Plural planning theories: cherishing the diversity of planning

ABSTRACT

Spatial planning faces the brutal plurality of truths, exacerbated by constant crises and long-term transformation. When ideologically weaponized narratives replace ‘the truth’, planners no longer can validate their inputs into the planning process by referring to an undisputed base of knowledge. We present two approaches to planning theories that help understand why and how planners can address plural rationalities. One approach asserts that polyrationality is inevitable and planners need to listen to other voices, other rationalities. The other approach admonishes planners to choose wisely which worldview, rationality or bias they wish to follow and pursue. Finally, we invite the academic planning community to provide environments that allow for more theory-led debates. The AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories will continue to provide one such forum.

KEYWORDS:

• Polyrationality
• truth
• ideologies
• Cultural Theory

Planning and the brutal plurality of truths

People often disagree about what has happened. Akira Kurosawa’s film Rashomon (1950) is a famous example of how individuals perceive the same situation entirely different. Consider, for example, how different individuals present today’s world. One maybe says this:

Listen to the truth! For 15 years, the world has been in crisis mode. Starting in 2008, the real estate crisis that developed into a veritable financial crisis brought the financial sector and public budgets to the brink of disaster. In 2015, the humanitarian crisis involving droves of refugees resulted in new walls and a frustrated culture of welcome. In 2020, the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic pushed public health systems, economies, social life, and education beyond capacity. By the end of 2020, the United Kingdom had left the European Union, leaving an abysmal gap between Brexiteers and remainders. In February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine, ending the post-WWII order of international cooperation. In the wake of this war, an energy crisis seriously threatened countries worldwide to recover from the pandemic. Throughout the 15 years, the world’s abilities to curb the climate crisis grew weaker and weaker, with a huge probability looming that the final tipping point can be averted no longer.

Another one, however, says this:

Listen to the truth! For 15 years, the world has been in crisis mode. Starting in 2008, the over-regulation of the credit-system challenged real estate markets. Governments worldwide poured out billions to banks that were willing to give cheap credits to governments. In 2015, the impulsive opening up of European borders to migrants from failing states in the Global South invited criminals and drug traders to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or Sweden. In 2020, leftish governments worldwide exaggerated a flu-like disease and condemned everybody to staying in lockdowns or social distancing. By the end of 2020, the United Kingdom finally retrieved its sovereignty only to find cunning EU bureaucrats diminish the success through legal agitation. In February 2022, Ukraine and the NATO finally pressured Russia so relentlessly that it had to defend its sovereignty through a well-ordered police operation. Due to food and energy scarcity, African and Asian countries suffered most from the power-hungry Western aggression, while arms dealer in the United States and European Union received billions for an unprecedented arms-race against Russia. Throughout the 15 years, the so-called climate crisis was summoned whenever governments feared that independent thinkers and countries would not bow to Western hegemony.

Like in Kurosawa’s film, we can listen to the complaints about a multitude of crises. But disagreeing about what has happened is harmless compared with the mounting incapability to decide, without any doubt, which one of the two speaks the whole truth while the other one is entirely wrong. We can, of course, take sides according to our own beliefs and preferences. But taking sides is not the same as knowing the truth.

For the past two decades, planning theory relied on consensus building, collaborative planning or communicative planning (Forester 1989, 1999, 2009; Healey 1997; Innes and Booher 2010). The brutal plurality of truths, as in our example, makes consensus building, collaborative planning or communicative planning less plausible. In municipal councils, in citizen meetings, in public debate and in social media battles, planners face a plurality of truths that hardly can be dealt with by an attempt at ‘getting to Yes.’ How does the plurality of truths emerge? Trivial explanations come to mind. Everybody today is familiar with information bubbles and social networks, alternative facts and contrarian beliefs. The omnipresence of the internet in everyday life makes it impossible to elude the brutal plurality of truths. But things are not trivial at all. When ideologically weaponized narratives replace ‘the truth’, planners no longer can validate their inputs into the planning process by referring to an undisputed base of knowledge. No supreme value exists that is recognized by all: Divine will, truth, human dignity, justice, economic growth, or efficiency all had their time as widely accepted inspiration to settle disputes, share resources or achieve multi-partisan consensus. Previously, when consensus building or collaborative planning were still possible, this did not mean that stakeholders never have agonistic relationships filled with acrimonious hate. What makes life different today is that agonistic relationships filled with acrimonious hate no longer occur now and then; they are now felt by too many too often.

As co-coordinators of the AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories, we are aware that the brutal plurality of truths affects planning at all levels: neighbourhood, city, city-region, region, national, European, even international and global. Our mission is to question how planners might respond by acknowledging plural rationalities (or polyrationality) as an important building block for planning in a world that struggles with a lack of consensus. In the remainder of our essay, we are presenting two approaches to the brutal plurality of truths and its implications for spatial planning and theory-building. We conclude with an invitation to the academic planning community to actively (re-)engage with planning theories.

Two approaches to plural planning theories

One approach: polyrationality and a trifle of lunacy

One approach to the brutal plurality of truths is to acknowledge that this is neither new nor in itself dangerous. In fact, plural representations of ‘the truth’ are a survival strategy. Such plurality is sometimes called ‘multiple belonging’: We can be Europeans, Austrians, migrant workers, geographers and fans of Marvel comic books in a sense that we are these things simultaneously, yet not necessarily willing to share our multiple belongings with everybody. In fact, interaction rituals help us present various aspects of our identity to selected audiences (Goffman 1967): We show to our parents, our spouses, our friends or our dentist well-defined details of ourselves — yet often these ‘details’ are quite dissimilar. Many people have no problems in using plural rationalities as a survival strategy in their daily lives. Planning theorists, however, find it more difficult.

Acknowledging planning theories in the plural is not just a rhetorical gesture. Above all, it is a statement of the will to survive. Who has not suffered a rejection from an academic publisher stating that a comparison of (rapidly implemented) COVID-19 measures and (endlessly retarded) climate protection, the political philosophy reflection on 3D-printing of buildings, or the difference between the expertise of medical doctors and spatial planners has absolutely nothing to do with planning theory? Most planning theorist seem to accept such verdicts, but the artificial ‘mainstreaming’ of planning theory to the gusto of editors and reviewers is harmful to the field. In order to reveal itself, truth requires a whole host of experiments, occasional failures and a trifle of lunacy. What we have learned from meetings of the AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories so far is this: The starting point of theory-building and planning must not be the longing for a Pure Theory of Planning, but the curiosity about needful and viable approaches to planning problems.

Take, for example, planning and climate action. A broad consensus exists that climate action is necessary, and many experts agree on the significance of land use modifications for climate action. Apart from symbolic activities, however, very little is done in planning to prevent climate change. Landowners do not want to sacrifice their revenues, citizens do not want to reduce their meat consumption, drivers do not trade their cars for bicycles, much of Europe’s electricity is still produced by burning coal. Each case of retarded learning has spatial implications that range from urban bicycle networks to the conversion of farmland used for animal food production. Compare the retarded climate measures with measures fighting the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 through 2022 (Reckien 2021). Strict lockdowns reduced personal mobility to almost nil. Within days, homes were transformed into offices and workplaces. Neither holiday travel nor commuting polluted the air, emissions merely were caused by cargo transport. Green spaces and public parks in the vicinity of homes as well as detached single-family houses with large backyard gardens gained in value. Again, each of these measures had drastic spatial implications. In contrast to climate action, however, COVID-19 measures were implemented rapidly and with substantial public and private resources. Should we really dispense with a comparison between the fundamentally different experiences with climate action or COVID-19 because this is not planning theory? Of course, planners must be curious about what drives or hampers social change: Anxiety or solidarity, money or Twitter, economic necessity or the pleasure of the leisure class?

Planning theories can benefit from social and political theories that examine the brutal plurality of truths. Early sociologists like Emile Durkheim or Georg Simmel understood well that social power relates to open and arcane knowledge, the ability to shape the perceptions of truth and the inclusion in or exclusion from epistemological in-groups. With regard to spatial planning, the theory of polyrationality draws from Cultural Theory, an anthropological theory developed by Mary Douglas (Douglas 1966/1992, 1982, 1992, 1999; Douglas and Ney 1998; Douglas and Wildavsky 1983) and others (Dake 1992; Mamadouh 1999; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).

Douglas’ Cultural Theory (or grid/group theory) considers the presence or absence of four rationalities: hierarchist, individualist, egalitarian, fatalistic (Douglas 1982, 183–254; Douglas and Ney 1998, 122–124; Schwarz and Thompson 1990, 7). Rationality-based approaches to spatial planning pay attention to how stakeholders socially construct space, land use, conflict, authority, power. Rationality-based approaches look for ambiguity and vagueness, plural perceptions and flexible boundary making (‘frontier management’) as manifestation of polyrationality (Davy 1997, 2008). Cultural Theory does not insist on limiting plural rationalities to just four. It asserts, however, that in all social situations plural rationalities are present.

The theory of polyrationality applies Douglas’ understanding of plural rationalities to spatial planning and land policy (Davy 1997, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2021; Hartmann 2012; Shahab, Hartmann, and Jonkman 2021). In the everyday practice of spatial planning, we can observe various rationalities, for instance:

• Hierarchist planning trusts expert knowledge, distrusts markets and communities and issues spatial plans to control land uses and urban developments.

• Individualist planning relies on market forces; a spatial plan must offer economic incentives to private actors who can contribute to desirable spatial changes.

• Egalitarian planning seeks to build trust within the local community; a spatial plan helps the community to protect itself and to exclude outsiders.

• Fatalist planning has come to terms with the fact that planners have very little influence, but that plans are what politicians and other powerful stakeholders demand.

The theory of polyrationality, as an example of a planning theory that embraces the brutal plurality of truths, examines the impact of the four rationalities on planning strategies and spatial plans. The four rationalities do not offer one single path to salvation but a variety of strategies and a number of possible spatial outcomes. Polyrationality is inevitable, yet it comes with disruption, discontinuity and quite some clumsiness. The theory of polyrationality alerts planning theorists to the fact that monorational theory-building might look clean and elegant, but only a consideration for other voices and other rationalities yields viable results.

We have noticed in planning conferences and workshops as well as in the academic literature a broad consensus that ‘one size fits all’ is not suitable for spatial planning and theory-building. Hardly any planning theorist still looks for a Pure Theory of Planning. Rarely, however, do planning theorists fully engage with other rationalities, other voices. This is not only a consequence of tight conference slots or the word limits of academic journals. The consensus that one size does not fit all does not yet create an environment for planners to cherish plurality. Therefore, the members of the AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories encourage each other to leave their theoretical comfort zones and try out other worldviews and approaches to define problems or look for solutions.

Another approach: plural planning theories and the simultaneity of crises and transitions

The brutal plurality of truths is embedded and articulated in a variety of narratives, all claiming to be regarded as ‘the truth’ at the same time. A crucial challenge of future knowledge generation in planning is thus how to deal with these plural truths — not only from the perspective of planning. One way of grasping these different truths, rationalities and worldviews is through different theoretical lenses on what we perceive as truth or reality. Accordingly, accounting for plural rationalities results in plural planning theories.

Theories, and thus planning theories as well, reflect a certain body of knowledge, legitimized by the scientific community at a certain point of time (Behrend and Levin-Keitel 2020): theories are children of their times. The historical genesis of planning theories is mirrored in various systematizations of planning theories, where single approaches are shown over time (illustrated as a timeline on the y-axes in the diagrams, e.g. Friedmann 1987). Every epoch has its own challenges and peculiarities, so have the planning theories developed in response to them. It was not by chance that the discussion of a communicative and collaborative turn (e.g. Healey 1997) became apparent in an era where public participation increasingly emerged in political agendas and international conventions. For instance, Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development stated that ‘[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.’

Today’s challenges are of different nature, multiple crises and structural social transformations in a breakneck speed and changing intervals defy long-term planning. On the one hand, multiple crises like the financial crisis, humanitarian crisis, COVID-19 or the climate crisis change the way in which we are living together. These crises occur suddenly with tremendous impacts or slowly infringe on the lived realities. These crises change not only planning and spatial development goals but also preconditions, normative goals and measures as well as the subject of planning quite massively. The financial crisis induced a housing crisis, the humanitarian crisis and wars put the energy supply of entire states upside down, and COVID-19 questioned the well-established planning approach of densification. On the other hand, our societies also undergo long-term structural changes such as digitalization, a questioning of democratic models alongside growing populism as well as the renewal of trade wars between different world regions at the same time as we see different crises unfold. These slow structural changes have a different character than crisis interventions: In form of gradual changes, they alter social priorities, possibilities for changing discourse, they shape the ways we live, our needs and socially accepted restrictions. Advances in technology are changing the way in which we plan and solve problems. Advances in technology also amend the way we make democratic decisions and influence which stakeholders and concerns are heard. In the process, notions of democracy and their susceptibility to hegemonic discourse, such as in chats or social media, are also changing. These gradual changes usually happen under the radar of daily crises. These simultaneous crises and transitions affect us at different speeds and often demand even contradictory answers. Apparently, these wicked problems become more complex and harder to grasp as they are embedded and articulated in a variety of narratives based on plural worldviews, rationalities and theoretical approaches, all claiming to present ‘the truth’. Crises exacerbate long-term trends, long for easy and immediate answers within the paradigm of the one truth out there. Long-term transitions are analysed and discussed in different rationalities, e.g. by different disciplines or from different point of views; however, this makes them highly complex and demanding to deal with, especially in an ever changing environment of crises.

The call for a plurality of planning theories seems at first glance mundane (Ferreira et al. 2009). Given the different modes of crisis and urgencies to act, it seems obvious to tackle different planning theories for different challenges. Surely, several planning theories can be placed side by side. Their diversity is easily accepted as long as plural planning theories do not openly contradict each other, do not question each other, or attack fundamental paradigms of planning such as the onto-epistemological question of how many realities are integrated into a certain theory – from a rationalist planning approach to a social-constructivist approach. These decisive differences of how to grasp truth or truths in plural are incompatible. Accordingly, an indifferent juxtaposition of theories is not, however, what we mean by plural planning theories. If one takes plurality seriously, it is inevitable to think about what plurality means when it goes beyond a mere coexistence of theories. Cherishing the plurality of planning theories is far more than the ‘cherry-picking’ of convenient aspects that fit one’s own rationality. On the contrary, ‘cherry-picking’ is even dangerous and hindering in theorizing, as it opens the door for ahistorical approaches or de-contextualization. On the contrary, acknowledging the plurality of planning theories immediately implies challenges and limitations for planning research and practice: If there is a plurality of planning theories, how should we navigate it? What are the underlying assumptions and privileges of such plurality? What are the specific questions plural planning theories deliver answers to? What does it imply to position oneself in this field of knowledge? How do theories serve as means for the global challenges in a world in permanent mode of crisis? Challenges arise for planning sciences and academia, for the planning debate and especially teaching in academia, as well as for planning in practice and the grand challenges we are facing.

The plurality of planning theories is not synonymous with an ‘anything goes’ approach. Planners need to be very conscious about which theoretical approaches they use and which planning theories they combine in their research. Each planning theory determines our perspective on reality(ies) and the way we look, hear, feel or judge upon the world out there. Our perspective depends on the chosen worldviews shaping our views of planning, the perspective from which we look at planning issues, our understanding of planning, its problem definition and its solution approaches. In other words, the underlying onto-epistemological question in how far different realities and truths are integrated in this approach and what exactly is named as truth, and, even more importantly, what is not.

Epistemologically, the variety of planning theories acknowledges different knowledge foundations and different ways of producing knowledge. Is local experience and knowledge about the local context as important as technical knowledge about the traffic flux or the per-minute-volume of stormwater? The choice of a specific planning theory determines which questions and answers this theoretical approach can be useful for and which limitations are part of the ontological standpoint. As we highlight in Year Two of the AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories, often theories from another field of knowledge or discipline are translated into planning (Beg, Steal and Borrow Online Conference). The climate crisis is countered by concepts such as resilience, the democracy crisis by local political activism, the transformation by real-world labs, etc. These are good approaches as such; however, the challenge is to understand the hidden assumptions and privileges as manifestations in these theories. Planning theorists must examine the fit of planning and its basic paradigms and whether they correspond to or contradict each other. Thus, the question arises whether, for instance, real-world laboratories do not contradict the long-term securing nature of planning, or whether local political dissent should be allowed to paralyze planning decisions.

In scientific discourse and especially in teaching, the plurality of planning theories also brings fundamental challenges concerning the question which theory can or should be applied. The prevailing systematization strategy based on chronological classifications of their genesis is only in parts helpful for the application. There are first attempts to systematize planning knowledge and theories differently: along the purposes for research and practice or by different ontological perspectives (Levin-Keitel and Behrend 2022; Rydin 2021).

The plurality of rationalities and planning theories has a specific significance for planning practice: As there is no ‘reality as such’, we need theoretical lenses to grasp realities. Planning’s idiosyncrasies of a corresponding field of action and an enduring orientation towards actions seem to ideally fit to contribute to the grand challenges we face in the twenty-first century. Individual planners, in planning administration or offices as well as in academia are to our experience highly motivated to contribute to a better development, believing that planning is a fundamentally important discipline in shaping the future. Plural planning theories are a means for planners to question ‘the world’ out there and find means and ways to analyse and reconfigure the very planning systems including the governance mechanisms, planning paradigms or the legal and financial foundation of planning practices. Only when being conscious about the theoretical lenses we have on planning realities, the planning profession can overcome the passive theorism it has found its peace in, and as a result become a more active ‘advocate’ for dealing with the huge transitions.

Creating room for debate

The AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories has been established to foster a conversation accounting for the plurality of planning theories. The mission statement, published on the AESOP homepage (https://aesop-planning.eu/thematic-groups/planning-theories), announces:

The AESOP TG Planning Theories offers space for academic conversations on plural theories about spatial planning. We appreciate planning theories as an unfinished project. We want to understand the strategies and dynamics of theory-building. We promote the use of social, economic, political, legal, philosophical or other theories in planning theories. We wish to understand the criteria adequate for assessing the quality of planning theories.

In these eventful times, we believe that the time to work on theories is now. For a progression and a vivid debate, we wish to leave behind polarization or a wrong-or-right approach. We cherish polyrationality, discussions (even if disruptive) and needful negotiations. Whether one takes the stance that polyrationality is a survival strategy, and thus to be embraced by planners, or one highlights the implications of the simultaneity of different crises, planning is confronted with substantial upheavals that lead to entirely different worldviews and realities for citizens, administrations and politics.

We notice many colleagues engaging with planning theories with a fresh perspective. Many initiatives within and outside of AESOP and ACSP find new interest in planning theories. Recent publications, like Rydin’s (2021) treatise on theory and planning research or Pojani’s (2022) book on alternative planning history and theory, showcase ongoing conversations. Year One of the AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories, inspired by Marvel’s ‘Infinity Stones’ focussed on space, time, power, mind, soul and reality. We were delighted by the interest and feedback from the academic planning community, with huge interests by individuals to ‘bear stones’ as well as very high and consistent levels of participation. We take this as a sign of interest in the further theorization of planning. Enriching contributions to these activities have helped to make different perspectives of this plurality of planning theories more visible. We discovered not only the multiverse of planning theories explaining different bits and pieces of the realities and planning practices out there. Against this background re-engaging not only with planning theories, but also thinking about these fundamental concepts which have been employed in various disciplines, from which we can Beg, Steal or Borrow (a task we set ourselves for Year Two) offers new opportunities to structure and gain planning knowledge.

While we see a new and very active community emerging, we are also faced with long term changes in academic ‘currencies’ and career progressions. An academic system that favours peer-reviewed articles over monographs and which is increasingly focussed on projects changes the dynamics of knowledge production. We caution that theory-building may be neglected. We shall not be shy to confront these fundamental changes and new realities of planning practice by demanding a new engagement with planning theories.

We close our contribution with an invitation: Making use of the multiverse of planning theories means to walk in the shoes of someone else for a while. Tolerating, valuing and accepting different arguments is a merit of such a process. Cherishing the plurality of planning theories does not imply an ‘anything goes’ approach or to cherry-pick specific aspects from different theories out of their context. We invite the academic planning community as a whole to provide environments that allow for more theory-led debates. The AESOP Thematic Group Planning Theories will continue to provide one such forum.

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the dedication and passion of the members of the AESOP Thematic Group ‘Planning Theories (plural)’, in particular the inspiration offered by Ernest Alexander, Vilim Brezina, Scott D. Campbell, Robin A. Chang, Stefano Cozzolino, Tijana Dabovic, Alex Deffner, Agnes Förster, Patsy Healey, Jean Hillier, Andy Inch, Christian Lamker, Harald Mieg, Clare Mouat, Yvonne Rydin, and Thorsten Wiechmann. Franziska and Meike also recognize gratefully the Akademie für Raumentwicklung in der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft (ARL) and their support for the International Working Group ‘Beyond the process – finding common ground for a discussion on planning’s substantial foundation.’

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).