![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This paper calls for a qualitative turn in discussing NATO burden-sharing. The paper takes issue with the numerical burden-sharing narrative in NATO and identifies its two main problems. Despite being simple, the 2% defence spending pledge lacks other basic attributes of any contributory system: fairness and effectiveness. Drawing from concepts of distributive justice, the paper analyses NATO’s first burden-sharing debates and demonstrates that due to their qualitatively different capabilities, the allies agreed on an egalitarian ability-to-pay distributive justice. Furthermore, it shows that the allies refrained from implementing fairness in terms of a one-size-fits-all formula, since this simple numerical approach could not produce fair and effective burden-sharing at the same time. Rather, they developed a dynamic framework for optimal sharing. These formative burden-sharing debates provide valuable lessons learned for the current build-up of NATO’s posture: less focused on formal sharing, more concerned with strategic outputs.
Acknowledgements
I thank Professor Frédéric Mérand, Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on the earlier versions of this manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dominika Kunertova is a PhD candidate in the Département de science politique at the Université de Montréal. She specialises in transatlantic defence and security cooperation.
Notes
1 In addition, the allies pledged to spend at least 20% of their defence budgets on procurement and modernisation of equipment. North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September 2014.
2 The allies made a similar high-level financial commitment in 1978 (expired in 1987), when NATO leaders agreed on “an annual increase in defence expenditure in the region of 3% in real terms”. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 30–31 May 1978.
3 Archival data collected for this analysis contain allied documents discussed in the North Atlantic Council, as well as reports on these private debates retrieved from the Canadian national archives.
4 The recent increase in European defence spending has largely been due to the Russian threat, not the pledge itself (Marrone et al. Citation2016, p. 4).
5 Free-riders are usually countries that contribute below NATO's average, according to a chosen indicator (Hartley and Sandler Citation1999, p. 671).
6 The second version of the equal sacrifice model says each member should endure the same real (not monetary) loss of welfare. In this interpretation, the actual tax scheme depends on how the marginal utility of income diminishes. Yet, it is difficult to operationalise since it requires speculations to quantify the amount of individual adequate sacrifice and equivalent utility loss.
7 It is important to note the difference between domestic and international distributive justice. Political theory, as Brown (Citation1997, p. 208) explains, tends to conceive the latter in procedural and formal, not social or distributive terms. The international sphere is concerned with whether the formal rules are followed and applied impartially, rather than with social or economic justice, especially due to barriers of the state-dominated international system (Hoffmann Citation1981, p. 143). For the purpose of this paper, NATO is a regionally limited group of nations with shared values, yet without a supranational authority, whose cooperation is based on solidarity and mutual aid.
8 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2 Defence Liaison Division to USSEA, 14 February 1951.
9 Lester B. Pearson in the House of Commons, 21 March 1952. LAC, Statements and Speeches, 52 (15).
10 Especially the French, American, and British emphasised the common responsibility. Only Luxembourg and Iceland were in a peculiar position, since the former had no naval forces and its contribution to SACLANT was unclear, and the latter had no armed forces or military budget at all. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 18th Panel meeting, 6 April 1951.
11 Both citations in LAC, PCO/204/U-40-4-(p) High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 5 April 1951.
12 LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 Memo to Panel by the Department of Finance, 24 November 1955.
13 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 17th Panel meeting, 15 and 19 February 1951.
14 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/1 IB-D(51)6 British representative to NATO Deputies, 23 February 1951.
15 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 16 February 1951.
16 There was also an alternative Canadian proposal (which never became an official position) that compared national contributions to club dues, or universal membership fees, which did not require adjustment to an individual's ability to pay. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
17 LAC, DEA/4485/50030-40/4 “NATO Roundup no. 1”, 12 May 1951.
18 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 11 May 1951.
19 The difference between the UK compromise and the US proposal resided in their treatment of land: the US wanted host countries to contribute necessary land (and force the European allies to increase their defence efforts), whereas the UK included land as one of the shared costs.
20 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30-2 16th Panel meeting, 18–19 January 1951.
21 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/5 Edmonds to Davis, 13 January 1953.
22 They included also mixed civilian–military purposes in so far as the military element could be identified, such as expenditures on airfields, meteorological services, aids to navigation, joint procurement services, and R&D. LAC, DND/21143/CSC1311:1/1 “Supplementary Directives and Questionnaire to NATO Member countries for purposes of consideration of equitable distribution of defence burdens”, 16 December 1950.
23 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Defence Liaison, 23 January 1950.
24 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Couillard to Wilgress, 17 March 1951.
25 LAC, MG26L/224/E4-26 Claxton to Prime Minister, 7 January 1950.
26 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Defence Research Board, 17 December 1949.
27 LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 8 December 1949.
28 LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 7 January 1950.
29 LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 8 December 1949.
30 LAC, DEA/4498/50030-K-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 22 December 1949.
31 LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 Memorandum by Defence Liaison Division, 18 October 1949.
32 LAC, DEA/4486/50030-A-40/1 NATO FEC STAFF (50) D-17/1a, 18 July 1950.
33 LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 18 March 1950.
34 LAC, DEA/4498/50030-K-40/1 11th Panel meeting, 7 July 1950.
35 LAC, DEA/4486/50030-A-40/1 North Atlantic Council Deputies, D-D/1, 22 July 1950.
36 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 Canadian Ambassador in Washington to SSEA, 25 November 1950.
37 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 24 November 1950.
38 LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2, Canadian Delegation to North Atlantic Council Meeting to SSEA, 21 September 1950.
39 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 7 November 1950.
40 LAC, DEA/4788/50069-40/1 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 23 November 1950.
41 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 4 November 1950.
42 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 Wrong to Heeney, 21 November 1950.
43 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 12 April 1951; SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 16 April 1951; and SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 20 June 1951.
44 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 Griffin to Plumptre, 19 April 1951.
45 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 3 March 1951.
46 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/1 Plumptre to USSEA, 6 March 1951.
47 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Couillard to Wilgress, 17 March 1951.
48 This particular debate seems to echo today's purchasing power parity measures, which allow for comparing living conditions and examining per capita welfare. For more details see the research project Penn World Table, which looks at real GDP per capita as a measure of relative living standards across countries (Feenstra et al. Citation2015). I thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this reference.
49 LAC, DEA/4485/50030-40/4 “NATO Roundup no. 1”, 12 May 1951.
50 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/2 FEB-D(51)51 “Equitable Distribution of Defence Burdens: Interim report by the Financial and Economic Board”, 20 August 1951.
51 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/2 Canadian representative to OEEC, Paris to SSEA, 4 September 1951.
52 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/2 FEB-D(51)51 “Equitable Distribution of Defence Burdens: Interim report by the Financial and Economic Board”, 20 August 1951.
53 Although, the main reason for the TCC exercise appeared to be the need of the 12 ministers to negotiate an agreed report. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 Draft Commentary on Economic and General Aspects of the TCC Report and the Canadian Annex (Memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee), 2 January 1952.
54 LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 NATO, Financial and Economic Board, “TCC – Draft Plan of Work”, 10 October 1951.
55 LAC, PCO/227/P-10-M 30th Panel meeting, 18 June 1952.
56 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 “The Organization of NATO–TCC and Related Suggestions”, 2 January 1952.
57 LAC, DEA/4903/50115-P-40/2 Extract from Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 9 October 1952.
58 LAC, DEA/4485/50030-40/5 Memorandum for USSEA, 4 February 1953; LAC, MG26L/95/D-50 Pearson to St. Laurent, 31 January 1952.
59 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 4 November 1950.
60 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
61 LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 Memo for Cabinet Defence Committee, n.d. April 1951.
62 The only exception was infrastructure. The user principle and benefits to the host country indeed made part of the calculations. However, most of the time it was difficult to “[distinguish] between a project that contributes to the international welfare and one that redounds to the benefit of a particular country” (Kravis and Davenport Citation1963, p. 313).
63 This is also why in many countries national referenda and plebiscites on tax policy are abolished.
64 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/3 Drury to Leger, 27 April 1955.
65 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/5 “Some Economic Aspects of NATO”, 1 January 1953.
66 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-10/1 George Drew, Speech from the Throne, 1 September 1950.
67 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Plumptre to USSEA, 20 January 1951.
68 In addition, even if a government earmarks a certain amount of defence money for a given fiscal year, it does not necessarily mean this money will actually be spent on defence, for example due to occasional inter-departmental transfers.
69 The NATO ACT's publicly distributed document Framework for Future Alliance Operations directly informs the NDPP and makes recommendations for the future NATO Forces.
70 The so-called 40/8 ratio; revised to 50/10 in 2009 (Ringsmose Citation2016, pp. 208–209).
71 The 2012 Chicago Summit introduced the Connected Forces Initiative, which recognised interconnectedness and interoperability as a primary goal for NATO Forces in 2020. More recently at the 2014 Wales Summit, the allies developed the NATO Readiness Action Plan, together with a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Force integration units. Lastly, the 2016 Warsaw summit introduced a concept of Enhanced Forward Presence to assure greater readiness and responsiveness of NATO Forces.
72 Further research into the capability approach, justice, and inequality in the public policy domain might prove useful for the study of burden-sharing in NATO. See Nussbaum (Citation2011) or Hausman et al. (Citation2016).