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Abstract
This paper analyses the multiple pathways through which legitimacy of armed groups is constructed in conflict-affected states. It adopts a political sociological approach to the study of armed group legitimacy. Such a strategy assists in identifying whether armed groups enjoy legitimacy in a given empirical context and avoids applying pre-determined normative criteria. The focus is on three types of relationships: civilian communities, the state or regime in power and external actors including regional and international sponsors, to discern which types of legitimacy matter for armed groups in different relationships.
Notes
1. Della Porta, Terror against the State, 209.
2. Schlichte and Schneckener, Politics of Legitimacy, 409–24.
3. Somers, Constitution of Identity, 605–49; Emirbayer, Relational Sociology, 281–317; Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence; Nexon, Relationalism, 99–126; Jackson and Nexon, Relations before States, 291–332.
4. Wesley, State of the Art, 369–85; Eriksen and Sending, Seeing Beyond the State; Andersen, Legitimacy in State‐Building, 205–19.
5. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy, 575.
6. Andersen, note 4 above; Lemay-Hébert, Statebuilding, 21–45.
7. While the relationship between armed group and other violent non-state actors is important towards the overall success of a rebel movement, it is less relevant from a legitimacy standpoint and falls outside the scope of the current piece.
8. Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, 209–29.
9. Beetham, The legitimacy of power.
10. Blau, A formal theory, 201–18.
11. Lund, Twilight institutions, 685–705.
12. Kasfir, Guerrilla Governance, 281.
13. Arjona, Civilian Resistance.
14. Hofmann, Myths set in motion, 160.
15. Kalyvas, ‘Microlevel Studies of Violence in Civil War, 658–68.
16. Malthaner, Violence, Legitimacy, and Control, 427.
17. Lecomte-Tilouine, Terror in a Maoist Model village, 383.
18. ibid, 383–84.
19. McCullough, The legitimacy of states.
20. Mahmood, The Guardian, Mosul One Year on.
21. Ibid.
22. ibid.
23. Schlichte and Schneckener, Politics of Legitimacy, 409–24.
24. Sarkar and Sarkar. The Rebels' Resource Curse, 1–29.
25. Weinstein, Inside rebellion.
26. Chesterman, Civilians in War, 34; Barbelet, Protection Crisis.
27. Hendrie, Now the people.
28. See note 23 above, 410.
29. See note 13.
30. Mampilly, Insurgent Governance.
31. See note 13.
32. Salehyan et al., External support, 709–44.
33. See note 13 above.
34. See note 12 above.
35. Willms, Justice through Armed Groups, 23–4.
36. Levi and Sacks, Legitimating beliefs, 314.
37. See note 12 above.
38. Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia.
39. See note 16, 433.
40. See note 14, 161.
41. Unsworth, The state’s legitimacy.
42. Schlichte, Shadow of violence, 49.
43. Hangzo and Kaur, Progovernment armed groups.
44. Hazen, gangs as armed groups, 369–86; Kingsbury, Power politics, 219–23.
45. See note 11, 677.
46. Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 567–76.
47. Förster, Maintenant, on sait qui est qui, 699–722.
48. Mampilly, Rebel rulers.
49. Migdal and Schlichte, Rethinking the state, 14–5.
50. Policzer, Non-State Armed Groups, 12; Kalyvas, The logic of violence, 216.
51. Allen and Reid, Justice at the margins,106–23.
52. Pratten, The politics of vigilance, 707–34; Buur, Democracy & its discontents, 571–84.
53. Bakonyi and Stuvøy, Violence & social order, 374.
54. See note 12, 3.
55. Tull, A reconfiguration of political order?, 429–46.
56. Reno, Warlord politics and African states, 227.
57. Jaquier, The Islamic State.
58. Ayoob, The Myth of the Islamic Sate.
59. Jenkins, Opposed to the Islamic State.
60. Staniland, States, insurgents and wartime political orders, 243–64.
61. North, Limited access orders.
62. Snyder, Does lootable wealth breed disorder, 943–68.
63. Brenner, Ashes of co-optation, 337; Smith, Myanmar.
64. Meehan, Drugs, insurgency and state-building, 388–9.
65. See note 63 above, 339.
66. Sheppard, What the Syrian Kurds have Wrought.
67. Munive and Somer, Protection of civilians,10–13.
68. Verweijen, Stable instability, 7–10.
69. Ibid.
70. Toros, We don't negotiate, 413.
71. Aronson et al., How Rebels Win.
72. Balcells and Kalyvas, Revolutionary Rebels.
73. Bhattacharya, Strategic Interaction, 574–75.
74. Carey and Mitchell, Pro-Government Militias and conflict.
75. Jentzsch et al., Militias in Civil Wars, 755–69.
76. Carey et al., Monopoly of violence, 250.
77. Lyall, Are co-ethnics more effective, 1–20.
78. See note 74 above.
79. Mitchell et al., Pro-government militias, 812–36.
80. Berti, Rebel politics, 118–36.
81. Al- Hawat and Elhamoui, Civilian interaction.
82. ibid.
83. Cunningham et al., It Takes Two, 570–97.
84. Salehyan et al., External rebel sponsorship, 633–61.
85. Salehyan et al., Explaining external support, 709–44.
86. Ibid.
87. See note 2 above.
88. Lasley and Thyne, Secession, legitimacy, 289–308.
89. Regan, Third-party interventions, 55–73; Heger and Salehyan, Ruthless rulers, 385–403; Cunningham, Blocking resolution, 115–27.
90. Reyntjens, Second Congo War, 220.
91. See note 68 above.
92. Bellina et al., Legitimacy of the State, 36.
93. Jones et al., Concepts and Dilemmas, 17.
94. Ibid., 25.
95. Thornton, The Kurds as Proxies.
96. ibid.
97. ibid.
98. Munive and Somer, Counter-terrorism and the protection of civilians, 28–30.
99. ibid.
100. ibid.