Uncover the theory practice gap in Swedish transport planning: an interdisciplinary approach

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the gap between planning theory and planning practice in Swedish infrastructure planning. Planning theory was of limited relevance in order to understand the planning processes and the documents. Instead sociology, political theory and philosophy appeared as useful theoretical resources. Bourdieu’s theories on social and cultural capital, and ‘the feel for the game’ were useful in understanding planning practice. In order to develop communicative planning theory into a useful asset for planning practice the system perspective and the emphasis on public spheres from Habermas communicative action theory, critical realism and political pluralism might well serve as theoretical point of departures.

KEYWORDS:

• Planning theory
• planning practice
• regional transport planning
• social theory
• politics
• philosophy

Introduction

Background

In 2008 The National Transportation Administration (NTA) in Sweden introduced a new planning guide called Regional System Analysis Method description (RSAM) (Trafikverket, Banverket, Vägverket, Sjöfartsverket, & Luftsfartsstyrelsen, 2008). The aim was to improve the focus and goal accomplishment in national and regional Swedish transport planning. Each region should produce a planning document – a Regional System Analysis Document (RSAD). In the RSAD, the transport modes should complement each other in order to support transportation needs on regional and national level, and to meet the national transport policy objectives in terms of: an equal transport system, a healthy environment, and a positive regional development (Trafikverket et al., 2008). The Regional System Analysis Process (RSAP) should be anchored in interest groups. The regions managing the RSAPs and the production of the RSADs have a political mandate that also incorporates regional development, sustainability, health, etc.

Taking into account new planning prerequisites, insufficient accomplishment regarding potential for aggregating the results expressed in the RSADs to a National System Analysis (NSA), and provided inputs to the next planning step about choosing between possible infrastructure alternatives, the NTA took the initiative for research on evaluation of RSADs and RSAPs (Trafikverket, 2013a). The aims were to ‘identify shortcomings and potentials for improvements’ in the RSAs, and, to ‘[…] evaluate methods for system analysis […]’ (p3). This paper is an outcome of this evaluation of RSAPs and RSADs.

Based on the RSAM, where concepts like ‘system analysis’, and ‘anchoring’ processes were used, our first research hypothesis to test was if knowledge from planning theory based on system analysis, rational choice, and communicative planning was apparent in the RSADs and the RSAPs. Our second research hypothesis to test was if the regions strived to maximize economic allocations to the region in line with game theory. None of these hypotheses could be verified.

Aim and research question

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the gap between planning theory and planning practice (the T-P gap). The research question to be answered is: How can the gap between planning theory and practice be explained and bridged?

Structure of the paper

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the theoretical frameworks are outlined and previous findings on the T-P gap are briefly described. Second, the case studies including empirical procedures and findings are presented. Third, an interdisciplinary comparison, review and discussion of the T-P gaps (as they appear in the RSAPs and the RSADs) departing from sociological, political, and philosophical aspects is presented. Fourth, the paper ends with a discussion and suggestions for further studies.

Theoretical frameworks

The theoretical frameworks used are structured according to Yiftachel’s (1989, pp. 26–30) three complementary operational levels of debates on planning: the urban form debate (prescriptive and substantive land-use theories concerning ‘What is a good urban form?’ By Faludi (1973, p. 3), conceptualized as ‘theories in planning’), the procedural debate (prescriptive procedural planning theories concerning ‘What is a good planning process?’ By Faludi (1973, p. 3), conceptualized as ‘theories of planning’), and the analytical debate (explanatory socio-political theories concerning ‘What is planning?’). Theory is here – broadly – understood as ‘relevant knowledge to bear on a specific problem’ (Lindblom, 1959/1996, p. 206; see also Alexander, 2016, p. 93, 95, 98).

The RSAM comprises – in a way – general guidelines on wanted planning procedures (the procedural debate), vague guidelines on what kind of infrastructure should be included (the urban form debate) and on what kind of societal aspects (the analytical debate) the RSAPs and RSAD should comprise. The first theoretical framework used in section two – analysing the RSAPs and RSADs – is therefore first and foremost based on prescriptive procedural planning theories, see Table 1.

Table 1. A brief presentation of planning theories used as resources in understanding the RSA planning documents and planning procedures. See Allmendinger (2017), Hall (1992), and Taylor (1998).

Planning approach/theory	Main features.	In Yiftachels (1989) typology^a	Reference
Blueprint planning	Detailed plans depicting a precise future land use (often based on standard solutions).	The urban form debate	Faludi and van der Valk (1994)
System planning	The region or the city is conceived as a system with interlinked parts: a change in one part or link then affects all other parts and links in terms of number of people, economic activity, flows, environmental impacts, etc. The system is also considered to be affected by internal and external uncontrolled societal processes producing unpredicted outcomes. Related to rational planning.	The procedural debate	McLoughlin (1969), Johansen (1977)
Rational planning	A planning process structured in goals, means, consequences and feedback. Belief in optimal solutions and objectivity.	The procedural debate	Faludi (1973)
Communicative (/collaborative) planning	Planning processes based on communication, learning and consensus building between (all) interests. Belief in phenomenology and social constructions.	The procedural debate	Healey (1997)
Game theory and negotiation	A framework to understand planning processes where (strong) interests negotiate and cooperate (or not) according to their individual agenda. Non-cooperation mode appears when interests do not cooperate. Cooperation mode might appear through repeated negotiations.	The analytical and procedural debates	Johansen (1977), Binmore (2007), Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe (2002)
Incrementalism	Relaxing the complexity in comprehensive planning by ‘dividing large decision into smaller ones’ (Friedmann, 1987, p. 129) and emphasizing the role of ‘watchdogs’ (Lindblom, 1959, p. 204) in guarding specific interests and values. See also Isaksson and Richardson (2009)	The (explanatory) procedural debate	Friedmann (1987), Lindblom (1959)
Advocacy planning	Acknowledges politics, pluralism, representative democracy and different kinds of interests – sometimes in synergy and sometimes in conflict.	The procedural and the analytical debates	Davidoff (1965)
Social learning	Emphasizes knowledge formation, management, and a learning process where methods and goals might be adjusted during the implementation procedure.	The procedural debate	Friedmann (1987)
Regime theory	Emphasizes different economic, social and environmental problems and needs. Different types of cooperation between public and private organizations are therefore needed.	The explanatory- procedural debate	Stoker and Mossberger (1994)
Regulation theory	Emphasizes different problems and needs for regions in relation to the changing capitalistic system (on global level).	The explanatory- procedural debate	Khakee (2005)
‘Phronetic planning’	Flyvbjerg’s (2002) Foucault inspired planning approach specifically incorporating power issues. That is how agents active in the planning procedure are able to define what is important and right based on their possession of power. Flyvbjerg emphasizes the importance of introducing: ‘planning councils’ (2002, p. 364), public hearings, public planning information, ‘watchdogs’, external expertise, legal trials, guidelines for ethics in democracy (Flyvbjerg, 1993)	The exploratory – prescriptive procedural debate	Flyvbjerg (1993, 2002)

^aMain characteristics, approximate definitions. See also Allmendinger's (2017, pp. 43–50) criticism regarding this typology.

The discussion in the third section, that attempts to define and bridging (see Allmendinger, 2017, p. 29) the T-P gap, is based on socio-political theories and departs from March’s (2010) paper on sociology based on Sartre and Marx, Willson (2001) on politics based on planners’ instrumental rationality and politicians’ strategic rationality, and Lord (2013) on the philosophical issue of solipsism. These authors depart first and foremost from the communicative planning paradigm. In order to understand what kind of planning activities have been carried out, we discuss these authors’ contributions in relation to our empirical findings, and in relation to an additional set of socio-political theories based mainly on Habermas (1984, 1987) communicative action theory and Bourdieu’s (1980/1992, 1983) theories on capital (the analytical debate), Davidoff’s (1965) theories on advocacy planning (the procedural and analytical debates), Pargetter’s (1984) philosophy on solipsism, and Sayer’s (1992) philosophy on critical realism. This second set of theories is used as explanatory theories that aim to uncover what kind of planning activities have been carried out.

Previous research on the theory – practice gap: a brief overview

Studies of the T-P gap in planning are not new. The T-P gap in planning has several definitions and various suggestions for how it might be bridged have also been proposed. For instance, Kiernan (1983, pp. 71–72) relates the T-P gap – ‘[…] this theory-practice chasm […]’ – to: one, that planners’ day to day work ‘[…] inhibits reflection and analysis’; two, the ‘[…] absence of any intellectual discourse between […] theorists and practitioners’; and three, the ‘prevalence of a number of anti-political planning ideologies which […] eviscerate planning of its political content and therefore of its relevancy’. Kiernan (1983, p. 73) emphasizes ‘[a] political understanding of planning would begin with a recognition that […] planning in fact affords very few right and wrong answers, but instead affords answers which are largely contingent on one's underlying political and philosophical values’. Alexander (1997, p. 5) defines (parts of) the T-P gap as ‘the absence of systematic knowledge that translates the relatively general and abstract concepts and explanations of normative and positive [planning] theory into case-specific prescriptions for [planning] action’. Thompson (2000) questions the overall value of using planning theory to understand planning practice. Willson (2001) highlights the difference between planners’ need for instrumental rationality and the politicians’ endeavour for strategic rationality as the root of the T-P gap. Kudva (2008, p. 369) suggests using planning practice as a ‘prism’ in understanding knowledge transfer between planning theory and planning practice. Watson (2008, quoted in Allmendinger, 2017, p. 29) describes the T-P gap as the ‘lack of a ‘good fit’ between planning theory and contextualised planning practice’. Allmendinger (2017, p. 29) describes the T-P gap as ‘[…] theories for planners to use […] which are totally ignored by practitioners’. According to Allmendinger (2017, p. 295), planners prefer to have a range of theories to choose among that fit ‘their own interests’ upholding their ‘expert status’ (p. 31). Talvitie (2009), in order to uncover the T-P gap, emphasizes a further understanding of the socio-psychological character of the planning process. March (2010) emphasizes the limitation within communicative planning in handling unforeseen outcomes and suggests a sociological meta-theoretical test of communicative planning theory. Alexander (2010, p. 100) presents solutions to bridge the T-P gap in the form of ‘the enlightenment model’. Binder (2011), in turn, provides insights on the importance of understanding the role of habits based on Bourdieu in uncovering the T-P gap. Feitelson (2011) suggests methods for how to introduce complexity into a communicative planning process. Lord (2013) analyses the gap from a philosophical perspective and suggests the use of Wittgenstein’s language game to bridge the T-P gap. Vogelij (2015) describes what kind of knowledge is useful in planning practice characterized by a situated dynamic complexity. Alexander (2016) – in order to bridge the T-P gap (defined as the gap between a generic planning and ‘“epistemic” practice’, p. 93) – proposes a development of ‘mid-level [planning] theories for particular planning practices such as spatial [or regional] planning’ (p. 99).

For a broader discussion on the definition of the T-P gap, see Allmendinger (2017, pp. 29–34).

Case studies

For reasons of comprehensiveness and relatively well-developed RSADs the following three regions were selected as case studies: Halland, Skåne and Gävleborg, see Figure 1.

Figure 1. The location of the Gävleborg region, the Halland region and the Skåne region in Sweden.

Empirical procedures

The analysis was conducted in four main steps:

Step 1: In order to understand the planning procedures and the planning documents relating to the RSA for each region, we employed content analysis (Bergström & Boréus, 2005) based on planning theories (hypothesis 1), see Table 1. Planning theory, however, was of limited relevance in explaining the RSAPs and the RSADs.

Step 2: To develop a further understanding the documents were then analysed according to game theory in an institutional perspective (hypothesis 2). Preliminary results supported this hypothesis of a game approach based on non-cooperation mode (Binmore, 2007; Johansen, 1977; Raiffa et al., 2002).

Step 3: With the objective of verifying or rejecting these hypotheses (1–2 above), seven interviews were conducted with planners and experts who participated in the RSAPs using a semi-structured interview technique (Edwards & Holland, 2013; Holme & Solvang, 1997). Planning or game theories did not, however, provide much help in understanding the RSAPS and the RSADs. There were still unexpected and unexplained gaps between theory and practice.

Step 4: In the final step we made an interdisciplinary comparison with other studies. In this step we discuss our empirical findings in relation to findings from three relatively recent research papers on the gap between planning theory and planning practice. The three perspectives selected were sociology based on March’s (2010) understanding of the individual freedom vis-à-vis the environment based on Marx and Sartre, politics based on Willson’s (2001) notions of planners’ need for instrumental rationality and politicians’ need for strategic rationality, and philosophy based on Lord’s (2013) understanding of constraints and possibilities in communication based on solipsism and Wittgenstein’s language game. These interesting contributions did provide a range of fruitful perspectives on sociology, politics and philosophy that relate to our empirical findings and provide theoretical device in guiding us forward adopting an alternative set of socio-political theories in our efforts to explain the RSAPs and RSADs

The scope here is a confined interdisciplinary study not a meta-theoretical test.

Empirical findings

Planning context

The Swedish transportation planning system is formally divided into two spatial levels: the national and the county/regional level. Basically the NTA makes analyses and plans and the parliament prioritizes between infrastructure objects and steering tools, and distributes financial allocations between the regions (Trafikverket, 2013b).

The transportation planning chain fundamentally functions as follows: Each of Sweden’s 20 regions should provide a system analysis (see Table 1) of all types of transportation infrastructure (roads, railways, airports and shipping ports) – an RSAD (Trafikverket et al., 2008, pp. 12–13). The regions are political organizations comprising planning sections (and other sections). The RSADs should provide information to the National System Analysis (NSA) (p. 7) and the subsequent national and regional object planning (the county transport plans developed by the regions, and the national transport plan developed by Trafikverket) (p. 7, 8, 10) on what kind of measures should be implemented to attain the goals (p. 21).

The following structure should be applied in the RSADs: 1. goals, 2. functions (the functioning of the ‘system’, p. 12), and 3. measures. The goals should be based on national goals regarding the transportation system (p. 8, Appendix 1). Functions are for instance travel time between two cities (p. 15). Measures are specific physical investments (p. 10, 27), and other aspects such as pricing systems, initiatives to change people’s behaviour towards walking, cycling and using public transport, etc. (p. 12). The RSAs should comprise some sort of cost–benefit analysis (p. 12), CO₂ emissions should be estimated (p. 19), synergies and conflicts between measures should be balanced (p. 18, 26), goal fulfilment should be estimated (p. 22, 25), specific physical measures should be named (p. 21, 25, 26) and descriptions of geographical areas should be presented (p. 18). Further, the RSADs should provide knowledge about inter- and intra-regional transport (p. 5). The RSADs should be anchored in regional reference groups made up of travellers, municipalities, transport companies and representatives of business and commerce, and other interests (p. 5). The RSAD should also include a strategic environmental assessment (p. 11). The proposals in the RSADs should be ‘efficient both for regional and for long-distance traffic’ (p. 4).

Planning documents

The RSAD covering Halland describes the transport infrastructure and transportation in this region (Region Halland, 2008). The northern part of Halland lies within the Gothenburg labour market region. The RSAD in Halland comprises goals, functions, commuting, freight and suggestions for a range of activities and investments. The planning procedure is described as a three-step sequence: 1. identifying national, regional and local goals; 2. describing the system in order to fulfil the goals; 3. identifying measures to develop a transport system in accordance with the goals (p. 6). The importance of anchoring is also emphasized:

To achieve a broad anchoring Region Halland has on two occasions invited a large number of public and private actors to a dialogue on the future transportation system in Halland. (Region Halland, 2008, p. 5).

The conclusions of the Halland RSAD states:

The Region of Halland considers the system analysis to be a guideline for future planning of undertakings in the transport system. For the region, this document will serve as an important basis regarding future prioritising between undertakings in connection with the county transport plan (p. 3).

In order to be able to prioritize between various undertakings in the transport system there should therefore be some sort of impact analysis presented in the RSADs.

The goals are formulated in general terms of increased accessibility, attractiveness, decreasing car use and increasing public transport, conflicts between high accessibility and environmental concerns (pp. 22–25). Public and private organizations participated in various ways in the process. General devices to influence transport needs, usage of existing infrastructure, and provide new infrastructure were analysed (pp. 25–26). The document's final section presents a list of desired transport infrastructure investments. This list is based on seven defined transport corridors (p. 23), e.g. between Laholm and Kungsbacka, Varberg and Borås, and Varberg and Smålandsstenar. For each corridor, three consequences (safety, equity, and ecological impact) are estimated by means of plus and minus signs due to suggested changes in the transport system, and other measures such as information efforts, etc. (p. 25). For instance, in the Laholm-Kunsgsbacka corridor 15 measures (more departures to Kastrup, develop exchange nodes in the transportation system, double-track railway lines, etc. pp. 33–34) are suggested.

The Skåne RSA presents the aim of the RSA as

• (…) further clarify the needs and priorities that the actors in Skåne want to convey to the national level.

• (…) consolidate collaboration and consensus in Skåne on goals and priorities

• Reconcile and coordinate with the surrounding [regions] (Region Skåne, 2008, p. 8).

The Skåne RSAD covers subjects such as societal prerequisites, national and regional goals, dialogue, and presentation of what kind of activities support goal accomplishment on the regional scale. The planning process is described as follows:

An overall study has been made on functions and measures based on the 6 objectives […]. The [RSA] study has been accomplished in cooperation with the planning actors in the region. Cooperation and anchoring have been carried out with the municipalities – both politicians and officials. (p. 8)

A number of meetings were held with various interest groups, politicians, municipalities and neighbouring regions. In an appendix, Region Skåne makes a structured effort to analyse the linkage between goals, function and measures:

The regional system analysis has identified 24 functions in the transport system. A function has been defined as a functional property of the transport system and in itself none has any positive or negative influence. However, measures can affect the function positively as well as negatively. In order for the goals to be achieved, it is required that the functions in general develop positively, i.e. towards the goals. The starting point for the identification of the functions was that they must be structured and comprehensive, i.e. together provide a comprehensive picture of the transport system’s most important properties. (Trivector, 2008)

The technical part of the Skåne RSAD is impressive and comprises 6 goals, 24 functions and 180 measures (various kinds of investments). In the main planning document, the suggestions for future investments are divided into six levels of ambitions and external national investments. For instance, on the 30 billion Skr level (year 2010–2020) improvements on national roads such as the E6, E22, and E65 (p. 62), and a number of regional roads such as roads number 11, 108 and 109 (p. 61), as well as railway infrastructure, such as a tunnel under the city of Malmö, four railway tracks between Arlöv and Flackarp, and a number of (unspecified) new railway stations (p. 62) are suggested priorities.

The goals in the Gävleborg RSAD are very general: ‘good accessibility […] and well-functioning transport possibilities’ (Region Gävleborg, 2008, p. 10). The planning organization is well-structured and comprises a focus group, cooperation with other regions, and anchoring with politicians. The planning process was a four-step procedure comprising: 1. development of visionary themes; 2. development of a focus group with representatives from municipalities, the National Transportation Agency, transport companies, and regional trade and industry representatives; 3. coordination efforts, and 4. meetings (p. 11). The RSA process was also integrated in other regional planning procedures where meetings with 200 people were accomplished. Basically, the Gävleborg RSAD is a description of the region in terms of business, population, transport flows, etc. Each section in the Gävleborg RSA ends with a list of necessary investments. Somewhat contradictorily, the section comprising ‘A package for system development’ says:

The investment costs for individual objects should be calculated by the NTA […] In order to be able to accomplish undertakings that provide system improvements […] funding should at least be doubled. (p. 69)

Recommended railway projects are for instance double-track lines between Sundsvall – Gävle, Kilafors-Holmsveden and Gävle-Storvik-Avesta/Krylbo. Regarding roads, seven recommendations (as we understand physical improvements) are described, including European highways 4 and 45 (national road 83/84), bypass at Hofors (national road 56), and road safety measures between Edsbyn and European highway 4 (p. 69).

On the whole these documents and procedures seem impressive. However, the procedures presented in the planning documents do not correspond well with any of the planning theories, see Table 1. In the RSADs studied, infrastructure changes and possible consequences are not well described from a system perspective. Advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives on the intra-regional scale (not necessarily quantified) are not presented. For instance, they do not present what kind of social, economic and ecological spatial effects (traffic flow, green house gas emission, costs) various transport planning alternatives may have in various parts of the region (system analysis, impact analysis), learning procedures, possible formation of common knowledge and understanding, anchoring processes with regional citizens are not well described (communicative planning, social learning and ‘phronetic planning’). Conflicts between interests, conflicting political goals, definitions of problems or solutions based on political standpoints are not described. The RSADs therefore cannot be understood as an (political) advocacy or communicative planning process either.

The picture, from the RSADs, on what kinds of process have been taking place could possibly be defined as vague comprehensive rational expert planning processes with some meetings with predefined interest groups.

What they have in common is that they present a list of desired investments – either in the RSADs or in the subsequent county object plans referring to the RSADs. The arguments are said to be based on a system analysis (which they are not). It seems as if the RSADs are fundamentally tools for requesting money from the government. A hypothesis was therefore developed that the RSADs are not plans for infrastructure development which aims at accomplishment of planning goals, but primarily function as devices to maximize the economic allocations to the regions. The mechanism could be explained by game theory where the regions in a non-cooperation mode compete for money from the government (Binmore, 2007 and Raiffa et al., 2002). This second hypothesis would – if true – explain the poor quality of the planning documents (as instrumental guidelines for future action) and the result in the form of a list of necessary investments.

In order to illuminate the planning processes and answer the question of what kind of planning was actually conducted, seven interviews were held with the planners and experts involved in the planning processes. Their backgrounds were quite diverse: within an age span of 30–70 years, one woman, six men, and educations based on traffic engineering, planning, and political science. The design of the questions was based on planning theories, basic game theory (see Table 1) and basic sociology (mainly Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1996/2007; and Bourdieu, 1980/1992, 1983, Habermas, 1984, 1987. See also Ritzer, 2008).

Interviews

Each interview lasted about 1 h and 20 min and followed a semi-structured interview approach (Edwards & Holland, 2013; Holme & Solvang, 1997). The aim was to understand what kind of planning had been conducted. The first question was open: ‘Could you please describe the planning process’. Later on the questions were more precise, such as ‘What kind of social, ecological and economic impact analyses did you perform?’ From the interviews a non-theoretical picture emerged. For instance, when the interviewees answered the first question we expected some sort of planning model, theory or initial literature study serving as guidelines for understanding the RSAM and the subsequent planning activities. One answer to the first open question about the planning process was:

The anchoring with the municipalities was very important. I divided the region into a three-day tour, rented a bus and took along all civil servants and politicians, had a look at each part of the region and the civil servants and the politicians pointed out – for them – important objects … thereby I got a broad anchoring.

(Respondent 1 in region 3 (R1.3))

There was thus a sort of practical understanding of the question. Surprisingly, not one of the respondents referred to any kind of theoretical framework that guided their design of the planning procedures.

When defining the concept ‘system analysis’ (included in the RSAM and in the title of the RSAD, and elsewhere) we here again expected some references to literature within planning theory, system planning, or system analysis, or some description of the functioning of the system, see Table 1. Some of the answers were as follows:

… [silence] … yeah  … there is probably some scientific definition … eh but … Yes I would say that it is … it is … not merely an analysis, but a process that includes an analysis, a process … but also a dialogue … dialogue activities where one works with objects, goals, challenges, problem descriptions and possible measures on a comprehensive level for a region … ehum … I would say that. (R1.1)

[long silence] … a good name to call it a system … there were no comprehensive thoughts … define? … No I just think the transport system is a system … You make an analysis of that system … including all kinds of transport modes […]. (R2.2)

… long-term planning … what kind of transport system do we need in the county … in the future. What does future freight, private and public transport look like … commuting, where do people reside and work? (R1.2)

[..] in a system analysis you should present what it looks like right now. In a way it was a logical division. The focus in planning is: What do we want? System analysis is: What does it look like? Object planning is: What shall we do? (R2.1)

There are several problems apparent here. Changes in traffic flows, demographics, economic development, etc. are not apparent. Possible environmental impacts are not presented. The lack of structure and common knowledge of some basic theoretical frameworks regarding the definition of the RSAPs and RSADs is apparent.

One answer to the question about the existence of theories or knowledge that guided the planning process was:

No. It depends on what you mean by theories [for instance communicative planning or system planning theory] … I dare to say that we were not really into this … it certainly exists as a basis but you do not really use these terms. (R1.2)

When we asked about what kind of human resources were represented in the planning process, we received the following answerers:

… this was crystallised naturally … those who seemed to be prominent in certain fields were handpicked from time to time. (R1.3)

We who work here know the environment. What can you talk about with a regional politician? What are they interested in knowing? Or a municipal planner or politicians. That is not so easy if you are located in Borlänge [the headquarters of the NTA]. (R1.1)

What do you mean? … . It was me [political science], traffic engineers from the national road and railway agencies, Living environments [people from a department in the regional planning organisation] … (R2.1)

Apparently there was no structured discussion (as Rydin, 2007 suggests) on what kinds of knowledge from various fields were needed in the planning process. This is problematic as there is a risk of missing valuable knowledge that exists outside the prevailing transport planning doctrine in the RSAPs (see also Faludi & van der Valk, 1994, pp. 17–18). As the title included the term ‘system analysis’, and this concept is frequently used in the RSADs, we expected some sort of control or estimation of various consequences. Some answers to the question ‘What kind of impact assessment was conducted?’ were expressed as follows.

… No. We did not suggest any physical constructions either. That was in the next step … it was not that great … was difficult … was very fuzzy. Should we compare with a zero alternative? … (R2.2)

Don't know … capacity should be as good as possible. (R1.3)

Social, economic and ecological impacts?  … That is always a difficult question. Of course these kinds of linkages exist … are in [the process] all the time. But it is hard to quantify […]. (R1.2)

It seems as if the RSAM is regarded as a vague guideline. No structured discussions on what kind of consequences or impacts might occur and should be analysed were thus apparent. One answer concerned the RSAD as a political product was:

If we had integrated this analysis [a technical report (Trivector, 2008)] in this [the RSAD] the document would not be so easily accessible […] for readers, for municipalities that would accept it, for politicians. It should be a public document that presents the region […] … what can I say … […]. The main problem is that a political decision must be … it's very hard to describe […] at an aggregated level … the plan must be easily communicable. Politicians must be able to communicate their message of what they made a decision about. Politicians would like to have visionary projects […]. (R1.2)

In their reply the respondents did not bring up any ideological perspectives. On the question about how developed common knowledge (social learning/communicative planning approach) was managed the following answer was given:

Some sort of knowledge is difficult to document. How does this actor reason? What will happen if I suggest this? Then this situation will emerge there, and then those people will think something here, and so forth. (R1.1)

The general picture that emerges from the interviews confirmed some of our findings form the content analysis of the RSADs. The RSAPs were not conducted according to a system planning approach – but possibly according to a vague comprehensive rational planning approach with some communicative efforts. Our hypothesis on a non-cooperation mode (Binmore, 2007) between the regions based on a game theory approach was to some degree also rejected, see Table 2. On the one hand, it was declared that the regions strive for investments and maximizing their budget (R1.1 and R1.3). On the other hand, informal and formal networks, as well as repeated inter-regional negotiations in a number of meeting points outside the RSAPs (R1.1) support a cooperation mode between the regions. These findings, as well as an altruistic attitude among the planners, implied a rejection of the hypothesis regarding game theory (individual budget maximization and a non-cooperation mode).

Table 2. Results from the document study and the interviews. Y = Yes, N = No. Parentheses imply ‘to some degree’. ‘Other kinds of planning theories’ are advocacy planning, social learning, incremental planning, regime theory and regulation theory, see Table 1.

Theories	Planning documents			Interviews
	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3	Region 1	Region 2	Region 3
System planning	N	N	N	N	N	N
Rational planning	(Y/N)	(Y/N)	(Y/N)	(Y/N)	(Y/N)	(Y/N)
Communicative planning	N	N	N	(Y)	(Y)	(Y)
Game theory and negotiation	(Y)	(Y)	(Y)	N	N	N
Other kinds of planning theories	N	N	N	N	N	N

Two major positive aspects of this planning process were emphasized: One, communication, learning and consensus with various participants (private, municipal, regional, etc.), and, two, a comprehensive approach regarding the development of the transport infrastructure. The impression is that these respondents appreciated going beyond the transport focus, blueprint planning, and embraced a (vague) comprehensive planning perspective with communicative efforts, see Table 1. These conclusions were nevertheless not guided by explicit knowledge in planning theory or any effort to form new knowledge and consensus into a structured explicit asset in the planning process.

The qualitative analysis of the RSADs and the planners’ statements regarding the influence of conventional planning theories (hypothesis 1) and game theory (hypothesis 2) on the planning process thus indicates that these hypotheses had insufficient explanatory value, see Table 2. There seems to be a significant gap between planning theory and the RSAPs/ RSADs. The lack of agreement on concepts implied divergent design of the RSAPs and RSADs (no ‘[s]pecific knowledge-based [common] epistemic culture’, Alexander, 2016, p. 93, among the regional planners could be detected) which then could not be aggregated to the national level. This situation gave rise to a focus on research regarding the gap between planning theory and planning practice in general. Inspired by March’s (2010) suggestion of conducting a meta-theoretical test, we will here make a confined interdisciplinary analysis of the T-P gap apparent in the RSADs and RSAPs.

Comparison with other studies: an interdisciplinary approach

Three relatively recent studies on the planning theory-planning practice gap were reviewed and compared with our empirical findings: sociology based on March (2010), politics based on Willson (2001) and philosophy based on Lord (2013). As all three depart from the communicative planning paradigm, and as communication is also put forward in RSAM, some focus is put on this theoretical approach in the first section below.

A sociological gap

March (2010) discusses the influence of communicative planning theory on planning practice in an institutional approach using social theory. Two cases in the state of Victoria, Australia, 1982–1997, are presented: (A) a legislation process aimed at simplifying the planning procedure, and (B) the use of a residential design code aimed at supporting higher urban densities (p. 112, 116). March describes a situation where people, organizations and various interests have the opportunity to participate in the planning process. However, the result was – according to March (p. 118) the opposite of a communicative planning process – ‘an anti-dialectic manifest of participation’ that does not cope with the core values of communicative planning. Like us, March has an interest in analysing the lack of planning theory in planning practice. In order to do so, March studies the influence of planning guidelines on the planning process (case A above), and the outcome (case B above) (p. 112).

In the first case (A), knowledge in institutional design and Faludi's (1973) theory on rational comprehensive planning was more relevant than communicative planning theory in order to conduct the process. In the second case (B), March (p. 116) describes how the combination of neo-liberal ideology and an endeavour for inner city development gave rise to high-density projects.

March thus argues that in these planning processes communicative planning theory cannot be used as an explanatory theory (p. 119). March states that: One, as most planners today are trained within the theoretical framework of communicative planning and therefore – based on the findings above – dismiss (communicative) planning theory and are ill-skilled for their job (p. 122); Two, ‘The lack of a wider meta-theoretical test of planning theory has allowed for a considerable misuse and unintended outcomes in planning practice’ (p. 121). Instead, March argues, planners reject planning theories and have learned planning ‘on-the-job’ (p. 120).

March (p. 110) locates contemporary planning practice in a philosophical and planning-theoretical divide between, on the one hand, positivism and comprehensive rational planning and, on the other hand, critical theory and communicative planning. The planners are considered to be locked in one of these perspectives and therefore not able to deal with both moral issues and technical facts.

March claims that the sociologies developed by Sartre and Marx are useful in understanding the failure of planning practice and in understanding the planner in his/her social context. March (p. 111) refers to Marx's and concludes that ‘Actors, including planners, are agents within the wider structure of a governance setting. This acknowledges that we have choices, but must work within circumstances not of our own choosing’.

Further, March (p. 112) links the failure of communicative planning theory as a normative theory to unintended consequences based on Sartre (1960/1976, p. 47) concept of ‘the practico-inert’. March (p. 112) interprets the ‘practico-inert’ in the following terms: ‘The practico-inert suggests that inertia allows action to tend towards undesirable outcomes, combined with most actors’ passivity. This may explain the failure of theory to strongly influence planning practice in many circumstances.’

As we understand, March investigates the legalization process according to the following analytical sequence: 1. ‘underpinning norms’ – 2. development of planning law – 3. evolving ‘subsequent norms’ (influence planners) – 4. urban plans/urban development/urban design code. Further, March (p. 112) also examines ‘the role of theory in establishing and modifying these [underpinning and subsequent] norms’. In the case March (p. 112) describes, the ‘underpinning norms’ are the rational planning theory based on – and ‘justified’ by reference to – Faludi (1973), (March, 2010, p. 116). The planning law is the Planning and Environment Act (1987). The ‘subsequent norms’ were – as we understand – defined by neo-liberal ideology supporting the ‘neo-liberal purposes of facilitating inner city redevelopment’ (p. 116). As we understand, social theory is used to position the planner in a societal context where the planners within this constrained context have some choice (Marx). As the social context does not correspond with the assumed prerequisites in communicative planning the planning is regarded as a failure (Sartre).

Although we support March’s (2010) initiative in understanding planning from a sociological perspective, our interpretations of Marx and Sartre differ. In general, Marx presents a situation where the individual is completely dependent on the environmental circumstances characterized by the capitalistic system. This could be exemplified by this quote: ‘[…] man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, change with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations, in his social life […]’ (Marx, 1848/2007, p. 109). Marx thus does not discuss the individual freedom vis-à-vis the environment in terms that could be understood in the way March presents them. Further, the term ‘practico-inert’ is not easy to understand. Sartre (1960/1991, pp. 46–47) states:

Thus, as the active power of the holding together it's parts, the only corrective of an act of imagination: the symphony or the painting, as I have showed elsewhere, are imaginers projected through the set dried paints or analogon. In the case of practical objects – machines, tools, consumer goods, etc. – our present action makes them seem like totalities by rescuing, in some way, the praxis which attempted to totalities their inertia. We shall see below that these inert totalities are of crucial importance, and that they create the kind of relation between men, which we will refer to, later, as the practico-inert.

It is not clear to us, however, why the ‘practico-inert’ should explain the failure of planning theory. Further, why should theories be considered useless because human creations are constrained and influenced by uncontrolled circumstances (see Table 1)?

March (2010) uses Sartre’s (1960/1976) second philosophy to position the individual planner towards determinism, and Marx’s theory to position the individual planner towards voluntarism. Usually, Sartre and Marx are positioned the other way around. Sartre is most famous for his existentialistic (first) philosophy emphasizing the individual’s free will (Sartre, 1946/1986), and the opposite emphasis on determinisms within Marxism (see Ritzer, 2008; Taylor, 1998 Thrift, 1983; cf Giddens, 1984, p. 175, concept of ‘constraints’). We therefore do not fully understand why specifically Sartre or Marx is used for this purpose. Nor do we understand how these theories could uncover the gap between communicative and rational perspectives.

Our empirical material does not indicate structural constraints as a problem (quite the opposite); it indicates problems of communicating complex knowledge (the technical report) and the importance of social networks (see R1.2). We believe (in contrast, for instance, to Binder, 2011; Lord, 2013; March, 2010; Neuman, 2000; and Talvitie, 2009) that it is worthwhile to go back to Habermas’ communicative action theory and also to Bourdieu’s theories on capital to define and bridge some parts of the sociological gap.

Communicative planning theory is primarily based on Habermas’ communicative action theory (Allmendinger, 2017): ‘Reason and the rationalisation of society’ (Habermas, 1984) focusing on the lifeworld (see, for instance, Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997). However, when the system perspective is also incorporated from – ‘The critique of functionalist reason’ (Habermas, 1987) – the capacity to handle complex planning procedures from a lifeworld perspective is severely constrained. Habermas (1975, 1985, 1987) describes society as a coin with two (major) sides: the lifeworld and the system. Habermas (1987, p. 117) says:

[…] society is conceived from the perspective of acting subjects as the lifeworld of a social group. In contrast, from the observer’s perspective of someone not involved, society can be conceived only as a system of actions such that each action has a functional significance according to its contribution to maintenance of the system.

The system extends outside the lifeworld and can only be understood through the social sciences. The system is divided into the administrative and the economic systems.

Further, lifeworld processes have limitations in reaching mutual understanding. As consensus cannot be achieved in large groups with diverse interests, a number of public spheres (cf. political pluralism below) will emerge (Habermas, 1996/2007). The public spheres functions as a signal system detecting societal problems – but cannot develop solutions or decisions on system level (Habermas, 1996/2007, 1985). Further, unmediated specialized knowledge cannot be utilized in the public sphere (Habermas, 1985, p. 340, 349). In order to handle complex problems, a ‘potential for cognitive concentration’ within an administrative system is thus needed (Habermas, 1975, p. 293).

Communicative planning theory in general does not to a sufficient extent acknowledge the complexity in the administrative and economic systems, and the differentiation of the lifeworld in public spheres as they are described by Habermas (1985, 1987, 1996/2007). The belief in consensus and understanding within communicative planning could therefore be questioned (see Neuman, 2000).

The problem seems to be that communicative planning theory (and the RSAPs) need to also incorporate the system perspective, the differentiation of the lifeworlds in public spheres, relax the expectation of participation and consensus, and focus on the anchoring process, mediate complex information and plans into the public spheres and let public spheres serve as signal systems detecting deficiencies. Communicative planning theory and the RSAPs should acknowledge the importance and limitation of communicative action in society and within planning.

March (2010) points out some crucial issues: In order to understand planning processes and planning, it is important to understand the planner in his/her social context. The empirical findings in this study both support and contradicts March’s empirical findings. For example, the (undeveloped) communicative planning approach is here, contrary to March’s findings, very much appreciated by the planners, and unforeseen outcomes are not mentioned as a negative aspect. Instead, the social context, informal social networks and knowledge about ‘what works’ and ‘who to contact’ seem to be of great value (see R1.1). Like Binder (2011), we therefore suggest Bourdieu's sociological theories as an asset for understanding the planner in his/her social context. Bourdieu (1983) argues that the individuals in a social struggle – by acquiring social (social networks), cultural (formal education, informal knowledge and objectified cultural capital) and economic capital – strive for status. This position-taking is governed by the cognitive scheme, the habitus, and the practical sense ‘the feel […] for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1980/1992, p. 82).

When using Bourdieu's (1980/1992, 1983) theory in combination with the information provided by, for instance, R1.1 it is apparent that what matter in the RSAPs are informal knowledge, social capital, the understanding of the social context (habitus), and knowledge of how to behave in a complex social process – a ‘feel for the game’. Formal and informal knowledge in planning theory are of limited value.

The first reason why communicative planning fails, is connected to the limitation of the capacity in the lifeworld processes and the implicit ‘feel for the game’ in the planner’s social context. In practice, some mental schemes and some capitals matter – others do not. The main goal for the planners and the participants might not be to produce good plans or a good infrastructure (see Yiftachel, 1989 and Friedmann, 1987) but to take a position and – possibly more importantly – to act according to the game within the informal planning practice. These untransparent informal social networks and practices are problematic also from a democratic point of view.

A political gap

Willson’s (2001) point of departure is an understanding of transport planning where instrumental rationality and the objective scientific rational planning paradigm dominate. In practice, the planners, according to Willson (2001 p. 6), nonetheless face not only ‘competing interest groups’ and ‘multiple, perhaps ideologically defined problems’, but also a political reality governed by ‘strategic rationality’. Political strategic rationality is not directly linked to optimal solutions, but win-win situations, broad and open agreements. This tension between conflicting ‘rationalities’, according to Willson, results in dysfunctional planning processes, ‘poor plans, cynical planners, frustrated politicians, and a mistrustful public’ (p. 8). In order to overcome the tension between planning and politics, Willson suggests a communicative rationality based on Habermas (1984) communicative action theory.

Willson does, though, point to something important: the issue of politics in planning. The fusion of planning and politics seems to be a major problem also in the empirical material – the RSADs – studied here. In the RSAD general pictures of the regions are presented and not information that could guide future actions.

Nonetheless, the empirical findings here do not support the conflict between strategy and instrumentality. Instead, there is a conflict between the need for political communication and complexity (R1.2). It is here proposed that the second reason why communicative planning theory fails is, first, a false belief in the possibilities to reach understanding and consensus, and an unawareness of ideological perspectives in defining problem, solutions and consequences (see R1.2, R1.3) similar to the ‘unitary public-interests model’ (Kiernan, 1983, p. 77). The second reason why communicative planning theory fails is the incapacity to communicate complex information. Thus, according to respondent R1.2, the politicians must be able to formulate and explain their decision in a simple understandable manner. This situation produces the second political gap between (communicative) planning theory and the RSAs. Contrary to Willson (2001), we do not understand how communicative rationality could solve the tension between the planners’ instrumental rationality and the politicians’ strategic rationality. We believe one of the major problems is that planning and plans – here the RSADs – are presented as un-political (see Kiernan, 1983), and that there is a lack of methods to communicate complex value-laden information (cf. Feitelson, 2011).

Different ideologies (see Kiernan, 1983, p. 73; Sargent, 2009, p. 3) imply decisively different understandings of the world, different definitions of problems and solutions, and thereby different roles for infrastructure and planning (cf. Friedmann, 1987; Yiftachel, 1989). The answer is thus to turn planning into an ideological (and political) (see Kiernan, 1983; McFarland, 2007) issue where the ideological argument regarding definitions of problems and solutions is transparent, explicit, and understandable, but possibly not agreeable from various ideological positions, see Table 3 for a brief overview.

Table 3. Positions of major ideologies. For comprehensive descriptions, see Ritzer, 2008, Andersen and Kaspersen (2000), Schumaker (2010), Allmendinger (2017).

	Major ideologies	Brief description	References
No private ownership of the means of production. Social ownership and control of the means of production.	Marxism	Two major classes: Capitalist possessing all property. Propertyless proletariat. Capitalism is the determining force in a society. False consciousness. Structural determinism. In a communist society: no market economy, social ownership and control of the means of production (land, buildings, and infrastructure, plans). The socialistic ethic: equal material conditions.	Marx (1844/2007); Marx and Engels (1848/2007); Engels (1893/2019); Manley (1983); Månson (2000a)
	Neo-Marxism	A number of classes, interests, and social groups. Capitalism is regarded as a strong structuralizing mechanism. Hegemony. Frankfurt school. Discourse analysis, Analytical Marxism. Planning supports capitalism.	Gramsci and Buttigieg (1932/2010), and others; Jaret (1983); Frølund Thomsen and Andersen (2000); (Harvey, 1989)
	Neo-Pluralism	A number of social groups. Capitalism is one (strong) structuralizing mechanism among others. People are aware about their own interests. Unequal and unfair distribution of power is assumed.	Manley (1983); McFarland (2007); Schumaker (1991/2010)
	Pluralism	A number of social groups and interests. Power is defined as causation. Balanced power distribution is assumed. Ownership (land, buildings, and infrastructure) and control (land use plans) are assumed to be separated to some degree.	Weber (1922/1987); Månson (2000b); Dahl (1957); Davidoff (1965)
	Social-Liberalism	Similar to below, but emphasizes a minor strong state managing negative external effects. Inequalities accepts so far it benefits all/the least advantages. Social market economy emphasizing social security and social justice (Freiburgh School).	Rawls (1975/2010); (Taylor & Jordan, 2009)
	Liberalism	Focuses on the individual's rights and freedom. Utilitarianism. Private ownership and control. The liberal ethic: The individual freedom, inviolability and equal distribution of opportunities. No specific group interests. Laissez-faire. Welfare is maximized by free trade and exchange.	Locke (1690/2010); Mill (1860/2010); Manley (1983)
Private ownership and control of property. Free trade and strong market. Minimal state.	Libertarianism	Similar to above, but emphasizes. (ultra)minimal state and individual freedom. The society (and a ‘fair’ distribution of resources) is too complex for anyone to interpret and plan. The libertarian ethic: ‘From each as they chose, to each as they are chosen’.	Nozick (1974/2001, 218)

Within political pluralism and advocacy planning the representative democracy and parliament are emphasized as arenas where various interests are represented, where complex information is processed, and where procedures managing compromises between various interests are already taking place. Davidoff (1965, p. 216) says: ‘In an ideal situation local parties would establish political platforms, which could contain master plans […]’. Then the voters would face blue, green, red, etc. master plans linked to understandable objectives (and possibly compromises). Schumaker's (1991/2010, p. 163) method where various interest groups are identified and welfare is distributed among them based on transparent ‘complex equality’ might possibly serve as a guiding example for a neo-pluralistic planning model. Planning based on representative democracy (advocacy planning) has however been criticized for its incapacity to handle public opinion (Taylor, 1998). The response to these kinds of situations within planning theory was communicative planning and a belief in consensus – to a substantial degree influenced by Habermas (1984). However, this is not necessarily the only path of action. Schumaker (1991/2010) emphasizes the influence of representatives (political parties among other interests), participants, and public opinion in the pluralistic political procedure. Habermas (1987) also emphasizes the importance of mediating complex information into the lifeworld and the functioning of the lifeworld as an antenna to detect ‘system deficiencies’ (Habermas, 1996/2007, p. 391). Media and planning should thus support the creation of public spheres and mediate complex information into the lifeworld.

By uncovering the ideological dimension, planning (with compromises) will to a greater extent be understandable, transparent and possible to discuss – and then be judged at the next political election.

A philosophical gap

Lord (2013) identifies two major philosophical problems in planning: first the conflict regarding understanding between positivism and post-positivism (see also Yiftachel, 1989, pp. 25–26; and Allmendinger, 2017, p. 38), and second, the inherent theoretical contradiction in understanding within phenomenology and communicative planning (within post-positivism).

In the first conflict of understanding (between positivism and post-positivism), both ‘subjective data from linguistic engagement’ and ‘expert-technocratic construction of objective evidence’ appear as a ‘dissonance’ between theory and practice (Lord, 2013, p. 32). This conflict is defined by Lord (p. 29) as the root of the first philosophical ‘theory-practice gap’. These theories make supporters ‘theoretically incapable’ of understanding each other (p. 32). This gap manifests itself in practice by ‘poor quality, unnecessary or unwanted infrastructure’ (p. 29).

The second philosophical conflict (within post-positivism) emerges due to the apprehension that we as individuals cannot come close enough to developing a true understanding. Communicative planning fails on its own premises. This gap in understanding is explained by solipsism – that I as an individual can only understand what I myself actually mean when I use a certain word – no one else (p. 31). I do not actually know if other people even exist.

In order to overcome these two gaps, Lord refers to Wittgenstein and proposes a complex analytical non-theoretical approach focusing on the language. By investigating words based on their use in everyday practice – by a ‘language game’ (p. 33), ‘and the rules by which it is played’ (p. 35) – their actual meaning is assumed to be understandable. By using a language game it is thus assumed possible to develop understanding between people and thus bridge the philosophical gaps and explain a planning process.

The empirical findings here, to some extent, support Lord’s notion about the first problem (the positive – post-positive gap). One of the answers from the interviews (R1.1) indicates that a (positivistic) technical report (Trivector, 2008) is difficult to integrate in the RSAPs (post-positivistic communication between interests). This situation indicates a gap between positivism and post-positivism. In contrast, answers from the respondents (e.g. R2.2) also indicate a sort of belief in the positivist approach. The empirical findings here do not provide any apparent evidence for the second problem (within post-positivism) concerning misunderstanding based on solipsism. Quite the contrary – the communicative approach was not regarded as a cause of misunderstanding.

According to these empirical findings, it is here argued that the first problem, the positivism – post-positivism antagonism, to some degree exists as a theoretical and practical problem, but also that the second problem, within post-positivist theory, exists – at least as a theoretical problem.

Post-positivists might dismiss ‘facts’ regarding the functioning of the system (urban activities, spatial distribution of resources, global warming, etc.) as information that does not acknowledge people’s perceptions about their environment. A positivistic approach might dismiss the signals from the lifeworld (on unfair distribution of spatial resources) as ill-informed opinions not worth considering. Therefore it is important to provide a philosophical argument to explain and possibly to bridge the positivist – post-positivist gap.

The first problem (positivism – post-positivism) could philosophically be managed by using an alternative explanatory theoretical framework: Critical Realism (CR). CR has been expressed as a bridging philosophy for studies of the social and physical world (Sayer, 1992; see also Allmendinger, 2002; Naess, 2015). The basic assumption in CR is that an external real world exists but we as individuals have our own interpretation of this world. The individual has a single hermeneutic relation with physical objects – a change in the subject’s conception of the physical objects does not change the physical object. Physical objects are physically produced although socially defined. In relation to social objects (socially defined and socially produced objects as an ideology, a theory, etc), the individual has a double hermeneutic relation – a change in the subject’s conception of the social object actually changes the social object (perhaps not very much).

The use of CR might contribute to solving the gap between positivist and post-positivist theories. It acknowledges that an external physical and social world could, through learning processes, be subjectively understood and socially defined, possibly with competing definitions.

Nonetheless, even if misunderstanding due to the language – the second philosophical problem (within post-positivism) concerning solipsism – is the main factor for a failure of communicative planning (if it is?), we do not understand how Wittgenstein’s language game could solve the problem of individual understanding of every word. It is not explained by Lord how a common understanding (in large groups?) could be achieved. According to the level of abstraction, the usefulness of Wittgenstein's language game in democratic planning practice seems doubtful (see also Alexander, 2016).

It is here argued that the second problem (solipsism) could be handled by using an alternative philosophical framework: the theory of ‘scientific inference of other minds’ (Pargetter, 1984). The existence of other people (an external world) cannot be proved, but the hypothesis of the existence of other people with minds similar – but not identical – to my own can be checked by observation of the behaviour of other people.

The strength of a scientific inference depends solely on the explanatory power of its conclusion. […] What I can check on is that this hypothesis [the existence of other people] does explain the behaviour of other people in a satisfactory way, and this is the only check required for the justifiable use of a scientific inference. Pargetter (1984, p. 160)

It seems reasonable that an external world exists, that other people exist, that they have a private language similar to my own private language, and that we, to some degree, can learn from and understand each other. Thus, misunderstandings exist but could to some degree be solved in lifeworld processes.

Discussion and conclusions

This paper analyses the gap between planning practice – as it appears in the RSAs studied here – and planning theory from a confined interdisciplinary approach. Planning theory (hypothesis 1) and game theory (hypothesis 2) were of limited use in understanding the RSADs and the RSAPs. Our analysis provides some insights based on sociology, politics and philosophy in defining and bridging the T-P gap.

First, Bourdieu’s (1980/1992, 1983) theories on capital, the feel for the game, and position-taking were valuable in detecting un-transparent social networks and planning activities in the RSAPs. These hidden informal practices are problematic from a democratic point of view. We believe that the RSAs should formalize and make transparent what kind of knowledge (cf. Alexander, 2016 Rydin, 2007) and networks should be represented in the planning procedure. Otherwise the sociological gap will remain and the RSAPs and RSADs will continue to be incomprehensible.

Second, politicians need to be able to communicate and anchor their politics – here in the form of RSADs. We therefore believe that ideological positions, conflicts, definitions of problems, solutions and compromises should be apparent in the RSADs (cf. Davidoff, 1965). They might possibly be presented in a visionary political document. Further, following Habermas (1984, 1987, 1996/2007) the regions conducting the RSA planning process should also have a strategy for anchoring political decisions through participation and formation of public spheres, and apply a strategy to mediate complex knowledge. The system analysis might be presented in a formalized technical appendix. The RSA will thereby be transparent and possible to discuss and evaluate in a political democratic process.

Third, philosophical issues regarding problems of understandings were – in a way – apparent in the RSAPs and RSADs. We believe that Critical Realism, which acknowledges both a physical and a social world defined by intersubjective understandings, might well serve as a useful philosophical position in the RSAPs. In practice, the RSAs should then incorporate both technical facts and social constructions.

The interdisciplinary approach applied here implies quite limited theoretical perspectives within each discipline in the analyses of the RSAs. Only a few aspects within sociology, political theory, philosophy and even planning theory have been covered (see Allmendinger, 2017; Friedmann, 1987; Taylor, 1998; Thrift, 1983; Yiftachel, 1989 for wider meta-theoretical contributions). Further, this analysis is based on a limited empirical material. Our empirical findings cannot therefore be understood as representing planning practice in general. Future research should develop testable hypotheses, extend the number of selected cases and perform further stringent analysis regarding various applied planning approaches.

We look forward for others to criticize and complement this confined interdisciplinary analysis.

The authors thank the two reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Swedish Transport Administration [grant number TRV2011/87690].