The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue – different readings of the crisis in Ukraine

ABSTRACT

Recent developments in European security have shown the growing need for a better understanding of the security dynamics on the European continent. This article presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of European security in general, and concerning the crisis in Ukraine in particular. As much of the literature on these issues has been normatively driven, we aim to provide an impartial presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counterproductive. With this article we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a development in Russia–EU relations. After presenting an analysis of the differing EU and Russian perceptions, we discuss the potential for dialogue between such different worldviews, and reflect on potential implications for European security. As the article shows, there are tendencies of a certain adjustment in the Union’s approach that may make a partial rapprochement between the two sides more likely.

KEYWORDS:

• EU
• Russia
• Ukraine
• dialogue
• security

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Pernille Rieker is a senior researcher at NUPI. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Oslo. From 2005 to 2009, she headed the Department of International Politics at NUPI. She has also worked as a senior advisor at NordForsk (2009–2010). Her research interests are related to international and regional security, European integration and external governance, as well as national foreign and security policy with a special focus on the Nordic countries and France. She has published widely on these issues. Her latest publication is the edited volume External governance as security community building – the limits and potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2016.

Kristian Lundby Gjerde (MPhil, Oxon) is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) specialising in post-Soviet politics. He has studied international relations in Russia and holds a master degree in Russian studies from Oxford. Prior to joining NUPI, he worked as an Executive Officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Baku. He is currently editor of the Nordic area studies journal Nordisk Østforum.

Notes

1. The analysis is informed by a series of interviews conducted in Brussels (with the EEAS, the Commission and different member states delegations in Brussels) and Moscow (with well-placed foreign policy specialists and European diplomats) in May 2015. In addition, we have consulted official documents and statements as well as secondary literature by Russian and Western scholars.

2. Interviews, Brussels, June 2015.

3. The so-called big bang enlargement, integrating 10 new members took place in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria became members in 2007 and Croatia in 2013.

4. It should be noted that although emphasis on the need for multipolarity has been at the core of Moscow’s foreign policy thinking since the mid-1990s, this does not mean that Russia has consistently supported the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Quite on the contrary, Russia’s relationship with the OSCE could be described as “a consistent gradual downward trend” (Kropatcheva 2015, p. 18; see also Kropatcheva 2012), indicative of Russia’s disappointment also with this organisation.

5. Interviews, Moscow, May 2015.

6. Blockmans et al. (2012) provide an accessible and thorough overview of the history and mechanisms of Eurasian economic integration.

7. For more details about these periods, see Haukkala (2015).

8. Interviews, Brussels, June 2015.

9. Interviews, Moscow, May 2015.

10. Interviews, Brussels, June 2015.

11. Interview, Moscow, May 2015.

12. Such statements appear hypocritical in the context of Russia’s support of anti-Maidan rebels and separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Seen from Moscow, however, it is not necessarily a contradiction to criticise perceived Western actions (regardless of the tendency to grossly overestimate the extent to which Western countries are able to manage processes), and at the same time apply the same means that they claim Western countries do: Moscow criticises the way they perceive West to change the rules of the game, but considers it justified to respond in the same vein. Many statements from Russian officials seem to follow this logic, as Putin at a press conference in 2014:

… look how well trained the people who operated in Kiev were. As we all know they were trained at special bases in neighbouring states: in Lithuania, Poland and in Ukraine itself too. They were trained by instructors for extended periods. They were divided into dozens and hundreds, their actions were coordinated, they had good communication systems. It was all like clockwork. Did you see them in action? They looked very professional, like special forces. Why do you think those in Crimea should be any worse? (Putin 2014a)

13. Interviews, Brussels, June 2015.

14. For an overview of EU sanctions, see http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm. For an overview of US sanctions, see http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/

15. Interviews, Moscow, May 2015.

16. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/.

17. Similar talks have also been undertaken in relations to gas issues, but these talks will not be covered here.

18. In an advisory referendum held in the Netherlands on 6 April, over 61% of the voters rejected the ratification of the AA between the EU and Ukraine. Although the political character of this referendum and the Dutch Advisory Referendum Act and the geopolitical implications of the AA itself have already been the subject of heated discussions in the Netherlands and beyond, the legal implications of this referendum remain unclear. While it is not entirely clear which elements of the agreement fall under national competences, the DCFTA is under EU competence and will thus apply in the Netherlands as well (Van der Loo 2016).

19. Interviews, Moscow, May 2015.

20. Interviews, Brussels, May 2015.

Additional information

Funding

This project is co-funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and its 2014 call for research projects and the EUNOR project funded by the Research Council of Norway (RCN).