Combating terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan

Abstract

This article aims to offer a preliminary assessment of Russian and Uzbek attempts to combat terrorism after 9/11. While both cases fit into the larger post-Soviet political narrative, itself shaped by strategic realignments following the events of 9/11, relatively little work has been undertaken to analyse how terrorism and law enforcement have intertwined in order to generate military, legislative and police responses in these countries. Thus, while recognizing how security policies changed in Russia and Uzbekistan immediately after 9/11, this paper argues that policy reactions to home-grown terrorism have, for the most part, continued to be the main driving force behind attempts to combat terrorism. Equally, however, the latter part of this paper argues that a more nuanced account of security in the North Caucasus and Central Asia is needed in order to study terrorism effectively. In particular, the emergence of suicide terrorism in Russia and Uzbekistan raises important issues, not just about post-9/11 law enforcement, but also identity politics, illustrating how diverse local, regional and international forms of identification shape International Relations theory.

Notes

¹ Of course notable exceptions do exist. See, for example, Alexandor Cherkasov and Dimitry Grushkin (2005).

² For further analyses of these differing approaches to counterterrorism, see the papers on Europe in this Special Issue.

³ This reading of ‘insurgency’ in Russia may go some way to explain the intransigence of the authorities, and their continued refusal to deal with even ‘moderate’ sections of the Chechen resistance.

⁴ The chronology of the two Russo-Chechen conflicts in the 1990s is generally considered in terms of large-scale hostilities, and the use of the Russian army, rather than militias from the Russian Interior Ministry. As such, the first war occurred from 1994–1996 and the second conflict occurred from 1999–2002. The author recognizes the various problems stemming from the various labelling of Chechen groups as terrorist organizations or freedom fighters, but because the argument is primarily theoretical, I will use the term ‘Chechen rebels’ and ‘terrorists’ interchangeably to reflect anti-Russia operations.

⁵ Notable exceptions to this general argument can be found in the work of Pavel Baev (2006) and Graeme Herd (2000).

⁶ Significantly, while the group of foreign fighters led by Ibn al-Khattab, and for that matter Khattab himself, have been variously linked to Osama bin Laden, reports and commentaries actually indicate that various elements of the movement he headed were in competition with Al Qaeda as it emerged in the mid-1990s. Tumelty (2005a; 2006), for instance, highlights that al-Khattab's policies did not involve attacking the US.

⁷ For an illuminating discussion of the role of amnestied fighters, see John Russell (2006, 946).

⁸ A number of cases have been brought to the European Court of Human Rights stemming from the use of forced disappearance, arrest and detention, by pro-Kremlin groups.

⁹ For a further detailed debate about the roots and role of the siloviki, see Bettina Renz (2006).

¹⁰ While editing this paper, Russian authorities announced that the Jordanian-born Abu Hafs Al-Urdani, leader of the Arab fighters in Chechnya, had been killed in a ‘special operation’. Reports from rebel groups indicated that his wife and family had been detained by pro-Kremlin groups, prior to his killing.

¹¹ Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan form a considerable portion of Central Asia and are labelled Central Asian republics. A common Soviet legacy has shaped their respective domestic political approaches to combating terrorism.

¹² A note here should be made of what is called the ‘Chechen syndrome’. As a result of the two wars, around one million Russian soldiers have, in a largely underfunded, conscript army, been involved in war-fighting in the North Caucasus. Little has been done to assess the impact of soldiers returning to Russia who have experienced combat operations in Chechnya.

¹³ For detailed accounts of Foreign Fighters in Chechnya, see Murad Batal Al-Shishani (2006).