ABSTRACT
Even at the height of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow found ways to cooperate on nuclear issues. But what brought the two rivals to the negotiating table in the first place? History points to Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction (GRIT), an approach employed by President John F. Kennedy and, later, George H. W. Bush to cut through enemy images and move arms control forward. Today, GRIT could offer a path out of the US-Russia security dilemma towards renewed nuclear engagement. GRIT’s emphasis on self-restraint aligns with cuts to military budgets that will follow from the pandemic. Its use of unilateral, reciprocal steps, meanwhile, could open doors to asymmetric and multilateral arms control modalities.
Notes
1 Osgood later expanded and clarified these criteria. In an article he authored in 1980, for example, he identifies ten criteria for its successful implementation, which place a much greater emphasis on protecting the actor from vulnerability in case of defection (Osgood Citation1980).
2 Relevant materials from John F. Kennedy’s papers include Box 1090, which lists “book titled ‘An Alternative to War or Surrender’ by Charles Osgood,” and Box 1139, which includes, “book, ‘An Alternative to War or Surrender’ by Charles Osgood sent by Harvey Sanford, Ann Arbor Michigan”. A guide to the papers can be viewed at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKWHCFOVZ.
3 Osgood went on to serve on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s Social Science Advisory Board from 1964 to 1971.
4 Wheeler (Citation2018, 107) points out that GRIT does not provide any mechanism in and of itself to ensure that “actors will prove trustworthy on other issues where the stakes are higher, and as a result, temptation to behave opportunistically increases” with each round of reciprocal acts.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sarah Bidgood
Sarah Bidgood is the Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, USA.