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Abstract
Once only coordinating the foreign policy of its member states, the European Union (EU) now endeavors to speak on behalf of non-EU states. In the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), its declarations are often backed by a large number of countries. This article enquires into the function of diplomatic alignment. Its findings question the use of alignment as a normative benchmark for European integration. It argues that adherence to EU norms is not the only rationale for alignment, and, more interestingly, that there are valid reasons not to align, which do not contradict EU norms, as well as more questionable reasons to align, which do. This article, in conclusion, argues that the function of alignment supports the EU's claim for international leadership, and that the reactions of non-EU states should be gaged in the light of this venture.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the reviewers for their comments. They gratefully acknowledge the support the OSCE afforded them in the framework of the researcher-in-residence program. They would like to thank in particular Ms Alice Němcová, from the OSCE office in Prague, for her kind assistance. They also thank the participants of the 6th ECPR Conference and 2011 Congress of the Swiss Political Science Association, who have commented on earlier versions of this article. This work was supported by the National Research Fund of Luxembourg (FNR) under Grant [AFR 2718121].
Notes on contributors
Mr Florent Marciacq is a Research Associate at the European Governance Programme, University of Luxembourg. He was OSCE researcher-in-residence in 2011 and joined the Chair of Research on legislative studies at the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg in 2012. He completed his joint Ph.D. studies in 2014 at the University of Luxembourg and University of Vienna with the support of Luxembourg's National Research Fund (AFR 2718121). His thesis explores foreign policy and European integration issues in the Western Balkans. Florent Marciacq graduated in political sciences from the Vienna Diplomatic Academy (MAIS) and in international economics from the Reims Management School (M.Sc.).
Ms Natalia Sanmartin Jaramillo is a Strategy Researcher at PAU Education, Barcelona. She has worked as political adviser and expert for the presidencies of the European Council for Spain, Belgium, Hungary, Poland, and Cyprus within the EU delegation team at the OSCE. She holds a master's degree on International Relations from the University of Strasbourg as well as a master's degree in Advanced Interdisciplinary European Studies at the College of Europe (Natolin Campus). She is currently finishing a third masters on Political and Democratization Studies at the Spanish Distance-Learning University (UNED).
Notes
1. The percentage of recorded votes in the UN General Assembly with consensus among EC members was under 50 per cent until 1991, with a lowest peak in 1983 at 28 per cent.
2. With the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU delegation in Vienna gradually took over some of the prerogatives of the Presidency. The statements in the OSCE Permanent Council are now delivered by the EU delegation but only after the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office gives the floor to the Presidency, which in turn gives the floor to the representatives of the EU delegation.
3. LGBT stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender persons. In 2010, for instance, Moldova did not align itself with the EU statement at the occasion of the Day against homophobia (PC.DEL/416/10). In 2012, it did not align itself with the EU statement ‘regarding respect for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons’ (PC.DEL/909/12). The position of its government regarding this issue aroused many concerns in the EU and even led to a statement criticizing human rights infringements against LGTB in the country (e.g. PC.DEL/284/12).
4. In 2009, for instance, Serbia did not align itself with some the EU statements criticizing the involvement of Russia in the South Ossetia war. It instead drew a (questionable) parallel between Georgia and Kosovo, which had declared independence (see PC.DEL/91/09, FSC-PC.DEL/16/09, PC.DEL/107/09/Rev.1).
5. Armenia (and Azerbaijan) did not align themselves with most of EU statements regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (e.g. PC.DEL/946/08, PC.DEL/946/10, PC.DEL/1078/10).
6. Such calculations played a role, when Macedonia decided to keep joining the EU and criticizing Russia's behavior during the 2008 conflict with Georgia (e.g. PC.DEL/620/08, PC.DEL/712/08). Moscow retaliated by addressing Macedonia as ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, although Russia had recognized the country under its constitutional name ‘Republic of Macedonia’.
7. Moldova, for instance, could not afford to align itself with all the statements the EU issued against Russia's involvement in the 2008 South Ossetia war, although it shared the views of the European Union in many respects (see PC.DEL/324/08, PC.DEL/348/08, PC.DEL/620/08, PC.DEL/712/08, PC.DEL/918/08).
8. Another example is Ukraine in 2011, which did not align itself with the EU statement criticizing Russia's infringement of human rights (PC.DEL/77/11/Rev.1).
9. Turkey, for instance, did not align itself with most of the EU statements targeting Azerbaijan, whether on human rights or on security issues (e.g. PC.DEL/350/07, PC.DEL/406/07, PC.DEL/672/07, FSC-PC.DEL/29/08, PC.DEL/464/09, PC.DEL/564/09, PC.DEL/620/09, PC.DEL/941/09, PC.DEL/76/10, PC.DEL/206/10, PC.DEL/496/10, PC.DEL/740/10, FSC.DEL/124/10, PC.DEL/242/11, PC.DEL/319/11, PC.DEL/453/11, PC.DEL/511/11) or Kazahkstan (PC.DEL/28/05, PC.DEL/913/07, PC.DEL/17/09, PC.DEL/93/09, PC.DEL/305/09, PC.DEL/680/09, PC.DEL/714/09, PC.DEL/827/09, PC.DEL/1008/09, PC.DEL/1085/10/Rev.1, PC.DEL/12/11, PC.DEL/43/11). Ankara often issued instead declarations in its national capacity, although it bore a message that was very similar to the EU's. The same applies to Lichtenstein or Norway, mostly in the field of human rights (see e.g. PC.DEL/764/07).
10. Montenegro, for instance, readily aligned itself with EU statements on systems of arms export controls (e.g. FSC.DEL/482/06/Rev.1, FSC.DEL/171/08), although it barely participates in arms trade.
11. Non-alignment then rather signals dissatisfaction with the way the EU's mechanism is designed. Turkey, for instance, refrained from aligning itself with some of the EU's statements on the Kosovo talks (e.g. PC.DEL/300/06).
12. Only a few non-EU states, for instance, aligned themselves EU opening statements (e.g. EEF.DEL/12/09).
13. Liechtenstein and Island, for instance, did not align themselves with some EU statement criticizing the use of death penalty, although they usually did (see PC.DEL/119/08, PC.DEL/46/08).
14. Liechtenstein, for instance, did not align itself with EU statements on Arms Trade Treaty negotiations (FSC.DEL/171/08) or Kyrgyzstan (PC.DEL/748/09, PC.DEL/654/09) or Turkmenistan (PC.DEL/676/09, HDIM.DEL/0597/09, PC.DEL/886/09, PC.DEL/1089/08).