Transgovernmental networks and rationalist outputs? The partial social construction of EU foreign policy

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) foreign policy has gone beyond intergovernmentalism. It is largely formulated by (Brussels-based) national officials, in a process characterised by a high number of cooperative practices, diffuse sentiments of group loyalty and possibly argumentative procedures. Yet, in many cases, the most likely output of this process reflects the lowest common denominator of states’ positions or the preferences of the biggest states. The article intends to investigate this puzzle. In the first part, it corroborates its existence by using answers from an original database of 138 questionnaires and 37 interviews with EU negotiators. Next, it argues that cooperative practices remain often subordinated to nationally oriented ways of doing things. Consequentialist practices perform an anchoring function, in that they define the parameters around which (social) practices operate. The last section looks more closely at the sites of and meanings attached to EU foreign policy-making. By discussing national diplomats’ conspicuous leeway in Brussels, it also argues that negotiating practices are performed through a mix of partial agency and persistence of national dispositions. On the whole, changing practices is difficult, even in dense and largely autonomous settings such as EU foreign policy. The social construction of EU foreign policy occurs only to a partial extent.

KEYWORDS:

• Diplomacy
• socialisation
• EU foreign policy
• practice
• negotiations
• transgovernmentalism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Nicola Chelotti is Lecturer in Diplomacy and International Governance at Loughborough University London. He previously held teaching and research positions at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University College London, University of Aberdeen and University of Pisa. His research interests primarily concern negotiations and diplomacy, while trying to unveil the informal practices that shape policy processes and outcomes. His research has appeared in journals such as Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of European Integration and West European Politics. He has just published a book on the formulation of EU foreign policy (Routledge, 2016).

Notes

1. Permrepr#23, June 2013.

2. With the partial exceptions of the Coreper ambassadors and their Antici collaborators. For more methodological information, cf. Chelotti (2016).

3. Around 10 interviewees preferred not to reveal their nationality. The 37 in-depth interviews were conducted with officials of 17 different states.

4. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

5. Permrepr#28, July 2014.

6. Permrepr#27, June 2014.

7. Permrepr#26, June 2014.

8. Permrepr#21, June 2013.

9. Permrepr#30, July 2014.

10. Permrepr#22, June 2013.

11. Permrepr#34, July 2014.

12. Permrepr#4, May 2008.

13. Permrepr#34, July 2014.

14. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

15. Permrepr#28, July 2014.

16. Permrepr#34, July 2014.

17. Permrepr#34, July 2014.

18. Permrepr#28, July 2014.

19. Permrepr#14, June 2008.

20. In CSDP, even if Germany recently appears more willing to invest resources and political capital in defence, the two most important countries remain the UK and France.

21. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

22. Permrepr#32, July 2014.

23. Permrepr#31, July 2014. On burden-sharing in crisis management operations, cf. Mérand and Rayroux (2016).

24. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

25. Permrepr#31, July 2014.

26. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

27. Permrepr#35, July 2014.

28. Permrepr#30, July 2014.

29. Permrepr#24, June 2013; Permrepr#23, June 2013.

30. Permrepr#30, July 2014.

31. Permrepr#35, July 2014.

32. Permrepr#29, July 2014.

33. Permrepr#28, July 2014. Also: Permrepr#27, June 2014; Permrepr#31, July 2014.

34. Permrepr#24, June 2013; Permrepr#28, July 2014.

35. Permrepr#27, June 2014; Permrepr#28, July 2014.

36. Permrepr#3, May 2008; Permrepr#5, May 2008; Permrepr#23, June 2013.

37. Permrepr#23, June 2013.

38. Permrepr#22, June 2013.

39. Permrepr#26, June 2014.

40. Permrepr#32, July 2014.

41. Permrepr#37, July 2014.

42. Permrepr#33, July 2014.

43. Permrepr#25, June 2014.

44. Permrepr#22, June 2013.

45. Permrepr#31, July 2014.

46. Permrepr#34, July 2014.

47. Permrepr#7, May 2008.