Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.

Keywords:

• tactical nuclear weapons
• nuclear deterrence
• NATO
• trans-Atlantic relationship
• Russian nuclear weapons

Notes on contributors

Petr Suchy is Head, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University.

Bradley A. Thayer is Reader, Department of Politics, Languages, and International Studies, University of Bath.

Notes

1. We subscribe to the definition of NSNWs provided by Jeffrey Larsen (2006, pp. 6–7), who, in turn, draws from the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms. While definitions may vary depending on mission, range and yield, among other factors, we will use TNWs and NSNWs synonymously, with their central point of distinction from strategic weapons as being defined by their battlefield mission. We are cognizant of the definitional problems related to tactical nuclear forces. For the purpose of this article, their definition by range should be complemented by their use and carrier. Thus, we find useful the application of the exclusion principle, which is not an ideal either, but in our case when we deal solely with Russian and US systems, which stay out of other agreements on strategic and intermediate nuclear forces, this method can be helpful to cover all remaining systems that are not, for the time being, subject to any arms control agreement. On this problem with definition, see Arbman and Thornton (2003, pp. 9–10) or Pomper et al. (2009, p. 22). See also Perkovich et al. (2012, pp. 7–8).

2. An excellent overview of the pivot to Asia is (Friedberg 2012). For a strong critique, see Ross (2012).

3. Reportedly, between 150 and 200 TNWs (B-61) are deployed in six bases in five European states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey (Norris and Kristensen 2011, pp. 64–73). See also Perkovich et al. (2012, pp. 6–7).

4. For a careful analysis of the role United States TNWs in the course of the cold war, see Rose (1980).

5. An excellent discussion of this role is Cohen and Van Cleave (1976, pp. 11–28).

6. An insightful discussion of the evolution of U.S. and Soviet thinking on TNWs in this period is found in Cohen and Van Cleave (1976, pp. 54–79).

7. Here our analysis is concerned with Europe, we recognize that TNWs, in conjunction with conventional earth penetrators, would have usefulness for holding Iran's and North Korea's nuclear facilities, and other military targets, at risk.

8. For an excellent partial account of the unilateral arms control steps the United States has taken, see US commitment to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (1997).

9. For a detailed account and various figures concerning the TNW reductions in US and Russia, see, for example Kristensen (2012).

10. Making a related argument, Nikolai Sokov submits that a similar role has been given to long-range and medium-range nuclear systems, rather than TNWs, due to the more distant location of critical targets (Pomper et al. 2009, p. 14, Sokov 2014).

11. After interviewing a number of diplomats and specialists serving at NATO (Authors' Interview April 2014), we reach the conclusion that it is unrealistic to expect a direct correlation between NATO's nuclear sharing politics and the various organizational and structural changes within the Alliance. Accordingly, we question whether recent internal developments, structural and organizational changes within NATO, have significant influence over the issue of nuclear sharing. We recognize that some of these changes may influence or be influenced by a changing perception of various nuclear issues within NATO and its nuclear policy. Of course, information on these internal changes is classified.

We do note that the Nuclear Policy Directorate was recently moved from the Defence Policy and Planning division to the new division Emerging Security Challenges, which also includes the WMD Center. Since its role is largely advisory, and it principally focuses on coordinating tasks provided to the NPG/HLG, the authors would not want to overemphasize its influence over NATO policies.

Another relevant body, the Special Advisory and Consultation Committee on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation was established in February 2013. It cooperates and is assisted by the High Level Group. We believe that its foundation also signals that arms control still continues to be an important issue for the Alliance. For a detailed discussion, see Meier and Lunn (2014).

12. See Podvig (2012).

13. See Kristensen (2013).

14. On Russia's nuclear renaissance, see Thayer and Skypek (2008).

15. For example, see Odom (1998).

16. On the capabilities of the SS-26, see O'Halloran (2013, pp. 65–66) and Sweetman (2013). On the possibility that variants are an INF violation, see Sweetman (2013).