The Leverage of the Gatekeeper: Power and Interdependence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey

Abstract

In March 2016, the European Union and Turkey reached an agreement seeking to end the refugee flows from Turkey to Greece. This agreement is the outcome of a bargaining process in which Turkey gained considerable leverage from its position as a ‘gatekeeper’ situated between Syria and an increasingly ‘immigration-averse’ and securitised EU. More importantly, this bargaining process might have broader implications for the EU and its relations with its periphery, since Turkey has progressively reversed the asymmetries of power by demonstrating the indispensability of its continued commitment to act as gatekeeper vis-à-vis an increasingly fragmented and anxious EU.

Keywords:

• European Union
• Turkey
• migration
• agreement
• refugee crisis
• leverage
• interdependence

Acknowledgements

For constructive comments on previous versions of the article, we would like to thank Raffaella A. Del Sarto and three anonymous referees. Research for this article was carried out in the framework of the research project ‘BORDERLANDS: Boundaries, Governance and Power in the European Union’s Relations with North Africa and the Middle East’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant Agreement Number 263277. The project is hosted at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and directed by Raffaella A. Del Sarto.

Notes

¹ Del Sarto, “Borderlands”.

² T.C. Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı [Turkish Coast Guard Command], “Press Information Notes”.

³ Justice and Home Affairs, Outcome of the Council Meeting.

⁴ Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey, Official statistics on temporary protection, 27 May 2016, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik

⁵ Özalp, “New refugee wave may exceed Turkey’s capacity”.

⁶ UNCHR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey”, 19 May 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224

⁷ IOM, “Mediterranean Update - Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities”, 17 May 2016, https://www.iom.int/infographics/mediterranean-update-migration-flows-europe-arrivals-and-fatalities-17-may-2016

⁸ This type of selection criteria was proposed by member states such as Slovakia, Poland and Bulgaria: Werber, “European countries willing to accept migrants”.

⁹ The main reasons were disagreements on the kind of aid demanded by Turkey and that offered by international donors, as well as on the criteria and procedures of disbursing the aid. See, International Crisis Group, Blurring the Borders, 13-14. According to Metin Çorabatır, a retired UNHCR-Turkey official, reluctance towards receiving international aid was mainly due to the Turkish state’s unease with the international donors’ close monitoring and involvement that would come with the aid. This is a ‘traditional reflex’ of the state, also displayed during earlier refugee crises, such as the 1988-91 Iraqi crisis and the 1992 Bosnia crisis. See, “Türkiye, Suriyelilere BM yardımını hiçbir zaman kabul etmedi” [“Turkey never accepted UN aid to Syrians”], T24, 5 November 2013, http://t24.com.tr/haber/turkiye-suriyelilere-bm-yardimini-hicbir-zaman-kabul-etmedi,243322

¹⁰ Melvin, “Europe to blame for drowning”.

¹¹ Davutoğlu, “Turkey cannot deal with refugee crisis alone”.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Pamuk, “Turkish security forces stop migrants”; Starr, “Turkey prevents Syrians reaching Union”.

¹⁴ “Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan Edirne'den göçmen akınına hazırlanıyor” [“Greece and Bulgaria are getting ready for a migrant influx from Edirne”], BBC Türkçe, 17 September 2015.

¹⁵ Traynor et al., “Migration crisis”.

¹⁶ Council of the European Union, “Remarks by President Donald Tusk”.

¹⁷ Council of the European Union, “Informal Meeting on Migration”.

¹⁸ Gotev, “EU summit to pledge €1 billion”.

¹⁹ The VLD was launched together with the signing of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in December 2013. According to the initial deal of 2013, Turkey committed to readmitting third country nationals three years after the ratification of the readmission agreement, in return for which the Commission committed to presenting its final VLD report by the same time. After Turkey ratified the agreement in October 2014, the government often presented the deal to the domestic public as a diplomatic victory, implying that this would mean the lifting of Schengen visas for Turkish citizens once Turkey starts implementing the clause related to the readmission of third country nationals in October 2017. However, the EU has insistently emphasised that the lifting of visas cannot be considered an automatic outcome of the process, as the VLD implies a positive opinion for visa liberalisation by the Commission by Autumn 2017 only if Turkey completely fulfills the 72 benchmarks, while the final decision of a visa-waiver will be subject to the approval of the European Parliament and the European Council.

²⁰ “Turkey frowns at EU refugee aid plan”, EurActiv, 8 October 2015.

²¹ Nielsen, “Turkey demands €3bn”.

²² European Commission, EU-Turkey joint action plan.

²³ Council of the European Union, European Council Meeting Conclusions.

²⁴ “Ak Parti Sözcüsü Ömer Çelik: AB'nin mülteci yardımı önerisi sonuçlanmadı” [“AKP Spokesperson Ömer Çelik: Negotiations over the EU’s Refugee Aid Proposal are not yet concluded”], HaberTürk, 16 October 2015.

²⁵ Turkey demanded the opening of Chapters 15, 17, 23, 24 and 26, corresponding to the Chapters on Energy; Economic and Monetary Policy; Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Justice, Freedom and Security; and Education and Culture, respectively. Chapters 23 and 24 are particularly problematic due to Turkey’s troubled performance in those areas and Cyprus’ blockage since 2009.

²⁶ “Merkel shifts EU-Turkey stance upon migrant crisis”, Hürriyet Daily News, 18 October 2015.

²⁷ According to Freedom House, in terms of media freedom, Turkey went down from the category of ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’ since 2013 and with a continuously deteriorating score since then. See, Freedom House. Freedom of the Press- Country Report: Turkey 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/turkey. The 2015 annual report of the Committee to Protect Journalists showed that the number of imprisoned journalists increased from 7 in 2014 to 14 in 2015, the fifth highest number after China, Egypt, Iran and Eritrea. See, Committee to Protect Journalists, “2015 prison census: 199 journalists jailed worldwide”, December 2015, https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2015.php

²⁸ European Commission, Turkey 2015 Report; European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2014.

²⁹ Hacaloğlu, “Dolmabahçe Mutabakatı Doğru Değil” [“Dolmabahçe Accord is improper”].

³⁰ At the press conference, the parties read two separate texts, listing essential steps for both sides’ roadmaps, as well as their demands and conditions for the reinvigoration of the peace process. The government gave priority to the PKK’s laying down its arms and the need for further democratisation, while the 10 points read by the HDP emphasized the importance of taking measures to strengthen pluralistic democracy and equal citizenship. While differing on their statements, the two parties, in principle, agreed on reinvigorating the resolution talks, including the state, the HDP, the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and the PKK leadership in Qandil; setting up a ‘monitoring committee’ for the talks; and ensuring that Öcalan calls upon the PKK to hold a congress for laying down their arms to open the way for a political solution. For further details of the content of the statements and the meeting, see Bayramoğlu “The process of resolution”, 4-9; and Çiçek and Coşkun, “Dolmabahçe’den Günümüze Çözüm Süreci” [“The Peace Process from Dolmabahçe to Present-Day”], 9-11.

³¹ Both government spokespersons and the president started openly to label the HDP “a PKK-offshoot”, asserting that it had no place in parliamentary or local politics as it is under the influence of the terrorist organisation. See, for example, “Erdoğan'dan HDP'li belediye başkanlarına tepki” [“Erdoğan’s reaction against HDP mayors”], BBC Türkçe, 2 May 2015; “Akdoğan: Bunlar zaten PKK'nın uzantısı” [They are a PKK offshoot anyway], Sabah, 24 May 2015; “Akdoğan: HDP barajı geçerse sıkıntı olur” [It would be problematic if the HDP exceeds the threshold], T24, 23 April 2015.

³² The ceasefire officially ended when the Turkish state resorted to an armed offensive against the PKK after the latter claimed the revenge-killing of two police officers on 22 July following the Da’esh suicide attack in the Kurdish town of Suruç on 20 July. See, “Kurdish group claims 'revenge murder' on Turkish police”, Al Jazeera, 22 July 2015.

³³ “Need for transparency, investigations, in light of “alarming” reports of major violations in south-east Turkey”, OHCHR, 10 May 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19937&LangID=E.

³⁴ The 1128 academics who signed the petition in January 2016 have faced wholesale investigations and persecution on the grounds of “terrorist propaganda”. Some signatories were dismissed or suspended by their universities and three academics were jailed pending trial between 15 March and 22 April. See, “Turkey: Academics Jailed For Signing Petition”, Human Rights Watch, 16 March 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/16/turkey-academics-jailed-signing-petition.

³⁵ The leaked document (in English), the content of which was later verified by Erdoğan, was published on a Greek website called “Euro2day”. See Papamiltiadou, “Χοντρό παιχνίδι στην πλάτη της Ελλάδας” [“Big game behind the back of Greece”].

³⁶ First author’s notes from an unrecorded interview with a high-ranking official of the EU Delegation to Ankara, 5 November 2015.

³⁷ Council of the European Union, “Press remarks by President Donald Tusk”.

³⁸ Keohane and Nye, Power and interdependence, 10.

³⁹ Negotiations on Chapter 33 (financial and budgetary provisions) were also opened on 30 June 2015.

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union. EU-Turkey statement.

⁴¹ The Republic of Turkey, “Regulation on work permits for foreigners”.

⁴² Çetingüleç, “Turkey grants Syrians right to work”.

⁴³ “EU convinces Italy on 3B-euro fund for refugees in Turkey”, Daily Sabah, 2 February 2016.

⁴⁴ “Official opening of NATO operation in the Aegean”, NewEurope, 8 March 2016.

⁴⁵ “Number of migrants arriving in Greece dropped 90% in April”, Frontex, 13 May 2016, http://frontex.europa.eu/news/number-of-migrants-arriving-in-greece-dropped-90-in-april-6e7oBw

⁴⁶ “Migrant crisis: Greece starts deportations to Turkey”, BBC, 4 April 2016.

⁴⁷ Nielsen, “Turkish PM issues visa ultimatum”.

⁴⁸ “Overview Turkey meets 65 of 72 requirements for visa liberalisation”, Statewatch, 6 May 2016, http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-com-turkey-readmission-requirements-overview.pdf

⁴⁹ The EU requirement for Turkey to revise its “legal framework as regards organised crime and terrorism” so as to bring it on par with the ECHR and ECtHR case law, and guarantee that it is implemented in ways to “ensure the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, of assembly and association in practice” was included among the “fundamental rights” section of the 72 benchmarks contained in the initial readmission agreement reached in December 2013. Hence, it appears in the Commission’s First VLD Progress Report of October 2014. See, European Commission, Report on the progress by Turkey, 33.

⁵⁰ The debates over Turkey’s restrictions on freedom of expression gained international renown when Germany accepted Turkey’s demand for the criminal prosecution of a German comedian for a controversial satirical poem on the grounds that it insulted the President of Turkey. See Taylor, “German comedian could face jail time”.

⁵¹ Letsch and Rankin, “EU-Turkey visa deal on brink”.

⁵² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Resmi Sitesi [The Official Webpage of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey)] “Hep Birlikte Türkiye’yi Büyütmenin ve İleriye Götürmenin Mücadelesini Vereceğiz”, [“We will strive together to make Turkey bigger and better”], 10 May 2016, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/43913/hep-birlikte-turkiyeyi-buyutmenin-ve-ileriye-goturmenin-mucadelesini-verecegiz.html Also see, Gürsel, “EU-Turkey refugee deal”.

⁵³ Martin and Pamuk, “Give visa freedom or abandon deal”.

⁵⁴ Yeginsu and Shoumali, “Syrian Refugees Killed by Border Guards”.

⁵⁵ On 9 September, Juncker presented the Commission’s package of proposals addressing the refugee crisis. Among these was the proposal to amend the Asylum Procedures Directive so as to recognise all transit countries between Syria and the EU as ‘safe countries of origin’, manifesting the EU intention to return Syrian asylum seekers to those transit countries. These countries are Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. See, European Commission, Proposal establishing list of safe countries.

⁵⁶ “Turkish asylum applications soar in Germany”, Telegraph, 5 August 2016.

⁵⁷ Del Sarto, “Borderlands”, 149.

⁵⁸ Cassarino, “Migration and border management”.

⁵⁹ Del Sarto, “Normative Empire Europe”, 3.

⁶⁰ “Migrant crisis: Amnesty hits out at EU over Turkey deal”, BBC, 19 March 2016; Nebehay and Baczynska, “Migrant deal may be illegal”.