European trade policy in interesting times

Abstract

This article draws out the implications of the other contributions to this special issue and reflects on their implications for the development of the European Union’s trade policy. It makes three main arguments. First, intense popular opposition to (some) trade agreements has disrupted the EU’s efforts to manage the tensions among the objectives of policy-making efficiency, policy effectiveness and political legitimacy. Second, public opposition to trade agreements is profoundly shaped by how the threat from trade has been framed. Third, the politics of different free trade agreements are even more interconnected than has been previously acknowledged. Taken together these arguments mean that EU trade policy is being made in particularly ‘interesting times’ and is, therefore, especially challenging.

Keywords:

• Effectiveness
• efficiency
• legitimacy
• trade policy
• framing

Acknowledgements

This article is part of a wider project that has been funded with support from the European Commission (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence 2014-1842). It reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments. I am solely responsible for any shortcomings.

Notes

1. For a fuller discussion of the developments, including the factors underpinning them, see Young and Peterson (2014, 57–60).

2. ‘Germany’s Gabriel gets SPD Green Light to Support CETA,’ Euractiv.com, 20 September 2016.

3. See the Leave Campaign website (http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html). Accessed 7 January 2017.

4. Buonanno (2017) questions the validity of this framing. For a more sympathetic assessment see De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016).

5. She contends that this perception is associated with European ‘myths’ – Green Europe, Social Europe, Human Rights Europe – that have been deployed, including by the Commission, to help construct a European identity.

6. Shiller (2017) used his presidential address to the American Economic Association to call for serious study of the effects of ‘narratives’ on economic behavior. For Shiller a narrative is ‘a simple story or easily expressed explanation of events that many people want to bring up in conversation or on news or social media because it can be used to stir others’ concerns or emotions, and/or because it appears to advance self-interest’ (5). Narratives can also be ‘based on varying degrees of truth.’ A narrative, therefore, has much in common with frames as understood in political science.

7. Interview with a transatlantic business representative, Washington, DC, 18 May 2015. Comments by Jennifer Hillman, ‘Convergence and Divergence in Mega-Regional Trade and Investment Agreements’ Conference, American University, 26 January 2015.

8. Establishing where products originate can be extremely cumbersome, particularly when they are produced through transnational value chains.