in the Yishuv 1917–1948 (in Hebrew); Stivi-Kerbis, ‘The Surprise of Peace: The Challenge of Intelligence in Identifying Positive Strategic–Political Shifts,’ 448–66; Libel, ‘Looking for Meaning: Lessons From Mossad’s Failed Adaptation to the Post-Cold War Era, 1991–2003,’ 280–92; Magen, ‘Strategic Communication of Israel’s Intelligence Services: Countering New Challenges with Old Methods,’ 269–85; Pascovich, ‘The Devil’s Advocate in Intelligence: The Israeli Experience,’ 854–65; Leslau, ‘Israeli Intelligence and the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal,’ 327–438; Jones, ‘A Reach Greater than the Grasp: Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon 1990–2000,’ 1–26.

6. Harkabi, Intelligence as a State Institution (in Hebrew); Gazit, ‘Intelligence and the Peace Process in Israel,’ 35–66; Ze’evi-Farkash and Tamari, And How Would We Know? (in Hebrew); Yadlin, in TAUVOD (Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2013), https://bit.ly/3ycg3lF; Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic; Amidror, Intelligence – from Theory to Practice (in Hebrew); Kupperwasser, Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence Reforms; Zohar, ‘Israeli Military Intelligence’s Understanding of the Security Environment in Light of the Arab Awakening,’ 203–34; Asher, Master’s Craft: The Story of Military Intelligence in the IDF (in Hebrew); Gilbo’a and Lapid, eds., Masterpiece: an Insider Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence (in Hebrew); Even and Granit, The Intelligence Community – Where To? (in Hebrew); Even and Siman-Tov, ‘The National Intelligence Estimate Mechanism in Israel,’ 83–96; Shapira, ‘Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and Using Conceptual Frameworks,’ 283–99.

7. Halevy, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad; Sagui, Lights in the Fog (in Hebrew); Gilon, Citizen C; Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts; is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew).

8. A salient example of this is a journal called Intelligence in Theory and Practice, published by the Israeli Center for Research of Intelligence Methodology: https://bit.ly/34mgUUC (in Hebrew).

9. Kahana, ‘Intelligence Against COVID-19: Israeli Case Study,’ 259–66; Shpiro, ‘Israeli Intelligence and the Coronavirus Crisis,’ 1–16.

10. For just two out of numerous descriptions of the ‘intelligence cycle’ see: Johnson ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies; Phythian ed., Understanding the Intelligence Cycle.

11. Aldrich and Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American Intelligence: Culture, Ethnocentrism, and the Anglosphere,’ 1009–28; Davies and Gustafson eds., Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere; Graaff, Noce and Locke, eds., Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures; Graaff, ed., Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: a Comprehensive Reference; Pringle, ‘The Heritage and Future of the Russian Intelligence Community,’ 175–84; Mattis, ‘Assessing Western Perspectives on Chinese Intelligence,’ 678–99.

12. For studies underlining the importance of the comparative approach see: Hastedt, ‘Towards the Comparative Study of Intelligence,’ 55–72; O’Connell, ‘Thinking about Intelligence Comparatively,’ 189–99; Phythian, ‘Culture of National Intelligence,’ 33–41.

13. For this perspective of intelligence as organization, process, and product, we rely on Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.

14. Hulnick, ‘What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,’ 959–79; Sims, ‘Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-source Fusion,’ 38–56; Soeters and Goldenberg, ‘Information Sharing in Multinational Security and Military Operations. Why and Why Not? With Whom and With Whom Not?,’ 37–48.

15. Evans, ‘Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure – Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle,’ 22–46; Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Theory: Seeking Better Models,’ 149–60.

16. Phythian, ‘The Intelligence Cycle is Dead, Long Live the Intelligence Cycle,’ 70–89.

17. National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America; Turner, ‘Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment,’ 383–97.

18. Anthony, Data Fusion Support to Activity-Based; Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-based Intelligence: Principles and Applications; Johnston, Modernizing Defense Intelligence: Object Based Production and Activity Based Intelligence; Long, ‘Activity Based Intelligence: Understanding the Unknown,’ 7–16; Atwood, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis,’ 24–33

19. Miller, ‘The CIA Unveils a Radically New Org Chart’.

20. Rohde, ‘John Brennan’s attempt to lead America’s spies into the age of cyberwar’; Imler, ‘Strengthening Central Intelligence: An Evidence-Based Framework for Action,’ 544–67; Slick, ‘On a Path Toward Intelligence Integration,’ 11–15; Barnes, ‘C.I.A Reorganization to Place New Focus on China’.

21. Davies, ‘The problem of Defense Intelligence,’ 797–809.

22. Davis, ‘ISR Versus ISTAR: A Conceptual Crisis in British Military Intelligence,’ 73–100.

23. Palfy, ‘Bridging the Gap between Collection and Analysis: Intelligence Information Processing and Data Governance,’ 365–76.

24. For just several examples see: Farson, ‘Is Canadian intelligence being re-invented?,’ 49–86; Hulnick, ‘U.S. Intelligence Reform: Problems and Prospects,’ 302–15; Lowenthal, ‘A Disputation on Intelligence Reform and Analysis: My 18 Theses,’ 31–37; Marrin, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Theories: Current State of Play,’ 479–90; Treverton, ‘Theory and Practice,’ 472–78; Katz, ‘Maintaining the Intelligence Edge: Reimagining and Reinventing Intelligence through Innovation’.

25. Medina, ‘The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: What to Do When Traditional Models Fail,’ 23–28.

26. Barger, Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs; Lahneman, Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs; Lahneman, ‘Is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Occurring?,’ 1–17; Lahneman, ‘The Need for a New Intelligence Paradigm,’ 201–25; Medina, ‘The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis: What to Do When Traditional Models Fail,’ 23–28; Denece, ‘The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: 1989–2003,’ 27–41; Vinci, ‘The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: How Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Will Transform Espionage’; Ferris, ‘Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?,’ 199–225; Chambliss, ‘We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform,’ 5–13.

27. Petrelli, ‘Analytical innovation in intelligence systems: the US national security establishment and the craft of “net assessment”,’ 1–18.

28. Adamsky and Bjerga, eds., Contemporary Military Innovation: between anticipation and adaptation.

29. For an illustration of such anticipative thinking in American intelligence see: https://bit.ly/3HR1WWi (accessed 2 March 2022).

30. For a few examples see: Nolte, ‘US Intelligence and Its Future: Aligning with a New and Complex Environment,’ 615–18; Shapira, ‘The Main Challenges Facing Strategic Intelligence,’ 3–19; Cunliffe, ‘Hard target espionage in the information era: new challenges for the second oldest profession,’ 1018–34.

31. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security; Mandel and Irwin, ‘Uncertainty, Intelligence, and National Security Decision Making,’ 558–82.

32. Cogan, ‘Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century,’ 304–21; Blanken and Overbaugh, ‘Looking for Intel?..Or Looking for Answers? Reforming Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment,’ 559–75.

33. Berkowitz, ‘Information Technology and Intelligence Reform,’ 107–18.

34. Stelle, ‘Intelligence Affairs: Evolution, Revolution or Reactionary Collapse?,’ 187–89.

35. Rachman, ‘Putin, US Intelligence and the global fight for the Ukraine narrative’; Zegart, ‘The Weapon the West Used Against Putin’.

36. ‘Executive Order 14,008 of 27 January 2021, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,’ 7619–33; Sikorsky, ‘Analyzing the Climate Security Threat: Key Actions for the U.S. Intelligence Community’.

37. Lentzos, Goodman, and Wilson, ‘Health Security Intelligence: Engaging Across Disciplines and Sectors,’ 456–76; Gressang and Wirtz, ‘Rethinking Warning: Intelligence, Novel Events, and the COVID-19 Pandemic,’ 131–46.

38. Ossthoek and Doerr, ‘Cyber Threat Intelligence: A Product Without a Process?,’ 300–15.

39. National Intelligence Council, ‘Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections’.

40. Baudet, Braat, van Woensel, and Wever, eds., Perspectives on Military Intelligence: From the First World War to Mali: Between Learning and Law.

41. Moore, Moore, Cantey and Hoffman, ‘Sensemaking for 21^st century intelligence,’ 45–59; Harrington and McCabe, ‘Detect and Understand: Modernizing Intelligence for the Gray Zone’.

42. Schwille, Atler, Welch, Paul, and Baffa, Intelligence Support for Operations in the Information Environment.

43. Congressional Research Service, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1–19: Competition Continuum.

44. Teitelbaum, The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers’ Use of Intelligence Analysis; Itai Shapira, ‘The Main Challenges Facing Strategic Intelligence’; Wolfberg, ‘When Generals Consume Intelligence: The Problems that Arise and How They Solve Them,’ 460–78.

45. Brown and Medina, ‘The Declining Market for Secrets: U.S. Spy Agencies Must Adapt to an Open-Source World’.

46. Kavanagh and Rich, Truth Decay.

47. For a broad discussion see: Vrist Rønn and Høffding, ‘The Epistemic Status of Intelligence: An Epistemological Contribution to the Understanding of Intelligence,’ 694–716.

48. Lim, ‘Big Data and Strategic Intelligence,’ 619–35; Landon-Murray, ‘Big Data and Intelligence: Applications, Human Capital, and Education,’ 92–121; Vogel, Reid, Kampe, and Jones, ‘The impact of AI on intelligence analysis: tackling issues of collaboration, algorithmic transparency, accountability, and management,’ 827–48.

49. Wirtz, ‘The Cyber Pearl Harbor redux: helpful analogy or cyber hype?,’ 771–73; Lindsay, ‘Cyber conflict vs. Cyber Command: hidden dangers in the American military solution to a large-scale intelligence problem,’ 260–78; Rovner, ‘Cyber War as an Intelligence Contest’.

50. Even and Granit, The Intelligence Community – Where To? (in Hebrew); Even and Siman-Tov, eds., Challenges of the Israeli Intelligence Community (in Hebrew).

51. Kober and Ofer, eds., Intelligence and National Security.

52. Zaitun, ‘Chief of the IDI: ‘We Practiced Intelligence Superiority’ (in Hebrew)

53. Siman-Tov, ‘The Role of Intelligence in the IDF Strategy’ (in Hebrew).

54. Tal and Kett, National Security: The Israeli Experience; Meridor and Eldadi, Israel’s National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later.

55. Hershkovitz, ‘A Three-Story Building: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,’ 765–84.

56. For just several examples see: Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep; Handel, ‘The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,’ 461–502; Kahana, ‘Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,’ 81–104; Ben-Zvi, ‘Between warning and response: The case of the Yom Kippur War,’ 227–42.

57. Times of Israel Staff and Ginsburg, ‘Israel: We’ve Been “Absolutely Certain” for Months Assad Using Nerve Gas’; Limor, ‘At the End of the Day, It’s All About Iran’.

58. Even though such a scenario was considered by the IDI in 1996; See: Silver, ‘The Mossad Spy Who Turned Bad’.

59. Lt. Col. Shai, ‘The Age of Agranat is Over’ (in Hebrew).

60. Bar-Joseph, Handel and Perlmutter, Two Minutes Over Baghdad.

61. Ramon, ‘Three Nuclear Failures, and the Forthcoming Fourth one’; ‘“Outside the Box”: The Operation to Destroy the Syrian Nuclear Reactor’ (in Hebrew); Yadlin and Siman-Tov, ‘The Strike on the Reactor in Syria – Implications for Intelligence’ (in Hebrew).

62. Arnold, Bunn, Chase, Miller, Mowatt-Larssen and Tobey, ‘The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications,’ 230–42.

63. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes.

64. Times of Israel Staff and Gross, ‘IDF reveals “longest, most significant” Hezbollah tunnel on norther border.’

65. Podmazo, ‘Technology and Intelligence: Changing Trends in the IDF’s Intelligence Process in the Post-Information Revolution Period,’ 41–62.

66. Adamsky, ‘Unintended Escalation: 5 Lessons For Israel for the Russia-NATO Standoff’; Golan, ‘Unintended War? Unplanned Escalation as a Driver for War in the Middle East’ (in Hebrew); Ortal, ‘Going to Offense: A Theoretical Framework for the Momentum Plan’ (in Hebrew); Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel’s War Against Hezbollah.

67. Eisenkot and Siboni, ‘The Campaign Between Wars: How Israel Rethought Its Strategy to Counter Iran’s Malign Regional Influence’.

68. Riemer and Sobelman, ‘Corecive Disclosure: Israel’s Weaponization of Intelligence’; Riemer, ‘Politics is not everything: New perspectives on the public disclosure of intelligence by states,’ 554–83.

69. ‘Time of Truth: Clear and Precise Danger’ (in Hebrew).

70. Siman-Tov and Alon, ‘The Cyber Domain Obligates,’ 73–92; Brantly, The Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence Cyber Decision-Making; Lindsay, ‘Cyber Conflict vs. Cyber Command: Hidden Dangers in the American Military Solution to a Large-scale Intelligence Problem,’ 260–78; Poznansky, ‘Covert Action, Espionage, and the Intelligence Contest in Cyberspace’; Buchbut, ‘The Hidden Battles that Delay the Establishment of the Cyber Arm in the IDF’. Moreover, in 2020, the commander of Unit 8200 published an article highlighting the need for superiority in the cyber domain and for offensive actions; see: BG A. et al., ‘Towards Military Superiority in the Cyber Domain,’ 149–62 (in Hebrew).

71. Siman-Tov and Hershkovitz, IDI was Born – The first decade of AMAN (in Hebrew).

72. Harkabi, Intelligence as a State Institution (in Hebrew).

73. Siman-Tov, ‘First tensions in the Israeli intelligence system,’ 138–43.

74. Ben-Porat, ‘The Problematic Nature of Intelligence Assessments,’ 19–25.

75. Siman-Tov, ‘A Journey Following the Development of Jointness in AMAN,’ 10–15 (in Hebrew).

76. Lapid, Covert Warriors: The Israeli Intelligence – An Insight from Inside (in Hebrew).

77. Brun, ‘Intelligence for the Air Force’.

78. Siman-Tov, ‘A Journey Following the Development of Jointness in AMAN,’ 12.

79. Golan and Shay, eds., The Limited Confrontation.

80. Greenvald, ‘The Concept of Combined Elimination – This is How the Shin Bet Prevents Terrorist Attacks’ (in Hebrew).

81. These operations involved agencies with different subordinations: the IDF and its units, Shabak which is subordinate to the prime minister’s office, and the Border Guard which is de jure a police unit.

82. Ze’evi-Farkash and Tamary, And How Would We Know? (in Hebrew); Fassa Yosef and Shapira, ‘Bridge over Troubled Water: The Aman Endeavor in the World of Complexity,’ 11–29; Kochavi and Ortal, ‘Maase AMAN – A Permanent Change in a Changing reality,’ 45.

83. Ze’evi-Farkash and Tamary, And How Would We Know?, 81–84; Greicer, ‘Self Disruption: Seizing the High Ground of Systemic Operational Design (SOD),’ 21–37.

84. Ze’evi (Farkash), ‘A Critical Look at Intelligence,’ 53–57.

85. Kuperwasser, Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence Reforms.

86. During these years, inter-agency transformations were also discussed in the Israeli intelligence system, with potential implications for the relationship between collection and analysis. For instance, in the early 2000s several agreements were reached between the different agencies regarding the ‘division of labour’. This was known at the time as the ‘Magna Carta’ project and was aimed at institutionalizing the interaction between agencies with different subordinations (the IDI as a military organization, Mossad and Shabak subordinate to the prime minister’s office, the Center for Political Research subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). For instance, see: Even and Granit, The Intelligence Community – Where To? (in Hebrew), 39–43. This topic of inter-agency transformations is beyond the scope of the current article.

87. Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza.

88. Commission to Investigate the Event of the Campaign in Lebanon (Winograd Commission), ‘Chapter Six: Military Intelligence in the Campaign,’ 255–62 (in Hebrew); Bar-Joseph, ‘Israel’s Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War,’ 583–601.

89. Michnick, ‘Lessons in Military Intelligence’ (in Hebrew).

90. Buchboot, ‘This is How the IDF Plans to Try to Eliminate Nasrallah’; Michael, Siman-Tov, and Yoeli, ‘Jointness in Intelligence Organizations: Theory Put into Practice,’ 5–30.

91. Ofek and Karo, ‘Chapters from the theory of the organizational revolution – a look at the process of change in the IDI,’ 32 (in Hebrew).

92. Yadlin, ‘IDI is a role model and object of appreciation,’ 4 (in Hebrew).

93. Yadlin, ‘Summary: The Challenges for the Israeli Intelligence Community’ (in Hebrew).

94. Siman-Tov and Alon, ‘The Cybersphere Obligates and Facilitates a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs’.

95. As of late 2021, Kochavi is a Lt. Gen. and the Chief of the IDF’s general staff.

96. Kochavi and Ortal, ‘Maase AMAN – A Permanent Change in a Changing reality’.

97. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes; Siman-Tov and G., ‘Intelligence 2.0: A New Approach to the Production of Intelligence’.

98. Colonel G., ‘Response to the Article “The Story of Tracebook”,’ 315–21 (in Hebrew).

99. Glik, ‘The Walls did not break – the story of Tracebook,’ 163–183 (in Hebrew).

100. See note 96 above.

101. Buchbut, ‘Glimpse: Unit 3060 is Leading a Revolution in Intelligence Information’.

102. Johnson, Preparing for “Hybrid“ Opponents: Israeli Experiences in Lebanon and Gaza.

103. Siboni and Ben-Yaakov, ‘Intelligence-oriented Land Combat’ (in Hebrew).

104. Halevy, ‘AMAN 2048: Intelligence Superiority in the Digital Age’ (in Hebrew).

105. Colonel A.H., ‘Does Intelligence Research Need to Change, and How?,’ 48–59.

106. Major A., ‘Analyzing Network Intelligence in the Big-Data Era,’ 54–61; Valensi and Sasson, ‘Text as Data: Computerized content analysis as an intelligence tool,’ 90–103.

107. Colonel Y., ‘The Journey to Clarify the Perception and Realization of Operational Intelligence Superiority in the Digital Age,’ 10–23; Melman, ‘Shin Bet Director: With the Help of Cyber Warfare, We Have So Far Arrested 2,000 Terrorists’ (in Hebrew).

108. See note 67 above.

109. Buhbut, ‘The War to Distance the War: The Decade Which Brought the Covert Operations to Center Stage’ (in Hebrew).

110. Hayman, ‘Chief of Military Intelligence’s Introduction’.

111. Shalom, ‘The Concept of Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence,’ 18.

112. Hayman, ‘Chief of Military Intelligence’s Introduction,’ 4.

113. Shalom, ‘The Concept of Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence (“Theory”),’ (in Hebrew).

114. Colonel B. and Colonel G., ‘The Implementation of Change to the Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence,’ 24–31 (in Hebrew).

115. For a similar approach regarding the inherent collaboration between intelligence and policy or operations see: Kerbel and Olcott, ‘The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers,’ 11–27.

116. Ofek and Karo, ‘Chapter from the Theory of Organizational Revolutions – a Perspective of the Process of Change in AMAN,’ 32–47 (in Hebrew).

117. See note 114 above.

118. Zaitun, ‘We Have Implemented Plans That We Could Not Imagine – IDI: Most Significant Targets Were Attacked’; ‘The Chief of Staff Visited a Factory that Produces Quality Targets in Real Time’.

119. Buhbut, ‘The Secret Facility Monitoring the Iranian Nuclear Project’.

120. Colonel B. and Colonel G. ‘The Implementation of Change to the Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence,’ 24–31.

121. Makrenkov and Gutterman, ‘Aspects of Jointness in the Intelligence-Digital Transformation in AMAN and IDF,’ 110–18 (in Hebrew).

122. ‘A New Target Department Has Been Inaugurated in AMAN’ (in Hebrew).

123. See note 121 above.

124. Marcus, ‘Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israeli-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF,’ 500–28; Marcus, ‘Learning “Under Fire”: Israel’s Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare,’ 344–70.