The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years: what lessons can be learned?

ABSTRACT

Extensive research has been published about the failure of Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, mainly in the context of flawed analysis and strategic surprise. Fifty years after the war, the current article uses an intelligence studies lens to describe major lessons which can be learned from this failure of early warning. Such lessons include the required focus of strategic intelligence on identifying change rather than continuity, the need for explicit analytical methodology beyond inductive reasoning, the importance of integrating assessment of adversary intentions and capabilities, the risk of over-reliance on raw information, and the need for a culture encouraging contrarian thinking.

KEYWORDS:

• Intelligence Failure
• Intelligence Methodology
• Early Warning
• Israel
• Strategic Surprise
• Lessons

Introduction¹

On October 6, 1973, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar known as ‘Yom Kippur’ (the day of atonement), Egypt and Syria initiated a surprise military attack against Israel. Israel was not only caught by surprise but faced what some of its leaders perceived as an existential threat.² More than 2,600 Israeli soldiers and officers were killed, and thousands were injured. In this war, Israel suffered the consequences of the hubris created by its swift military victory over Egypt and Syria just six years earlier, in the Six Days War.³

Although the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) gained a military victory after 19 days of fighting, with Israel receiving substantial assistance from the US,⁴ the Yom Kippur War is considered a trauma for the Israeli national security establishment and society.⁵ In the years leading to the war, the IDF relied on early warning from a military attack by Egypt and Syria, provided by its intelligence system. However, in the absence of such early warning during Yom Kippur, the IDF did not mobilize its reserve forces in time to adequately defend from the Arab attack, and the Israeli leadership was caught in a mindset of surprise.⁶ The common perception, therefore, is that flawed intelligence and specifically flawed analysis was the main reason for the war catastrophe.

After the war, the Israeli government formed a state commission of inquiry, the Agranat Commission.⁷ Many of this commission’s observations, published in 1974, related to intelligence matters, and especially to the flawed analysis conducted by Israeli military intelligence (referred to hereafter as IDI, Israeli Defense Intelligence, AMAN in Hebrew).⁸ Moreover, most of its recommendations to oust individuals from their assignments referred to intelligence officers, such as the IDI director Eli Ze’ira, the head of IDI’s Research and Analysis Department (which later became a division, referred to hereafter as RAD) Arieh Shalev, and the head of IDI RAD’s Egyptian Branch, Yona Bendmann.

Israel’s ‘watchman’, as Bar-Joseph has referred to Israeli intelligence services and specifically to the IDI, ‘fell asleep’ during Yom Kippur.⁹ Moreover, the IDI did not only fail to provide early warning. As Gelber has claimed, it also failed to recognize the deterioration of Israel’s deterrence, i.e., the Egyptian and Syrian willingness to initiate another war after their loss to Israel in 1967.¹⁰

Yom Kippur is considered one of the seminal intelligence failures in modern history and is accordingly one of the most heavily researched topics in intelligence studies.¹¹ It was first studied through the framework of strategic surprise, emanating from a flawed analysis and failure to identify denial and deception – such as in Operation Barbarossa (1941), Pearl Harbor (1941), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).¹² This research focuses on the IDI’s adherence to an intelligence assessment, also known as the ‘conception’, assigning low probability to war during Yom Kippur. The ‘conception’ was effectively a fixated paradigm which caused the IDI to ignore information showing that a surprise attack was emanating,¹³ and to overlook the Egyptian denial and deception.¹⁴

Declassification of archival material allowed deeper study of the reasons for the intelligence failure.¹⁵ This is best illustrated through the extensive research of Bar-Joseph, the leading scholar of Yom Kippur, who relied on primary sources, focusing his research on personality and psychological traits of the Israeli leadership and of the IDI leadership.¹⁶

Although new works about Yom Kippur continue to be published,¹⁷ a comprehensive study of the lessons that can be learned from this war is still absent.¹⁸ The current article addresses this gap, applying intelligence studies frameworks to study extant research and findings. Although five decades have passed since the Yom Kippur War, some of the lessons described in this article are still relevant for intelligence scholarship and practice. However, studying the way in which lessons were effectively implemented in the Israeli intelligence system is beyond the article’s scope.

The article adds a current and scholarly perspective to the extensive study of Yom Kippur and Israeli intelligence. Furthermore, by discussing the specific case of Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, it can contribute to broader debates about lessons which can be learned from intelligence failures.

The article opens with an overview of the literature about Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War. It then provides brief background on the Agranat Commission report, which set the foundation for the initial process of lesson learning from Yom Kippur. The core of the article then uses intelligence studies frameworks to analyze failures of Israeli intelligence as described in the extant literature and the lessons drawn. The article concludes by reviewing these lessons and suggesting avenues for further research.

The Yom Kippur war: the literature

Reflection on Israeli intelligence performance in the Yom Kippur War is extensive and broad. It is to be found in scholarly work,¹⁹ professional studies (many of them published only in Hebrew),²⁰ professional conferences,²¹ public conferences,²² popular culture platforms,²³ and public statements of acting and former Israeli practitioners.²⁴ Most work focuses on the national and strategic levels, with only few studies discussing tactical-level intelligence.²⁵ Furthermore, although most work discusses failures prior to the war, some has also studied intelligence successes during the war.²⁶

The empirical evidence underpinning research into the Yom Kippur War includes both primary and secondary sources.²⁷ The former category comprises original IDI analytical documents and managerial correspondence, transcripts of IDF and Israeli government meetings where IDI and Mossad personnel provided their professional views and recommendations.²⁸ Many of these documents were published by the Agranat Commission in 1974.²⁹ Moreover, many testimonies before the commission have become publicly available.³⁰ The latter category comprises memoirs of and interviews with acting intelligence officers during the war.³¹ It also comprises memoirs written by senior Egyptian and Syrian individuals.³²

Most research into lessons learned from Yom Kippur relates to the failure of strategic early warning and therefore to ways of avoiding of strategic surprise.³³ For instance: Israeli former practitioners, some of them serving in key positions in the IDI during Yom Kippur, have discussed ways to consider diverse adversary courses of action (COAs) while not remaining fixated on an analytical paradigm, to improve the interaction between intelligence and decision-making, and to nurture a culture of contrarian thinking and doubt.³⁴

Bar-Joseph studied lessons regarding the interaction between intelligence and decision-making and the management of the intelligence community.³⁵ In some of his other studies, such as with McDermott, Bar-Joseph describes traits required of intelligence professionals and especially analysts based on Yom Kippur lessons.³⁶ He also focuses on the issue of early warning.

Brun, however, claimed that the focus on early warning prevented Israeli intelligence from learning other lessons. Such fields, according to Brun, include targeting intelligence, intelligence for force design, and operational-level intelligence.³⁷ Such topics are beyond the scope of the current article.

The Agranat Commission report³⁸

The Agranat Commission provided several conclusions regarding matters of intelligence. These became the cornerstone of Israeli intelligence in the post-Yom Kippur era.³⁹ First, the Commission recommended ending the monopoly of the IDI in national intelligence assessments. Specifically, it recommended strengthening the analytical capacities of the Mossad,⁴⁰ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the regional commands in the IDF. This line of recommendations was later to be framed as ‘pluralism’. Second, it recommended establishing a mechanism and nurturing a culture focused on critical thinking, thus avoiding unitary assessments and groupthink inside the IDI. Third, it recommended establishing the role of an intelligence advisor to the prime minister, as a mediator between the prime minister and intelligence agency directors.

The Agranat Commission’s conclusions have created substantial and enduring influence over the Israeli intelligence system.⁴¹ The IDI, for instance, has conducted many professional conferences about Yom Kippur over the years.⁴² IDI directors or heads of IDI’s RAD, when providing public interviews, constantly refer to Yom Kippur and the way it has shaped their practice.⁴³ Moreover, the Agranat Commission’s conclusions, alongside those of other commissions of inquiry, have influenced the Israeli idea of intelligence professionalism.⁴⁴

Yom Kippur was also experienced by the Israeli intelligence system as a paralyzing trauma. An acting IDF officer, for instance, wrote in 2005 that ‘the age of Agranat is over’, claiming that Yom Kippur had constrained Israeli intelligence from adapting to new challenges along the years and that the IDI has become fixated on early warning for war.⁴⁵ Amos Yadlin, a former IDI director, claimed in 2013 that the trauma of Yom Kippur caused Israeli intelligence to be over-focused on early warning for war for several decades, thus neglecting the realm of operational intelligence for warfare; that IDI adopted a conservative and minimalist analytical approach, focusing on analyzing capabilities in fear of once again erring in assessing intentions; and that IDI analysts have become hesitant and over-cautions in their conclusions.⁴⁶

What lessons can be learned from the Yom Kippur intelligence failure?

The fixated ‘conception’: the foundational cause of failure

Prior to Yom Kippur, the IDI leadership acted and thought in a dogmatic way, based on an analytical paradigm formulated over several years. This paradigm was later known as ‘the conception’ and proved in hindsight to be flawed, although it relied on high-quality and reliable information.⁴⁷ In the years leading to Yom Kippur, it was allegedly proven correct several times, thus increasing the Israeli leadership’s confidence in its validity.⁴⁸

According to this paradigm, Egypt was planning a grand campaign against Israel, intended for substantial territorial gains in Sinai, a territory conquered by Israel in the Six Days War in 1967.⁴⁹ Egypt assessed its own capability to conduct this offensive as limited, since it lacked the means to mitigate the superiority of the Israeli Air Force and to strike targets deep inside Israel. The IDI accordingly assessed that until Egypt was able to alter this balance of power, through advanced strike airplanes or operational surface-to-surface missiles acquired from the Soviet Bloc, it would not initiate a war.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the IDI assessed that Syria would not go to war without Egypt.⁵¹

The adherence to this paradigm prevented the IDI from acknowledging an abundance of new information which reflected Syrian and Egyptian preparations for war. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, this information effectively reflected a new Egyptian strategy, unnoticed by Israeli intelligence.⁵² It included: a reliable report provided by a Mossad elite spy codenamed ‘the Angel’, later revealed as Ashraf Marwan, who met with the Mossad director in London the night before war broke out⁵³; warning of an Egyptian and Syrian planned attack provided by King Hussein of Jordan, who met with Israeli prime minister Golda Me’ir several weeks before Yom Kippur in a meeting orchestrated by Mossad⁵⁴; high-quality IDI SIGINT (signals intelligence) which pointed at a withdrawal of Soviet advisors and their families from Syria and a removal of Soviet military assets from Egypt, and even at a Soviet assessment regarding a possible Egyptian and Syrian attack; field observations and VISINT (visual intelligence) illustrating the emergency deployment of Syrian and Egyptian militaries along the borders with Israel; diverse information showing that Egyptian soldiers had been allowed to break the fast during Ramadan; as well as many other potential indications and warnings.⁵⁵

All of this information, as an original RAD document from the days prior to Yom Kippur shows, was collected and even brought to the attention of decision-makers yet dismissed as evidence of Arab preparations for war.⁵⁶ Moreover, another original RAD document shows that this paradigm was embraced by the IDI leadership just several hours before war broke out, by which time the Israeli political and military leadership was already acting in a mindset of war.⁵⁷ The failure to acknowledge the collapse of this analytical framework, as the next sections will show, has different facets.

Failure #1: overlooking a shift in Egyptian strategy a year prior to the war

One of the pitfalls which led the IDI to become fixated with its ‘conception’ was the failure to understand and identify a shift in the strategy and calculus of Egyptian president Sadat which occurred during 1972.⁵⁸ This change has made the assumptions underpinning IDI’s analysis, and therefore the ‘conception’, obsolete. Yet IDI was not aware of this issue.

Sadat effectively decided to initiate a limited war, with limited territorial gains in the Sinai Peninsula, relying on improved air defence capabilities. This campaign was aimed at triggering a political process which would bring back the land conquered by Israel in 1967. Sadat therefore decided to rely on the extant equipment the Egyptian military possessed, not waiting for advanced airstrike or surface-to-surface capabilities.⁵⁹

While the Mossad director during Yom Kippur, Zvi Zamir, claimed that he provided information about this new Egyptian strategy,⁶⁰ Ze’ira, the IDI director during the war, denied this claim.⁶¹ In any case, the IDI did not identify this change in Egyptian strategy. It continued to abide by its ‘conception’, i.e., it assessed that Egypt was aiming for a grand war which was dependent on Egypt acquiring advanced military capabilities. And since no such capabilities had been acquired, the IDI assessment assigned war a low probability.

Applying intelligence studies frameworks highlights this colossal analytical failure. One of the major roles of strategic intelligence is to identify shifts, discontinuities, and inflection points in adversary strategic decision-making, or more broadly in the strategic environment, preferably as they begin to emerge.⁶² In Yom Kippur, Israeli intelligence failed this ultimate test. It also failed this test several years later, when Egyptian president Sadat decided to sign a peace agreement with Israel: when Sadat landed in Israel in 1977 to initiate a peace process, the IDI still assessed that this might be part of a deception plan.⁶³

Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, strategic warning should be about more than preventing surprise in a specific event.⁶⁴ Surprise is also about an emerging change in an adversary’s strategy and calculus.⁶⁵ Strategic warning, as Chan has shown, should therefore be ‘concerned with drastic departures from the customary behavioral pattern of one’s adversary’.⁶⁶ As Garbo has shown in her seminal study about surprise and early warning, strategic intelligence is about identifying change and anomalies⁶⁷ rather than merely about acknowledging continuity.

Second, prior to Yom Kippur, operational and tactical intelligence about adversary military capabilities and readiness was analyzed per se and therefore allowed a fair understanding of Egyptian and Syrian military capabilities and readiness for war. However, this information was not used to understand which new strategy or emerging concept of operations it reflected. The IDI assessment of adversary strategy had become a basic and unchallenged assumption⁶⁸ through which all tactical intelligence was interpreted.⁶⁹ Tactical and operational intelligence, therefore, is not only aimed at supporting warfighting.⁷⁰ It should also contribute an operational perspective to strategic analysis.

These lessons highlight the importance of integrating all levels of intelligence and the blurred line between strategic and tactical intelligence.⁷¹ Intelligence analysis is therefore more about synthesis, i.e., integration of different perspectives and sources.⁷² Only by doing so can it identify discontinuities and change.

Failure #2: lack of methodology for analytical processes, over-reliance on intuitive and inductive reasoning

While the ‘conception’ stood at the heart of its findings, the Agranat Commission hardly addressed issues of intelligence methodology, let alone theory, which underpinned the adoption of the ‘conception’. Moreover, IDI personnel testifying before the Commission hardly addressed methodological issues, which were also overlooked in professional writings of senior IDI officers,⁷³ including in the memoirs of Ze’ira’s and Shalev’s which included extremely detailed descriptions of Israeli intelligence during Yom Kippur.⁷⁴ An exception is to be found in the writings and speeches of Yo’el Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit during Yom Kippur (then codenamed 848 and later 8200), who claimed that analysis in the IDI lacked doctrinal and methodological foundations, unlike the discipline of SIGINT (which Ben-Porat himself was in charge of).⁷⁵

Some practitioners and scholars have begun to bridge this gap in recent decades, claiming that IDI’s analytical methodology, especially that regarding strategic analysis, was flawed during Yom Kippur. IDI analysis, according to these arguments, relied solely on inductive reasoning and intuition, with no structured methodology for the analytical process.

Lanir, for instance, provided a novel theoretical perspective on the Israeli surprise in Yom Kippur.⁷⁶ He asserted that Israeli intelligence wrongly used the inductive and empiricist approach, suitable for tactical and operational intelligence, when producing strategic intelligence. Hence, according to Lanir, Israeli intelligence failed to understand the emerging Egyptian strategy as described in the previous section.⁷⁷

Brun also claimed that the IDI applied a flawed analytical methodology during Yom Kippur, and did not use deductive methods.⁷⁸ More broadly, in his works as an intelligence practitioner-turned-scholar, Brun continuously advocates the use of structured analytical techniques (SATs) and, specifically, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.⁷⁹ The influence of Ben-Israel, a leading Israeli intelligence practitioner scholar, stands out from Brun’s writings.⁸⁰ Ben-Israel also claimed that a deductive and Popperian-influenced approach might have been useful during Yom Kippur.⁸¹

Applying an intelligence studies perspective, therefore, highlights the fact that IDI analytical assessments during Yom Kippur relied on analysts’ experience and intuition. Analytical methodology and specifically epistemology was only tacit,⁸² with inductive reasoning being the dominant approach to the creation of knowledge. Brun claimed in 2018 that such inductive reasoning is still the dominant approach in Israeli intelligence.⁸³

More broadly, Wasserman showed as early as 1960 that the inductive method is the traditional approach in intelligence analysis.⁸⁴ Bruce claimed in 2008 that it has remained so for decades.⁸⁵ However, inductive reasoning can hardly assist in identifying shifts and inflection points, since it focuses on continuation rather than on change.⁸⁶ As George has claimed, the approach known as ‘alternative analysis’ is necessary for escaping the fixation on what he framed as analytical ‘mindsets’.⁸⁷ Such alternative analysis was missing in the case of Yom Kippur.

What was also missing in IDI practice was also the use of abduction, known as ‘inference to the best explanation’ for new and potentially surprising information as part of intelligence analysis.⁸⁸ Ze’ira might have effectively (and implicitly) used abduction when receiving information regarding the evacuation of Soviet advisors’ families from Syria, which the IDI intercepted on the night of October 4^th and 5^th, more than a day before war broke out.⁸⁹ Ze’ira, according to his own testimony, was troubled by this information since he had no clear explanation for it. In other words, he felt this information might contradict the ‘conception’. Yet Ze’ira did not go as far as adopting a new paradigm and abandoning the extant one.

Applying another intelligence studies framework focusing on epistemology, the IDI leadership lacked a structured methodology for analytical processes during Yom Kippur.⁹⁰ It effectively relied on evidentialism for justifying its analytical conclusions, i.e., justified the validity of the ‘conception’ through raw information. It did not rely on reliabilism, i.e., a reliable intelligence process, or indefeasibilism, i.e., inability to refute the analytical conclusion. This is also reflected in the way Ze’ira and Shalev tried to explain, in hindsight, the analytical failure. They blamed collection agencies for not providing the most relevant information, rather than admitting a foundational problem in the analytical process.⁹¹

Another issue arising from applying intelligence epistemology frameworks is the tension between rationalism and empiricism as the best way to produce knowledge.⁹² Specifically, Ben-Porat claimed that the foundation of intelligence should be high-quality raw information, i.e., that empiricism outweighs rationalization.⁹³ As will be shown later, analysis in the IDI had empiricist inclinations, yet it also relied on rationalism for ‘turning information into intelligence’.⁹⁴

Several major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, intelligence methodology, especially that of the analytical process, should be explicitly discussed by intelligence leaders. Second, intuitive and induction-based reasoning methods, despite their many strengths, are not sufficient to identify emerging changes and inflection points. They should be augmented by deductive and abductive methods, and more broadly by alternative analysis. Third, intelligence organizations should acknowledge the tension between empiricist and rationalist approaches, reflected through different cultures of collection and analytical organizations: while the former discipline is naturally inclined towards empiricism, the latter is naturally inclined towards rationalism. Philosophy, therefore, has much to offer intelligence scholarship and practice.⁹⁵

Failure #3: confusion regarding early warning (intentions or capabilities?)

Early warning has been one of the core missions of Israeli intelligence since its early days in the 1950s.⁹⁶ As the acting IDI director wrote in 1987, ‘When we refer to the essence of intelligence, we first and foremost mean early warning for war’.⁹⁷ Although the IDI tried to conceptualize and institutionalize early warning for decades,⁹⁸ the Yom Kippur failure reveals an absence of an agreed-upon and coherent definition, specifically regarding the balance between adversary intentions and capabilities.

Writ large, assessment about intentions provided the foundation for early warning in Israeli intelligence from its early days, although this led to several intelligence failures. In 1960, for instance, Israeli intelligence failed to provide early warning of an Egyptian military deployment along the Egypt-Israel border, despite an abundance of information about Egyptian military actions, since it relied on a flawed assessment regarding Egyptian intentions.⁹⁹ And in 1967, Israeli intelligence failed to recognize the escalation process which later led to the Six Days War, relying on a flawed assessment regarding Egyptian intentions.¹⁰⁰

After Yom Kippur, and IDI’s failure to assess intentions, several IDF senior leaders claimed that intelligence should focus on early warning of capabilities.¹⁰¹ Ze’ira and Shalev, attempting to clear their reputations, also claimed that the IDI provided accurate and timely early warning regarding the capabilities and readiness of the Egyptian and Syrian militaries.¹⁰² Ze’ira claimed this should have been sufficient for the mobilization of reserve forces, and that the IDI was only committed to providing early warning about capabilities and preparations for war rather than about intentions.¹⁰³

Shalev admitted that intelligence should assess adversary intentions yet asserted that decision-makers are also responsible for such assessments.¹⁰⁴ Ben-Porat asserted that intelligence analysts are inherently incapable of assessing adversary intentions.¹⁰⁵ However, original documents show that not only did the Israeli leadership expect the IDI to provide assessments about adversary intentions prior to the war, but that the IDI’s senior leadership willingly and knowingly provided such assessments prior to Yom Kippur.¹⁰⁶

The confusion regarding intentions and capabilities also stands out when studying the interaction between the disciplines of collection and analysis in the IDI prior to and during Yom Kippur. For instance: Aharon Yariv, the IDI director prior to Yom Kippur, sent a paper in 1972 to the IDF deputy chief of general staff, titled ‘intelligence early warning’.¹⁰⁷ In this paper, Yariv focused on collection rather than on analysis, mentioning that, ‘The capability of collection units to provide early warning to the main Egyptian and Syrian scenarios was tested’. Ze’ira sees this as proof that early warning is a matter of collection about capabilities and not of analysis regarding intentions.¹⁰⁸

The intentions-capabilities debate has endured in the Israeli intelligence system. Yadlin, a former IDI director, mentioned in 2013 that Israeli intelligence must analyze adversary intentions, otherwise Israel would constantly be in a state of alert.¹⁰⁹ In 2017, Moshe Ya’alon, a former IDI director, IDF chief of general staff and Israeli Minister of Defense, also pointed to the need for intelligence about intentions.¹¹⁰ This debate has also been discussed in intelligence studies literature.¹¹¹

This topic can also be seen as a reflection of the tension between tactical and strategic intelligence, another topic heavily discussed in intelligence studies. On the one hand, scholars have pointed at the limited influence strategic intelligence has over US foreign policy and claimed that decision-makers expect intelligence to provide them mostly with facts and information rather than with strategic analysis, i.e., with intelligence about capabilities.¹¹² On the other hand, intelligence organizations continue producing strategic intelligence, and even broaden their areas of interest to topics beyond traditional military ones.¹¹³

Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, the question of whether early warning should focus on capabilities or on intentions has become partially obsolete. Although indications and warning intelligence is perceived as focused on adversary military preparations and therefore capabilities,¹¹⁴ decision-makers still expect intelligence to provide strategic warning,¹¹⁵ which inherently involves an assessment of intentions. An intelligence assessment on the national level, as mentioned earlier, must incorporate both strategic and tactical intelligence.¹¹⁶ Moreover, although analysis of intentions, as Yarhi-Milo has shown, can rely on ‘indications of intention’, it can also be inferred from military capabilities or doctrine.¹¹⁷

Furthermore, early warning challenges emanate not only from a surprise military or terrorism attack,¹¹⁸ but also emerging threats and opportunities which are not the result of adversary decision-making. These include, for instance, popular upheavals, global pandemics, and economic crises.¹¹⁹ In these cases, the issue of intentions is irrelevant, as is the notion of capabilities. Moreover, since many of these events are idiosyncratic, it is hard to construct an ‘indications and warning’ model relying on past experience.¹²⁰

Second, in foundational issues such as strategic early warning, intelligence systems must agree on a coherent framework which not only guides their practice, but also enables a constructive dialogue with decision-makers. During times of warfare or crises, the absence of such a framework might result in policy and intelligence failure.

Failure #4: over-confident strategic analysis at the military general staff level

While the IDI leadership formulated its ‘conception’ at the strategic level of military decision-making, i.e., at the IDF general staff level, it was unwilling to accept contrarian assessments created in more operational levels and contexts. Such an assessment was also made by the Mossad director, Zamir, although during Yom Kippur the Mossad lacked formal responsibility for intelligence analysis.¹²¹

Furthermore, in the days prior to Yom Kippur, such assessments were created by the intelligence departments of the IDF Northern Command headed by Hagai Mann,¹²² and of the Israeli Navy (IN) headed by Rami Luntz.¹²³ Several officers in the Southern Command intelligence department also assessed an Egyptian attack was being prepared, yet this assessment was disregarded by the command’s intelligence officer, David Geddaliah, who fully embraced the IDI’s ‘conception’.¹²⁴ These alternative assessments were not brought to the attention of the IDI leadership.

The intelligence departments in the IN and in the regional commands of the IDF allegedly had two disadvantages compared to the IDI’s RAD. First, they were focused on operational and tactical intelligence, lacking a strategic perspective. In other words, they focused on adversary capabilities rather than on intentions. Second, because of compartmentalization, they were not exposed to all sensitive and classified information which reached the IDI.¹²⁵ Mann, for instance, was not notified of Me’ir’s meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, mentioned earlier.¹²⁶

In hindsight, these disadvantages might have effectively enabled a better assessment, not only about military capabilities, but also about the intentions they reflected. The IN intelligence department followed changes in the Egyptian Navy and concluded these were part of preparation for war rather than simply an exercise. The Northern Command intelligence department followed Syrian reinforcements near the border with Israel and concluded these were part of preparations for war rather than readiness to confront an Israeli attack. Moreover, since the IN and the Northern Command intelligence departments were not aware of all sensitive sources of information used by the IDI’s RAD, they were not dependent on such information for their analysis.¹²⁷ The IDI and specifically the IDI’s RAD were too dominant and therefore had a monopoly over national intelligence estimates.

The dilemma about IDI as a military intelligence organization engaging strategic matters has been subject to debate since the early days of Israeli intelligence in the 1950s.¹²⁸ For instance: Tamir Pardo, writing in 2013 as Mossad director, claimed that an operational/military intelligence agency, namely the IDI, cannot conduct national intelligence assessments.¹²⁹ Even and Siman-Tov claimed in 2015 that the IDI’s status has waned regarding national intelligence estimates. Even claimed in 2017 that directors of Mossad and Shabak have tried to deprive IDI of its responsibility for national estimates, preferring that integration of assessments be conducted by the prime minister.¹³⁰

However, Yom Kippur does not necessarily prove the inherent limitations of military intelligence organizations conducting strategic and national assessments. A more important lesson is the risk entailed in one organization having a monopoly over national assessments. This phenomenon was exacerbated during Yom Kippur by the high level of competition between IDI and Mossad, and specifically between the agencies’ directors, which effectively constrained Mossad’s influence over national and military decision-making.¹³¹

The major lessons which can be drawn, therefore, are cultural as well as organizational. An overarching intelligence assessment conducted by organizations on the national or strategic echelons should integrate operational and tactical perspectives, while strategic analysis organizations must maintain fertile working relations with subordinate echelons. In Yom Kippur, this was not the case. The IDI leadership was arrogant and unreceptive to contrarian assessments coming from tactical-level echelons in the IDF or from Mossad. Mann, for instance, testified that the relationship between him and the head of IDI’s RAD was flawed, and that the RAD was disconnected from the mindset of the Northern Command intelligence department.¹³²

Failure #5: over-reliance on high-quality raw information

As shown earlier, the Yom Kippur intelligence failure is usually considered as resulting from analysis overlooking raw information. However, at least in two cases, Israeli leadership was over-dependent on high-quality and intimate raw information, specifically that received through covert collection.

The first case pertains to the Mossad elite spy known as ‘the Angel’, Ashraf Marwan, who, as noted earlier, provided a specific early warning the night before the war.¹³³ This information caused the Israeli leadership to mobilize reserve units and to consider (and reject) a preemptive strike, although the IDI leadership was still not certain that a war was imminent. Intelligence officers serving in key positions during the war reinforce the view of Marwan as an elite spy, providing intimate and rare information for several years prior to Yom Kippur.¹³⁴

Shlomo Gazit, the IDI director after Yom Kippur, has claimed that the Israeli leadership was dependent on Marwan’s reports, and did not assess that war was imminent until Marwan provided such explicit information. This claim was reinforced by the testimony of Avi’ezer Ya’ari, the head of the Syrian branch in IDI’s RAD during the war.¹³⁵ Shalev points at the over-reliance on elite HUMINT sources, referring to Marwan’s reports over the years,¹³⁶ while Ze’ira also highlights the dependence of the Israeli leadership on this information.¹³⁷

The second case pertains to the IDI’s ‘special means of collection’.¹³⁸ Although Amos Gilbo’a claimed that this episode bears no special lessons,¹³⁹ the current article adopts a different approach, claiming that this was another case of over-reliance on intimate raw information. This approach is supported, for instance, by the testimony of Shabtai Bril, a senior officer in IDI’s SIGINT unit during the war.¹⁴⁰

Many details about the ‘special means’ are still secret. The partial information implies that these were advanced battery-operated devices placed inside Egypt, aimed at identifying signs of an imminent attack through sophisticated eavesdropping capabilities, allowing Israel to listen to intimate Egyptian communication. Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit, assured Israeli prime minister Me’ir in 1972 that these ‘special means’ would provide early warning were the Egyptians to initiate an attack.¹⁴¹ The ‘special means’ were perceived by the Israeli leadership as an ‘insurance policy’ against a surprise military attack.¹⁴²

Ze’ira’s own testimony to the Agranat Commission illustrates the importance he attributed to the ‘special means’:

The question I ask myself is where is my insurance in case the analysts are wrong? My insurance rested with certain means [with excellent accessibility and reliability]. And I told myself: Let’s say that they are wrong. Then I must get an unambiguous indication that they are wrong through these means. This is the whole theory in a nutshell. There is a concept, new facts must come and undermine it. I have here [excellent sources] through which I will get the indications if this concept is valid or not.¹⁴³

When operated just several days before the war, and only for several hours, these means indeed provided no special signs of an imminent attack. Although Ze’ira denies this, scholars and former practitioners contend that the ‘special means’ should have been operated much earlier, yet Ze’ira refused to do this since he assessed that an Egyptian attack was not imminent and therefore did not wish to put at risk the means’ operability.¹⁴⁴

The extant research shows that the Israeli leadership indeed relied on the ‘special means’ for early warning.¹⁴⁵ And since Ze’ira reported no unusual communications intercepted through these ‘means’, decision-makers saw this as another reason to adhere to the ‘conception’ and assess that the Egyptians were not on the verge of initiating a war.

Applying an intelligence studies perspective reveals several relevant lessons. Although according to the ‘intelligence cycle’ model decision-makers consume only finished analytical products, while analysts are the ones who consume collected raw information, this is clearly not the case in practice.¹⁴⁶ The literature acknowledges that decision-makers and intelligence senior leaders sometimes prefer intimate raw information over complicated and ambiguous analytical assessments.¹⁴⁷

However, direct access to raw information also has its pitfalls, and Yom Kippur marks an extreme end of decision-makers’ reliance on raw information. The Israeli leadership not only relied on the covert sources mentioned above but effectively became dependent on them. Such a dependency might have prevented acknowledging other warning signs, provided by more ‘standard’ sources.

Two major lessons, therefore, stand out. First, access of decision-makers to raw, intimate, and covert information is inevitable. However, early warning should still be perceived as an analytical product, i.e., of ‘all-source analysis’,¹⁴⁸ since single-source intelligence bears many pitfalls.¹⁴⁹ This should be the case even if the raw information potentially provides decision-makers with access to ‘the adversary national security rooms’ and allegedly makes intelligence analysis redundant.

Moreover, the mere existence of a covert source does not necessarily mean this source can constantly provide reports. This was the case with Marwan who provided early warning only 12 hours before the Yom Kippur War broke out. This was also the case with the ‘special means’, which could not provide information when not activated.

The second lesson pertains to the balance between covert collection and open-source information or intelligence (OSINT), a topic extensively studied in recent years.¹⁵⁰ More broadly, this pertains to the balance between covert information with direct access to adversary centers of gravity, and between information collected through more standard methods – such as websites, aerial photos, or field reconnaissance – which do not necessarily allow access to core adversary circles. Covert intelligence has a unique added value, yet early warning is an analytical product which should be underpinned by all-source analysis.

Failure #6: misinterpretation of Arab culture

Another facet of the IDI analytical failure was its flawed understanding of foundational cultural and social aspects of Egypt’s decision-making in the years prior to the Yom Kippur War. Specifically, the IDI failed to acknowledge that Egypt was willing to take major risks to ‘erase the 1967 humiliation’, i.e., to restore dignity and self-respect after the colossal loss to Israel in the Six Days War.¹⁵¹ US intelligence also overlooked such cultural aspects,¹⁵² reflecting a broader phenomenon of failing to understand Arab society and culture.¹⁵³

Ze’ira explicitly testified in 2013 that he made a mistake during Yom Kippur by not integrating into the IDI’s RAD individuals with an understanding of Arab culture.¹⁵⁴ Shalev explicitly mentions the mistake he made in analyzing Sadat’s personality: while the IDI’s RAD assessed Sadat as a weak and incompetent leader, as reflected in a special analytical product prepared in 1970,¹⁵⁵ the Egyptian president altered Egyptian strategy and thus surprised Israel.¹⁵⁶ Dror Shalom, the head of IDI’s RAD in 2019, explicitly claimed that in Yom Kippur, the RAD did not understand Sadat.¹⁵⁷

Applying intelligence studies frameworks, this can be seen as a failure of cultural intelligence, i.e., intelligence which aims at understanding foreign cultures.¹⁵⁸ Ben-Porat, already mentioned several time in this article, explicitly accused the RAD of failing to understand Arab culture and language.¹⁵⁹ A similar accusation was made by Bril, another senior officer in IDI’s SIGINT unit during the war.¹⁶⁰ This failure of cultural intelligence can also be seen as ethnocentrism, i.e., assessing adversary strategy through one’s own culture and calculus.¹⁶¹

The major lesson, therefore, is the imperative to incorporate cultural perspectives in all levels of intelligence analysis, from tactical¹⁶² to strategic. This should not come at the expense of military or technical intelligence, yet it should augment them and especially underpin strategic intelligence.¹⁶³ Understanding Arab cultures has been one of the major challenges facing Israeli intelligence since its early days in the 1950s.¹⁶⁴ Cultural intelligence is as important today as it was in 1973.¹⁶⁵

Failure #7: the ‘human factor’ – groupthink, cognitive closure, over-confidence, arrogance, lack of moral courage in the face of hierarchy

Bar-Joseph and McDermott focused on the ‘human factor’ of the IDI and IDF leadership as one of the major causes of the Yom Kippur intelligence failure and strategic surprise.¹⁶⁶ For instance, they describe the IDI director’s need for cognitive closure, and his authoritarian and decisive style, as major reasons for the IDI’s inability to consider contrarian assessments and thus acknowledge when the analytical paradigm pointing at a low probability of war had become obsolete.¹⁶⁷ A similar line of research focusing on cognitive closure was described by Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski.¹⁶⁸

As mentioned earlier in this article, several individuals – such as Binyamin, an intelligence officer from the IDF Southern Command¹⁶⁹; Mann, the intelligence officer of the IDF Northern Command¹⁷⁰; Luntz, the head of the Israeli Navy (IN) intelligence department¹⁷¹; Ya’ari, the head of the Syrian branch in the IDI’s RAD¹⁷²; Albert Souda’i, the head of the political sector in the RAD’s Egyptian branch¹⁷³; and Ben-Porat, the commander of IDI’s SIGINT unit¹⁷⁴ – disagreed with the IDI’s assessment regarding a low probability of war. This was also the case with Mossad director, Zamir.¹⁷⁵ However, all these individuals did not manage to change the formal IDI assessment, and their assessments were not heard by the Israeli national and defence leadership.

The IDI, therefore, failed to develop a culture of openness, at least in the field of analysis. This resulted in analytical over-confidence and arrogance. Many claim this culture was influenced by the personal traits of the IDI director at the time, Ze’ira,¹⁷⁶ who unlike his predecessor, Yariv,¹⁷⁷ tended to avoid conflicting assessments.¹⁷⁸

The major lesson, therefore, regards intelligence professionalism and ethics. This pertains especially to an openness to reassessing existing paradigms and being willing to abandon them and adopt new ones,¹⁷⁹ and a willingness to accept contrarian assessments. It is therefore a cultural and managerial issue on top of a professional one.

Contrarian thinking received much attention after Yom Kippur. Many IDI directors and heads of RAD, for instance, have mentioned in public appearances the Yom Kippur legacy and underscore the open culture they cultivated as a result of the lessons learned.¹⁸⁰ Avoiding groupthink and expressing moral courage have become a cornerstone of Israeli intelligence,¹⁸¹ as is the imperative to express moral courage in the face of hierarchy.¹⁸² Moreover, the IDI director who replaced Ze’ira, Gazit, gave much attention to developing a culture of openness, forming a department dedicated to contrarian and critical thinking, named ‘the Review Department’ and mostly known as ‘the Devil’s Advocate’.¹⁸³ The department head, since the mid-1980s, has reported directly to the IDI director.¹⁸⁴

The IDI director’s introduction to a book about the ‘Review Department’, published in early 2023, illustrates the importance of a contrarian and critical mindset:

The year 2023 is unique and symbolic, since we mark 50 years since the Yom Kippur War and the IDI’s colossal failure, as a national estimator, in its core missions: early warning for war and assessing adversary intentions … The lessons of this war are substantially embedded in the IDI … The Review Department rose out of the great failure of Yom Kippur … ¹⁸⁵

The ‘Devil’s Advocate’ department is still active as of early 2023,¹⁸⁶ and has broadened its responsibilities to include reviewing not only intelligence assessments but also intelligence processes.¹⁸⁷ However, there are still debates regarding the effective contribution of this department to the intelligence product.¹⁸⁸

Conclusion

The Yom Kippur failure is considered one of the seminal intelligence failures in modern history. It has received extensive scholarly and professional attention, mainly relating to early warning and strategic surprise. In the practice of Israeli intelligence, Yom Kippur has had an enduring and occasionally even a traumatic influence.

In the first years after the war, scholars situated Yom Kippur in the broad context of strategic surprise studies. This literature described the way Israeli intelligence adhered to an analytical framework, known as ‘the conception’, thus ignoring an abundance of indications and warning and not revealing the Egyptian deception plan. As information was declassified, research has expanded to focus on other explanations. Key to this has been the extensive research of Bar-Joseph, which mainly focuses on the ‘human factor’, i.e., psychological and personality traits of Israeli intelligence and national security leadership. The article builds on this literature and uses intelligence studies frameworks to show that additional lessons can be learned.

First, strategic intelligence should constantly look for changes in adversary strategy, operational concepts, and calculus. The foundational mindset of strategic intelligence should be on change, anomalies, and inflection points, rather than on continuation and confirmation. This is the cornerstone of strategic early warning.

Second, intelligence methodology, especially but not solely that of analytical processes and epistemology, should be made explicit and not remain only tacit. This is intended to harness intuition and augment it with more structured and scientific-influenced methods. Relating to the previous lesson, intelligence should embrace and adopt the abductive method of reasoning, aimed at providing ‘the best available explanation’ for new and surprising information. Absence of a methodological foundation might cause a dependency on intuition alone. And intuition, especially in times or circumstances of change in the strategic environment, is not enough.

Third, intelligence estimates, especially on the national level, must integrate analysis about adversary capabilities and intentions. Providing decision-makers with just one of the two is not sufficient for setting policy and strategy. Moreover, while analyzing adversary capabilities, intelligence should also deduce the intentions these capabilities might reflect. And while analyzing adversary intentions, intelligence should deduce the capabilities required to implement such intentions.

Fourth, national intelligence estimates, although usually produced by national agencies or at the general staff level of military organizations, must integrate and incorporate analysis created by more operational-focused and tactical-focused echelons. This directly relates to the previous lesson. Intelligence agencies on the national level usually have the broadest perspective of available sources, and since they interact with national decision-makers, they also have the broadest perspective of national requirements. However, this does not mean that more operational perspectives cannot provide their own added value.

Strategic and operational intelligence, therefore, can and should reciprocally contribute to each other. Moreover, national intelligence organizations should avoid arrogance based on their broad perspective. All-source analysis for national intelligence, therefore, should relate not just to different collection methods but also to different analytical perspectives. It is therefore effectively synthesis rather than analysis.

Fifth, while intelligence leaders and political decision-makers must read raw information acquired by collection agencies, over-dependence and ‘addiction’ to such information might prevent a broad analytical perspective. In other words, while intimate and raw information provides direct access to the adversary, it reflects only a narrow perspective. It cannot be the sole foundation for strategic assessment and decision making.

From a philosophical perspective, this can be seen as a tension between empiricism and rationalism when producing knowledge. Decision-makers sometimes distrust strategic analysis and therefore effectively rely on the former, i.e., on raw information provided by covert sources. Collection agencies will also be inclined towards the former, while analytical agencies will rely on the latter. Intelligence agencies must balance these two approaches, viewing them as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive.

Sixth, cultural intelligence, i.e., intelligence aimed at understanding adversary culture, is crucial for strategic analysis, and even for early warning. Such cultural intelligence relies on collection of open-source intelligence (OSINT), as well as historical and social perspectives. Although the age of big data as experienced in recent years makes intelligence more reliant on advanced technologies and quantifiable data, qualitative methods and ‘soft’ analytical skills have not become obsolete. A cultural perspective might not only augment strategic analysis, but also improve understanding of operational and tactical phenomena.

Seventh, ‘it is all about people’. The personality traits of intelligence senior officers set the context for their conduct and the organizational culture, and hence influence the intelligence product. Cognitive closure, arrogance, over-confidence, lack of openness to criticism and contrarian opinions, are all personality and psychological traits intelligence directors should avoid.

Intelligence directors must therefore constantly consider their potential mistakes. They should reduce uncertainty for decision-makers through accurate and precise assessments, yet at the same time they must acknowledge that intelligence assessments are inherently vague, and that knowledge produced by intelligence agencies is inherently partial. However, while organizational and top-down solutions are important, they are not a panacea. The responsibility to develop and implement an open and critical culture rests first and foremost on the individual intelligence professional.

Although fifty years have passed since Yom Kippur, some of the lessons described in the article are relevant for current intelligence practice, beyond that of the Israeli intelligence system. The early warning provided by the US and UK intelligence systems regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for instance, illustrates a successful synthesis of intentions and capabilities analysis, as well as integration of covert sources and OSINT.¹⁸⁹ The failure of US intelligence to provide adequate early warning of the Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, as another illustration, was described as a failure to identify change in adversary calculus.¹⁹⁰ Some of the lessons discussed in this article are also relevant for current intelligence scholarship – such as those relating to philosophical and methodological issues,¹⁹¹ the functions of military intelligence,¹⁹² or organizational cultures of intelligence systems.¹⁹³

The article, which focuses on the specific case of Israeli intelligence in Yom Kippur, can contribute to broader debates about lessons which can be learned from intelligence failures. Future research can also study the effective implementation of Yom Kippur lessons in the Israeli intelligence system, thus allowing comparative study of the influence of failures and traumas across different national intelligence systems.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Itai Shapira

Itai Shapira is a PhD candidate at the University of Leicester, studying Israeli national intelligence culture. Itai has served for more than 25 years in the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI), in various roles on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. He has published articles about intelligence and strategy on Intelligence and National Security, War on the Rocks, Defense One, Strategic Assessment, The National Interest, 19FortyFive, Small Wars Journal, RUSI Commentary, and RealClear Defense.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph and David Siman-Tov for their excellent remarks on an earlier draft of this article.

2. Shamir, “Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War,” 1035–1052; Tsoref, “Golda Meir’s Leadership in the Yom Kippur War,” 50–72; and Raz, “The Significance of the Reputed Yom Kippur War Nuclear Affair,” 103–118.

3. Gavriely-Nuri, Israeli Culture on the Road to the Yom Kippur War.

4. Tal, “A Tested Alliance,” 29–54.

5. Rodman, “Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War .” Lebel and Lewin, eds., The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relations; Inbar, Israel’s National Security; Navon, “From Kippur to Oslo, 1973–1993,” 1–40.

6. Bar-Joseph, “Strategic Surprise Or Fundamental Flaws? the Sources of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War,” 509–530; and Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 1–33; and Golan, “In the Shadow of Surprise,” 88–97.

7. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew).

8. For a description of the Israeli intelligence system see, for instance: Kahana, “Reorganizing Israel’s Intelligence Community,” 415–428.

9. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep.

10. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973,” 546. Gelber himself served as a military and scientific assistant to the Agranat Commission.

11. Ben-Zvi, “Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks,” 381–395. Ben‐Zvi, “Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 227–242. Ben-Zvi, “The Study of Surprise Attacks,” 129–149. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” 461–502. Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 348–380.

12. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles,” 455–467. Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,” 655–672.

13. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept,” 81–104.

14. Sheffy, ”vercoming Strategic Weakness,” 809–828; and Ze’evi, “The Egyptian Deception Plan (in Hebrew),” 431–438.

15. The most recent website containing declassified materials is: https://yomkipurwar.mod.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx (in Hebrew)

16. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 1–33. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War”, 531–546. Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” 75–99. McDermott and Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor. Bar-Joseph also relied on primary sources to study other aspects of the Yom Kippur War beyond those of intelligence, such as: Bar-Joseph, A War of its Own: The Air Force in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew).

17. Even, “Forty-Five Years since the Yom Kippur War: Intelligence and Risk Management in the Thirty Hours Preceding the War,” 141–165. Rom, Gilat and Sheldon, “The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun,” 357–373.

18. Bar Joseph has studied several lessons: Bar-Joseph, “Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era,” 70–83.

19. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” 461–502. Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” 348–380. Bar-Joseph, “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 1–33

20. Such as: Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258. Gilbo’a, Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew). Barka’i, Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew). Ya’ari, “Intelligence Assessment in Israel’s Unique Conditions (in Hebrew),” 213–222. Ben-Porat, The Last Report: T Minus 90 (in Hebrew).

21. Intelligence Corps School, “20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of Intelligence (in Hebrew)”. Shapira, Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War – Forty Years After (in Hebrew).

22. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goXJn2WGRwA&list=PLCapdZwzDpNnAHl7KWycMHi-erPE0tUKX&index=20

23. Tel’ad. “The Silence of the Horns (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2J-gZVvzd8 Channel and HOT. “And the Land Shall Not be Quiet (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUhIIRSJZZo&list=PLx3PgeksmQeVpok2H3xNen8nUj1J3r6f4

24. Such as: Buhbut. “The ‘National Estimator’ in an Interview (in Hebrew)”, https://shorturl.at/byzDF

25. Bar-Joseph and Yossef, “The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War,” 584–608. Dekel. “Revised Study of the Intelligence Failures in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” https://bit.ly/3o0CjtI Asher, The Syrians are on the Fences: The Northern Command in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew).

26. Sindawi and Kahana, “The Yom Kippur War: The Successes of Israeli Intelligence,” 762–774. McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor 216–234

27. Bar-Joseph, “Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Thirty-Year Perspective,” 251–266.

28. (in Hebrew)

29. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew)

30. https://archives.mod.gov.il/docs/agranat2/Pages/default.aspx (in Hebrew)

31. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew). Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew). Gazit, Crucial Crossroads (in Hebrew). Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew). Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew). Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew).

32. Such as: Heikal, The Road to Ramadan.

33. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources. Lev-Ran, “Surprise and Early Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (in Hebrew),” 17–21.

34. Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258. Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Ya’ari, “Intelligence Assessment in Israel’s Unique Conditions (in Hebrew),” 213–222. Lev-Ran, “Surprise and Early Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (in Hebrew),” 17–21

35. Bar-Joseph, “Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era,” 70–83

36. Bar-Joseph and McDermott, “Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reform,” 127–145.

37. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 25–38.

38. The Agranat Commission, The Report of the Agranat Commission (in Hebrew)

39. Gazit, Between Early Warning and Surprise: On the Responsibility for National Intelligence Estimate in Israel (in Hebrew). 12–23

40. Mossad is the Israeli foreign intelligence and special operations agency. In Yom Kippur, it was solely a collection and operational organization with no formal responsibility for analysis.

41. Molchdesky, “The Conception in the Hand of Language (in Hebrew),” 34–64. Gazit, Between Early Warning and Surprise: On the Responsibility for National Intelligence Estimate in Israel (in Hebrew). Ofer and Kober, eds., Intelligence and National Security (in Hebrew).

42. Intelligence Corps School, ’20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of Intelligence (in Hebrew).

43. Limor. “’Israel has the Ability to Completely Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program’”, https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/03/29/israel-has-the-ability-to-completely-destroy-irans-nuclear-program/. Limor, “We are Nearing the Threshold of War (in Hebrew),” https://www.israelhayom.co.il/magazine/hashavua/article/8764533 Limor. “A TikTok War and Weapons-Grade Enrichment,” https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/04/29/a-tiktok-war-and-weapons-grade-enrichment/. Limor, “At the End of the Day, it’s all about Iran,” https://www.israelhayom.com/2019/09/29/at-the-end-of-the-day-its-all-about-iran/. Har'el, ‘A First Glimpse into the Research and Analysis Division of AMAN (in Hebrew)’, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1699717 Greenwood. “A Glimpse into the Research and Analysis Division of AMAN (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/gBI67 Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes

44. Col. Itai, “The Minefield of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 78–95.

45. Lt. Col. Shay, “The Era of Agranat is Over (in Hebrew),” 106–109.

46. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew)”.

47. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew)

48. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew); Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,” 87. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in may 1973,” 520–546.

49. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 198

50. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 59–78. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew)

51. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,” 81–104

52. Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Gelber, “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in may 1973,” 520–546. Gilbo’a, Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew)

53. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel

54. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 89–92

55. The topic of indications and warning is one the most prominent in intelligence studies; for instance, see: Wirtz, “Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,” 550–562.

56. https://archive.kippur-center.org/mid-southern-command/leket-modin-51073.pdf (in Hebrew).

57. Ben-Porat, The Last Report: T Minus 90 (in Hebrew)

58. Spofford and Warren L. Henderson, Anwar El Sadat and the Art of the Possible: A Look at the Yom Kippur War. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 29–30

59. Kahana, “Early Warning Versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973,” 84–85

60. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 678 Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 71–79

61. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 67

62. Shapira, “Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and using Conceptual Frameworks,” 283–299.

63. Stivi-Kerbis, “The Surprise of Peace: The Challenge of Intelligence in Identifying Positive Strategic-Political Shifts,” 448–466. Gazit. “The Egyptian Peace Initiative – the Intelligence Background (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tyt77pX2pds

64. As in: Wirtz, “Theory of Surprise,” 97–111. Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” 1–56. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack : Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.

65. See also: Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse”, 781.

66. Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,” 172.

67. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. 31

68. Flawed assumptions are described in the literature as a typical pitfall of intelligence analysis; see: Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” 157–170.

69. Several similarities can be found to the flawed US intelligence assessment during the Cuban missile crisis, where the national estimate assigned low probability for the Soviets placing offensive missiles in Cuba, even though military force build-up was identified. The intelligence assessment and national decision-making changed only after a reconnaissance flight revealed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, for instance: Wirtz, “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 120–149. Zegart, “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure,” 23–39. Merom, “The 1962 Cuban Intelligence Estimate: A Methodological Perspective,” 48–80.

70. See, for instance: Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?” 199–225.

71. Odom, “Intelligence Analysis,” 316–332.

72. Pili, “Deciphering Intelligence Analysis: The Synthetic Nature of the Core Intelligence Function,” 128–142.

73. Such as: Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 40–45. Lev-Ran, ‘Surprise and Early Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (in Hebrew),” 17–21. Gilbo’a, “Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Not always Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 251–258

74. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew). Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew)

75. Intelligence Corps School, “20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of Intelligence (in Hebrew)” 30.

76. Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis (in Hebrew).

77. The issue of objectivity in intelligence is a broad one and beyond the scope of the current article. For an example of an Israeli scholar who provided harsh criticism of objectivity in intelligence see: Amos Granit, “The Development of the Intelligence Idea in America (in Hebrew),” Tel-Aviv University, 2006).

78. Brun, Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes 30–31

79. These topics have received extensive attention in recent years. For instance, see: Jones, “Critical Epistemology for Analysis of Competing Hypotheses,” 273–289. Borg, ‘Improving Intelligence Analysis: Harnessing Intuition and Reducing Biases by Means of Structured Methodology,” 2–22. US Government, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Artner, Richard S. Girven and James B. Bruce, Assessing the Value of Structured Analytic Techniques in the U.S. Intelligence Community.

80. Ben-Israel, Dialogues on Science and Intelligence (in Hebrew). Ben-Israel, ‘Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process’, 660–718.

81. Col. Itzhak, “The Philosophy of Intelligence: The Logic of the Assessment Process (in Hebrew),” 145–182.

82. For a discussion of tacit knowledge in intelligence analysis see: Ormerod, “Michael Polanyi and the Epistemology of Intelligence Analysis,” 377–391.

83. Brun, “Approaches to Intelligence Research in the Post-Truth Era,” 142–151.

84. Wasserman, “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” 156–159.

85. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 171–211.

86. Shapira, “Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and using Conceptual Frameworks,” 283–299

87. George, ”Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis,” 385–404.

88. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 141.

89. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 137–141. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 141–148

90. Whitesmith, “Justified True Belief Theory for Intelligence Analysis,” 835–849.

91. Bar-joseph, “The Intelligence Chief Who Went Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel’s Best Source Ever,” 226–248. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 122–123

92. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” 139–143

93. Ben-Porat, “The Problematics of the Intelligence Estimate (in Hebrew),” 19–25.

94. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 30–33

95. Gaspard and Pili, “Integrating Intelligence Theory with Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue,” 763–776. Quist, “What Philosophy can do for Intelligence,” 777–790.

96. Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,” 765–784

97. Shahak, “AMAN Director Introduction (in Hebrew),” 7–8.

98. Hershkovitz and Siman-Tov, “Analytical Early Warning, Agents Early Warning and Electronical Early Warning: The Evolving Early Warning Concept in the 1950s (in Hebrew),” 258–279.

99. Sheffy, “Early Warning of Intentions Or of Capabilities? Revisiting the Israeli – Egyptian Rotem Affair, 1960,” 420–437.

100. Siman-Tov and Shmuel Even, “The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War,” 135–148. Hershkovitz, “’A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse,” 776–778

101. Tal, “Early Warning in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” (annex). Bar-Lev, “The Decision-Maker and Intelligence: From a Decision-Maker’s Perspective (in Hebrew),” 489.

102. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew)

103. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 73–84.

104. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 247.

105. Ben-Porat, ,”Intelligence Assessments: Why do they Collapse? (in Hebrew),” 223–250. Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew). Ben-Porat, “The Problematics of the Intelligence Estimate (in Hebrew),” 19–25

106. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources

107. https://archive.kippur-center.org/mid-southern-command/atraa-modinit-june73.pdf (in Hebrew). Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 535

108. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 78.

109. Yadlin. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (in Hebrew)”.

110. Ya’alon, “Intelligence from the Viewpoint of the Decision Maker (in Hebrew)”, 13–16.

111. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning 17–25

112. Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Hilsman, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” 1–45. Marrin, ‘Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy,” 725–742.

113. For example, see: National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: Climate Change and International Responses – Increasing Challenges to US National Security through 2040. Bowsher, Bernard and Sullivan, “A Health Intelligence Framework for Pandemic Response: Lessons from the UK Experience of COVID-19,”.

114. Wirtz, “Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty,” 550–562

115. Gentry and Gordon, “U.S. Strategic Warning Intelligence: Situation and Prospects,” 19–53.

116. Such as in the US NIE (national intelligence estimate) regarding the Iranian nuclear project published in 2007: Treverton, “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” 164–175.

117. Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” 7–51.

118. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism,” 31–55.

119. Barnea, We Never Expected that: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence .

120. For a discussion of the Israeli experience pertaining to the upheaval in the Middle East which emerged in 2010 see, for instance: Pascovich, “Intelligence Assessment regarding Social Developments: The Israeli Experience,” 84–114.

121. Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew)

122. Mann. “Northern Command Intelligence Prior to the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/gjsx4

123. Mertz, “Navy Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” 48–51.

124. Neta, Indications and Warning for War (in Hebrew).

125. Mertz, “Navy Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” 49–50

126. Mann, “On the Obtuseness in the Research Division in these Dark Days (in Hebrew),” 75.

127. Bril, “AMAN’s Research and Analysis Division was the One Who Ignored an Abundance of Indications and Warnings (in Hebrew),” 85–93. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 186 Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 42

128. Siman-Tov and Hershkovitz, AMAN Out of the Shadows: The First Decade of the IDF Intelligence Directorate (in Hebrew).

129. Shapira, Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War – Forty Years After (in Hebrew) 74–77

130. Even, ”From National Intelligence Assessment to National Risk Assessment (in Hebrew),” 23–32.

131. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 95

132. Mann. “Northern Command Intelligence Prior to the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew),” Mann, ‘On the Obtuseness in the Research Division in these Dark Days (in Hebrew)’, 72–79

133. Bar Joseph, The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel

134. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 85

135. Ya’ari, “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 42.

136. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 186–187

137. Ze’ira, Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) 91–95

138. Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 531–546 Raz, “The Hands of Ze’Ira and the Voice of Dayan (in Hebrew),” 162–213. Langotzky. ”The Truth about the ‘Special Means’ (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/dkns1

139. Gilbo’a, Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (in Hebrew) 7.

140. Bril, “AMAN’s Research and Analysis Division was the One Who Ignored an Abundance of Indications and Warnings (in Hebrew),” 85–93

141. Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War”, 536.

142. Ibid, 537–538. Aderet. “Military Intelligence Chief Misled Israeli Leaders Ahead of 1973 War, Declassified Doc Reveals (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/apxO9

143. As edited by Bar-Joseph in: Bar-Joseph, ‘The “Special Means of Collection”: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War’, 537.

144. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 97–104

145. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 148–149 Bar-Joseph, “The ‘Special Means of Collection’: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War,” 538

146. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,” 959–979.

147. Hulnick, ,”The Intelligence Producer – Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” 229. Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence 24. A famous historical example for this is Winston Churchill: Andrew, “Churchill and Intelligence,” 181–193. Aldrich and Cormac, ”From Circumspection to Centrality: Prime Ministers and the Growth of Analysis, Co-Ordination, Management in the UK Intelligence Community,” 7–24.

148. Miller, “Improving all-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation,” 337–354.

149. Gibson, “Future Roles of the UK Intelligence System,” 918–921.

150. Eldridge, Hobbs and Moran, ”Fusing Algorithms and Analysts: Open-Source Intelligence in the Age of ‘Big Data’,”, 391–406. Miller, ‘Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): An Oxymoron?” 702–719. Williams and Ilana Blum, Defining Second Generation Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the Defense Enterprise.

151. Goldstein, “The Six Day War: The War that no One Wanted,” 767–784.

152. Rezk, “Re-Evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis,” 470–495.

153. Rezk, “Orientalism and Intelligence Analysis: Deconstructing Anglo-American Notions of the ‘Arab’,” 224–245.

154. Ze’ira. “What did we Collect, what did we Assess (in Hebrew),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3Dcw-CIUU8

155. Gilbo’a, Mr. Intelligence (in Hebrew) 576.

156. Shalev, Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) 166–173

157. Limor. “We are Nearing the Threshold of War (in Hebrew)”.

158. Yelamos, Goodman and Stout, “Intelligence and Culture: An Introduction,” 476–478. Duyvesteyn, ,”Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?,” 445–459.

159. Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew)

160. Barka’i, Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 90–91.

161. Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism.

162. Dostri and Michael, “The Role of Human Terrain and Cultural Intelligence in Contemporary Hybrid and Urban Warfare,” 87–88.

163. Shapira, “The Main Challenges Facing Strategic Intelligence,” 3–19.

164. Eyal, ,”Dangerous Liaisons between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel,” 653–693.

165. Milstein, “The Lack of in-Depth Understanding about Objects Researched by the Intelligence Community,” 67–77.

166. McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor

167. Ibid, 213

168. Bar-Joseph, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” 75–99

169. Neta, Indications and Warning for War (in Hebrew)

170. Tochfeld. “Northern Command’s Intelligence Officer: I had Tons of Information (in Hebrew),” https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/528311/

171. Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and its Sources 99–100

172. Dvori. “The Officer Who Tried to Warn of War and Scorned Now Speaks (in Hebrew),” https://shorturl.at/nFMX4

173. Mendel. “The Colossal Failure in AMAN (in Hebrew),” https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4423154,00.html

174. Ben-Porat, Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew)

175. Zamir, With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew)

176. McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor

177. For a detailed analysis of Yariv’s career and personality see: Gilbo’a, Mr. Intelligence (in Hebrew)

178. Barka’i, An Error’s Flap of Wings (in Hebrew) 48–49

179. Yariv, Ze’ira’s predecessor, was described as embracing a new analytical paradigm several weeks prior to the Six Days War in 1967; see: Siman-Tov, “The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War,” 135–148

180. Buhbut. “The ‘National Estimator’ in an Interview (in Hebrew),” Limor. ‘At the End of the Day, it’s all about Iran,” Limor. “A TikTok War and Weapons-Grade Enrichment,” Kochavi. “The Lesson from Yom Kippur: Nothing is Taken for Granted (in Hebrew),” https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4132491,00.html

181. Shapira. “The Israeli Perspective on Strategic Intelligence,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3Q2XBPZtxM

182. Col. Itai, “The Minefield of Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 78–95

183. Pascovich, “The Devil’s Advocate in Intelligence: The Israeli Experience,” 854–865.

184. The author of this article has also served as the head of this department.

185. Sternberg, David Siman-Tov and Doron Matza, Devil’s Advocate: A Journey through the Paths of Israeli Review (in Hebrew). 6–7

186. Sternberg, Devil’s Advocate: A Journey through the Paths of Israeli Review (in Hebrew)

187. Col. and I., “Intelligence Supervision: Creating Relevance in the Present Era,” 121–130. Col., “A ‘Red Team’ for the Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence (in Hebrew),” 48–56.

188. Kitri, “Summary of Workshop about ‘Iphcha Mistabra’ and Disruptive Thinking (in Hebrew)”.

189. Dylan and Maguire, “Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War” 33–74. Abdalla, Davies, Gustafson, et al. ‘Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part 1’, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/intelligence-and-the-war-in-ukraine-part-1/. Zegart, ‘Open Secrets: Ukraine and the Next Intelligence Revolution’.

190. Rovner. “Was the 2016 Election an Intelligence Failure?” https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/2016-election-intelligence-failure/

191. Rønn, “The Multifaceted Norm of Objectivity in Intelligence Practices,” 1–15. Coulthart, “Why do Analysts use Structured Analytic Techniques? an in-Depth Study of an American Intelligence Agency,” 933–948.

192. Baudet et al., Military Intelligence: From Telling Truth to Power to Bewilderment?, 1–22. Spoor and de Werd, “Complexity in Military Intelligence,” 1–21.

193. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” 78–111. Jones and Silberzahn, Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001.