![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Recent developments in European Union (EU) asylum cooperation raise important questions about the nature of cooperation and the potential problems facing collective action in the realm of EU internal security. The emergence and the subsequent stability of the Schengen/Dublin system is especially puzzling, given the highly inequitable distribution of costs and benefits that this system entails among the participating states and begs the question as to why those states that are likely to face a disproportionate ‘burden’ under the system would have agreed to it. This article seeks to provide an alternative approach to answering this question by drawing on a public goods framework. We argue that a simple focus on free-riding and exploitation dynamics, as emphasized in the traditional collective action literature, falls short as an explanation and instead demonstrates how more recent theoretical contributions to the public goods literature can offer new insights into the origin and evolution in cooperation in this sensitive policy area.
Notes
1. Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the states of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 22 September 2000 (OJ) L 239 (Schengen Convention); Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the Community, Dublin, 15 June 1990, OJ (1997) C254/1 (Dublin Convention); Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 25 February 2003 (OJ) L 50/2 (Dublin II Regulation).
2. It is important to note that these numbers are as reported by Member States to Eurostat and that they are absolute numbers and do not represent a proportional measure. This may be the reason why countries, such as Germany and France, report such high numbers, as they also receive the highest absolute volume of asylum applications, are more likely to have a better reporting and record-keeping system, and are perhaps also more likely to receive requests on the basis of hierarchical exemptions under the Dublin system (such as the presence of immediate family or previously issued visas, etc.).
3. and analyze data between 2008 and 2010, as this was the only data available at the time of writing.
4. Where we refer to public goods in this article, we are referring to any goods that have public goods elements even though they may not be ‘pure’ public goods.
5. In and , only data from 2009 are consulted, as this was the only year that had available information for all countries, except for Belgium and Norway.
6. The same could be said for EURODAC, as access to this database and, hence, its benefits are limited to those participating in the system.
7. This is not to suggest that core Member States made no contributions in this area and there is at least some evidence of implicit trading in terms of financial contributions. For example, the Council Regulations establishing FRONTEX articulated that the operating budget was to be made up of a general EC subsidy, which was to be supplemented by any voluntary contributions from participating states. Between 2008 and 2010, the EC subsidy accounted for about 95 per cent of the operating budget of FRONTEX; however, the only voluntary financial contributions were made by Norway, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, and Switzerland. Furthermore, with regard to contributions to actual operation efforts (in terms of resources, people, etc.), the main net contributors to FRONTEX in 2010 were Austria, France, and Germany (FRONTEX Citation2011).