“Overdetermined” or “Indeterminate”? Remarks on Knowledge and Class

Abstract

This essay argues that Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff have conflated two distinct definitions of “overdetermination.” In the first, overdetermination describes a worldview wherein all entities and processes (including “theory”) are constituted by all other processes. In the second, “overdetermination” describes a worldview wherein all entities and processes (again, including “theory”) are caused by all other processes. An implication of the former view is that the essence of an entity cannot simply be read off of its individual existence, but is a function of its relations with all other entities. An implication of the latter view is that outcomes cannot be predicted in advance, regardless of the information given ex ante. The present essay argues that the second view does not necessarily follow from the first. Failure to distinguish between the two results from a confusion between an ability we (sometimes) have—the ability to predict events—and a metaphysical interpretation of that ability—the claim that entities have essences independently of one another.

Keywords:

• Stephen Resnick
• Richard Wolff
• Friedrich Nietzsche
• Overdetermination
• Philosophy of Science

Notes

¹The choice of Nietzsche may, I concede, seem misplaced. Resnick and Wolff do not rely upon Nietzsche in arguing for their positions on epistemology and ontology. However, as I hope will become apparent, much of the epistemological stance that Resnick and Wolff wish to articulate finds strong support in Nietzsche. This should not be entirely surprising. Resnick and Wolff trace the concept of overdetermination to Freud, but it can be traced further back to Nietzsche. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche (1967a, 81) argues that punishment is overdetermined because its meaning is informed and created by different impulses and utilities in different social contexts. To be sure, for Nietzsche (as with Freud), “overdetermination” is not an epistemological concept. The connection does not seem entirely irrelevant, however, particularly when one considers the enormous intellectual debt that Freud owed to Nietzsche. Of course, these comments may well raise more questions than answers, and I do not by any means intend to fully defend the view that Nietzsche's epistemology is a precursor to the overdeterminist position. That must wait until another essay. All I intend to do here is use Nietzsche's texts as I see them, a valuable resource for the demonstration at hand.

²The same could be said for many other passages. For example, Resnick and Wolff (1987, 190) draw on the issue of subsumed class payments, noting that, though such payments could have their intended effect (i.e., of increasing capital accumulation), it is also possible that “increased corporate budgets for research and administration to cut costs or develop new products, for exploration to discover new sources of raw materials, and for managers to improve the productive process all may come to naught.”