Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative

Abstract

The article examines the factors that led to the establishment and evolution of the minilateral cooperation among France, Germany, the United Kingdom (and eventually the High Representative for CFSP) vis-à-vis Iran. The analysis brings together two theoretical approaches, institutional design and role theory. It posits that minilateral cooperation in the Iranian case and security affairs in general do not easily translate into multilateral cooperation. It finds that in contrast to the trade and economic realm, the course of security minilaterals is strongly shaped by rivalling formal institutions, specific characteristics in the non-proliferation regime (lack of specificity in central norms) and the role behaviour of the United States. European minilateral cooperation started (as in the case of the Middle East Quartet and Six-Party Talks) when the US rejected bilateral engagement. The initiative successfully mediated a temporary suspension of Iran's enrichment activities as long as Tehran believed that the EU-3 could bring the US to the table and commit the Bush Administration to a comprehensive negotiated settlement, including US security guarantees. Since the EU-3 and the subsequent P-5 (the permanent five members of the UNSC) plus Germany/EU High Representative for CFSP minilaterals have been incapable of forming a resilient transatlantic coalition of policy makers to negotiate a comprehensive settlement, another serious split could occur if Washington pursues a punitive course without having fully supported a cooperative solution to the crisis.

Notes

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6. Sharam Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 73.

7. Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Iran and the Bomb 1: How Close is Iran?’, 19 January 2006, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/945/ian-focus-part-1-how-close-is-iran-to-the-bomb accessed on 3 January 2006. Yellow cake is a source material made from uranium ore. The yellow uranium powder needs to be converted into a gas, uraniumhexafluorid (UF-6), so that the low natural level of the uranium isotope 235 (0,7 %) can be increased by separating the heavier isotope 235 from isotope 238 through gas diffusion, centrifuge or laser isotope enrichment processes. Up to this point, Iran has proved unable to produce pure enough feed material (UF-6) domestically for its centrifuge enrichment process. As a consequence, Iran has used imported UF-6 (from China before 1992) to prove its ability to enrich while preserving its few working centrifuges.

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12. Ole Elgström, Michael Smith, ‘Introduction’, in Elgström, Smith (eds), The European Union's Roles in International Politics, p. 4.

13. Miles Kahler, ‘Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers’, International Organization 46/3 (1992), p. 682.

14. Carolyn Rhodes, ‘Introduction: The Identity of the European Union in International Affairs’, in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community (London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 1–18; Schwegmann, Die Jugoslawien-Kontaktgruppe in den Internationalen Beziehungen.

15. Christer Ahlström, ‘The EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in Shannon Kile (ed.), Europe and Iran. Perspectives on Non-Proliferation, SIPRI Research Report No. 21 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 27–46; Oliver Meier, ‘The EU at the NPT Review Conference: A Modest Success for the EU's Emerging Policy in Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, in Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch (eds), The EU's Emerging Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy. Trends and Prospects in the Context of the NPT-Review Conference 2005, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Newsletter Issue 17 (2005), available at http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue17.pdf accessed on 25 October 2005; Harald Müller, Lars van Dassen, ‘From Cacophony to Joint Action: Successes and Shortcomings of the European Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy’, in Martin Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Record and Reforms (London, Washington: Continuum, 1997), pp. 52–72.

16. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 108.

17. Friedrich Gröning, Wolfgang Rudischhauser, ‘Die Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran und anderen aktuellen Krisen’, in Dirk Schriefer et al. (eds), 50 Jahre Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation IAEO. Ein Wirken für Frieden und Sicherheit im nuklearen Zeitalter (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2007), p. 47.

18. An Iranian negotiator, Houssein Mousavian, declared in December 2004: ‘Our talks with the Europeans were reaching a standstill and the Russians sent a message to us, saying that if we reached a standstill, they would stop cooperating with us’, cited in BBC Monitoring, 24 December 2004.

19. See Hopman, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts, p. 228; Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 105.

20. David Albright, Corey Hinderstein, Iran's Next Steps: Final Test and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant, 12 January 2006, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ran/irancascade.pdf accessed on 23 January 2006; Jeffrey Lewis, Iran and the Bomb 1: How Close is Iran?, 19 January 2006, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/945/ian-focus-part-1-how-close-is-iran-to-the-bomb accessed on 3 January 2006.

21. Of course, the minute enrichment in a small and single cascade in March/April 2006 does not present a major breakthrough or prove the Iranian capacity to run a complex multi-cascade enrichment process over several month and years. Thus, an Iranian technical capacity to produce enough weapons-grade uranium is still years away, assuming that no hidden and successful P-2 centrifuge programme exists. However, when measured against the standard by some Israeli officials that Iran must be prevented from gaining the expertise to successfully enrich uranium, the point of no return has passed. From now on any military action would have to take out not only the known enrichment facilities, but also the personnel who have the expertise to rebuild and run it successfully, in order to limit an Iranian nuclear weapons capacity in the future, Paul Rogers, Iran: Consequences of a War, available at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/IranConsequences.pdf accessed on 22 April 2007, p. 8.; Whitney Raas, Austin Long, ‘Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities’, International Security 31/4 (Spring 2007), pp. 7–33 for a comparative feasibility assessment of Israel's military pre-emption options to destroy key nuclear sites.

22. Flynt Leverett, Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options toward Iran (New York: Century Foundation, 2006), p. 19; Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 34.

23. George Perkovich, ‘Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation’, Foreign Affairs 82/2 (March/April 2003), pp. 2–8.

24. Robert Gallucci, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 April 2006, p.3. available at www.senate.gov/∼foreign/testimony/2006/GullucciTestimony060426.pdf accessed on 5 May 2007.

25. Gary Milhollin, Iran: Cutting Off the Means to Make a Bomb, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, 8 March 2006, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/Gary/hirc-milhollin-030806.html accessed on 10 May 2006, p. 3.

26. Peter Rudolf, Die Iran-Politik der Bush-Administration. Konfrontative Eindämmung und ihre Konsequenzen (Berlin: SWP, 2007).

27. Johannes Reissner, ‘Iran und seine Nachbarn: Konkurrenz, Pragmatismus und der Ruf nach Kooperation’, in Jens van Scherpenberg, Peter Schmidt (eds), Stabilität und Kooperation: Aufgaben Internationaler Ordnungspolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), pp. 140–160; Johannes Reissner, ‘Europas Beziehungen zu Iran’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 54 (B9/2004), pp. 48–54.

28. Phebe Marr, ‘US Policy of Sanctions: Prospects for Revision’, in Sven Behrendt, Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds), Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000), pp. 263–286; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle. The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004). On the 6 + 2 talks Flynt Leverett, Dealing with Tehran available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett_diplomatic.pdf accessed on 5 May 2007, p. 11.

29. Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 6 June 2003 (GOV/2003/32), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf accessed on 20 September 2006.

30. Gary Samore, Meeting Iran's nuclear Challenge, No. 21, available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No21.pdf accessed on 24 July 2005, p.2; Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p.13; Glenn Kessler, ‘2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks’, Washington Post Online, 14 February 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021301363.html accessed on 14 February 2007.

31. Ahlström, ‘The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, p. 32f.

32. Agence Europe, Bulletin quotidien Europe 2003: UE/Etats-unis/Nuclèaire: John Wolf souhaite qu’ EU et Etats-Unis travaillent étroiment contre la prolifération nucléaire et insiste sur le problème iranien, 3 May 2003, p. 7.

33. Schwegmann, ‘Kontaktgruppe und EU-2-Verhandlungen’, p. 2; Communication with Official of the German Foreign Ministry.

34. Sebastian Harnisch, Ruth Linden, Einsame Vermittler. Die EU-3 müssen ihre diplomatischen Hebel stärken, Nichtverbreitungsbrief 05/2005, available at http://www.politik.uni-trier.de/mitarbeiter-/harnisch/pubs/Nichtverbreitungsbrief05-2005.pdf accessed on 20 September 2005; Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p.14f.

35. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 98–99.

36. IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81).

37. Iranian officials were fully aware of this limitation of the EU-3 position, see Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 67. In fact, Flynt Leverett, who was the acting officer on the Middle East in the NSC, argues that the Iranians rejected the June 2006 package proposal by the P-5 plus Germany because it did not contain security guarantees, despite Iranian insistence and European prodding, Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p. 16.

38. IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, 18 September 2004 (GOV/2004/79).

39. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 66.

40. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 67f. Both quotes were from Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief negotiator, at the time.

41. See Kaveh Afrasiabi, Abbas Maleki, ‘Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September’, Brown Journal of World Affairs 9/2 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp. 255–265; Dr. Chen Kane, Nuclear Decision Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse, Middle East Brief No.5/2006, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, available at http://www.brandeis.edu/centers/crown/publications/MEB/MEB5.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007.

42. Gröning, Rudischhauser, ‘Die Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran’, p. 49.

43. The E3/EU also recognized in the PA that the suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.

44. IAEA, Communication dated 26 November 2004, received from the permanent representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement, Signed in Paris on 15 November 2005, INFCIRC/637, 26 November 2004, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirco637.pdf accessed on 2 May 2006; Oliver Meier, Gerrard Quille, ‘Testing Time for Europe's Nonproliferation Strategy’, Arms Control Today (May 2005), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Oliver_Quille.asp?print accessed on 1 June 2005, p. 1.

45. For an elaborate version of this legal position Henry Sokolski, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Energy, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee On International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, 2 March 2006, http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/House031006.pdf accessed on 30 May 2007. Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p. 16.

46. Gröning, Rudischhauser, ‘Die Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran’, p. 51.

47. There are several features of the Iranian programme that arouse suspicion. There is certainty that Iran received plans to shape uranium metal into a hemispherical sphere, a format for which there is only a military application. Also, there is a reasonable probability that Iran received, through the Khan network, a nuclear warhead design of Chinese origin, see David Sanger, ‘U.S. Demand Deepens Gulf with Iran over Nuclear Facilities’, New York Times Online, http://select.nytimes. com/gst/abstract.html?res_F20F16FE3D540C708CDDAC0894DD404482 (accessed on 3 May 2005).

48. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 73.

49. Annalisa Gianella, Interview with Oliver Meier, July 24, 2005, ACT Online, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050726_Giannella.asp accessed on 20 September 2005; Director General of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67), available at http://www.armscontrol.com/GOV_2005_67.pdf accessed on 20 September 2005.

50. Gröning, Rudischhauser, ‘Die Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran’, p. 50.

51. General Framework for Objective Guarantees, Firm Guarantees and Firm Commitments 2005, available at http://abnews.go.com/images/International/iran_eu_objectives.pdf accessed on 20 September 2005.

52. Harnisch, Linden, Einsame Vermittler.

53. Iran Communication 2005: Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, 17 November 2005, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc661.pdf accessed on 28 January 2006.

54. Pirouz Mojathedzadeh, Kaveh Afrasiabi, ‘Iran's Nuclear Program. A Crisis of Choice, Not Necessity’, International Herald Tribune, 25 August 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/11/opinion/edkaveh.php accessed on 5 May 2007.

55. Response by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement proposed by the E3/EU, available at http://www.basicint.org/countries/iran/IranResponse.pdf accessed on 20 September 2005.

56. Letter of E3 Ministers and the EU High Rep. to Dr. Rouhani, dated 5 August 2005, available at http://www.basicint.org/countries/iran/IranIAEA20050808.pdf accessed on 20 September 2005.

57. Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p. 16 suggests that the question of security guarantees again in 2006 played a crucial role in the Iranian rejection of the P-5 plus Germany proposal.

58. Pierre Goldschmidt, ‘Decision Time on Iran’, New York Times, 14 September 2005, available at http://www.nci.org/05nci/09/decision_time_iran.htm accessed on 5 May 2005.

59. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Address to the Sixtieth Session of the UN General Assembly, 17 September 2005, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050918-irna02.html accessed on 20 September 2005.

60. Gröning, Rudischhauser, ‘Die Organe der IAEO und ihr Umgang mit dem Iran’, p. 51.

61. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution, adopted 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007, p. 1.

62. Global Security Newswire (GNS), ‘Iran Willing to Offer Nuclear Aid to Islamic States’, 16 August 2005, available at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/W_2005_9_16.html#47F2852F accessed on 20 September 2005.

63. The so-called Russian proposal is based on a pragmatic legal perspective that does not fix the legal status of Iran's (claimed) right to the full fuel cycle. It foresees, similar to the Russian–Iranian cooperation for building and running the light water reactor in Bushehr, that Iran would convert uranium ore into yellow cake, but would transfer the conversion to uraniumhexafluorid and the enrichment process to Russia and also return the spent fuel rods to Russia, so that the most sensitive technical processes and materials would not take place on Iranian territory, see Daniel Dombey, Neil Buckley, Gareth Smyth, ‘Russia Tries to Break Impasse with Iran’, 25 October 2005, available at http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=Daniel+Dombey%2C+Meil+Buckley%2C+Gareth+Smyth%2C+%E2%80%98Russia+tries+to+break+impasse+with+Iran%E2%80%99&y=8&aje=true&x=9&id=051025000836 accessed on 5 May 2007.

64. Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses’, CRS Report, RL 32048 (Washington: CRS for Congress, updated 6 April 2006).

65. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambition, pp. 108–112.

66. Communication dated February 2006 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency (INFCIRC/666), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc666.pdf accessed on 2 May 2007.

67. E3/EU, Statement on the Iran Nuclear Issue, Berlin 2006, available at http://www.iranwatch.org/intenational/EU/germany-mfa-eustatement-0011206.pdf accessed on 10 May 2006.

68. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution adopted 4 February 2006, GOV/2006/14, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007.

69. Sebastian Harnisch, ‘Ohne Hast zum Ziel: Der IAEA-Gouverneursrat, seine Kompetenzen und die Chance auf eine friedliche Lösung des iranischen Atomstreits’, Nichtverbreitungsbrief 09/2006, available at http://www.politik.uni-trier.de/mitarbeiter/harnisch/pubs/Nichtverbreitungsbrief092006.pdf accessed on 10 May 2006.

70. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 28 September 2006, GOV/2006/27, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007, para. 34, in which the DG explicitly requests additional transparency measures.

71. UN Security Council, Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006, S/PRST/2006/15, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm accessed on 18 April 2007.

72. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 28 September 2006, GOV/2006/27, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007, Para. 31, 34.

73. Ephraim Asculai, ‘Intelligence Assessment and the Pont of No Return: Iran‘s Nuclear Program’, Tel Aviv Notes, 8 August 2005, available at http://listserv.tau.ac.il/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0508&L=tau-jcss&T=0&F=P&P=224 accessed on 21 April 2007.

74. Peter Rudolf, Die Iran-Politik der Bush-Administration, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/produkte/swp_aktuell_detail.php?id=7152 accessed on 05 May 2007; Seymour Hersh, ‘The Redirection’, The New Yorker Online, 5 March 2007, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh accessed on 23 April 2007.

75. Carol Glacomo, Sue Pleming, ‘Major Powers Fail to Agree over Iran Strategy’, Reuters, 9 May 2006. available at http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=8730 accessed on 5 May 2007.

76. The text of the proposal was leaked by the website Iran Focus, see ‘Text of P5+1 nuclear package of incentives offered to Iran’, available at http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=7946 accessed on 2 August 2006.

77. A leaked British memo had already indicated that Russia and China may change their attitude towards making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement, if the EU-3 offered a comprehensive proposal that was rejected by the Iranians, see No author, ‘Leaked Letter in Full: UK Diplomat Outlines Iran Strategy’, Times Online, 22 March 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article744070.ece accessed on 5 May 2007; see also Paul Kerr, ‘U.S. Allies await Iran's Response to Nuclear Offer’, Arms Control Today Online, July/August 2006, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/IranResponse.asp accessed on 9 August 2006.

78. Condoleezza Rice, Press Conference on Iran, 31 May 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/67103.htm accessed on 2 August 2006. This position on enrichment activities is, at least in principle, compatible with a position that has been attributed to German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung. In an interview with Reuters Jung had stated that Iran should be allowed to carry out a limited uranium enrichment programme under IAEA supervision. Jung failed to mention that this was an option for the future when Tehran had regained the trust of the international community. While several commentators suggested that Jung's comments exposed a ‘fundamental crack’ in the P-5 plus Germany group, another reading of the episode is more plausible. At the time Defence Minister Jung was already under attack for his handling of the German participation in the EU mission to Congo and the Minister simply declined to admit that he spoke out of line; see Louis Charbonneau, ‘Germany Could Accept Nuclear Enrichment in Iran’, Reuters, 28 June 2006; John Vinocur, ‘Can Merkel's Coalition Take the Lead in Europe?’, International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2006; Gareth Porter, ‘Washington Rejects a German Compromise on Iran’, Asia Times Online, 22 July 2006, available at http://www.atimes.com accessed on 10 August 2006; and Communication with a German Foreign Official, 11 August 2006.

79. Condoleezza Rice, Press Conference on Iran, 31 May, 2006.

80. UN Security Council Resolution 1696/2006, 31 July, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm accessed on 22 April 2007.

81. UN Security Council Resolution 1696/2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm accessed on 5 May 2007.

82. Michael Spies, John Burroughs, ‘Commentary on Security Council Resolution 1696 on Iran’, 31 July 2006, New York: Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/UNSCres-jul06.htm accessed on 22 April 2007.

83. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 28 September 2006, GOV/2006/27, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007, para. 32; IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 27 February 2006, GOV/2006/15, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf accessed on 18 April 2007, para. 20.

84. Leverett, Dealing with Tehran, p. 16.

85. Daniel Y. Kono, ‘When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade’, International Studies Quarterly 51/1 (March 2007), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00444.x accessed on 5 May 2007, p. 166.

86. There is continuing ‘chatter’ about a compromise that could restart the negotiation process based on a ‘cold or warm standby’, i.e. the acceptance of some Iranian centrifuges/cascades not operating or operating with neutral gases that do not increase the amount of enriched uranium and technical expertise in running complex cascade systems. In order to build up trust that P-5 arbitration will be implemented by Iran, the compromise on the standby conditions must ensure that Iran does not gain additional weapons related expertise.