Show them the flag: status ambitions and recognition in small state coalition warfare

ABSTRACT

Why do small states actively contribute to US- and NATO-led military operations? The small state literature has recently developed a novel explanation, referring to their dependency upon the alliance hegemon. The logic is that the small states aim to improve their status and reputation in order to remain relevant and to receive protection. This article contributes to this literature by moving away from this fear of abandonment motivation towards more positive status incitements. It shows how such status motives actually guide and shape small states’ military contributions in US- or NATO-led operations. It does so by using recent innovations in process-tracing methodology to create a status-seeking mechanism. Using the case of Belgium’s participation in the military coalition against ISIL, this article goes beyond the usual Scandinavian suspects in the small state literature and demonstrates that status motivations have relevance for a wider group of small states.

KEYWORDS:

• Status
• realism
• United States
• NATO
• Belgium
• process-tracing

Introduction

Smaller allies and partners of the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have over the past decades made military participation in US- or NATO-led operations a priority (Oma and Petersson 2019, Pedersen 2019). Even though they did not always have an immanent interest at stake, countries such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium have, contrary to expectations in realist and collective action literature, offered relatively large contributions (compared to their size) and demonstrated a considerable risk willingness in operations like those in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq/Syria (Oneal 1990, Sandler 1993, Olson and Zeckhauser 1996, Lepgold 1998, p. 90, Ringsmose 2010, p. 329, Mello 2014). While explaining military activism is at the core of the realist alliance literature, the motivations of small states to participate in military operations has traditionally played a more peripheral role, due to their limited capabilities and relevance for the outcome of these operations.

In order to explain the puzzling willingness and variation in the smaller allies’ willingness to militarily bandwagon in US- or NATO-led operations, realists have expanded on the threat perspective. It has been suggested that small states contribute due to negative intra-alliance pressures, where their dependency of the US is considered critically important. This mainly refers to the security guarantee from Washington, which has been the foundation of the European security architecture and has benefited the smaller European allies (Walt 2005). In such an asymmetric relation, it has traditionally been argued that small states fear defection from the security guarantee, which is why they feel pressured to “over-perform” in such operations. In other words, military participation in coalition warfare has been seen as a means to prove to the hegemon that they are still relevant and “defend worthy” allies (see Kristensen and Larsen 2017, Bailes et al. 2016, Snyder 1997, Olson and Zeckhauser 1996, Ringsmose 2010, Oma and Petersson 2019).

While protection motives obviously play a role for small security dependent states, we challenge this negative interpretation of the drivers behind small state engagement. We join the argument that “positive” motivations should also be considered. More in particular, positive motivations can shape the actual type of contribution to coalition warfare and help to explain why small states might “punch above their weight” (Wivel and Crandall 2019). Following recent tendencies in the small state literature, this article claims that small states are also motivated by potential rewards in the form of prestige and recognition, which they receive from the alliance hegemon for their engagement (Neumann and de Cavalho 2015, Jakobsen et al. 2018). These rewards can then be translated into an improved status position within the alliance.

This status-seeking hypothesis has over the past years gradually gained foothold, with several authors having cautiously recognised, and found empirical proof for the presence and relevance of such positive status motives in the security strategies and motivations of the small Scandinavian states (Pedersen 2018, Jakobsen et al. 2018, Crandall and Varov 2016, Græger 2015). So far, however, it has hardly been explained how such positive motives actually guide and potentially shape small states’ military contributions in US- or NATO-led operations. Following this observation, we intend to offer theoretical and empirical insights in the actual process of status-seeking behaviour in small state contributions to US- and NATO-led operations. More in particular, we provide a theoretical step in filling that gap in the alliance literature, by suggesting a status-driven mechanism that fleshes out the process by which small states, that are dependent upon a US security guarantee, translate their status ambitions in actual military contributions to US- and NATO-led operations, with the goal of gaining recognition.

In general, studies on the actual causal pathways explaining small state military activism remain largely absent to date. This is remarkable, as a mechanism approach can allow for stronger empirical tests of the various factors that explain small states’ military participation in such operations. To the authors’ knowledge, only Oma and Petersson (2019, this journal) have so far explicitly developed and tested a causal mechanism that can explain small state military contributions. While we build upon their work, our study also differs in two critical ways from their publication. Theoretically, we move away from the fear of abandonment motivation towards more positive status incitements, where an increase in status and reputation does not only count in the eye of the alliance hegemon, but also in the relation to other security dependent small states in the alliance. Empirically, we move beyond the usual Scandinavian suspects that have so far been the centre of attention in the small state literature (Oma and Petersson 2019, but also: Jakobsen and Rynning 2019, Pedersen 2018; 2019, Jakobsen et al. 2018, Wivel and Crandall 2019). By analysing the case of Belgium’s participation in the international coalition against ISIL, we intend to broaden the explanatory scope of the “bandwagon for status” hypothesis.

The puzzle of small state military activism in US- and NATO-led operations

The baseline in realist alliance theory is that states tend to join international coalitions and operations when the threat from external factors increases (Rose 1998). The threat-induced balancing behaviour stems from the assumption that states are “defensive positionalists” and aim to maximise territorial security in order to protect the status quo (Grieco 1990, p. 44). Accordingly, the hypothesis is that alliance members join US- or NATO-led military operations when they are faced with a direct or rising external threat. This traditional realist hypothesis is, however, increasingly challenged in two respects. First, the targeted adversaries in operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Iraq/Syria do not constitute a direct territorial threat towards the territorial integrity of many small states. Second, the relatively high number of military active small states challenges the collective action assumption which is part of the realist alliance theory. Following this logic, the US would be expected to provide the public goods in the form of increased security through their operations, regardless of the efforts of their smaller allies, given its wider security agenda. This logic would hence increase the small states’ incitement to buck-pass or freeride, rather than motivate them to put their troops at risk and “punch above their weight” (Lepgold 1998, p. 90, Olson and Zeckhauser 1996). Put differently, the threat hypothesis fails to explain active coalition behaviour of the smallest partners in US- or NATO-led military operations.

The realist inspired small state literature has therefor gradually elaborated upon and refined the threat hypothesis. In the modified version, it remains a key argument that small states are willing to participate militarily in such operations because of their security dependency of the US. Yet, the focus is meanwhile shifted to pressures that these small states face in their geographical regional settings and to internal alliance dynamics that are often detached from the concrete operation (Ringsmose 2009; 2010). In other words, because small NATO allies recognise that they cannot secure their own territorial security without NATO or the US, it is argued that a crucial concern is to remain a relevant and attractive ally in the eyes of the hegemon in order to ensure that the hegemon will not defect from its security guarantee (Ringsmose 2009, 2010). It has therefor been suggested that small states bandwagon for protection and are willing to join US- and NATO-led operations because of their territorial security dependency of the US. Participation is then perceived instrumentally, as a mean to pay for their territorial protection rather than just increasing their military expenditures (Ringsmose 2009, Kristensen and Larsen 2017).

The main argument in the modified threat perspective is hence that in asymmetric alliance relations, such as among NATO allies, the small states feel pressured to “over-perform” in coalition warfare in order to prove that they are still relevant allies worth defending. Ringsmose’s (2010) modified version of the threat hypothesis thereby suggests that a key to NATO’s success and ability to mobilise international coalitions to out-of-area operations, such as in Afghanistan, relates to its ability to produce regional European security. Recently, Oma and Petersson (2019) have also focused on the nature of dependency as a central driver behind small states’ contributions. Building on Snyder’s (1984, p. 466–468, 1997, p. 180–192) alliance security dilemma, they also argue that small states are driven by a “fear of abandonment” logic (see also Matlary 2014, p. 77, Oma 2012, p. 565). What differentiates Oma and Petersson’s publication from the current state of the art is their explicit effort to focus on how such fear of abandonment motivations affect coalition contributions, by focusing on the actual causal pathway. In sum, what connects these studies is that they see small states as driven by a fear of their patrons’ defection of the security guarantee (Kristensen and Larsen 2017).

Positive drivers: bandwagon for status

The modified balance-of-threat perspective has produced valuable insights into the workings of security alliances and has provided a strong explanation for small states’ military contributions that goes beyond their liberal rhetoric. It presents these small states as scavengers in a fading liberal world order, constantly trying to establish a reputation for themselves as loyal, defend-worthy and useful allies for the alliance hegemon, in the hope that the latter continues to invest in their future security against old and new territorial threats (see also Græger 2015). However, this literature might overestimate the importance of such negative dependency. More positive drivers have in this way long been disregarded, whereas they also constitute a potentially strong and important contributing factor in explaining why and how small security dependent states participate militarily in US- and NATO-led operations.

Drawing on recent trends in neo-classical realism (Jakobsen et al. 2018, Jakobsen and Rynning 2019, Wivel and Crandall 2019) and constructivist alliance literature (Græger 2015), we argue that it can be purposeful to adopt a broader understanding of the utilitarian motives behind small state alliance behaviour. In this way, some of the empirical and theoretical shortcomings which the modified threat hypothesis has encountered can be modified. First, contrary to expectations, there has been a striking variation in the contributions to US- or NATO-led operations by similar security dependent small states, which indicates that other drivers than just a fear of abandonment might be at play (Haesebrouck 2017a, 2017b, Schmitt 2018, Massie 2019). Second, the modified threat hypothesis insufficiently explains why small allies might “punch above their weight” by providing relatively large contributions or by demonstrating a high degree of risk willingness in those operations where the US would otherwise be expected to provide the public security good (Neumann and de Cavalho 2015). There is so far no evidence in the literature that indicates that small states have been pressured by the US to over-perform, which questions this threat-oriented explanation.

In order to address the puzzle about military contributions of small states, our core argument is that their involvement and engagement in such “asymmetric alliances” creates opportunity structures that yield potential benefits which go beyond simple protection motives. Such gains often take the form of either prestige, recognition or status which small states expect to receive for their active participation in US- or NATO-led military operations. These gains can in turn be used by the small state to improve its status position vis-à-vis other competing small states, or together with their peers. In other words, small states also aim to make themselves useful to the great powers in order to obtain non-material gains in the form of great power recognition (Græger 2015, Wood 2013).

Conceptually, we argue that it is productive to treat “reputation” and “status” as analytically distinct. “Reputation” is somewhat in the control of the actor, as actors can seize, acquire and invest in their reputation. Reputation can then be understood as the “beliefs about persistent characteristics of an actor” that others have about an actor (Dafoe et al. 2014, p. 374). States can therefore have reputations for certain behaviours and roles in the international system. We argue that for status improvement, small states need to invest in certain traits of behaviour. “Status” is often regarded as a function of the global or regional system since it is granted or accorded by others, even though it can be influenced by a state’s reputation (Wohlforth 2009). Status can be defined as “an actor’s standing in a global deference hierarchy arising from power, resolve, and wealth, and consequently what rights, respect, and patterns of deference that actor can expect.” (Dafoe et al. 2014, p. 375). Improved reputation through great power recognition is therefore a necessary condition for small states in order to improve their status position (e.g. Neumann and de Cavalho 2015). What is crucial, however, is that in order for status-seeking behaviour to be successful, the role played by the small state has to be spotted by the great power; the recognition needs to be acknowledged publicly, often as an acknowledgment of the small state’s large contribution relative to its size (Neumann and de Cavalho 2015). This recognition might subsequently be used to raise the states’ reputation as a trustworthy ally which can ultimately result in an increased status position vis-à-vis its regional peers.

So far, the small state literature has only cautiously begun to recognise the potential presence of status motives. There has recently been increased interest in, and empirical proof of status motivations in a number of (similar) Scandinavian cases (Græger 2015, Pedersen 2018; 2019, Jakobsen et al. 2018, Crandall and Varov 2016, Wivel and Crandall 2019, Oma and Petersson 2019, Jakobsen and Rynning 2019). Yet, while these studies offer support for the bandwagon for status hypothesis, their analyses have not yet shown how such motives actually guide small states military activism (see however Jakobsen et al. 2018). Neither has it so far been shown whether and how small states are able to translate such prestige into an improved status position, nor has the hypothesis been tested outside the usual Scandinavian suspects. As mentioned, while authors such as Oma and Petersson (2019) have recently moved the alliance contribution literature considerably forward by developing a causal mechanism that explains coalition contributions, they did so from a fear of abandonment perspective. We add to this by suggesting that such a causal pathway which explains small state military activism might also be triggered by more positive status motivations.

In the following, we therefor aim to make three contributions to this latest wave of alliance literature. First, we argue that status-seeking motivations help to explain small states’ participation in, and their military contribution to, US- or NATO-led operations and thereby offer a different perspective on dependency relationships in transatlantic relations. This suggest that concerns about recognition and prestige to a certain extent determine the actual military contributions to coalition warfare. Second, we argue that there is considerable semantic confusion in the literature that conflates means (i.e. reputation) and goals (i.e. increased status position). We therefore propose a status-seeking mechanism that connects these means and goals by using process-tracing methodology. Third, by offering empirical insights about the case of Belgium’s contribution to the international coalition against ISIL, we expand the contextual scope of status-seeking motives beyond the usual Scandinavian suspects.

Towards a status-seeking mechanism

The main aim of this article is to unfold a mechanism which links the condition (C) of being a being a security dependent small state with an interest in status consolidation or improvement with the outcome (O) of military participation in US- and NATO-led operations (Table 1). The condition is defined as being a small state in an asymmetric alliance, where the small state depends on the alliance and the alliance hegemon to ensure territorial protection. Military participation is understood as the deployment and use of military capabilities which involves the risk of casualties in US- or NATO-led operations.

Table 1. A ‘Bandwagon for status’ mechanism.

	Condition (C)	Part 1	Part 2	Part 3	Outcome (O)
Theoretical mechanism	Small states which are dependent upon US security guarantees	Participation in operations is perceived as an opportunity to improve upon the country’s reputation in the alliance and as a mean to improve status	Pro-active initiatives to join US- or NATO-led coalitions	Contributions are designed to create recognition from the US	Military Participation in US- or NATO led operations
Predicted observable manifestation	Condition – Small state member of NATO and relies on US security guarantee. Part 1 – Small state considers participation in military coalitions as a mean to obtain benefits and improve a country’s status position. Part 2 – Small state pro-actively expresses a preparedness to join coalitions out of free will or argue that they share the same goals as the great power and that participation is in the interest of the state. Part 3 – Small state designs contributions as requested by the US and/or are considered risk full. Outcome – Small state uses its military capabilities in US- or NATO-led operation and demonstrates a risk willingness.

Status-seeking motives have been conceptualised in different ways (see Jakobsen et al. (2018), Pedersen (2018; 2019), Oma and Petersson (2019) for recent examples). What connects these authors is that they mainly identified statements that suggested a presence of status motivations in their considerations to contribute to US- or NATO-led operations. Yet, there have so far been no attempts to show how positive status motivations shape military contributions or to test whether states aims to utilise the improved reputation to improve their status position.¹ We aim to move the emerging literature forward by explicitly focusing on the process of status-driven behaviour, trying to capture the mechanism starting from dependency to the decision to participate with military capabilities. In order to connect the condition and the outcome we formulate the following mechanism that includes theoretically certain parts, which we derive from the status-seeking literature and from recent advancements made by Oma and Petersson (2019) in particular:

1. Participation in operations is perceived by the small state as a reputation-building strategy for successful status-seeking;

2. The small state takes pro-active initiatives to join US- or NATO-led coalitions;

3. The small state makes contributions that are designed to create recognition from the US;

It is important to emphasise that we do not see small state military contributions to US- or NATO-led operations as mono-causal, since multiple different motivations can be in play at the same time. Finding evidence of status-seeking thus not necessarily contradicts the bandwagon for protection hypothesis. The main purpose of the following empirical analysis is rather to upgrade our confidence in status motivations as an important contributing factor behind small state activism in military operations. Working with the case of Belgium, where multilateralism plays a central condition in the country’s security strategy, we have included the presence of a UN legitimation as a scope condition, as the situation regarding the Belgian decision not to participate in the Iraq war in 2003 demonstrates that this is a pre-condition of the country’s involvement in such operations.

Methodologically, the analysis is based on a variant of the theory-testing process-tracing method. We operationalise the mechanism in a minimalist manner and the main aim is to upgrade our confidence in the presence of such motives in the case at hand (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 2019). In order to conceptualise and operationalise the status-seeking mechanism, we begin with the outcome and subsequently attempt to assess the theory’s ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case by searching for the expected empirical fingerprints in the empirical material (i.e. searching for congruence between expected predictions and observed empirical evidence). Given the non-exclusive nature of the hypothesis in the realist bandwagon literature, priority has been given to maximise analytical certainty rather than uniqueness of the empirical observations. Theoretical uniqueness refers to the formulation of empirical predictions that do not overlap with those of other theories, which might be difficult to observe. In situations where we have a hypothesis formulated in a manner that is highly unique and we find the predicted evidence, our confidence increases in the presence of the theory. Certain predictions refer to predictions that are unequivocal, which implies that these predictions have to be observed, or the theory fails the empirical test (Beach and Pedersen 2019). In relation to part one, however, we have given priority to uniqueness, because it explicitly states that the potential gains from the participation in the operations are considered as a strategy for improving the country’s status position and is thereby critically different from the mechanism developed by Oma and Petersson (2019). In general we aim to focus on factors that have to be present in order to upgrade our confidence in the overall status-seeking hypothesis (Beach and Pedersen 2019).

Before turning to the empirical analysis, a source-critical remark is necessary. As initially noted by Jakobsen et al. (2018), for participation to be considered legitimate in a wider public context, it is often necessary for decision-makers to publicly emphasise idealistic motivations or explicitly relate their military activism to principles from the UN Charter. Interest-based arguments are often not seen as legitimate by the wider public, which gives decision-makers a strong incentive to downplay the relevance of these considerations in resolution texts and in public reasoning. We have attempted to overcome this interpretation challenge by triangulating data from official documents and speech acts with insights from interviews conducted with national Defence cabinet officials.

Belgium as a small but active coalition partner

We test the bandwagon for status mechanism on Belgium’s participation in the international coalition against ISIL, which we consider a typical case. Typicality is according to Beach and Pedersen (2019) determined by the causal relation one wants to test. Accordingly, if we want to trace the mechanism linking the defined condition (security dependent small state) with the outcome (military participation in US- or NATO-led operations) we have to identify cases where both the condition and the outcome is present. This provides us with a population of 11 NATO members (that are assumed to be – in varying degrees – dependent on a US security guarantee) that have also contributed with military capabilities to the coalition’s operation: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Spain, United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway (McInnis 2016).

Belgium is here conceived as a typical European small state, which has a long history of participation in US- or NATO-led operations (e.g. Liégeois & Glume 2008; Renard 2016; Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006). As mentioned, this case selection also comes with the benefit of broadening the potential empirical relevance of the status hypothesis outside the Scandinavian context (see Græger 2015, Pedersen 2018; 2019, Jakobsen et al. 2018, Jakobsen and Rynning 2019, Wivel and Crandall 2019).

Despite its limited military capabilities and defence budget, which decreased for several years after the end of the Cold War, Belgium has repeatedly contributed to peace and security operations under a UN, NATO, and EU flag (Sauer 2015). Yet, attention has over the decades shifted from primarily being a contributor to NATO and UN operations during and immediately after the Cold War, to a more Europeanist contributor profile from the end of the 1990s onwards (Coolsaet 2014, Koops and Drieskens 2012; Sauer 2015). Belgian post-Cold War military deployments initially focused on UN peacekeeping operations, with considerable troop contributions to UN operations in Africa and the Balkans in the early 1990s. The killing of ten Belgian blue helmets at the start of the Rwandan genocide on 6 April 1994 considerably impacted the country’s view on UN peacekeeping, however, leading to a freeze of contributions for years. But the declined contribution to UN peacekeeping operations is argued to be not only the result of the Rwanda trauma, as it is also seen as “a political choice” to gradually shift the country’s military focus to contributions to NATO and EU operations (Koops and Drieskens 2012).² Meanwhile, since the 2000s, the country has actively participated in three out of four US- or NATO-led military operations: to ISAF in Afghanistan, Operation Unified Protector in Libya and the coalition against ISIL in Iraq/Syria.³

Coalition contributions in the fight against terrorism, like those of Belgium to the coalition against ISIL in Iraq/Syria, can of course hardly be disconnected from these countries’ foreign fighter problems and the threat of terrorist attacks, as Saideman (2016, p. 296) rightfully claimed. Yet, this does not per definition exclude the potential presence of status motivations. One can namely wonder why the Belgian government has in recent years repeatedly decided to actively contribute to alliance warfare, while a more restraint stance would have been equally justifiable, following freeriding perspectives. Most notable is the country’s recurrent contribution by deploying F-16 fighter jets (Reykers and Fonck 2016, Fonck and Reykers 2018), which has repeatedly made its coalition participation more than just symbolic. At the height of its contributions to ISAF, Belgium had six fighter jets deployed. In Libya, Belgium joined the operation on 21 March 2011 – only four days after its launch – with again six fighter jets which participated actively in the coalition’s bombing campaign until the mission’s end on 31 October 2011. Likewise, roughly a month after the launch of the international coalition’s operation against Daesh in Iraq/Syria, Belgium on 26 September 2014 deployed yet again six fighter jets to actively contribute to the campaign over Iraqi territory. This contributions was in January 2016 expanded to include the Syrian territory as well. In the analysis we can therefor consider Belgium as a typical case for testing the status-seeking mechanism.

Remarkably, while Belgium’s activism in NATO-led operations has often been perceived as a translation of its support for multilateralism, its participation in the Libya operation – which also included a marine minesweeper and about 200 military support personnel – has led some experts to suggest that it “undoubtedly enhanced Belgium’s reputation in Washington” (Coolsaet 2014, p. 11). Although these claims so far remain without empirical proof, it illustrates that there is a general expectation of status ambitions in Belgium’s foreign and security policy. Research by Haesebrouck moreover pointed out that in Libya, the Belgian contribution was labelled as sharing a “high burden”. It was argued that together with Canada, Denmark and Norway, the “number of air sorties and strike missions flown by these allies is at least proportional to their size” (Haesebrouck 2017a, p. 2244). As indicated by Chivvis (2014, p. 190–191), these four countries all conducted a comparable number of air sorties, leading to an account of 22 per cent of the strike sorties, hence punching considerably above their economic weight. According to data from Airwars, a non-for-profit organisation which tracks international military actions, Belgian fighter jets also shared a considerable part of the burden in the activities of the coalition against ISIL when it comes to air strikes in Iraq, despite operating in rotation with forces from the Netherlands.⁴

On can therefor also wonder if the Belgian active participation in the military coalition against ISIL, despite the absence of a clear and unequivocal UN authorisation, was in some ways also shaped by status motivations. While the decision to contribute six F-16 fighter jets was for sure inspired by security concerns (see Fonck and Reykers 2018), it can equally be expected that status and reputation gains impacted the government’s decision to participate.

Testing the mechanism on Belgium’s contribution to the coalition against ISIL

As Belgium can be considered a small state which is dependent upon an American security guarantee, and because it contributed actively to the coalition against ISIL, we will in the next section assess if and how its contribution was also shaped by status motivations. Each of the three parts of the aforementioned status mechanism will therefore be tested.

Part 1: participation in operations is perceived as a mean to improve status

Belgian government leaders continuously plea for supporting multilateralism, which is seen as a mean to avoid great power abuse and to prevent that organisations such as NATO become an American instrument (e.g. di Rupo 2012, Michel 2016, Coolsaet 2014, p. 584). The Verhofstadt government’s refusal to support the Iraq war in 2003, which took place without a UN authorisation, was the clearest and most contentious example of this idealism. Yet, it also led the American press to depict Belgium among the “Axis of Weasel”, even describing it as “strategically irrelevant” (Coolsaet 2014). This remarkable episode of rebellion against US hegemony seemingly contradicts the bandwagon for status hypothesis.

Despite this remarkable episode, military contributions have nonetheless repeatedly been used as a tool for gaining influence. This was, for instance, visible in the Belgian successful bids for a seat in the UN Security Council in 2007–2008 and in 2019–2020. Both candidacies coincided with increased contributions to the UN operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006 and the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) since 2014. The former has been argued to be part of a strategy to gain greater influence and authority during its Council membership (Koops and Drieskens 2012). Interviews with government officials furthermore confirm that “military contributions are of course a means in our campaign for a UNSC seat” (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 13 July 2017). After Donald Trump’s election as US President, Pieter De Crem, then Minister of Defense, re-iterated his belief that “a small or middle-size state such as Belgium diplomatically has everything to gain from showing it is a reliable partner” (De Tijd, 21 January 2016). Wikileaks cables from the US Embassy in Brussels to the Pentagon furthermore provide indication that “De Crem sought to re-establish Belgium as a small but reliable NATO ally.”⁵ During De Crem’s visit to the Pentagon in November 2013, then US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel thanked him “for his unwavering support on transatlantic security issues”, and they emphasised their “commitment to maintaining the close defense relationship shared by the United States and Belgium” (American Force Press Service 2013).

Also the months preceding the anti-ISIL coalition reflected a preference for consolidating, and even improving, ties with the US. During President Obama’s visit to Belgium in March 2014, then Prime Minister Di Rupo emphasised that “The ties between Belgium and the United States are very strong. I have said this before and I’m saying it again today, in the presence of President Obama” (Di Rupo 2014). Later, in a speech at the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, Minister of Foreign Affairs Reynders said: “I am particularly proud of one little sentence that can be found on the State Department’s website page on Belgium. It simply reads as follows, and I quote: ‘The United States appreciates Belgian activism in international affairs’” (Reynders 2015). Similar views were expressed in interviews. When asked about the importance of having the NATO and EU headquarters based in Brussels and the effect thereof on Belgium’s military troop deployments, a party leader of a majority party summarised it as follows: “We have the NATO headquarter; we are the centre of the EU. We are embedded in multilateral organisations. So it is constantly about the question ‘what kind of a partner’ are you” (Interview with Member of Parliament, Brussels, 14 July 2015). Others indicated that the Belgian participation in the anti-ISIL coalition should therefore also be seen as “a logical consequence of the reputation our country has as a solidary partner” (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 23 March 2016).

As mentioned, despite a continuous decline in its defense budget in the last decade(s), Belgium seemingly became a reliable contributor to military operations. Not surprisingly, in parliamentary discussions about defense budget cuts and replacement of the ageing F-16 fighter jet fleet, former Prime Minister Michel repeatedly emphasised credible military capacity as a means to gaining diplomatic influence. Interviews conducted with former Defence cabinet officials also reflect this belief. One key official highlighted that “actively contributing and participating in risk-sharing through engaging F-16s buys you goodwill”, thereby indicating that this is a way to compensate for not spending 2 percent of the country’s GDP on defense as required by NATO (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 13 July 2017).

Key to understanding the Belgian participation in the coalition against ISIL (and earlier in the NATO-led Libya operation), is that these decisions coincided with two governments in which Christian-Democrat Pieter De Crem was Minister of Defense (2007–2014). It is generally agreed that it was his firm belief that military capacities can be used to gain diplomatic influence, preferably through robust military activism rather than contributions to less visible UN peacekeeping operations (see also Koops and Drieskens 2012). This conviction has been supported over the past years, as Belgium’s participation in US- and NATO-led military operations has repeatedly been both publicly and privately applauded. During his aforementioned visit to Belgium in March 2014, then President Obama praised “brave little Belgium” as a trustworthy partner, referring to its active participation in Afghanistan and Libya (De Standaard, 26 March 2014). Moreover, several Foreign Affairs and Defense cabinet members emphasised in interviews that Belgium’s participation in the Libya operation opened diplomatic doors or at least prevented that doors remained closed.

Part 2: pro-active steps to coalition participation

On 23 September 2014, the US formally requested the Belgian government to “favorably consider the deployment of the F-16s and other military assets, in coordination with the US Central Command.” (DOC 54 0305/001). The letter followed a similar request that described a potential Belgian air force contribution as “vital support to the campaign” (DOC 54 0305/001).

However, parliamentary debates on a possible Belgian participation in the anti-ISIL coalition already took place before these letters were received, providing strong indications of a pro-active approach by the Belgian government (Reykers and Fonck 2016). In the debates on 10 September 2014 and 18 September 2014, it was obvious that the government preferred to contribute to the coalition and how it wished to do so. On 10 September, Minister of Foreign Affairs Reynders declared in the Foreign Affairs Committee that a formal request to participate had not yet been received, but that such requests usually relate to “the C130 transport capacity or the F16 attack capacities” (DOC 54 0307/001). He emphasised that the problem of foreign fighters makes Belgium directly involved and requires the country to take responsibility. In addition, then Defense Minister De Crem outlined that “the Defense Department is capable of deploying six F-16s, accompanied by 120 military personnel, for an indefinite period of time”, adding that in preparation thereof “the Defence Staff already maintains multinational contacts” (DOC 54 0307/001).

The Belgian participation was initially limited to the Iraqi territory. However, after several mandate extensions, the government formally decided on 13 May 2016 to extend its F-16 activities to the Syrian territory. Although this decision again followed a formal request by the US government, concrete traces of pro-active behaviour were observable here. A Defense cabinet member stated: “we knew that question would come but we have remained silent for weeks towards the media”. He added that “immediately after the Dutch announcement that they would expand their efforts to Syria, we contacted them and started planning for a potential Belgian expansion to Syria” (Interview member of the Defense cabinet, Brussels, 23 March 2016). Prime Minister Michel again framed this expansion as necessary in order “to show solidarity” and “to remain a loyal and trustworthy partner” (CRIV 54 COM 425, p. 12).

Part 3: contributions designed to gain recognition from the US

Prior to the formal requests to join the coalition, government officials did not refrain from publicly spreading the message that Belgium was willing and capable of sending F-16 fighter jets, a message that clearly fitted American expectations. Each of the letters requesting Belgium to participate also explicitly referred to its fighter jets. Meanwhile, both the government and members of parliament were well-aware that an active and offensive contribution would imply an increased risk of terrorist attacks in Belgium, a fear that became reality on 22 March 2016 with the Brussels attacks (CRIV 54 PLEN 005). Recognising this, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in parliament that no operation is ever without risks and that there is no guarantee against casualties. At the same time, he stressed (again) that it is Belgium’s responsibility as a reliable partner to show solidarity (CRIV 54 PLEN 005).

Likewise, in July 2017, opposition members of the Green party protested heavily against the Belgian focus on what they considered attack contributions. They compared the Belgian offensive approach with the Dutch contributions, which they believed to offer a better balance between diplomacy, defense and development. Overall, this focus on fighter jet contributions relates back to the aforementioned show-the-flag effect. The impact of the 2011 Libya operation, for which Belgium was praised as one of the few NATO members that actively contributed, should not be underestimated either. “Libya gave us much credit in the USA, and prestige”, as it was framed by a key Defense official (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 13 July 2017).

The Belgian participation in the coalition (in Iraq) was initially scheduled to last for one month, after which efforts would be evaluated. However, after several mandate extensions, Belgian F-16s were still active in summer 2017, including over Syrian territory. Mid-October 2014, during a meeting of the Chiefs of Defense of the coalition partners in Washington, US delegates stressed the need for a long-term commitment. The Belgian Chief of Defense was positive, and the new Minister of Defense, Steven Vandeput, confirmed in parliament that a long-term commitment was “expected and planned” (DOC 54 0613/001, p. 6).

Remarkably, most mandate extensions were not solely framed as being necessary for winning the war against ISIL. Instead of saying that a Belgian mandate extension was necessary to defeat ISIL, Prime Minister Michel claimed during a parliamentary debate in May 2016 that “it is our responsibility as Europeans” to continue the air campaign (CRIV 54 COM 425). Even more remarkable is that in preparation of President Trump’s visit to Brussels in May 2017, in the context of the NATO summit, the Belgian government unsuccessfully tried to prepare an offer to the US which included an extension of its F-16 engagement. The failure to reach an agreement, due to internal disagreements, prior to the NATO summit was internally defined as “a missed opportunity” (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 13 July 2017). These efforts should of course be seen in relation to Belgium’s failure to meet the NATO goal of spending 2 percent GDP on defense. In the run-up to the 2017 NATO summit, Michel furthermore declared that “the contribution to the international coalition is very much appreciated and strengthens the image of our country as a trustworthy partner” (De Morgen, 23 May 2017). Overall, this clearly reflects status-seeking ambitions, in the sense of building a certain reputation. The extension of the F16 activities over the Syrian territory in May 2016 has been framed in the same way. It is in that sense noteworthy that the letter from US Secretary of Defense Carter, in which Belgium was invited to extend its activities to Syria, was preceded by a long commendation to the Belgian air force and their actions in Iraq (Interview with Defense cabinet member, Brussels, 23 March 2016).

The focus on visibility and recognition peaked in Spring 2017, when Belgium decided to extend its engagement until the end of the year. The Dutch government had announced, contrary to earlier agreements, that their fighter jets would be unable to take over from the Belgian F16s. Statements were characterised by a strong focus on solidarity, responsibility and visibility. On 5 July 2017, Vandeput provided an overview of Belgian activities since the start of the operation, indicating that Belgium is in the group of nine out of 68 countries that contribute actively to the air campaign, describing it as “our most remarkable contribution”. He added that Belgium had contributed 4–5 percent of the international air operations, framing it as “a contribution that is effectively appreciated internationally” (CRIV 54 COM 709, p. 8). A few weeks earlier, Prime Minister Michel said that “It is a reality that over the past two years, we have repeatedly received requests from our international partners to collaborate in several operations”, adding “that shows that we are credible” (CRIV 54 COM 670, p. 20).

Evaluating the status seeking mechanism

The presented analysis has offered empirical indications of how status and reputation ambitions shaped the Belgian contribution to the coalition against ISIL. It illustrated that the Belgian considerations about coalition participation were characterised by a need to show the flag and to demonstrate loyalty as a European and Atlantic partner. When it comes to the international coalition’s actions against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, these words were translated into practice by sending F-16 fighter jets for offensive actions. Although Belgium at first sight seemed to behave in a reactive fashion, the analysis showed that this reflects only one part of the story, as the government also proactively sent messages about the type of military capabilities they were willing to contribute to the anti-ISIL operation. In doing so, they stressed their preparedness to play an active role, without fearing the inherent risks in military actions. In this way, they pro-actively expressed their loyalty and reliability as a small coalition partner. Although winning the war against ISIL has of course been central to the official discourse, government officials did not refrain from stressing that their active involvement would also create visibility. The empirics showed that they repeatedly emphasised how their contribution made a difference and how much it was appreciated and recognised by coalition partners, and by the US in particular.

Discussion and conclusions

This article started from the observation that (voluntary) participation by small states in high-risk military coalitions can be considered puzzling from a threat perception perspective, as it deviates from leading bandwagon expectations. We emphasised that the concept of status-seeking is a welcome and timely update of realist theorisation in order to explain small states’ bandwagon with the US. We have suggested that small states might also instrumentally utilise operation participation to improve their status. In theoretical terms, small states’ gains motives and ambitions for status consolidation or improvement seems to move beyond the traditional asymmetric power perspective as applied in many realist studies, where the utility or spoils of victory are only assumed to favour the great power.

The overall theoretical ambition of this article was to add to our understanding of status ambitions as a driving force for small states’ decisions to join international operations, by building upon recent empirical proof for the status hypothesis. More in particular, we have offered another step in moving beyond merely showing the presence of such status motivations. By applying a mechanism-approach, we introduced a tool that can show how a desire for recognition and more positive status ambitions might be translated into actual contributions to US- or NATO-led military operations. In an analysis of the case of Belgium’s contribution to the international coalition against ISIL, it was shown how such a status dynamic takes place in practice. Empirics not only indicated pro-active moves towards active military contributions, they also reflected a tendency to shape the contribution in a way to maximise the potential for recognition by the US and to frame success as such.

However, while this paper has conceptually outlined how status motivations play out in practice and has offered first empirical proof for such a status mechanism, more research is clearly needed. This would first and foremost imply finding more empirical proof for the status mechanism by analysing contribution behaviour of other small states. Yet, this article also raises new questions. One question relates to the actual goal of status improvements. It would be analytically interesting to see if status competition also plays out in small state peer groups and how that peer group aspect affects contributions to coalition warfare. It can namely be hypothesised that small states might compete for recognition within objective or subjective peer groups where they try to improve their status through a reputation-building effort with the great power. The international system should from that perspective not be considered as purely anarchical, but rather as a system of different leagues of states where certain groups of states compete for non-material status within their own league. This would open up a new field of research.

In sum, what this article has shown is that Atlantic relations are not only a means for protection or security guarantees, they also become a strategic instrument for small states which allows them consolidate or improve their status. Status-seeking motives can thus be considered one (but not the sole) driver of small-state military coalition participation, which has so far only prudently been recognised. More, and more methodologically rigorous case studies are needed in order to move realist theorisation forward and to better explain why and how small states tend to show their flag and “punch above their weight” in high-risk military operations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Rasmus Brun Pedersen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University.

Yf Reykers is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences) at Maastricht University.

Notes

1 In their article Jakobsen et al. (2018) focus on the relevance of prestige as a driver for the small Scandinavian states and the design of their military contributions. However, they have primarily interpreted it as the relation between the small state and the hegemon, rather than utilizing status in reference to (small) states’ relations with other small states.

2 This is also reflected in the 2011 and 2014 government agreements, in which EU and NATO operations are more prominent than UN peacekeeping operations.

3 Granted, Belgium was a key critic of the US-led operation in Iraq of 2003. While seemingly contradicting the bandwagon for status hypothesis, the main reason for the then Verhofstadt government’s resistance against the Iraq operation was the absence of a UN authorization.

4 For figures and data on the airstrikes: see Airwars.org at http://airwars.org/data/ [Accessed 9 September 2019].

5 Wikileaks Cable from US Embassy in Brussels.