Abstract
In this study, we look at the evolution of a cooperative water regime in the delta of the Rhine catchment. In a Dutch–German case study, we focus on cross-border cooperation on the local and regional scale, describing and analyzing how a remarkably resilient and robust transboundary water regime has evolved over the course of 50 years. Context-, interest- and knowledge-based explanations contribute important insights into the evolution of the Deltarhine regime, and it is shown that the legal, institutional and socio-economic context shapes and constrains regional cross-border cooperation. Surprisingly in this regard, we find that European water directives have not yet played a decisive, catalyzing role for policy harmonization across borders. Finally, we show that key individuals play a crucial role in regime formation and development. We suggest that the presence of entrepreneurs and leaders adds explanatory power to current conceptual frameworks in international river basin management, thus meriting further research.
Acknowledgments and data
The authors kindly thank all respondents from Germany and The Netherlands for their kind participation in this study. The authors also thankfully acknowledge the constructive reviews of Jürg Bloesch and three anonymous reviewers who have helped to improve the paper. Underlying data for this paper are properly cited and referred to in the reference list and the appendices. Supporting data are included as seven tables in the corresponding supplemental file:
Table S1. Contextual characteristics of the international water regime in Deltarhine.
Table S2. Tabular overview of cooperation processes constituting the Deltarhine regime between 1963 and 2014.
Table S3. Overview of data sources and information.
Table S4. Overview of literature and empirical material pertaining to the study area and transboundary cooperation between The Netherlands and Germany.
Table S5. Overview of respondents.
Table S6. Detailed description of the four major phases of cross-border cooperation in Deltarhine.
Table S7. Overview of collective problems, negative externalities and win–win situations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2017.1371005