NATO’s 360-degree approach to security: alliance cohesion and adaptation after the Crimean crisis

ABSTRACT

In the mid-2010s NATO allies were facing the resurgence of a Russian threat at their borders, as well as terrorist actions in Europe and the MENA region. This evolving security environment provoked heated talks both within and outside NATO on its adaptation, often depicted as being the sign of irreconcilable disagreements. Conversely, this article argues that the "NATO 360-degree" concept adopted during the Warsaw Summit shows cohesion between the allies thanks to the Alliance's decision-making process. As a security community, member states were incentivised to find common grounds despite their diverging interests, which resulted in this new concept encompassing the "arc of insecurity". Its subsequent implementation also confirms the cohesion hypothesis, despite its obvious refocusing towards the East and collective defence. This article will first present the diverging threat perceptions within the Alliance. It will then focus on the implementation of the "NATO 360-degree" concept, promoted during the Warsaw summit, to finish with an initial assessment of the changes at work.

KEYWORDS:

• NATO
• European Union
• transatlantic security
• Russia
• cohesion

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the organisers of the EISS-NDC policy workshop “Intra-Alliance Challenges to NATO's Cohesion and European Security” for allowing me to present an early version of this article to NATO specialists in November 2019. I also thank the participants for their useful remarks during the workshop. At last, I am grateful to Miroslava Kovacova for having proofread the latest version of my article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Christelle Calmels is a PhD student at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies (CERI) and an associate PhD student at the Institute of Strategic Research of the Military School (IRSEM).

Notes

1 For an extensive review of positive and negative correlates of group cohesion, see Thompson and Rapkin (1981, p. 624).

2 This fieldwork has been facilitated by our affiliation to the French Defense Ministry research centre (IRSEM), thanks to our DGRIS doctoral funding.

3 We have conducted interviews with civil servants, diplomats, military officers, and international staff from France, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Italy. To anonymise the interviewees, this paper relies on the method developed by Schmitt (2015) consisting of creating a 3-letters' and 1-number's code for each interview. The first letter designates the institutional position of the interviewee (capital, Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation, NATO headquarter in Brussels), the second one designates his/her status (military officer, diplomat, civilian, international staff), and the third one designates his/her nationality. The number is used to differentiate two or more individuals having the same characteristics. If suboptimal, this solution nevertheless allows to access high-ranking officials and to gain the trust of interviewees who would not accept to talk otherwise.

4 This reinvestment of NATO materialised through the obtention of the chairman of the military committee position, the UK's involvement in Estonia as a framework nation and the tenure of the 2019 NATO summit in London.

5 Federica Mogherini declared in 2016:

We are […] looking at ways in which we can work together, and NATO can support the activities of the European Union, in particular Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean, to dismantle the traffickers' business. But also, maritime security at large in other parts of the world. (Mogherini 2016)

6 The reference of the Warsaw summit communiqué as a “strategic concept by default” was regularly brought on the negotiation tables during our fieldwork within NATO, just like the desuetude of the 2010 Strategic Concept. These observations have been recorded in our ethnographic notebook.

7 The initial staffing number proposed by the Strategic Commands has been mentioned several times in meetings during our fieldwork within NATO and noted in our ethnographic notebook.

8 As underlined during several meetings we attended within NATO and noted in our notebook, Heinrich Brauss, then Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, and SACEUR (General Breedlove and then General Scaparrotti) were presented as the main proponents of the reform among the organisation's civil and military staff.

9 It is particularly noticeable on the countries’ respective social media (Twitter, Facebook, and governmental websites).

10 As exemplified by several conferences on the topic, like: NATO Engages Day 1: Back to Basics | Defense and Deterrence in the Modern Age. YouTube Video, 57:26, posted by “German Marshall Fund,” 13 July 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=86_NmzP_weg.

11 Patricia Weitsman (2003, 2004) focuses on wartime alliance cohesion in her various works.

12 The next US presidential election will be crucial in that matter, Donald Trump’s mandate being marked by inconsistent and aggressive communication.