Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: the New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence

Abstract

The paper calls for more attention to be paid to the heterogeneous character of new Islamic groups, including the need to avoid assumptions about the origins of radicalism, extremism and recourse to violence adopted by some of them. By focusing on a new movement of young Muslims in the Northern Caucasian Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria in the period from the 1990s to the early 2000s, we suggest that conceptualising some new Islamic groups as New Religious Movements (NRMs) can sharpen our understanding of the tensions, conflicts and violence often associated with them. This, in turn, can encourage us to take fuller account of factors including their social provenance, the appeal of their beliefs and practices, the demographic characteristics of their membership and the dynamics of their internal and external interactions with the wider society.

Notes

Some publications in the Russian language (for example Babich and Yarlykapov, 2003; Kisriyev, 2004; Malashenko, 2006; Makarov, 2007) offer useful ethnographic material and insights into the social and political contexts of new Islamic groups in the region.

Kabardino-Balkaria is a relatively small republic in the mountains of the Northern Caucasus. Its population is under a million; the main ethnic groups are Kabards (around 55per cent), Russians (25 per cent) and Balkars (11.5 per cent) (according to the 2002 Russian national census).

In this paper we refer to the Jamaat, or Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat (KBJ), and New Muslims interchangeably. When the word ‘jamaat’ is not capitalised, it refers to local groups (brotherhoods) of the Jamaat. A detailed history of the KBJ can be found in a report prepared by Aleksandr Zhukov, a member of the Memorial Human Rights Group in Moscow (Zhukov, 2008).

Another atypical demographic characteristic of the New Muslims was that it was a male-dominated group. However, discussion of the possible reasons for, and effects of, this is beyond the scope of the current paper. See also note 11.

During the postsoviet period many Kabards and Balkars have come to perform some Islamic rituals according to the Shafii madhab (school), simply because their teachers were (traditionally Shafii) Chechens and Dagestanis.

The word Salafi (from the Arabic salaf, predecessor) originally referred to adherents of Islam who sought to emulate the first three generations of ‘pure’ Muslims (‘The Pious Predecessors’). Throughout the centuries, this concept has inspired Islamic scholars, such as Taqi ad-Deen Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) and revivals associated with them. However, in contemporary usage Salafism is often associated with militant jihadi Islam, also referred to as Wahhabism. This usage is quite misleading as it lumps together different interpretations of Salafism to create a generalised threatening image that has little connection to the social reality of these groups (see Meijer, 2009a; Roy, 2004).

This reluctance to be seen as separate from the rest of Muslims is not uncommon among Salafis, as they consider sectarianism ‘un-Islamic’. However, as we indicate further, the KBJ leaders were specifically concerned about activities of competing Islamic movements originating from outside the region.

The most prominent of these charities was Hayat al-igasa al-Islamiya ad-dawliya.

It has to be noted that Muhammad bin-Saud University is known for its strict adherence to a narrow judicial interpretation of Islam (all judges in Saudi Arabia are educated there).

The teaching of al-takfir wal-hijra (Arabic ‘excommunication and exodus’) refers to a variety of different and often unconnected militant Islamic groups; originally it was the popular name of the Jamaat al-Muslimin (the Society of Muslims), an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s.

Contrary to the common view, the Jamaat included a considerable number of young women. While never in positions of formal authority, they nevertheless had prominent roles in the community, which, unfortunately, have never been properly studied.

In fact, the brothers would typically avoid referring to these places as mosques even though Friday prayers and most significant meetings were taking place there.

‘Amir’ is an abbreviation of Amir al-muminin (Arabic ‘Leader of the Faithful’) and refers to the title of those who hold legitimate power, both spiritual and political, in separate parts of what is seen as the global Islamic community (ummah). It is noteworthy that the KBJ leaders chose this title instead of ‘imam’ (‘prayer leader’).

All KBJ leaders and some members were good entrepreneurs and ran small businesses, such as an office furniture company, professional commercial translation services, and a vegetable market trade.

Olivier Roy (2004, pp. 1–57) makes a similar argument with respect to the second and third generations of Muslim minorities in western societies.

The Kadar Zone is a geographical area in Dagestan where in the 1990s local Salafis formed communities in two villages, Chabanmakhi and Karamakhi. This led to tensions and conflicts with the rest of the inhabitants who remained faithful to their traditional Sufi Islam. The subsequent intervention in 1999 of rebels from Chechnya, who attempted to provide support for the Salafis, resulted in an armed conflict that also involved Russian special forces.

Ichkeria is a historic (Turkic) name for what is now Chechnya, which is preferred among Chechen nationalists.

After joining Yarmuk, Musa Mukozhev remained Astermirov's closest ally until the Russian security services killed him on 11 May 2009.