https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3383-4143
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ABSTRACT
Hybrid warfare has been a popular term that refers to contemporary warfare. Despite the increasing number of critiques, NATO has used the term in its strategic documents and summit declarations. Since concepts are important in shaping our understanding and the way that our forces fight, NATO’s use of a controversial concept has raised some questions. In this context, this paper aims to explore the meaning of the hybrid warfare from the viewpoint of NATO, based on in-depth interviews with NATO officials who have sufficient expertise and experience about the concept. The authors conclude that hybrid warfare is an ambiguous concept which clouds NATO’s strategic thinking and leads NATO to forget the difference between war and peace. Further analysis has revealed that NATO uses this concept as a tool for the strategic communication rather than a military concept.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. TRADOC, Regulation 71–20, 9.
2. Ivo PIKNER et al., Military Operating Concepts Development, 13.
3. Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare Resurgence and Politicisation.
4. See the following critiques for earlier version; Glenn, “Thoughts on Hybrid Conflict”; Gray, Categorical Confusion?; Cox, Bruscino, and Ryan, “Why Hybrid Warfare is Tactics.” See the following critiques for expanded version; Puyvelde, “Hybrid War – Does It Even Exist?”; Tenenbaum, “Hybrid Warfare in the Strategic Spectrum”; Biscop, “Hybrid Hysteria”; Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War”; Renz and Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare”; Galeotti, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear?”; Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare”; Fridman, “Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?”; and Johnson, “Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures”. Stoker and Whiteside,…
5. Tenenbaum, “Hybrid Warfare in the Strategic Spectrum,” 95–97.
6. Creswell and Poth, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design, 121.
7. Mattis and Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Page numbers?
8. See the following articles for Hoffman’s concept: Hoffman, “The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” 2007; “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 2009; “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” 2009; “Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable,” 2010; “On Not-So-New Warfare,” 2014; and Johnson, “Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures,” 141.
9. Johnson, “Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures,” 8.
10. Ibid., 29.
11. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War,” 18.
12. Hoffman, “‘Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable,” 441–2; and Lasconjarias and Larsen, “Introduction: A New Way of Warfare,” 4.
13. See note 11 above.
14. Poli, An Asymmetrical Symmetry, 7.
15. Galeotti, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear?” 283; and Lasconjarias and Larsen, “A New Way of Warfare,” 2.
16. Giegerich, “Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict,” 15.
17. NATO, “White Paper. Next Steps NATO’s Transform. To Warsaw Summit Beyond.”
18. Maas, “Hybrid Threat and CSDP,” in Handbook on CSDP, 125.
19. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare,” 3; “Thinking About Future Conflict,” 12.
20. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” para. 5 and 13.
21. Ibid., para. 7–14.
22. Ibid., para 14.
23. NATO, “Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs.”
24. NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.”
25. Loringhoven, “Adapting NATO Intelligence in Support of ‘One NATO’.”
26. NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration,” para 21.
27. Ibid., para. 21.
28. NATO, “London Declaration.”
29. Authors’ interview with 7 and 9.
30. Authors’ interview with 6, 15, 16.
31. Authors’ interview with 13.
32. Authors’ interview with 1.
33. Authors’ interview with 2, 6, 8, 9, 10.
34. Authors’ interview with 4, 12, 16, 17, 18.
35. Authors’ interview with 12.
36. Authors’ interview with 17.
37. Authors’ interview with 7.
38. Breedlove, “Foreword,” in NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, XXV.
39. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 30.
40. Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, 187.
41. Authors’ interview with 11,16.
42. Authors’ interview with 8,16.
43. Authors’ interview with 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15.
44. Authors’ interview with 7, 15.
45. Authors’ interview with 8, 9, 10, 11.
46. Authors’ interview with 2.
47. Authors’ interview with 3, 10, 17.
48. Authors’ interview with 5.
49. Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare, xiv, 4.
50. Authors’ interview with 14.
51. JP 3–13, Information Operations, I-1.
52. Authors’ interview with 1, 5, 7.
53. Authors’ interview with 4, 11, 12, 14.
54. Authors’ interview with 11.
55. Authors’ interview with 7, 14.
56. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War,” 3.
57. Authors’ interview with 1.
58. Authors’ interview with 3.
59. Authors’ interview with 13.
60. Authors’ interview with 15.
61. Authors’ interview with 16.
62. Authors’ interview with 18.
63. Authors’ interview with 10.
64. Authors’ interview with 11.
65. Authors’ interview with 14.
66. Authors’ interview with 17.
67. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, xi.
68. Gray, Categorical Confusion? 16; Puyvelde, “Hybrid War,” 17; and Renz and Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare,” 11.
69. Authors’ interview with 3, 5, 7, 10, 13, 17.
70. Authors’ interview with 7.
71. Authors’ interview with 2, 8.
72. Authors’ interview with 3.
73. Authors’ interview with 14, 15, 1.
74. Authors’ interview with 13.
75. Authors’ interview with 17.
76. Authors’ interview with 14.
77. Authors’ interview with 7.
78. Authors’ interview with 6.
79. Authors’ interview with 7.
80. Authors’ interview with 18.
81. Authors’ interview with 18.
82. Puyvelde, “Hybrid War.”
83. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War,” 2.
84. Authors’ interview with 15.
85. Authors’ interview with 3. Modern warfare was also used by 8, 10, 15, 16.
86. Authors’ interview with 2.
87. Authors’ interview with 8. The term character of warfare was also used by 4, 11, 15.
88. Authors’ interview with 11.
89. Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 3, 23–24.
90. Authors’ interview with 3.
91. Authors’ interview with 5.
92. Authors’ interview with 6.
93. Authors’ interview with 9.
94. Authors’ interview with 10.
95. Authors’ interview with 11.
96. Authors’ interview with 17.
97. Authors’ interview with 18.
98. Authors’ interview with 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18.
99. Authors’ interview with 17.
100. Authors’ interview with 9.
101. Authors’ interview with 6.
102. Authors’ interview with 10.
103. Authors’ interview with 5.
104. Authors’ interview with 3.
105. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War,” 16.
106. Ibid., 13.
107. Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” 22.
108. Owen, “The War of New Words.”
109. Stoker, “What’s in a Name II,” 21, 23.
110. Authors’ interview with 11, 14.
111. JP 3–0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, V-13; FM 3–0 Operations, 3–2; Authors’ interview with 3, 11.
112. Authors’ interview with 6.
113. Tuck, “Hybrid War: The Perfect Enemy.”
114. Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning, 203; and Barnes, “Neophilia, Presentism, and Their Deleterious Consequences for Western Military Strategy.”
115. Lonsdale, The Nature of Warfare, 182.
116. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, 1.
117. Rich, “The Snowball Phenomenon: The US Marine Corps, Military Mythology and the Spread of Hybrid Warfare Theory,” 431.
118. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 58.
119. Coker, Rebooting Clausewitz, 46.
120. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 78.
121. Gray, Theory of Strategy, 35.
122. Gray, Categorical Confusion? 33.
123. Stoker and Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War,” 28.
124. Gray, Categorical Confusion? 42.
125. Fridman, Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’, 1.
126. Tenenbaum, “Hybrid Warfare in the Strategic Spectrum,” 95.
127. NATO, “NATO Defence Planning Process.”
128. Stoker, “What’s in a Name II,” 23.
129. Authors’ interview with 17.
130. Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 91.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Murat Caliskan
Murat Caliskan, Former military officer, retired Major. He has served in Turkish Army for more than 20 years before retired in 2016. He holds two M.A. degrees; one was received from International Cyprus University in International Relations (2005) and the other from Turkish War Academy in International Security (2012). He has also an MBA degree from Naval Postgraduate School/USA (2008). He worked at NATO HQ/Brussels between 2014 and 2016 before becoming a full-time PhD Student at the Université Catholique de Louvain/Belgium. He is currently studying on Strategic Theory, Military Strategy, Contemporary Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Political Warfare, and UN Peacekeeping Operations.
Michel Liégeois
Michel Liégeois is a professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain/Belgium where he teaches International Relations and Security Studies. Since 2016, he has chaired the Institute of Political Science Louvain Europe (ISPOLE). His research focuses on peace operations and Belgium’s foreign policy and more particularly its action on the Security Council. Michel Liégeois is the Director of the European Section of the French-speaking Network for Peace Operations Research (ROP) and is a member of the Boutros-Ghali Observatory’s scientific coordination on peacekeeping.