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ABSTRACT
Dependence has been demonstrated to be a main factor driving small states’ alliance contributions. However, the causal pathway linking dependence on the one hand, and small states’ contributions on the other, is seldom explicated and assessed. Furthermore, the ways in which dependence may shape, not only drive, such contributions, have received little attention. The purpose of this article is to elaborate the role of dependence in these regards. Drawing on Glenn H. Snyder’s “fear of abandonment” concept, it is argued that reputation is the main mechanism linking dependence and contributions. The article specifies the causal pathway and assesses it against case-study evidence of Norway’s and Sweden’s military participation in ISAF. The process tracing lends much support to the proposed mechanism, and comparison helps clarify how different alliance relationship status (member or partner) impacts on the theorised causal chain.
Acknowledgements
The authors are sincerely grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that have substantially helped improve the quality of the original manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Ida Maria Oma is Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Oslo. She lectures at the Norwegian Defence University College and has published on security burden sharing and Norway’s military engagement in Afghanistan. Her research interests include small states’ security and defence policies, NATO and defence cooperation in Northern Europe.
Magnus Petersson is Professor of Modern History at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Between 1998 and 2008 he was Lecturer, Director of Studies, and Head of Research and Development at the Swedish Defence University. He has been a Visiting Scholar at Boston University, George Washington University, Johns Hopkins University, and Macquarie University. He has published widely on Nordic and Trans-Atlantic security and defence.
Notes
1. Burden-sharing can be defined as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” (Cimbala and Forster Citation2010, p. 1).
2. A notable exception is Bennett et al. (Citation1997).
3. A “small state” is defined here as “a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so” (Rothstein Citation1968, p. 29). An “alliance” is defined as “a formal or informal association of states for the (threat of) use of force, in specified circumstances [intended for the security of its members], against actors external to the alliance” (Rynning and Smith Citation2018, p. 654). This definition is concise in its restriction to military means, security purposes and management of external threats, but broad enough to encompass both institutionalised and non-institutionalised security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.
4. For related studies exploring the role of status and prestige in driving small states’ alliance contributions, see Græger Citation2015, Jakobsen et al. Citation2018, Massie and Zyla Citation2018, Pedersen Citation2018. These studies do indeed link small states’ status- and prestige-seeking strategies to an instrumental quest for assistance and influence, but do not explicitly flesh out and trace the causal process between dependence and contributions.
5. Snyder’s term “loyalty reputation” is taken to mean whether one is perceived as an ally that can be counted on for solidarity and support.
6. It can be argued that the observable implications are in part consistent with the logic of “costly signaling”, referring to the making of “small but significant gestures that serve to prove that one is trustworthy” (Kydd Citation2005, p. 5). Essentially, confidence in following the reputation interpretation rather than costly signalling requires evidence of each interlocking part of the theorised mechanism; their ultimate aims are different.
7. For instance, humanitarian motives such as promoting peace, development and respect for human rights figured prominently in both Norwegian and Swedish political debate and they are complementary to security interests (supporting the UN, US and NATO and countering the threat of international terrorism) in explaining the countries’ ISAF engagements (Norges offentlige utredninger Citation2016, Statens offentliga utredningar Citation2017). The important point here, however, is that dependence has been established as a main driver of their contribution, which allows exploration of the reputation mechanism.
8. For detailed accounts of the evolution of the ISAF mission and NATO’s (intra-alliance) challenges in Afghanistan, see, for instance, Rynning (Citation2012) and Auerswald and Saideman (Citation2014).
9. Norway,Sweden and recently, Denmark, are among very few ISAF-contributing countries that have commissioned independent and comprehensive reviews of their engagements in Afghanistan (Norges offentlige utredninger Citation2016, Statens offentliga utredningar Citation2017, Mariager and Wivel Citation2019).
10. This section is to a large extent based on one of the author’s PhD dissertations (Oma Citation2015).
11. Norway’s delegation to NATO noted in May 2003 that participation in OEF “has provided Norway with great political gains in terms of relations with leading allies”. ISAF, on the other hand, had thus far “not had any structure or identity” that made it politically important for Norway to participate in any significant way (Report from the Norwegian Delegation to NATO, 26 May 2003. “Spørsmålet om fremtidig norsk deltagelse i Afghanistan” [MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) archives]).
12. For a comprehensive overview of Norwegian force contributions to OEF and ISAF, see Norges offentlige utredninger (Citation2016, p. 213).
13. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Department of Security Policy to the Minister of Defence, 13 May 2003. “NATO mot større rolle i Afghanistan – konsekvenser for Norge” [MoD archives].
14. Memorandum 13 May 2003, “NATO mot større rolle” [MoD archives].
15. Memorandum from the MoD’s Department of Security Policy to the Minister of Defence, 30 May 2003. “ISAF IV – aktuelle norske styrkebidrag” [MoD archives].
16. Memorandum from the MoD’s Department of Operations and Emergency Planning [2003–2008] to the Minister of Defence, 17 October 2003. “Afghanistan – norsk militær støtte til gjennomføring av grunnlovsforsamling” [MoD archives].
17. Memorandum 13 May 2003, “NATO mot større rolle” [MoD archives].
18. Memorandum from the Defence Staff to the Ministry of Defence, 27 August 2004. “Forsvarsstabens vurdering av satsningsområde i Afghanistan” [Norwegian Armed Forces archives].
19. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence to the Defence Staff, 9 February 2005. “Innledende planleggingsdirektiv – utviklingen av nasjonale bidrag til PRT/ISAF” [MoD archives].
20. Memorandum from the Chief of Defence to the defence minister, 3 July 2007. “Justering av innretning på styrkebidrag til International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) i 2008” [MoD archives].
21. Norway was also quick to announce its preparedness to take part in the post-2014 Resolute Support mission as a “responsible and credible” ally (Søreide Citation2014).
22. Memorandum from the MoD to the defence minister, 20 September 2007. “Norske bidrag til ISAF” [MoD archives].
23. Memorandum from the chief of defence to the defence minister, 18 October 2007. “Norske styrkebidrag til ISAF i 2008 – bistand til Nederland i Uruzgan” [MoD archives].
24. As the contribution to NATO-led ISAF increased, Sweden downsized its forces in Kosovo.