More than meets the gut: a prototype analysis of the lay conceptions of intuition and analysis

ABSTRACT

Using a prototype approach, we assessed people’s lay conceptions of intuition and analysis. Open-ended descriptions of intuition and analysis were generated by participants (Study 1) and resulting exemplars were sorted into features subsequently rated in centrality by independent participants (Study 2). Feature centrality was validated by showing that participants were quicker and more accurate in classifying central (as compared to peripheral) features (Study 3). Centrality ratings suggested a single-factor structure describing analysis but revealed that participants held lay conceptions of intuition as involving two different types of processes: (1) as an automatic, affective, and non-logical processing, and (2) as a holistic processing that can assist in problem-solving. Additional analyses showed that the centrality ratings of intuition’s facets were predicted by participants’ self-reported intuitive style, suggesting intuition is differently perceived by intuitive and non-intuitive people. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of intuition and analysis.

KEYWORDS:

• Intuition
• analysis
• lay conceptions
• prototype analysis
• individual differences

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The distinction of two kinds of thinking by dual-process theories is not without criticism (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In fact, revisions to these theories have been made by dual-process theorists themselves (e.g. De Neys, 2023; Evans, 2017; Pennycook et al., 2018). For the purposes of this paper, we simply use the terms “intuition” and “analysis” to refer to different types of decision processes adopted by people, regardless of whether the types have any kind of dualistic nature rather than activation along a single processing continuum.

2 For Factor 1, the features “Acting in a personal and unique manner” and “Engaging in imagination” were not included because these displayed similar loadings on both factors in this study, whereas, in Study 2, they had loaded higher on Factor 2. For Factor 2, the features “Predicting something will happen” and “Reading people” were also not included due to their inconsistency across studies (loading higher on Factor 1 in Study 2). Additionally, “Avoiding what feels wrong” was also not included due to this feature’s low loading on Factor 2 in this study.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) [grant number: SFRH/BD/110316/2015] awarded to Filipe Loureiro and UIDB/04810/2020.