ABSTRACT
I have received substantial monetary compensation and a formal apology from my first doctoral school, and a Ph.D. from another university. This essay describes my personal view on discussing the boundaries of academic judgment and research supervision with the ombudsman agency for higher education, and at the High Administrative Court of England and Wales. The Court’s judicial doctrine addresses substantial research accountability matters. It clarifies that although the Court and ombudsman agency must not interfere with academic judgment, not everything done by an academic can be considered as academic judgment. A Ph.D. supervisor can seriously fail to perform his/her duties.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Joao Silva Ferreira (University of Lisbon), Julia Smith (University of Strathclyde), Patrick McColgan (University of Strathclyde), Tony Lawson (University of Cambridge), Maria Nazaré Barroso (University of Lisbon), Frederick Lee (University of Missouri-Kansas City), Andrew Marshal (University of Strathclyde), Christine Cooper (University of Strathclyde), John Ferguson (University of Strathclyde), Tae-Hee Jo (State University of New York), and Tony Kenny.
Notes
1. From i) LBS, ii) Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and iii) ISEG-University of Lisbon.
2. The Queen on the Application of Tiago Cardao-Pito v. OIA and LBS. EWHC 203 [2012].
3. OIA’s Annual Report, Citation2012.
4. OIA’s Rules (Citation2008, Citation2013) at http://www.oiahe.org.uk/media/45341/oia-rulesmay2008_archive.pdf and http://www.oiahe.org.uk/media/1258/oia-rules-march-2013.pdf
5. OIA’s Annual Report (Citation2011, Citation2012, Citation2013b).
6. His name is Tony Kenny.
7. The Queen on the Application of Siborurema v. OIA-EWCACiv1365 (Citation2007).
8. The Queen on the Application of Burger v. OIA-EWHC 172 (Citation2013).
9. See endnote 7.