Pragmatising the curriculum: bringing knowledge back into the curriculum conversation, but via pragmatism

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the role of knowledge in the curriculum through a discussion of John Dewey's transactional theory of knowing. I do so against the background of recent calls to bring knowledge back into the discussion about the curriculum in which pragmatism has been depicted as a problematic form of relativism that should have no place in contemporary curriculum theory and practice. I show that rather than being a form of relativism, pragmatism actually moves beyond the modern opposition of objectivism versus relativism. Dewey's transactional theory of knowing moves the question of knowledge from the domain of certainty to the domain of possibility. I show in this paper how Dewey develops this argument and give reasons why this is an important contribution to the ongoing discussion about knowledge and the curriculum.

Keywords:

• curriculum theory
• knowledge
• pragmatism
• John Dewey
• objectivism
• relativism
• transactional realism

Notes

1. Within the confines of this paper, I wish to focus on what pragmatism – and more specifically John Dewey's pragmatism – may have to offer for the discussion about knowledge and the curriculum. A more detailed discussion of Young's argument and the differences between the form of social realist philosophy he favours and the transactional realism of Dewey is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, my main aim is to rectify common perceptions about Dewey's pragmatism – the paper is not meant to suggest that I agree with or support Dewey's views.

2. The actual formulation in the Plan of Organization of the University Primary School is: “The ultimate problem of all education is to co-ordinate the psychological and the social factors” (Dewey, 1895, p. 224).

3. This is not to suggest that he was the first to do so; see for example Young (1971).

4. For this I refer the reader to Biesta and Burbules (2003) and Biesta (2009a, 2009b, 2010b).

5. The latter view was the one put forward by logical positivism and, although philosophically discredited, still lives on in the idea that knowledge acquisition is an inductive process starting from the collection of ‘basic facts’ and working ‘upwards’ towards general statements (see Ayer, 1959; Achinstein & Barker, 1969).

6. Dewey's approach is sometimes characterised as instrumentalism, also by Dewey himself. Whereas instrumentalism is generally taken as the view that theories are instruments or tools, Dewey's instrumentalism is about the instrumental character of objects-of-knowledge.

7. Journell (2013) discusses the same issue in a recent article in this journal, but takes a social justice and mutual learning perspective. The point I am making here with Dewey follows an epistemological argument, albeit that it is a pragmatist approach to epistemology that is being pursued here, not one that operates on the assumption of the dualism of mind and world – which is an important point, as Dewey was actually highly suspicious of the whole ‘epistemological industry’ that had emerged on the basis of this assumption.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gert Biesta

Gert Biesta (www.gertbiesta.com) is a professor of educational theory and policy at the Institute of Education and Society, University of Luxembourg. He has published widely on the theory and philosophy of education and the theory and philosophy of educational research. His most recent book, The Beautiful Risk of Education, was published in 2014 by Paradigm Publishers, USA.