Abstract
The liberal international order (LIO) is now in a complex crisis. Its legitimacy and sustainability are put to the test with the growth of deglobalization forces, the rise of emerging powers dissatisfied with the LIO designed by the US, and climate change and the global pandemic. The crisis of the LIO is particularly salient in the Indo-Pacific, the epicenter of the US-China strategic competition, and secondary states in this region are increasingly concerned about its geopolitical consequences. However, I argue that secondary states often treated as the pawns of great powers can turn this circumstance to their advantage by adopting various strategies that maximize their leverage. We should take seriously the possibility that secondary states, by which I denote all states that are weaker or smaller than the hegemonic state and the rising power, can shape the contours of the US-China strategic competition and the newly emerging international order in the Indo-Pacific region. Preoccupied with great power politics, the existing literature on order transition has neglected the fact that secondary states can develop and exercise their own agency. Moreover, it remains vague what agency means in IR and how secondary states enact it. Against this backdrop, I propose an analytical framework that unpacks various types of agency along three dimensions—the motivation of agency, the type of mobilized resources, and the availability of partners. It will help us explain how weaker and smaller states participate and make their voice in reshaping international order in the Indo-Pacific.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory is one rare exception that differentiates various types of international political change. Like other transition theorists, however, his focus still lies in “systemic change,” which refers to the rise and decline of the dominant states that involves changes in the distribution of power (Gilpin, Citation1981).
2 I borrow the term “derivative” from Long (Citation2017). According to Long, the “derivative power” of small states comes from their relationship with a great power. He says, “small states may derive power by convincing larger states to take actions that boost their interests … Through the use of derivative power, the leaders of small states seek to act as the proverbial tail that wags the dog” (Long, Citation2017, p. 196).