Who gets the job? Recruitment and selection at a ‘second-generation’ Japanese automotive components transplant in the US

Abstract

Literature on Japanese transplant manufacturing firms in the automotive sector often emphasise the importance placed on attitude as opposed to skills in the hiring decisions for line workers. In this paper, a case study of one second-tier components supplier for a major Japanese automotive assembler in the Midwestern United States provides the opinions of senior managers and human resource associates regarding recruitment and selection practices. In-depth interviews, carried out over a two-week period in August 2000, are used to develop an understanding of the recruitment and selection process for line workers as well as to investigate the desired skills and value of previous Japanese experience. Results of the case study analysis are compared with two models from the literature: (1) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese automotive-related firms in Japan and (2) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese transplant automotive-related firms abroad. Deviations from the two models point not to a new paradigm of ‘second-generation’ Japanese transplants – those that have moved into regions quite familiar with Japanese firms and related management and production methods – but rather to overall weaknesses in the stereotypical models. Managerial opinions within the case study firm place limited value on familiarity with a Japanese environment, considering such experience secondary to attitudes and work ethics that are in line with the philosophy of the case study firm.

Keywords:

• Japan
• automotive transplants in the West
• personnel practices
• recruitment and selection

Notes

 1 Shimada employs a cultural allusion by referring to these characteristics as the ‘Three Sacred Treasures’ of Japanese industrial relations (1985: 44); and Aoki refers to them as the ‘three sacred tools’ that ‘allegedly harmonize industrial relations and elicit employee cooperation’ in Japan (1984: 4). Takezawa et al. (1982: 162) point out that the ‘three pillars of industrial relations’ became widely recognized from the late 1960s to the latter half of the 1970s; the three were mentioned in reports of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as early as 1972.

 2 Perhaps past-tense verbs would be more appropriate in this sentence. Hanami (2004), for example, questions the value and relevance of lifetime employment in contemporary Japan.

 3 For another useful description of the Flat Rock case, see Babson (1998).

 4 Such high numbers of applications – ordinarily 30 to 100 for each job opening – are typical for transplants in North America (Rinehart et al., 1997: 33).

 5 See, inter alia, p. 19 of the Fucini and Fucini text (on Bill Judson, Flat Rock's United Auto Workers representative) and p. 45 (on Denny Pawley, the highest-ranking American at the Flat Rock plant). Judson, for example, was chosen to work with Mazda because of his ‘even-tempered character’ and ‘stability’ (Fucini and Fucini, 1990: 19), precisely what Japanese firms in Japan look for in their candidates, according to the model suggested by Abegglen.

 6 The same can be said for Honda's Marysville plant (which, in 1982, became the first Japanese automobile facility to open in the US), where ‘few associates – even managers – had seen a car plant before the company hired them’ (Toy et al., 1988: 37).

 7 Bacon and Blyton (2005) contrast managerial and employee views in considering the extent to which team working can be interpreted as a method for enforcing employee compliance.

 8 However, Clark (1979: 158) maintains that a more complex system involving exams and interviews was retained for university graduates in Japan.

 9 Milkman, who surveyed 66 Japanese-owned, non-automotive manufacturing plants in California in 1989, found that the US-trained managers ‘do not conform to the “Japanese” model’ but rather use ‘standard’ human resource techniques (1992: 151). Whereas the typically US-trained human resource managers at automotive transplants practice recruitment and selection along what they believe to be ‘Japanese’ lines, those at US transplants outside the automobile industry are doing ‘as the Americans’ (1992: 151). This trend implies that the suggestion by Takezawa et al. (1982: 140) regarding the uniqueness of the Japanese automobile industry may be relevant to the question of the transferability of Japanese industrial relations abroad.

10 Yet, perhaps because the company is still young – or perhaps to provide safety buffers – the process more closely resembles ‘internal JIT’ (Delbridge, 1995: x) in that there are larger-than-necessary stockpiles of raw materials and finished goods at the beginning and end of the production process.

11 At least two interesting reasons why attendance may be stressed when selecting recruits to work at Japanese manufacturing firms can be described. First, if the firm is operating a strict just-in-time system with all waste eliminated, there is no spare labour: everyone is needed in order to keep the production going. This approach was suggested by MAPP's Senior Manufacturing Manager. Second, though, is that attitudes may serve as proxies as to how work is perceived. This nuance was suggested by MAPP's Senior Staff Engineer, who perceived a direct link between an individual's attendance and work ethic.

12 With respect to a large automotive assembler, see Kenney and Florida's description of Toyota's attempts at ‘welfare corporatism’ in Georgetown, Kentucky (1993: 291–5). Regarding the same plant, see also Mishina (1998).

13 When questioned about the sources of such philosophies, the Executive Vice President confessed that he had worked within the Japanese ranks for 22 years; and although he spent the first 12 years of his working career at an American firm, the latter experiences had influenced his management style more deeply.