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ABSTRACT
On 29 August 2013, the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a Prime Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders’ statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor – the role of historical precedent – was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Professor Juliet Kaarbo holds a personal chair in foreign policy at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15A George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK. Email: [email protected].
Dr Daniel Kenealy is a lecturer in public policy at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15A George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, UK. Email: [email protected].
Notes
† This paper extends the analysis in Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy, ‘The House of Commons Vote on British Intervention in Syria’, ISPI Studies, Analysis No. 228 (2014). The authors thank Ryan Beasley, Cristian Cantir, James Strong, Tim Oliver, and the members of the University of Edinburgh International Relations research group for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. In 1782 Lord North, then PM, lost a vote of no confidence following the British defeat at Yorktown.
2. The Labour amendment differed in setting out a clearer and more structured role for the UN in any intervention and in calling for compelling evidence that the Syrian government was responsible for the chemical attacks.
3. For more detailed discussion of how this research challenges the conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence in foreign policy, see Kesgin and Kaarbo (Citation2010).
4. For some efforts to increase parliament's involvement prior to the Iraq war see White (Citation2003).
5. In testimony to the House of Lords the former foreign secretary Jack Straw suggested that the reason for inaction was simply a failure of the Brown government to prioritise the issue. Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister in the 2010–15 coalition government, observed that internal disagreement remained an obstacle within government to any bill formalising the convention of Commons’ involvement and a vote (House of Lords Citation2013).
6. This remains one of the most bizarre aspects of the vote. 490 MPs in total voted for a motion that left open the possibility of a second vote, which may have authorized the use of UK military force. But those 490 votes were divided between a government motion and an opposition amendment. Both the PM and the leader of the opposition were in favour of keeping the possibility of using military force on the table and yet, following the vote, both were quick to declare publicly that such action was no longer an option.