The beginnings of Danish foreign policy activism: Supporting Baltic independence 1990-1991

ABSTRACT

1990–1991 saw a distinct change in Danish foreign policy in general and towards the Baltic countries in particular, shifting from a quiescent policy of non-recognition of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries to active support for Baltic independence. Drawing on declassified documents, this article argues that although the shift was made possible by Soviet decline and by US approval and support for the new Danish position, it was ultimately driven by the idea prevalent in Danish foreign policy thinking that it would further Denmark’s long-term indirect security interests. By contributing to restoring the independence of three small democratic states on the other side of the Baltic Sea, Denmark could promote a more stable – and to Denmark less threatening – Baltic Sea area. Alternative hypotheses for the shift in policy: that the Danish desire to adopt the Baltic cause was a way to perform a useful service to the US; or that it was driven by ‘pure’ humanitarian motives, and/or by consideration for international and domestic prestige are examined and rejected.

KEYWORDS:

• Baltic independence struggle
• Danish foreign policy activism
• Cold War history
• foreign policy analysis
• small states
• diplomatic history

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Acknowledgements

Research for this article was supported by The Independent Research Fund Denmark, the Danish Council for Independent Research (Social Sciences) and the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). For treasured feedback and/or assistance for various drafts of this article, I would very much like to thank Mart Kuldkepp, Kaarel Piirimäe, Juhana Aunesluoma, Lars Grønbjerg, Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen, Emilie Sort Mikkelsen, Andreas Bøje Forsby, Stefano Guzzini, Anders Wivel, Hans Mouritzen and the SJH reviewers and editors as well as the participants at research group discussions at DIIS and at the Reimagining Futures at the End of the Cold War (REIMAG) conference in Helsinki in August 2017. I thank Jessica Lerche for proofreading. I remain, of course, solely responsible for the arguments presented here. Any remaining errors are my own. Older versions of some parts of the text, were also submitted as part of the author’s PhD dissertation (Olesen, 'In the eye of the decision-maker'). I would like to thank the dissertation committee for valuable insights expressed both in the PhD-assessment report and during the defence.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The White House, “Remarks by President Obama,” 24 February 2012.

2. Halper, “Danish TV Host Mocks Obama,” 23 March 2012.

3. Or variations hereof such as active internationalism or simply active foreign policy.

4. Heurlin, “Nye prioriteringer”; Holm, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”; Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement; Petersen, “Kampen om den kolde krig”. For dissenting views on when post-Cold War activism began, see authors such as Rynning, “Denmark as a Strategic Actor?”, and Lawler, “Janus-Faced Solidarity”, who propose 2001 as a critical year of change for Danish activism.

5. Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik,” 78–79.

6. Together with the Danish engagement in the First Gulf War (Petersen, “Kampen om den kolde krig,” 465; Olesen, “In the Eye of the Decision-maker”, 303–5).

7. For an account of realism and idealism as components of Danish foreign policy activism see: Wivel “Still Living in the Shadow of 1864”.

8. The idea of indirect security takes a prominent role in official Danish discourse, not least in the report of the Danish defence commission of 1997 (Forsvarskommissionen, Fremtidens forsvar).

9. Nørgaard, “Danish Policies Towards the Baltic States,” 155–56.

10. Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik,” 81–86.

11. Hansen, “Dansk Baltikumpolitik,” 56–59.

12. Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 482–83.

13. Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle,” 239.

14. Ellemann-Jensen, Vejen, jeg valgte, 208–9, 233.

15. Olesen, “In the Eye of the Decision-maker”; Branner, “Options and Goals”; Branner, “Denmark Between Venus and Mars”; Wivel, “Still Living in the Shadow of 1864”; Olesen & Wivel, “Hvad blev der”; and Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”. See also Bjørn & Due-Nielsen, Fra helstat til nationalstat, 483–85 for an historic account of the beginnings of “order policy” in Danish foreign policy. See Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism” for an account of Danish foreign policy activism as primarily a project of the Liberal Party.

16. Mortensen & Wivel, “Mønstre og udviklingslinjer,” 566, 581–616.

17. Branner, “Options and Goals,” 210. For an extensive discussion of the foreign policy doctrines of P. Munch and Per Hækkerup, see Wivel, “Still Living in the Shadow of 1864,” 117–27.

18. Hansen, “Dansk Baltikumpolitik”; Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics; Holm, “Denmark’s Active Internationalism”; Holm, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”; Heurlin, “Denmark’s Security Policy”; Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret; Jakobsen, “Denmark at War”; Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement; Wivel, “Between Paradise and Power”; Olesen, “In the Eye of the Decision-maker”; and Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”.

19. Rynning, “Denmark as a Strategic Actor?”. Some authors such as Branner, “Options and Goals”; Branner, “Denmark Between Venus and Mars” and Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?” stress instead the continuity stretching back to the early 20^th century. They still recognize the period after the end of the Cold War, however, as a period of dominance for Danish foreign policy activism.

20. For an analysis of practice as the operational procedure for bringing foreign policy thinking and discourse into being see Neumann & Heikka “Grand Strategy” and, for Danish activism specifically, see Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”.

21. See Pedersen and Ringsmose “Aktivisme i dansk udenrigspolitik” for a discussion of the different means employed for activism.

22. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, and many others.

23. E.g. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies”; Russett et al. “Democratic Peace”. Some constructivists such as Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation,” 390 make similar arguments, arguing that the adoption of similar political systems such as democracy can help bring about a collective identity among states, thereby creating a more benign security environment.

24. Olesen, “In the Eye of the Decision-maker,” 297.

25. Hansen, “Dansk Baltikumpolitik”; Hansen, “Unipolarity and World Politics”; Heurlin, “Denmark’s Security Policy”; Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret; Jakobsen, “Denmark at War”.

26. See also Villaume, “Denmark and NATO Through 50 Years”, for a critique of Denmark’s change in policy towards the US after the end of the Cold War.

27. Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, 65–67. Keeping on good terms with the US was naturally also of prime importance during the Cold War. For a particularly illustrative example see the analysis of Denmark’s nuclear policy in Greenland in Olesen, “Tango for Thule”.

28. Jakobsen, Ringsmose & Saxi, “Prestige-Seeking Small States”; Pedersen, “Bandwagon for Status”. Similarly, Kristensen & Larsen point to similar alliance concerns, but also link them with more idealistic concerns (also see the next section), specifically cosmopolitan concerns to do good in the world as well as moral concerns for paying a (perceived) historical debt to the US and the UK, not least for defeating Nazi Germany in World War II (Kristensen & Larsen, “Denmark’s Fight Against Irrelevance”).

29. Holm, “Denmark’s Active Internationalism”; Holm, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”.

30. Branner, “Options and Goals in Danish European Policy” and Branner, “Denmark Between Venus and Mars”; Wivel, “Between Paradise and Power”; Wivel, “Still Living in the Shadow of 1864”; Rasmussen “What’s the Use of It?”; Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”.

31. Forsvarskommissionen, Fremtidens Forsvar.

32. Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”; Petersen, “Kampen om den kolde krig”; Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”; Olesen, “Two Danish Activist Foreign Policies?”

33. For an analysis of risk as a component of Danish foreign policy activism see Holm, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”; Jakobsen & Kjærsgaard, “Den danske FN-aktivismes storhed og fald” and Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”.

34. For a more extensive discussion of party politics in Danish Baltic politics see Olesen “Danish Support”.

35. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 483.

36. Archer, “Nordic Swans and Baltic Cygnets,” 60.

37. For an example of scholarly work favouring such an approach see Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle”.

38. Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric,” 25. For a more detailed analysis of developments in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War period, see Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism (Part 1)”; Kramer, “The collapse of East European communism (Part 2)”; Kramer, “The collapse of East European communism (Part 3)”.

39. For an analysis of the extent to which the Danish policy mattered see Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric”.

40. For an analysis of the interplay between Soviet decline and the growth of the Baltic independence movements see Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric”.

41. See above 5.

42. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 25 October 1989.

43. Petersen in Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 484 reaches a similar conclusion. For a more extensive analysis of the Danish policy of non-recognition see Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle”.

44. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 1 September 1989. (My translation).

45. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 17 January 1990. (My translation).

46. Along similar lines, Petersen, Europæisk og Globalt Engagement, 484, argues that the January 1990 memorandum was primarily about justifying the change to a policy that had already outlived its usefulness.

47. See above 45.

48. See for example Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 26 November 1990; See also Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle,” 262–63.

49. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 27–28 March 1990.

50. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 27 April 1990. (My translation).

51. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 24 March 1990.

52. Ibid.

53. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen himself argues for this interpretation. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, interview with the author, 17 April 2012.

54. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, interview with the author, 17 April 2012. (My translation).

55. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 10 January 1991.

56. Karup, “Kritik trækkes i land igen”.

57. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 4 February 1991. (My translation).

58. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 4 February 1991. (My translation).

59. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 4 February 1991. (My translation).

60. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 14 January 1991. (My translation).

61. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 9 January 1991. (My translation).

62. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 19 February 1991. (My translation).

63. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 5 June 1991.

64. Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Foreign Relations Committee), 19 August 1991. (My translation).

65. President George H.W. Bush, 1 August 1991. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-supreme-soviet-the-republic-the-ukraine-kiev-soviet-union (accessed 1 March 2021).

66. Sparrow, “Realism’s Practitioner,” 166–67; O’Clery, Moscow, December 25, 1991, 224.

67. This characteristic is shared by Icelandic foreign minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, whose country was, arguably, the first to recognize the (re-established) independence of the Baltic countries, and who argued that President Bush wanted a more cautious approach towards the Baltic countries than that pursued by Iceland (Wright, “For David against Goliath” https://deepbaltic.com/2016/06/17/for-david-against-goliath-icelands-support-for-baltic-independence/

68. Olesen, “Danish Support”.

69. Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik,” 81–86; Ellemann-Jensen, Vejen, jeg valgte, 208–9, 233. Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle,” 239; Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 482–83; Holm, “Denmark’s Active Internationalism”; Holm, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism”; Kristensen & Larsen, “Denmark’s Fight Against Irrelevance”.

70. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), March 1989. (My translation).

71. Udenrigspolitiske Nævn (Foreign Relations Committee), 15 January 1991. (My translation).

72. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 22 April 1992. (My translation). For a similar point in the established literature, see Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik,” 86 though Hoppe also attributes idealism as a driver.

73. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, interview with the author, 17 April 2012. (My translation).

74. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 4 February 1991. (My translation). See also Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 19 February 1990; Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 25 March 1990.

75. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 28 May 1990. (My translation).

76. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 1 June 1990. (My translation).

77. Ibid.

78. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 425–26.

79. For a comprehensive analysis of the Icelandic Baltic policy see Jóhannesson, “Icelandic Support”.

80. Olesen & Olesen, Poul Schlüters tid, 503.

81. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 483. Finland and Sweden were further hampered, by the fact that they had judicially recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries in 1940.

82. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 24 April 1991.

83. Olesen, “Danish Support,” 90–96.

84. As chairman of the Liberal Party Uffe Ellemann-Jensen enjoyed quite a free hand in foreign policy matters. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 222–23.

85. Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle”.

86. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 24 September 1990. (My translation).

87. Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 3 September 1991.

88. Dagblaðið Vísir, “Á óleyfilegum hraða”, Dagblaðið Vísir, editorial, page 4, 28 August 1991. https://timarit.is/page/2588230?iabr=on#page/n7/mode/2up; Udenrigsministeriet (Danish MFA), 28 August 1991. For an account of the rivalry between the Nordic countries see Olesen & Olesen, Poul Schlüters tid, 502. See also Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 483, who stresses the tactical element of the rivalry while, like this article, seeing Nordic rivalry playing only a relatively minor role in the strategic considerations behind the Danish Baltic policy.

89. Ellemann-Jensen, Vejen, jeg valgte, 229; Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle”.

90. Gallup, “Danmark, Nordisk Råd, Baltikum og Sovjet”.

91. Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik,” 79 and Grønbjerg, “The Baltic Independence Struggle,” 245–46.

92. This section draws heavily on Olesen “Danish Support”. For a more substantial analysis of Danish domestic confrontations over the Baltic issue see Olesen, “Danish Support”.

93. The so-called “Krigsudredningen” (War Inquiry) of 2019 on the decision-making leading up to Danish participation in the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq represents an attempt to do just that, and it finds that the American factor may have been more important in these cases (Mariager & Wivel, Hvorfor gik Danmark i krig?, 22).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the The Independent Research Fund Denmark/Danish Council for Independent Research [0602-00469B FSE, DFF –1329-00039].

Notes on contributors

Mikkel Runge Olesen

Mikkel Runge Olesen is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. His research interests include Danish foreign policy, Baltic Sea security, Cold War history and foreign policy analysis. Address: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Østbanegade 117, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark.