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Abstract
This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the criterion proposed by Roderick Chisholm, which is based on epistemological particularism. After sketching Chisholm’s approach, a response to epistemic relativism is presented which combines Chisholm’s particularism with epistemic naturalism and reliabilism. A number of objections to the position are then considered. The paper ends with remarks about the relationship between particularism and the naturalistic response proposed to epistemic relativism.
Notes
1 In my view, this is the most fundamental argument for epistemic relativism. I do not know how to prove this, so I merely attempt to strongly suggest that this is so. For my strong suggestion to this effect, see my (Citation2012). Some other authors also share my view of the fundamental nature of the argument (e.g. Williams Citation2007, 94).
2 As is well known, the post-Gettier literature renders this assumption problematic. Still, epistemologists continue to understand knowledge to be something more than mere true belief. For present purposes, it suffices to assume that what is required for knowledge in addition to true belief includes some form of epistemic justification, whether justification is understood in internalist or externalist terms. It may, of course, be necessary to add some further component as well. Myself, I am inclined to interpret the justificatory component in reliabilist terms along the lines of Goldman (Citation1992).
3 In other words, for present purposes I will assume that truth is not relative. Thus, the question of whether coherent sense may be made of a relativized conception of truth may be put aside as not relevant to the topic under discussion.
4 On the Azande poison oracle, see Evans-Pritchard (Citation1976, Chap. 8). For discussion of the poison oracle in the context of the present approach to epistemic relativism, see my (Citation2010).
5 A comment is perhaps in order about my use of the word “norm”. I use the word “norm” to refer to what are sometimes called standards of rationality. Philosophers of science who write about theory-choice often speak of rules of theory-choice or criteria of theory-appraisal. Similarly, Kuhn has a list of scientific values (e.g. accuracy, simplicity, consistency) which guide scientists in their choice of theory. I employ the term “norm” as a general term to refer to such standards, rules, criteria or values, to which appeal is made to justify belief or in the appraisal and acceptance of a scientific theory. Such norms are not epistemic aims or goals in the way that truth is an epistemic aim or goal. They are criteria of epistemic appraisal which are employed in the justification of belief.
6 My mention of Kuhn may help to further specify the kind of relativist position that I have in mind. Though tendencies toward epistemic relativism are present in such authors as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty and Peter Winch, my primary example of a relativist position is that of T. S. Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s view that the rules of puzzle-solving adequacy vary with paradigm, while there are no higher “extraparadigmatic” standards, seems to me to be a clear case of epistemic relativism. I have elaborated my approach to relativism with respect to Kuhn’s position in Structure in my (Citation2013b). It is important to note, of course, that Kuhn moved away from this position in later work.
7 As it happens, I endorse the view that at least some aspects of the methodology of science have undergone change in the history of science, and that there may be variation in methodology between areas of the sciences. But I do not regard the admission that method changes to be an admission of relativism. Such pluralism or variationism is consistent with the view that some methods are objectively better than others, which is what I take the relativist to deny. For discussion, see my (Citation2000).
8 This sentiment is well expressed by Kuhn when he remarks that “As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice—there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community” (Citation1996, 94).
9 There is a purely verbal way to avoid the problem. I could avoid using the word “context” and thereby avoid the confusion. Instead I might follow philosophers such as Goldman (Citation2010) and Williams (Citation2007) who speak of “epistemic systems” when they discuss the issue of epistemic relativism. But, while they are perfectly right to speak in this way, my inclination to speak of contexts is meant to reflect the fact that epistemic systems are themselves thought to vary with respect to background circumstances (e.g. historical time period, intellectual milieu, theoretical framework, etc.). “Context” seems to me to be the best general descriptive term for characterizing such circumstances.
10 My preferred term is “norm” rather than “standard”, but the contextualist speaks of standards. I shall follow this practice for the remainder of this section.
11 There is another way to express this point. Patrick Rysiew locates what I take to be the issue of epistemic relativism in terms of the rejection by the relativist of a metaphysical claim about the absoluteness of epistemic standards. By contrast, the contextualist is interested in the “semantics of knowledge-attributing sentences” (Rysiew Citation2011, 292–293).
12 Michael Williams treats relativism as a form of scepticism, since it tends to undermine confidence in our own beliefs (Citation2007, 96). But, while this may be an appropriate reaction to a claim of relativism, the claim that justification is relative to local standards implies that justification and knowledge exist, albeit in a relativized sense.
13 I have distinguished between a number of different forms that the problem of the criterion takes in Pyrrhonian scepticism (see my Citation2011, Section 2). The differences have no substantial relevance in the present context.
14 One might attempt to avoid the trilemma by taking some propositions to be self-evident. But, if this is to be more than the dogmatic adoption of a proposition, a reason must be given for holding a proposition to be self-evident. Yet appeal to a reason leads back to the justificatory regress, with the associated choice between circularity and the dogmatic acceptance of the proposition.
15 There is some dispute among scholars on how to interpret the Pyrrhonian suspension of belief. According to a standard interpretation, Pyrrhonian sceptics accept appearances but suspend judgement with respect to how things are in reality. See Perin (Citation2010, Chap. 3) for detailed discussion.
16 For further elaboration of the argument, see my (Citation2012). Against my way of putting the point, it has been objected that the appropriate response to the problem of the criterion is to say that the norms are unjustified, not that they are equally justified (see Seidel Citation2013). My response to this is to distinguish between weak and strong justification. According to the relativist, humans may be observed to appeal to a variety of norms to justify their beliefs in a range of different contexts. This is an empirical fact on which relativist and anti-relativist alike may agree. The relativist takes the argument from the criterion to show the norms to be fundamentally unjustified. Here the distinction between weak and strong justification may be employed to reflect the observed practice of appealing to norms to justify beliefs where such norms are not themselves justified. Weak justification is justification of a belief on the basis of a norm whether or not the norm is itself justified. Strong justification occurs when the norm is itself justified. The relativist denies the possibility of strong justification, so that weak justification is the only possible form of justification. For details, see (Sankey Citation2013a).
17 Lest it be thought that the relativist position described in this section is a straw man, I refer the reader to my (Citation2011), where I show that the argument from the criterion has been widely employed by influential thinkers in the history and philosophy of science.
18 It is worth noting that the assumption that we are able to identify cases of knowledge is one that both the naturalist and the particularist may share. Indeed, it seems to me to be a point of convergence between the naturalist and the particularist, which suggests that the naturalist would do well in general to adopt a particularist stance.
19 I am grateful to a referee for raising these issues, thereby giving me an opportunity to address them.
20 For simplicity, I mention only the value of true belief rather than knowledge. It is, of course, a complex matter whether knowledge has a value independent of true belief. However, this question may be set aside in the present context.
21 An internalist may reply that justification does not require that a norm be reliable but only that it be believed to be reliable. But one may believe that any norm is reliable (e.g. crystal-ball gazing, coin-tossing, etc.). Without a requirement that a norm actually conduce to truth, there is no way to exclude such norms as mistaken.
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Notes on contributors
Howard Sankey
Howard Sankey is associate professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. He works on topics such as epistemic relativism, scientific realism and incommensurability. His major publications include; The Incommensurability Thesis (Avebury 1994), Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability (Ashgate 1997), and Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science (Ashgate 2008).