Abstract
Debate in France about the return to NATO's integrated command structure revolved largely around whether or not Sarkozy had broken with the sacrosanct Gaullist principles of ‘non-alignment’. In reality, the decision was taken for quite different reasons. Since the end of the cold war, France has found itself heavily involved with NATO in a range of overseas missions. Militarily, to remain outside the command structure had become a major liability. The move, militarily, approximated to the return of the Prodigal Son. At the political level, the ongoing process of NATO's quest for a ‘new strategic concept’ meant that France needed to be fully present in the internal debates. Here, the move is closer to that of the Trojan Horse. There is no break with the Gaullist tradition.
Notes
1. Lies! Lies! … Untruths … A great democratic nation should not be informed with lies.
2. Author's interview with Sir Michael Jay.
3. The two most senior American officials presiding over the formulation and implementation of the NATO doctrine of ‘flexible response’ in the 1960s, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, testified publicly on several occasions in the 1980s and 1990s that their advice to the presidents they served was never to engage strategic nuclear weapons even if that meant abandoning Europe to the Red Army.
4. We must express a debt of gratitude to that great country, America, without whom our freedom and indeed our country would gradually have lost all meaning […] The defense of Western Europe, in the present and for many years to come, can only be conceived through respect for the Atlantic Alliance.
5. All in all, I want to be your friend, your ally, your partner. But a friend who stands tall, an independent ally and a free partner.
6. If the Yanks hadn't shown up, you'd all be Germans now.
7. Along with our European partners, we must ensure that NATO does not evolve, as the USA apparently wishes it to evolve, into a global organization engaging in missions that combine humanitarian, military and policing activities. NATO is not intended to be a substitute for the UN. It should retain a clear geopolitical anchoring in Europe and a strictly military vocation.
8. I hope that, in the coming months we can go forward together toward the reinforcement of ESDP and toward the renovation of NATO and of its relations with France. The two go hand in hand – an independent European defense capacity and an Atlantic organization in which we will play a full part.
9. Being allies does not mean alignment and I feel totally free to express both agreement and disagreement, without either complacency or taboo.
10. Who can claim to know what de Gaulle would do today?
11. A strategic concept is only relevant if it is adapted not to the current situation, but to the situation we will face in the future. Because not only should there be no delay in defining a strategic concept, but preferably, we should be ahead of events.
12. Sarkozy's presidential speeches are available from: http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?cat_id=7
13. This is a test for Europe: does she want peace or does she want to be left in peace? These require different policies, different strategies and will have different consequences. If you want peace, you have to give yourself the means to exist as an economic, financial, political and military power. If you want to be left in peace, then curl up in a ball, cover your eyes, plug your ears, don't speak too loudly and for a while, you will be left in peace. Until you discover that you lack the means to secure your own defense. But then it will be too late.
14. Its giant's wings prevent it from walking.