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Abstract
Migration did not figure in the European Security Strategy of 2003. Never mentioned as a threat, it was not even mentioned as a risk. Thirteen years later, migration is widely cited in the new European Union Global Strategy. Much richer than the previous security document and global in aspiration, the Global Strategy treats migration as a challenge and an opportunity, recognising the key role it plays in a rapidly changing security landscape. However, this multi-faceted perspective on migration uncovers starkly different political and normative claims, all of which are legitimate in principle. The different narratives on migration present in the new strategic document attest to the Union’s comprehensive approach to the issue but also to critical and possibly competing normative dilemmas.
Acknowledgements
This article draws on research conducted in the context of the project GLOBUS - Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice, which received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 693609. For more information: http://www.globus.uio.no.
Notes
1 See for example Tocci, “Interview with Nathalie Tocci”.
2 Exceptions to that were, for example, Sidiropoulos, “The EU Global Strategy”, and Mälksso, “From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy”.
3 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action (EUGS), 13, 16.
4 European Commission, Back to Schengen, 2.
5 Narrative theory has developed widely (see Czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research). What we do here is rely on a light concept of narrative as a conceptual device that allows us to identify correlations between the characterisation of a social phenomenon in a given society and that society’s representation of the social world (including self/other relations).
6 In general, the securitisation of discourse on migration has been broadly described. The OHCHR denounced the existence of a “toxic narrative on migration” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Shapingthepublicnarrativeonmigration.aspx), which the OHCHR aimed to reframe through a collective effort. Scholars have long identified processes of securitisation of the public debate in Europe (see, for instance, Allen, A Decade of Immigration) and of discourse on migration (see Huysmans, The politics of insecurity; Fakhoury, Securitising migration; Neal, Securitization and Risk at EU Border; Léonard, “EU border security and migration”; Ceccorulli, Framing irregular immigration).
7 cf. Manners, “Normative Power Europe”; Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles; Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?”.
8 European Union, Secure Europe in Better World (ESS).
9 On the genesis of supranational governance of migration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, see among others, Kaunert, European Internal Security.
10 Ibid., 4, 7.
11 European Union, Providing Security in Changing World.
12 European Parliament, “Irregular immigration in the EU”.
13 UNHCR, “Over one million sea arrivals”.
14 European Union, ESS, 2.
15 European Commission, European Agenda on Security and European Agenda on Migration, respectively.
16 Such as organised crime, trafficking, market for illicit drugs, terrorism, terrorist foreign fighters.
17 European Commission, European Agenda on Security, 4.
18 European Union, EUGS.
19 Livi Bacci, “L’Europa ha bisogno”.
20 Ceccorulli et al., “Europe ‘depopul-ageing’ bomb?”.
21 European Commission, European Agenda on Migration, 14-5.
22 European Union, EUGS, 13.
23 Council of the European Union, On the conditions of entry.
24 See, among others, Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan, “EU management of high skilled migration”.
25 On the relation between values and interest in the EUGS, see Youngs, “How to Balance Interests and Values”.
26 European Union, EUGS, 15.
27 The many references to human rights in the text have been widely noticed by commentators, see Doody, “EU Global Strategy under threat”.
28 For an overview of values and principles in EU foreign policy, see Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles.
29 European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU.
30 Ibid.
31 See Fassi and Lucarelli, European Migration System.
32 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation, 17.
33 European Union, Directive 2013/33/EU.
34 See, for example, Lavenex and Wichmann, “External Governance of Internal Security”; Longo, “Justice and Home Affairs”.
35 European Union, EUGS, 17.
36 Ibid., 20.
37 European Commission, European Agenda on migration, 3.
38 European Commission, Common policy on illegal immigration.
39 On the genesis of the Agency and its first institutionalisation through FRONTEX, see Léonard, “The creation of FRONTEX”. On the proposal for the EU Border and Coast Guard, see Rijpma, “Proposal for European Border and Coast Guard”.
40 European Council and European Parliament, European Border and Coast Guard.
41 Ibid., 12.
42 European Union, EUGS, 50.
43 European Commission, European Agenda on Migration, 3.
44 Ibid., 5.
45 European Union, EUGS, 36.
46 European External Action Service, European Union Naval Force.
47 On the external dimension of immigration and asylum policy, see Lavenex and Uçarer, “The External Dimension of Europeanization”; Boswell, “The ‘external dimension’ of EU Immigration” and Monar, “The EU’s growing role in AFSJ”.
48 European Commission, Establishing a New Partnership Framework, 5.
49 European Commission, Towards a more accessible asylum system.
50 European Union, EUGS, 24.
51 See Pastore, “Relazioni Euro-Africane e migrazioni”, 243.
52 European Commission, Strategy on the External Dimension.
53 European Commission, Global Approach to Migration. On the limits of creating a Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, see Hampshire, “Speaking with one voice”.
54 As reported in a Commission document, “Regional Development and Protection Programmes are focused on providing protection to those in need, but also on enhancing resilience of refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities”. European Commission, European Agenda on Migration, 10.
55 European Union, EUGS, 26.
56 European Commission, European Union Emergency Trust Fund.
57 European Union, EUGS, 27. Priority countries of origin and transit are Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ethiopia.
58 European Commission, Establishing a New Partnership Framework, 2.
59 Ibid., 13.
60 European Commission, EU ‘safe countries of origin’ list.
61 European Union, EUGS, 17.
62 European Union, EUGS, 28.
63 See, for example, Gibney, “Refugees and justice between states”.
65 European Commission, Establishing a Union Resettlement Framework.
66 Livi Bacci, “L’Europa ha bisogno”.
67 Ibid., 934.
68 The arrival of more than one million asylum seekers in 2015 is considered an exceptional event, but solidarity among member states in terms of burden sharing (mainly through the relocation plan) has nevertheless fallen short.
69 See, for example, on this point, Ruhs, The price of rights.
70 European Union, EUGS, 15.
71 Amnesty International, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe.
72 For a critical position on the impact of EU asylum policies in the EU, see ECRE, “Time to Save the Right”.
73 Grevi, “A global strategy for European Union”; Dijkstra, “Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers”; Mälksoo, “From ESS to EU Global Strategy”.
74 Cf. Lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles.
75 Menéndez, “The refugee crisis”.
76 The literature on the securitisation of migration is ample; see, for example Buzan, People, states and fear; Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security, a New Framework for Analysis; Huysmans, The politics of insecurity; Neal, “Securitization and risk”. For recent approaches see, for example, Fakhoury, “Securitizing migration” and Ceccorulli, Framing irregular immigration.
77 On the contribution of FRONTEX to the securitisation of migration, see, for example, Léonard, “EU border security and migration”.
78 See, for example, Musarò, “Cosmopolitan solidarity vs. national belonging”. For a critical review of the role of ‘crisis’ in the consolidation of control practices and techniques of governing, see Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins, “Crisis, Routine, Consolidation”, and Perkowski, “Deaths, Interventions, Humanitarianism”.
79 See, for example, Campesi , “FRONTEX”; Human Rights Watch, “EU policies put refugees at risk” and Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, “Deterrence and Protection”.
80 A European Agenda on Migration recognises that we are facing a “difficult balancing act”, 2.
81 “UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”, The Guardian, 27 October 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-migrant-rescue-plan
82 European Commission, Towards a more accessible asylum system.
83 See, for example, Wagner and Anholt, “Resilience as the new leitmotif”; Palm, “Did 2016 Mark a New Start?” Further on externalisation, see Dover, “Toward a Common EU Immigration Policy”.
84 European Commission, European Agenda on Migration, 2.
85 For a critical analysis of the hotspot system, see ECRE, “Implementation of hotspots”.
86 See for example ECRE, “ECRE Comments”.
87 See, on this point, Newland, “New approaches to refugee crisis”.
88 See, for example, Crawley et al., Destination Europe?.
89 See, for example, Oxfam, “Syria Refugee Crisis”.
90 Livi Bacci, “L’Europa ha bisogno”.