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Abstract
A theory of the state presupposes the conceptual demarcation between “internal” and “external” actors to the state. In Resnick and Wolff’s theory of the state, the contestation between “external” actors (classes/groups) and the conflict between internal actors (state institutions) remains underexplored. This essay expands Resnick and Wolff’s analysis by drawing from a case study of the postcolonial state of Pakistan in which the conflict internal to the state, the civil-military contradiction, plays an important role in mediating the political economy of the state-society. To make visible how internal conflict regulates state-society interactions, the essay synthesizes Resnick and Wolff’s class analysis of the state with Henri Lefebvre’s theory of state spatiality, arguing that the postcolonial state of Pakistan can best be characterized by the notion of “uneven state spaces” and thus illustrating that the state as a “site” is contested from both “external” and “internal” forces.
Acknowledgements
This essay has benefited from informal discussions I had with Shahram Azhar and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. I would especially like to thank Vamsi Vakulabharanam, Michael Ash, Sripad Motiram, S. Akbar Zaidi, and Mathew McCartney for providing invaluable feedback on an earlier draft.
Notes
1 This contestation among different socioeconomic actors is mitigated through elections to form the parliament and the elected government (executive branch).
2 The parliament and the elected government are mediated not only by the dynamics of the class struggle but also by the hegemonic institution—e.g., the military in Pakistan.
3 Postcoloniality in Pakistan can be understood in terms of the uneven development of state and society. While the development of the latter has been delineated at length in the literature, the development of the former has largely been overlooked.
4 The term pluralistic is used here strictly to signify that Marx’s analysis is not overly economistic.
5 Their focus is at a micro level (enterprise/household), but the argument is not dependent on any particular unit of analysis.
6 Resnick and Wolff (Citation1987) acknowledge that, in totality, society is comprised of both class and nonclass processes.
7 It is important to point out that a state-owned enterprise may engage in production processes with a different set of objectives vis-à-vis a private enterprise. For example, the production of health services under the state-run National Health Services in the United Kingdom cannot be equated with the production of private health services in the United States. Moreover, the state can change the rules and regulations of political and economic processes as it enjoys monopoly over the means of violence. Furthermore, when the state or its affiliated personnel (even in their private capacities) engage in production, they tend to get more concessions and advantages based on their networks and influence in postcolonial societies.
8 This Marxian analysis is incorporated in the more recent institutional-development economics literature as well. See Vahabi (Citation2009) and Chang (Citation2003).
9 Roy (Citation2009) has argued that informality is not an exception but a norm in the Global South.
10 Akhtar (Citation2018) has argued that access to state officials and resources is an important factor in ensuring the successful accumulation of capital in postcolonial Pakistan.
11 The internal conflict of the state can be both class and nonclass in nature. Erik Olin Wright (Citation1978) has argued that class struggle within the state apparatus often manifests in the form of demands for higher wages and the unionization of state workers. Moreover, this conflict arises due to two main factors: first, from the pursuit of self-interest by state officials at the expense of others, which can generate conflict; and second, from differences between state personnel and/or within institutions on the conception of the “national interest” (see Miliband Citation1983).
12 The role of the state (Pakistan) is conceptualized against the backdrop of the dialectical relationship between the postcolonial state and society and, in particular, the internal conflict in the state and its multiple manifestations within society.
13 The elected civilian government of Pakistan at the time, the Peoples Party (with its stronghold in Sindh province) signed the Kerry-Lugar Act (KLA) with the United States. The KLA prioritized civilian aid and ties between the two countries and demanded a more thorough accountability of military aid to Pakistan. Among other things, the KLA mandated that in order to get U.S. aid, Pakistan must ensure “civilian government control over the military, including oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders” (Soherwordi Citation2011, 67). The military establishment retaliated against the KLA and destabilized the government.
14 It was reported in the Dawn newspaper that the prime minister had asked the military’s top brass to stop patronizing nonstate militant groups, both inside and outside the country. The military reacted to this news story with anger, and the civilian government formed an inquiry board to investigate who leaked the contents of the meeting between the prime minister and the army chief. In response, the military publicly defied the civilian government by putting out a tweet through its official social media handle, stating that the “notification on Dawn Leak is incomplete and not in line with recommendations by the Inquiry Board. Notification is rejected.”
15 The military builds its positive public image by using entertainment mediums such as music, film, and drama.
16 The role of the Pakistani military in economic processes is seen in two distinct ways in the existing literature. On one hand, some see the military’s role in its alliance with the landed elite and argue that Pakistan is “stuck” in semifeudalism (see Khan Citation2005). On the other hand, the military can be seen as an institution that is solely interested in maximizing its profits (see Aziz Citation2008; Siddiqa Citation2007). This essay goes beyond these traditional approaches and argues that the military as an institution is pushed and pulled in different directions based on its ideological, institutional, economic, and political interests.
17 There is also the possibility of inherent tension between the individual interests of the members of the COA and the institutional interests of AWT. This tension arises because one’s place in the COA is not tied to the “ownership” of shares in the companies but is linked with rank and service in the military. Therefore, it could be argued that the COA is primarily interested in maximizing its salaries/bonuses rather than traditional capitalist accumulation by reinvesting because serving generals are replaced by new serving officers when they retire.
18 The uneven development of physical state spaces in the postcolonial period needs to be contextualized against the backdrop of the military’s policy to protect and reproduce its hegemonic rule over the state and society. In 1959, during the military dictatorship of General Ayub Khan, the country’s capital was moved from Karachi (Sindh province) to Islamabad (a newly created city in Punjab). The choice of Islamabad for the capital was not random; Islamabad is situated next to the military headquarters in the neighboring city, Rawalpindi. There are numerous potential benefits of the proximity between the military’s headquarters and the capital city. For example, the execution of a military coup d’état requires the physical control and command of state institutions located in the capital city (such as the prime minister’s office, the parliament, supreme court, and national TV), and in this context the proximity of Islamabad to the military headquarters seemed to play an important role in the successful execution of military coups (see Khan Citation2019).
19 This implies that the ideological hegemony (mental state space) of the military is highly fractured and uneven across Pakistan.