Beyond the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: Countering Comando Vermelho’s Criminal Insurgency

Abstract

Ten years ago, in 2008, the Brazilian Government adopted a strategy to regain control over the favelas in Rio de Janeiro – the Pacifying Police Units (UPP). In spite of initial favorable results, the main threat, namely the Red Command (CV), fought back and by 2014 the UPP strategy was badly frayed. In order to defeat this threat, it is necessary to reconceptualize CV as a criminal insurgency and to pinpoint and address the social and political factors that sustain it. This allows for a response inspired by the ‘shape-clear-hold-build’ counterinsurgency approach, which while cost-intensive is, in the long term, the most sustainable path to achieving security within the favelas and integrating these neglected areas within the broader city of Rio de Janeiro.

Keywords:

• Favelas
• criminal insurgency
• gangs
• counterinsurgency
• Rio de Janeiro
• Brazil

Notes

1. “Beltrame Diz Que Ataque a UPP É ‘Terrorismo’ E Não Descarta ‘Ações Desagradáveis.”

2. Arias, “Gang Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 238.

3. Ibid., 239.

4. Straubhaar, “A Broader Definition of Fragile States,” 44.

5. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 1.

6. Ibid., 2.

7. Arias, “The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 269.

8. Leeds, “Cocaine and Parallel Polities in the Brazilian Urban Periphery,” 47.

9. Arias, “Gang Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 240; Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 44.

10. Straubhaar, “A Broader Definition of Fragile States,” 44.

11. Leeds, “Rio de Janeiro,” 25.

12. Ibid.

13. “Evasão escolar é maior nas favelas do Rio.”

14. Leeds, “Rio de Janeiro,” 26–27.

15. Arias, “Gang Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.”

16. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 136.

17. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 4.

18. Arias, “Gang Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 240.

19. Ibid., 244.

20. Leeds, “Rio de Janeiro,” 28.

21. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 82.

22. Ibid.

23. Leeds, “Cocaine and Parallel Polities in the Brazilian Urban Periphery,” 61.

24. Skaperdas, “The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the State Does Not,” 185.

25. Leeds, “Rio de Janeiro,” 27.

26. Ibid.

27. Stark, Sociology, 613–14.

28. Leeds, “Cocaine and Parallel Polities in the Brazilian Urban Periphery,” 60. Arias, “Gang Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 240.

29. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 44–50.

30. Ibid., 51.

31. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State.

32. Tse Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Civil War,” 283.

33. Sullivan, “How Illicit Networks Impact Sovereignty,” 173.

34. Ibid., 176.

35. Arias and Rodrigues, “The Myth of Personal Security,” 54–56.

36. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 55–59.

37. Ibid., 59, underlining added.

38. Baile Funk is a party at the favelas where the main music style is funk carioca, whose lyrics usually contain references to poor social conditions, to the daily life in the slums, and to sexually related content.

39. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 61.

40. Ibid., 60.

41. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 4.

42. Goldstein, Laughter out of Place, 179–80.

43. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 2–6.

44. A style of kidnapping where the victim is abducted, taken to an ATM, and forced to withdraw the maximum allowed amount from the bank account.

45. Arias, “The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” 271.

46. Sampaio, “Out of Control,” 44–48.

47. R7, “Desvio de Armas No Rio.”

48. Prazeres, “Facção Que Comanda Tráfico No Norte Tem ‘conexões Estreitas’ com as Farc, Diz MPF.”

49. Garzón, “Introduction,” 8; Calgaro, “Brasil Na Rota Do Tráfico.”

50. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 3.

51. Sampaio, “Out of Control,” 47.

52. Dowdney, Children of the Drug Trade, 53.

53. Torres, “Micro-Ondas Do Tráfico: No Alto Do Morro, Um Símbolo de Terror E Poder.”

54. Estadão, “Trafico Fecha Acessos.”

55. Arrastão is collective robbing, where several criminals cover a large area and take away whatever they can. The name is the equivalent in Brazilian Portuguese to ‘trawler fishing’. See Adriano Araújo, “Invasão Na Linha Vermelha Provoca Pânico Em Motoristas.”

56. “Slum Lords—Comando Vermelho’s Hold on Brazil’s Favelas,” 6.

57. Stanford CDDRL, Mariano Beltrame, Secretary of Security, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

58. BOPE Batalhão de Operações Especiais – created in 1978 with special training and weapons for urban warfare.

59. Notably, rates of less-violent crime increased substantially with recorded cases of domestic violence varying from 27.12 (non UPP) to 84.66 (with UPP)/100,000/month. According to Ignacio Cano, Coordinator of Violence Analysis Laboratory and Associate Professor at State University of Rio de Janeiro, this increase in non-lethal crimes has two explanations: either the absence of strict control by the traffickers encourages these crimes or the population now feels safe reporting that they occur. Stanford CDDRL, Ignacio Cano, Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro.

60. Sampaio, “Out of Control,” 4.

61. Cano, “Os Donos do Morro,” 176.

62. Sampaio, “Out of Control,” 46.

63. Stanford CDDRL, Jailson Silva, Towards a New Paradigm of Public Policy in Rio’s Favelas.

64. Ibid.

65. Cano, “Os Donos do Morro,” 135–38.

66. See note 57 above.

67. Stanford CDDRL, Jailson Silva, Towards a New Paradigm of Public Policy in Rio’s Favelas.

68. Puff, “Como Grupo de Jovens Virou Referência Internacional Na Denúncia de Abusos Policiais.”

69. For a damning account of Rio’s police operations in the favelas, see Amnesty International, “Brazil: Police Killings, Impunity and Attacks on Defenders.”

70. See note 68 above.

71. Sampaio, “Out of Control,” 47.

72. Ibid., 44–8.

73. In 2016, more than 5,000 people were murdered in Rio. See “Rio’s Murder Rate Soared Last Year despite Calm during Olympics”; “Com Exército No RJ, Projeto Quer Justiça Militar Julgando Crimes Contra Civis.”

74. Ucko, “Beyond Clear-Hold-Build,” 526–51.

75. Prada, “Demonstrators March in Brazil to Support Corruption Crackdown.”

76. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism, 64.

77. Luhnow, “Guatemala Outsources a Corruption Crackdown.”

78. Interviews with Thomas Marks, Distinguished Professor of Irregular Warfighting Strategy at the College of International Security Affairs, and General Carlos Ospina, head of the Colombian armed forces from 2002 to 2007, National Defense University, Washington DC, January 2016.

79. “Los consejos comunales, la mejor vitrina que tuvo Uribe.”

80. Ospina and Marks, “Colombia: Changing Strategy amidst the Struggle,” 356.

81. Chade and Genebra, “Pressionado Na ONU, Brasil Declara Que Reduzirá População Carcerária Em 10%.”

82. Leeds, “The Brazilian Prison System: Challenges and Prospects for Reform.”

83. Kaiser, “Will Brazil’s Prison Riots Spur Needed Reforms?”

84. Lessons can be drawn from Task Force 134, the US military unit responsible for detainee operations during to so-called ‘surge’ in Iraq. Under General Douglas Stone, the unit offered each inmate an ‘initial assessment’ to identify political orientation, religious beliefs, and social concerns. Whereas, Islamist extremists were isolated and put through religious courses organized by moderate clerics, those drawn to the insurgency for more mundane and less ideological reasons were offered educational courses and vocational training. Psychologists were also on hand. For a period, the recidivism rate (defined as return to prison) declined from 6–8% to 0.2%. See Ucko, “Militias, Tribes and Insurgents,” 359–61.

85. The problem of stray bullets has recently attracted more attention. In the first six months of 2017, stray bullets caused a reported 632 unintentional killings and injuries in Rio. See Muggah, “Caught between Police and Gangs, Rio de Janeiro Residents are Dying in the Line of Fire.”

86. Freeman, “Raising the Flag over Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas,” 8.

87. Fórum, “UPP: Os Cinco Motivos Que Levaram À Falência O Maior Projeto Do Governo Cabral.”

88. Ospina and Marks, “Colombia,” 366.

89. See note 57 above.

90. This was the experience of US Army Colonel Christopher Kolenda in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan, Afghanistan. Given the lack of governmental reach into the area, Kolenda worked through traditional structures of governance such as village and district shuras, consensus-based committees bringing together elected local elders. He invested in the village elders as the most plausible alternative to radical influence, and localized development to provide economic opportunity to the young men who had been fighting as a means of making money. The approach is captured well in Kolenda, The Counterinsurgency Challenge.

91. Bolsa Familia is a social program to provide a minimum financial support to extremely poor families. The World Bank, “Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil.”

92. OECD, “Brazil,” 34.

93. “Jovem Aprendiz.”

94. For precedents and best practices, see Ucko, “Beyond Clear-Hold-Build”; Counterinsurgency Advisory & Assistance Team, “Less Boom for the Buck: Projects for COIN Effects and Transition.”

95. The World Bank, “Bolsa Familia.”

96. Yo, “Presalt Oil and Natural Gas Provide an Increasing Share of Brazil’s Production.”