The Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years: what lessons can be learned?

Bibliography

• Abdalla, N. S., P. H. J. Davies, K. Gustafson, D. Lomas, and S. Wagner. “Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: Part 1.” Accessed May 20, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/intelligence-and-the-war-in-ukraine-part-1/.
   Google Scholar
• Aderet, O. “Military Intelligence Chief Misled Israeli Leaders Ahead of 1973 War, Declassified Doc Reveals (In Hebrew).” Accessed May 16, 2023. https://shorturl.at/apxO9.
   Google Scholar
• The Agranat Commission. The Report of the Agranat Commission (In Hebrew). Jerusalem: Ministry of Defense and IDF Archives, 1974.
   Google Scholar
• Aldrich, R. J., and R. Cormac. “From Circumspection to Centrality: Prime Ministers and the Growth of Analysis, Co-Ordination, Management in the UK Intelligence Community.” Journal of Intelligence History 20, no. 1 (2021): 7–24. doi:10.1080/16161262.2020.1751512.
   Google Scholar
• Andrew, C. “Churchill and Intelligence.” Intelligence & National Security 3, no. 3 (1988): 181–193. doi:10.1080/02684528808431961.
   Google Scholar
• Asher, D. The Syrians are on the Fences: The Northern Command in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. A War of Its Own: The Air Force in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew). Israel 2021: Kinneret-Zmora-Dvir.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources. Ithaca, NY: University of New York Press, 2005. doi:10.1353/book4957
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “Main Trends in the Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Thirty-Year Perspective.” The Journal of Israeli History 24, no. 2 (2005): 251–266. doi:10.1080/13531040500195760.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “The Intelligence Chief Who Went Fishing in the Cold: How Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eli Zeira Exposed the Identity of Israel’s Best Source Ever.” Intelligence & National Security 23, no. 2 (2008): 226–248. doi:10.1080/02684520801977378.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “Lessons Not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era.” Israel Affairs 14, no. 1 (2008): 70–83. doi:10.1080/13537120701706005.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Sources of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.” The Journal of Military History 72, no. 2 (2008): 509–530. doi:10.1353/jmh.2008.0127.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “The “Special Means of Collection”: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War.” The Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (2013): 531–546. doi:10.3751/67.4.12.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U. “The Yom Kippur War and Intelligence (In Hebrew.” Studied in the Formation of Israel 23 (2013): 1–33. https://in.bgu.ac.il/bgi/iyunim/Pages/23.aspx.
   Google Scholar
• Bar Joseph, U. The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel. New York, NY: Harper, 2016.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U., and A. W. Kruglanski. “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise.” Political Psychology 24, no. 1 (2003): 75–99. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00317.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U., and R. McDermott. “Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reform.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 2 (2008): 127–145. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00061.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bar-Joseph, U., and A. Yossef. “The Hidden Factors That Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 584–608. doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.920255.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barka’i, A. An Error’s Flap of Wings (In Hebrew). Ramat Hashoron: Israeli Center for Intelligence Heritage, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Barka’i, A. Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings (In Hebrew). Ramat Hasharon: Israeli Center for Intelligence Heritage, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-Lev, H. ““The Decision-Maker and Intelligence: From a Decision-Maker’s Perspective (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 487–490. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Barnea, A. We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021.
   Google Scholar
• Baudet, F., E. Braat, J. van Woensel, and A. Wever. Military Intelligence: From Telling Truth to Power to Bewilderment?. The Hague: The Hague, 2017. doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_1.
   Google Scholar
• Ben‐Zvi, A. “Between Warning and Response: The Case of the Yom Kippur War.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 4, no. 2 (1990): 227–242. doi:10.1080/08850609008435141.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Israel, I. Dialogues on Science and Intelligence (In Hebrew). Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1989.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Israel, I. “Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process.” Intelligence & National Security 4, no. 4 (1989): 660–718. doi:10.1080/02684528908432023.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Porat, Y. “The Problematics of the Intelligence Estimate (In Hebrew.”Ma’Arach’Ot 296, (December 22, 1984): 19–25. https://bit.ly/3mxaCaY
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Porat, Y. The Last Report: T Minus 90 (In Hebrew). Ramat Hasharon, 1985.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Porat, Y. “Intelligence Assessments: Why Do They Collapse? (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 223–250. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Porat, Y. Closure: The Story of the Yom Kippur War Surprise (in Hebrew) Tel Aviv 1991: Yedi’ot Aharonot.
   Google Scholar
• Ben-Zvi, A. “Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks.” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 381–395. doi:10.2307/2009976.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ben-Zvi, A. “The Study of Surprise Attacks.” British Journal of International Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 129–149. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096859.
   Google Scholar
• Booth, K. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. London: Croom Helm, 1979.
   Google Scholar
• Borg, L. C. “Improving Intelligence Analysis: Harnessing Intuition and Reducing Biases by Means of Structured Methodology.” The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 19, no. 1 (2017): 2–22. doi:10.1080/23800992.2017.1289747.
   Google Scholar
• Bowsher, G., R. Bernard, and R. Sullivan. “A Health Intelligence Framework for Pandemic Response: Lessons from the UK Experience of COVID-19.” Health Security (2020). doi:10.1089/hs.2020.0108.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bril, S. “Aman’s Research and Analysis Division Was the One Who Ignored an Abundance of Indications and Warnings (In Hebrew).” In Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings, edited by A. Barka’i, 85–93 . Ramat Hasharon: Israeli Intelligence Heritage Center, 2014 November.
   Google Scholar
• Bruce, J. B. “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence.” In Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations, edited by R. Z. George and J. B. Bruce, 171–211. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Brun, I. Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in an Era of Dramatic Changes Ramat Hasharon 2018: Israel Intelligence Heritage Center.
   Google Scholar
• Brun, I. “Approaches to Intelligence Research in the Post-Truth Era.” Intelligence in Theory and Practice 3 (2018): 142–151. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2018/11/125_18_M.pdf. October.
   Google Scholar
• Buhbut, A. “The “National Estimator” in an Interview (In Hebrew).” Accessed November 2, 2022. https://shorturl.at/byzDF
   Google Scholar
• Chan, S. “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning.” The American Political Science Review 73, no. 1 (March 1979): 171–180. doi:10.2307/1954739.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Channel, 1. and HOT. “And the Land Shall Not Be Quiet (In Hebrew.” Accessed November 29, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUhIIRSJZZo&list=PLx3PgeksmQeVpok2H3xNen8nUj1J3r6f4
   Google Scholar
• Charlotte, Y., M. S. Goodman, and M. Stout. “Intelligence and Culture: An Introduction.” Intelligence & National Security 37, no. 4 (2022): 475–481. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2065610.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Col., D. “A “Red Team” for the Multi-Disciplinary Intelligence (In Hebrew.” Intelligence in Theory and Practice 6, (December 2020): 48–56. https://bit.ly/3tElMhz
   Google Scholar
• Col., I. “The Minefield of Intelligence (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and the Decision Maker, edited by O. Kazmirski, N. Grossman-Aloni, and S. Aludi, 78–95. Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Defence, 2004.
   Google Scholar
• Col., Itzhak. “The Philosophy of Intelligence: The Logic of the Assessment Process (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 145–182. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Col., S., and V. I. “Intelligence Supervision: Creating Relevance in the Present Era.” Intelligence in Theory and Practice 2 (2017): 121–130. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2017/12/Intelligence-in-Theory-and-in-Practice-no.2.pdf-. November.
   Google Scholar
• Coulthart, S. “Why Do Analysts Use Structured Analytic Techniques? An In-Depth Study of an American Intelligence Agency.” Intelligence & National Security 31, no. 7 (2016): 933–948. doi:10.1080/02684527.2016.1140327.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dahl, E. J. “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 31–55. doi:10.1080/01402390500032005.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dahl, E. J. Intelligence and Surprise Attack : Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013. doi:10.1353/book26551
   Google Scholar
• Davis, J. “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts.” In Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, edited by R. Z. George and J. B. Bruce, 157–170. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Dekel, E. “Revised Study of the Intelligence Failures in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew).” Accessed November 29, 2021. https://bit.ly/3o0CjtI.
   Google Scholar
• Dostri, O., and K. Michael. “The Role of Human Terrain and Cultural Intelligence in Contemporary Hybrid and Urban Warfare.” The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 21, no. 1 (2019): 84–102. doi:10.1080/23800992.2019.1598653.
   Google Scholar
• Duyvesteyn, I. “Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?” Intelligence & National Security 26, no. 4 (2011): 445–459. doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.580598.
   Google Scholar
• Dvori, N. “The Officer Who Tried to Warn of War and Scorned Now Speaks (In Hebrew).” Accessed March 9, 2023. https://shorturl.at/nFMX4.
   Google Scholar
• Dylan, H., and T. J. Maguire. “Secret Intelligence and Public Diplomacy in the Ukraine War.” Survival 64, no. 4 (2022): 33–74. doi:10.1080/00396338.2022.2103257.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Eldridge, C., C. Hobbs, and M. Moran. “Fusing Algorithms and Analysts: Open-Source Intelligence in the Age of ‘Big Data.” Intelligence & National Security 33, no. 3 (2018): 391–406. doi:10.1080/02684527.2017.1406677.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Even, S. “From National Intelligence Assessment to National Risk Assessment (In Hebrew).” In Challenges for Israel’s Intelligence Community, edited by S. Even and D. Siman-Tov, 23–32. Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2017.
   Google Scholar
• Even, S. “Forty-Five Years Since the Yom Kippur War: Intelligence and Risk Management in the Thirty Hours Preceding the War”. Cyber, Intelligence and Security, 3 no. 1 (May 2019): 141–165. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/forty-five-years-since-the-yom-kippur-war-intelligence-and-risk-management-in-the-thirty-hours-preceding-the-war/
   Google Scholar
• Eyal, G. “Dangerous Liaisons Between Military Intelligence and Middle Eastern Studies in Israel.” Theory & Society 31, no. 5 (2002): 653–693. doi:10.1023/A:1021302211194.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ferris, J. “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?” Intelligence & National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 199–225. doi:10.1080/0268452042000302967.
   Google Scholar
• Gaspard, J. J. S., and G. Pili. “Integrating Intelligence Theory with Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Intelligence & National Security 37, no. 6 (2022): 763–776. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2076327.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gavriely-Nuri, D. Israeli Culture on the Road to the Yom Kippur War. Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Gazit, S. “The Egyptian Peace Initiative - the Intelligence Background (In Hebrew).” INSS.Accessed November 1, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tyt77pX2pds.
   Google Scholar
• Gazit, S. Between Early Warning and Surprise: On the Responsibility for National Intelligence Estimate in Israel (In Hebrew). Tel-Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003.
   Google Scholar
• Gazit, S. Crucial Crossroads (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv 2016: Miskal.
   Google Scholar
• Gelber, Y. “The Collapse of the Israeli Intelligence’s Conception: Apologetics, Memory and History of the Israeli Response to Egypt’s Alleged Intention to Open War in May 1973.” Intelligence & National Security 28, no. 4 (2013): 520–546. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.699289.
   Google Scholar
• Gentry, J. A., and J. S. Gordon. “U.S. Strategic Warning Intelligence: Situation and Prospects.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 31, no. 1 (2018): 19–53. doi:10.1080/08850607.2017.1374149.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• George, R. Z. “Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 17, no. 3 (2004): 385–404. doi:10.1080/08850600490446727.
   Google Scholar
• Gibson, S. D. “Future Roles of the UK Intelligence System.” Review of International Studies 35, no. 4 (2009): 917–928. doi:10.1017/S0260210509990350.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gilbo’a, A. “Intelligence Assessments: Why Do They Not Always Collapse? (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 251–258. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Gilbo’a, A. Mr. Intelligence (In Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Acharonot Books, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Gilbo’a, A. Crucial Warning Goes Unheeded (In Hebrew). Ramat Hasharon: Center for Heritage of Intelligence, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Golan, S. “In the Shadow of Surprise: The Supreme Command in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew.” Ma’arachot 403-4, ((December 21, 2005)): 88–97. https://shorturl.at/gGKO1.
   Google Scholar
• Goldstein, Y. “The Six Day War: The War That No One Wanted.” Israel Affairs 24, no. 5 (2018): 767–784. doi:10.1080/13537121.2018.1505475.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grabo, C. M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002.
   Google Scholar
• Granit, T. A. “The Development of the Intelligence Idea in America. (in Hebrew).“ Tel-Aviv University, 2006.
   Google Scholar
• Greenwood, H. “A Glimpse into the Research and Analysis Division of AMAN (In Hebrew).” Accessed October 31, 2021. https://shorturl.at/gBI67
   Google Scholar
• Handel, M. I. “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise.” International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1977): 461–502. doi:10.2307/2600234.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Handel, M. I. “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise.” In Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, edited by R. K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken, 1–56. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
   Google Scholar
• Har’el, A. “A First Glimpse into the Research and Analysis Division of AMAN (In Hebrew).” Accessed March 19, 2022. https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1699717
   Google Scholar
• Heikal, H. The Road to Ramadan. London: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co, 1975.
   Google Scholar
• Hershkovitz, S. ““A Three-Story Building”: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 30, no. 4 (2017): 765–784. doi:10.1080/08850607.2017.1297122.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hershkovitz, S., and D. Siman-Tov. “Analytical Early Warning, Agents Early Warning and Electronical Early Warning: The Evolving Early Warning Concept in the 1950s (In Hebrew.” Studies in the Formation of Israel 21 (2011): 258–279.
   Google Scholar
• Hilsman, R. “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs.” World Politics 5, no. 1 (1952): 1–45. doi:10.2307/2009086.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hilsman, R. Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956.
   Google Scholar
• Hulnick, A. S. “The Intelligence Producer – Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach.” Intelligence & National Security 1, no. 2 (1986): 212–233. doi:10.1080/02684528608431850.
   Google Scholar
• Hulnick, A. S. “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle.” Intelligence & National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–979. doi:10.1080/02684520601046291.
   Google Scholar
• Inbar, E. Israel’s National Security : Issues and Challenges Since the Yom Kippur War. London: Routledge, 2008.
   Google Scholar
• Intelligence Corps School. “20 Years to the Yom Kippur War: A Series of Symposiums to Study the Role of Intelligence (In Hebrew).” Ramat Hasharon, Intelligence Corps School, (July1994).
   Google Scholar
• Jones, N. “Critical Epistemology for Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.” Intelligence & National Security 33, no. 2 (2018): 273–289. doi:10.1080/02684527.2017.1395948.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jones, N, and P. Silberzahn. Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947-2001. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. doi:10.11126/stanford/9780804785808.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Kahana, E. “Early Warning versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973.” Intelligence & National Security 17, no. 2 (2002): 81–104. doi:10.1080/02684520412331306500.
   Google Scholar
• Kahana, E. “Reorganizing Israel’s Intelligence Community.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 15, no. 3 (2002): 415–428. doi:10.1080/08850600290101686.
   Google Scholar
• Kitri, R. Summary of Workshop About “Iphcha Mistabra” and Disruptive Thinking (In Hebrew). Ramat Hasharon: Center for Intelligence Heritage, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Knorr, K. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles.” World Politics 16, no. 3 (1964): 455–467. doi:10.2307/2009582.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kochavi, A. “The Lesson from Yom Kippur: Nothing is Taken for Granted (In Hebrew).” Accessed April 22, 2023. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4132491,00.html
   Google Scholar
• Langotzky, Y. “The Truth About the ‘Special Means’(In Hebrew).” Accessed April 13, 2023. https://shorturl.at/dkns1
   Google Scholar
• Lanir, Z. Fundamental Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis (In Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Hakibutz Hame’uhad, 1983.
   Google Scholar
• Lebel, U., and E. Lewin, eds. The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the Reshaping of Israeli Civil-Military Relations. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Lev-Ran, A. “Surprise and Early Warning: Reflections on Foundational Questions (In Hebrew.”Ma’arachot 276-7, (November 21, 1980): 17–21. https://bit.ly/3AhJ1AT
   Google Scholar
• Limor, Y. “At the End of the Day, It’s All About Iran.” Accessed May 18, 2022. https://www.israelhayom.com/2019/09/29/at-the-end-of-the-day-its-all-about-iran/
   Google Scholar
• Limor, Y. “‘Israel Has the Ability to Completely Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program’.” Accessed July 3, 2021. https://www.israelhayom.com/2021/03/29/israel-has-the-ability-to-completely-destroy-irans-nuclear-program/
   Google Scholar
• Limor, Y. “A TikTok War and Weapons-Grade Enrichment.” Accessed May 11, 2022. https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/04/29/a-tiktok-war-and-weapons-grade-enrichment/
   Google Scholar
• Limor, Y. “We are Nearing the Threshold of War (In Hebrew).” Accessed September 9, 2022. https://www.israelhayom.co.il/magazine/hashavua/article/8764533
   Google Scholar
• Mann, H. “Northern Command Intelligence Prior to the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew).” Accessed April 22, 2023. http://www.goldameir.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=527&langpage=heb
   Google Scholar
• Mann, H. “On the Obtuseness in the Research Division in These Dark Days (In Hebrew).” In Comments: An Error’s Flap of Wings, edited by A. Barka’i, 72–79. Israel: Ramat Hasharon, 2015.
   Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 655–672. doi:10.1080/08850600490496452.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marrin, S. “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy.” Intelligence & National Security 32, no. 6 (2017): 725–742. doi:10.1080/02684527.2016.1275139.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McDermott, R., and U. Bar-Joseph. Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199341733.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Mendel, R. “The Colossal Failure in AMAN (In Hebrew).” Accessed April 15, 2023. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4423154,00.html
   Google Scholar
• Merom, G. “The 1962 Cuban Intelligence Estimate: A Methodological Perspective.” Intelligence & National Security 14, no. 3 (1999): 48–80. doi:10.1080/02684529908432552.
   Google Scholar
• Mertz, U. “Navy Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew.” Mabat Malam 67, (November 2013): 48–51. https://www.intelligence.org.il/userfiles/banners/mabat_malam_67c.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Miller, B. H. “Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 337–354. doi:10.1080/08850600701854417.
   Google Scholar
• Miller, B. H. “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): An Oxymoron?” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 31, no. 4 (2018): 702–719. doi:10.1080/08850607.2018.1492826.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Milstein, M. “The Lack of In-Depth Understanding About Objects Researched by the Intelligence Community.” Intelligence in Theory and Practice 2 (2017): 67–77. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2017/12/Intelligence-in-Theory-and-in-Practice-no.2.pdf. November.
   Google Scholar
• Molchdesky, N. “The Conception in the Hand of Language (In Hebrew.” Studies in the Formation of Israel 23 (2013): 34–64.
   Google Scholar
• National Intelligence Council. National Intelligence Estimate: Climate Change and International Responses - Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040. Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021.
   Google Scholar
• Navon, E. “From Kippur to Oslo: Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1973-1993.” Israel Affairs 10, no. 3 (2004): 1–40. doi:10.1080/1353712042000242563.
   Google Scholar
• Neta, Z. Indications and Warning for War (In Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Yedi’ot Sfarim, 2022.
   Google Scholar
• Odom, W. E. “Intelligence Analysis.” Intelligence & National Security 23, no. 3 (2008): 316–332. doi:10.1080/02684520802121216.
   Google Scholar
• Ofer, Z. and A. Kober, eds. Intelligence and National Security (In Hebrew). Mirkam. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Ormerod, O. “Michael Polanyi and the Epistemology of Intelligence Analysis.” Intelligence & National Security 36, no. 3 (2021): 377–391. doi:10.1080/02684527.2020.1836828.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pascovich, E. “Intelligence Assessment Regarding Social Developments: The Israeli Experience.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 26, no. 1 (2013): 84–114. doi:10.1080/08850607.2012.705625.
   Google Scholar
• Pascovich, E. “The Devil’s Advocate in Intelligence: The Israeli Experience.” Intelligence & National Security 33, no. 6 (2018): 854–865. doi:10.1080/02684527.2018.1470062.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pili, G. “Deciphering Intelligence Analysis: The Synthetic Nature of the Core Intelligence Function.” Intelligence & National Security 38, no. 1 (2023): 128–142. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2041947.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Quist, T. C. “What Philosophy Can Do for Intelligence.” Intelligence & National Security 37, no. 6 (2022): 777–790. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2076328.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raz, A. “The Hands of Ze’ira and the Voice of Dayan (In Hebrew).” Israelis 5 (2013): 162–213.
   Google Scholar
• Raz, A. “The Significance of the Reputed Yom Kippur War Nuclear Affair”. Strategic Assessments, 16 no. 4 (January 2014): 103–118. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-significance-of-the-reputed-yom-kippur-war-nuclear-affair/
   Google Scholar
• Rezk, D. “Orientalism and Intelligence Analysis: Deconstructing Anglo-American Notions of the ‘Arab.” Intelligence & National Security 31, no. 2 (2016): 224–245. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.949077.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rezk, D. “Re-Evaluating the Yom Kippur ‘Intelligence Failure’: The Cultural Lens in Crisis.” The International History Review 39, no. 3 (2017): 470–495. doi:10.1080/07075332.2016.1230766.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rodman D. Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War : Diplomacy, Battle, and Lessons. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2017. doi:10.2307/j.ctv3029jp6.
   Google Scholar
• Rom, R., A. Gilat, and R. Mary Sheldon. “The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 357–373. doi:10.1080/08850607.2018.1417526.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rønn, K. V. “The Multifaceted Norm of Objectivity in Intelligence Practices.” Intelligence & National Security (2022): 1–15. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2076331.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rovner, J. Was the 2016 Election an Intelligence Failure? Accessed July 6, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/2016-election-intelligence-failure/.
   Google Scholar
• Rovner, J. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801448294.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Shahak, A. “AMAN Director Introduction (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kover, 7–8. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Shalev, A. Failure and Success in Early Warning (in Hebrew) Tel Aviv 2006: Ma’arachot.
   Google Scholar
• Shamir, E. “Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War: A Reassessment.” Intelligence & National Security 36, no. 7 (2021): 1035–1052. doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1946954.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shapira, I. “The Israeli Perspective on Strategic Intelligence.” Accessed April 16, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3Q2XBPZtxM
   Google Scholar
• Shapira, I. “The Main Challenges Facing Strategic Intelligence.” Strategic Assessment 23, no. 1 (January 2020): 3–19. https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/The-main-challenges-facing.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Shapira, I. “Strategic Intelligence as an Art and a Science: Creating and Using Conceptual Frameworks.” Intelligence & National Security 35, no. 2 (2020): 283–299. doi:10.1080/02684527.2019.1681135.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shapira, N. Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War - Forty Years After (In Hebrew). Ramat Hasharon: Center for Heritage of Israeli Intelligence, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Shay, L. C. “The Era of Agranat is Over (In Hebrew.”Ma’arachot 403-404, (December 21, 2005): 106–109. https://bit.ly/3q1VF2O
   Google Scholar
• Sheffy, Y. “Overcoming Strategic Weakness: The Egyptian Deception and the Yom Kippur War.” Intelligence & National Security 21, no. 5 (2006): 809–828.
   Google Scholar
• Sheffy, Y. “Early Warning of Intentions or of Capabilities? Revisiting the Israeli–Egyptian Rotem Affair, 1960.” Intelligence & National Security 28, no. 3 (2013): 420–437. doi:10.1080/02684527.2013.789639.
   Google Scholar
• Shlaim, A. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War.” World Politics; World Pol 28, no. 3 (1976): 348–380. doi:10.2307/2009975.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Siman-Tov, D., and S. Even. “The Six Day War: The Intelligence Assessments on the Road to War.” In Six Days, Fifty Years: The June 1967 War and Its Aftermath, edited by G. Siboni, K. Michael, and A. Kurz, 135–148. Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2018.
   Google Scholar
• Siman-Tov, D., and S. Hershkovitz. AMAN Out of the Shadows: The First Decade of the IDF Intelligence Directorate (In Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Ma’rachot, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Sindawi, K., and E. Kahana. “The Yom Kippur War: The Successes of Israeli Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 28, no. 4 (2015): 762–774. doi:10.1080/08850607.2015.1022470.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spofford, C. R., and W. L. Henderson. Anwar El Sadat and the Art of the Possible: A Look at the Yom Kippur War. Washington DC: National War College, 2001.
   Google Scholar
• Spoor, B., and P. de Werd. “Complexity in Military Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence (2023): 1–21. doi:10.1080/08850607.2023.2209493.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stephen, A., R. S. Girven, and J. B. Bruce. Assessing the Value of Structured Analytic Techniques in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2016. doi:10.7249/RR1408.
   Google Scholar
• Sternberg, D., D. Siman-Tov, and D. Matza. Devil’s Advocate: A Journey Through the Paths of Israeli Review (In Hebrew). Israel: Ramat Hasharon, 2023.
   Google Scholar
• Stivi-Kerbis, S. “The Surprise of Peace: The Challenge of Intelligence in Identifying Positive Strategic-Political Shifts.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 32, no. 3 (2019): 448–466. doi:10.1080/08850607.2019.1565570.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tal, D. “A Tested Alliance: The American Airlift to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.” Israel Studies (Bloomington, Ind); Israel Studies 19, no. 3 (2014): 29–54. doi:10.2979/israelstudies.19.3.29.
   Google Scholar
• Tal, I. “Early Warning in the Yom Kippur War (In Hebrew).” Ramat Hasharon, Intelligence Corps School, 1994.
   Google Scholar
• Tel’ad. “The Silence of the Horns (In Hebrew).” Accessed November 29, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2J-gZVvzd8.
   Google Scholar
• Tochfeld, M. “Northern Command’s Intelligence Officer: I Had Tons of Information (In Hebrew).” Accessed March 9, 2023. https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/528311/.
   Google Scholar
• Treverton, G. F. “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.” Intelligence & National Security 36, no. 2 (2021): 164–175. doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1857072.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tsoref, H. “Golda Meir’s Leadership in the Yom Kippur War.” Israel Studies 23, no. 1 (2018): 50–72. doi:10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.03.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• US Government. A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. Washington DC: US Government, 2009.
   Google Scholar
• Wasserman, B. “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction.” Political Studies 8, no. 2 (1960): 156–159.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Whitesmith, M. “Justified True Belief Theory for Intelligence Analysis.” Intelligence & National Security 37, no. 6 (2022): 835–849. doi:10.1080/02684527.2022.2076332.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williams, H. J., and I. Blum. Defining Second Generation Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the Defense Enterprise. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018.
   Google Scholar
• Wirtz, J. J. “Organizing for Crisis Intelligence: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Intelligence & National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 120–149. doi:10.1080/02684529808432496.
   Google Scholar
• Wirtz, J. J. “Theory of Surprise.” In Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence, edited by R. K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken, 97–111. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
   Google Scholar
• Wirtz, J. J. “Indications and Warning in an Age of Uncertainty.” International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence 26, no. 3 (2013): 550–562. doi:10.1080/08850607.2013.780558.
   Google Scholar
• Wohlstetter, R. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962. doi:10.1515/9781503620698.
   Google Scholar
• Ya’alon, M. “Intelligence from the Viewpoint of the Decision Maker (In Hebrew).” In The Challenges for Israel’s Intelligence Community, edited by S. Even and D. Siman-Tov, 13–16. Tel Aviv: INSS, 2017.
   Google Scholar
• Ya’ari, A. “Intelligence Assessment in Israel’s Unique Conditions (in Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 213–222. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Ya’ari, A. “The Fundamental Mistakes of Intelligence (In Hebrew.” Ma’arachot 448, (April 21, 2013): 40–45. https://bit.ly/3bpx8MM
   Google Scholar
• Yadlin, A. “Intelligence: Secrets, Mysteries and Responsibility (In Hebrew).” INSSAccessed November 1, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goXJn2WGRwA&list=PLCapdZwzDpNnAHl7KWycMHi-erPE0tUKX&index=20.
   Google Scholar
• Yarhi-Milo, K. “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries.” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 7–51. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00128.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yarhi-Milo, K. Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691159157.001.0001.
   Google Scholar
• Zamir, Z. With Eyes Open Wide: The Mossad Director Alerts, is Israel Listening? (in Hebrew) Yehuda2011: Kineret Zmora-Bitan.
   Google Scholar
• Ze’evi, A. “The Egyptian Deception Plan (In Hebrew).” In Intelligence and National Security, edited by Z. Offer and A. Kober, 431–438. Tel-Aviv: Ma’arachot, 1987.
   Google Scholar
• Zegart, A. “Open Secrets: Ukraine and the Next Intelligence Revolution.” Foreign Affairs (December, 2022). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart.
   Google Scholar
• Zegart, A. B. “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies.” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 78–111. doi:10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.78.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zegart, A. B. “The Cuban Missile Crisis as Intelligence Failure.” Policy Review 175, no. 175 (2012): 23–39.
   Google Scholar
• Ze’ira, E. “What Did We Collect, What Did We Assess (In Hebrew).” INSS Accessed November 1, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3Dcw-CIUU8.
   Google Scholar
• Ze’ira, E. Myth Versus Reality: Lessons from the Yom Kippur War (in Hebrew) Tel Aviv 2004: Yedi’ot Aharonot.
   Google Scholar