Iris Murdoch and moral education: An initial conceptual framework and a practical example

ABSTRACT

This article takes up three interrelated elements of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy into an initial conceptual framework for moral education and explores a practical application of this framework to a lesson plan. The three elements are moral vocabulary, moral perception, and the quality of our states of consciousness. The framework constituted by these three elements suggests that moral education should enrich the moral vocabulary of students, sharpen their moral perception, and expand their consciousness. To provide a concrete example of what it would look like to advance these aims, the author shares their experience using Aesop’s fable The Fox and the Crow in community education programs with adolescents.

KEYWORDS:

• Iris Murdoch
• moral vocabulary
• moral perception
• quality of consciousness
• fables

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Iris Murdoch society for allowing me to present a version of this paper at its conference in 2021, as well as the attendees for their comments and questions. Thank you also to the three anonymous reviewers; their detailed feedback was immensely helpful and indicated their expert knowledge of Murdoch’s work and the secondary literature. The paper is much stronger as a result of their comments. Finally, I owe Megan Laverty a special acknowledgement: her kind encouragement and wise counsel were crucial in lifting the article to its present state.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Given the nascent character of the efforts in which I am involved, as well as the nature of the relationships I have developed in this context, I have decided not to name these programs, nor quote directly from any of their materials, staff, or participants. I am not involved in these efforts for the purposes of research per se—I am simply a volunteer. It seems inappropriate, then, to take up their time for the advancement of my own research or to submit their fledgling efforts to academic scrutiny. The way in which I draw on my experience, then, in the final section of the paper, is in the style of reflections on personal practice.

2. There are connections here with the interdisciplinary literature on the development of expertise and how it alters perception (Winch & Addis, 2019).

3. I do not mean to dichotomize memorization and understanding, only to say that the former does not necessarily imply the latter. Memorization, rightly undertaken, can certainly contribute to enhancing understanding.

4. Bakhurst (2011) draws heavily on McDowell’s (1994/1996) work on our conceptual capacities. There are also (potential) affinities here with some of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on language.

5. What I have called the faculty of judgment is connected, of course, with the Aristotelian concept of ‘phronesis’. The term phronesis is sometimes translated as ‘practical judgment’. See, Dunne (1993) for a discussion of the concept and its link with teaching. See, Kristjánsson et al. (2021) for a more recent exploration that draws on literature in psychology.

6. The recent controversy surrounding Meta is just one of many examples of these insincere intentions. Briefly, the company has been aware for some time that its app, Instagram, harms large numbers of teenage girls especially. See the Wall Street Journal’s The Facebook files (2021).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ilya Zrudlo

Ilya Zrudlo is a PhD candidate at McGill University. His research interests include philosophy of education, moral education, adolescence and youth, community development, and social change.