Coercive Europeanization: the EU's struggle to contain secessionism in the Balkans

Abstract

Secessionism is still the predominant conflict type in Europe. Even though the European Union (EU) extended the enlargement perspective to the Balkans 15 years ago, secessionist ambition remains pervasive, especially in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. How does secessionism affect Europeanization and how does Europeanization affect secessionism? It is argued here that in cases of unattained statehood domestic power struggles among deeply divided elites over status and territorial control undermine the consensus needed for Europeanization. In cases of attained de facto statehood the conflict focuses on recognition, which likewise polarizes societies and marginalizes reform. In such high-resistance scenarios, where the inclusionary EU norms clash with the exclusionary norms of the secessionists, the EU vigorously works to marginalize the secessionists by relying mainly on denial, punishment and imposition. Still, the EU's leverage is often insufficient in moving the conflicting parties towards within-state solutions and reform. A study of Bosnia's transformation since Dayton reveals, however, that the EU's leverage varies over time and that the EU at times itself inadvertently fans secessionism.

Keywords:

• secession
• EU enlargement
• Balkans

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Saša Konjević for his assistance in providing recent data on the legislation of the Bosnian parliament.

Notes on contributor

Rafael Biermann holds the Chair of International Relations at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany. His research focus is on peace and conflict studies, in particular ethnic conflict and third-party intervention, and on new theoretical approaches to study international organizations. His primary regional interest is in Southeastern Europe. Prof. Biermann has worked for several years both at US academic institutions and in the German Chancellery and MoD.

Notes

1. This is the slightly revised definition of Gawrich et al. (2010, p. 1210).

2. Secessionist moves are not necessarily motivated ethnically, though. Various definitions are discussed in Pavković and Radan (2011).

3. B92, 2013. Belgrade, Priština initial agreement in Brussels. Available from: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=19&nav_id=85780 [Accessed 14 January 2014].

4. Whether the Brussels agreement of 2013, which was mediated by Catherine Ashton, represents a breakthrough remains to be seen.

5. Croatia joined the EU in 2013, Serbia started negotiations in January 2014.

6. The documents, most of them cables, will not be quoted individually for classification reasons. They include, for example, reports of PIC meetings and protocols of meetings with Bosnian politicians and high-level visits to the region.

7. Confidentiality will be respected. Interviewees were: the Brcko Final Award Office; in Sarajevo the Directorate of European Integrations of the Council of Ministers, two MoD cabinet-level representatives, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the EUFOR and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and an EU Embassy official; in Banja Luka the Office of the President of the RS, a civil society representative and the head of an Embassy Office; in Mostar two Croat professors of Mostar University; in Belgrade a former adviser to Prime Minister Tadić and an EU Ambassador; and in Zagreb two representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for Bosnia as well as a former Assistant Minister of European Integration.

8. The EU Administration of Mostar is discussed in detail in Juncos (2013, pp. 99–110).

9. The open cities concept of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) supporting only communities, which are willing to accept multiethnic structures, complemented the EU's focus area concept supporting communities, which accept minority returns.

10. The Final Award of March 1998 explicitly rewarded the RS for the recent turn towards cooperation and thus signalled that cooperation pays off.

11. For a more detailed discussion of the Roadmap and the Feasibility Study see Noutcheva (2012, pp. 60–64).

12. See the graph on the use of the Bonn powers in Juncos (2013, p. 135).

13. Milorad Dodik – One Foot in Bosnia, but His Heart in Serbia, 2009. RFE/RL, 28 April 2009.

14. Partner Marketing/Reporter, 7 October 2006. Available from: http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/9153/serb_bosnians_support_independence/, [Accessed on 8 July 2011].

15. Dodik's War Against Bosnia and Herzegovina, News and Analysis, 2009. Bosnian Institute, 3 July 2009.

16. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, dpa/Reuters, 27 August 2010.

17. Catherine Ashton quoted in Nedim Dervisbegovic, 2010. For Bosnia's Dodik, Referendum Law Means it's Make-Or-Break Time. RFE/RL, 11 February 2010.

18. The high number of laws recorded in Table 3 for 2008 and 2009 can be attributed to visa liberalization.

19. European Stability Initiative, 2009. Bosnia's visa breakthrough and the power of Europe, Newsletter no. 8, 29 September 2009.

20. Noutcheva et al. (2004, p. 35) argued already in 2004 that conditionality might drive change in the initial stages of Europeanization, but ‘over the longer term endogenous processes may become the main driving forces behind domestic transformation’.