Entangled security logics: from the decision-makers’ discourses to the decision-takers’ interpretations of civil defence

ABSTRACT

Entangled logics, which attribute meaning to security, characterise the contemporary security field, bringing about broad comprehensions and ambiguous concepts. Civil defence has (re)surfaced as one such concept that is broadly conceived in the official discourses produced by decision-makers. Since security is ultimately enacted by practitioners, alias decision-takers, their interpretations of concepts significantly shape policy actions. Therefore, this article moves from decision-makers’ discourses to decision-takers’ interpretations and explores the divergent understandings of the concept of civil defence in Sweden. Applying a discursive approach to data gathered through official documents and interviews with 21 national agency representatives, organised under five societal sectors, it finds that two main interpretations emerge, across and within sectors. These are conceptualised as “territorial civil defence” and “societal civil defence”, linked, respectively, to logics of “territorial security” and “societal security”. These differences, as is argued, potentially challenge agency collaboration and eventual policy coherence in terms of policy aims, governance and venues for cooperation. Hence, the study highlights the complex constraints that contemporary security discourses set in the policy sphere. It concludes that in order to effectively meet and capture the complexity of contemporary security, disentanglement of the field’s concepts, both in theory and in practice, is needed.

KEYWORDS:

• Security logic
• civil defence
• discourse
• crisis preparedness
• Sweden
• total defence

Introduction

Contemporary European security is characterised by diverse and often transboundary threats that challenge existing defence policies and display entangled security logics together with ambiguous concepts. This is reflected in policy discourses and defence constellations that now, more often than not, combine military systems with resilience practices in order to meet “hybrid” challenges. This can be observed in many European countries and beyond; but perhaps the best illustration thereof is the re-emergence of the total defence principle in the Nordics (see Wither 2020, Larsson and Rhinard 2021). More concretely, the total reconstruction of the Swedish defence policy, by reintroducing conscription and reviving the civil defence, represents entangled security where the distinction between various logics has been blurred (see Larsson 2020).

The idea of entangled logics has its roots in the countless academic inquiries made into the evolution of the security notion, where a shift from a territorial state-centric perspective to broader interpretations has been identified (Buzan 1991, Buzan et al. 1998, Checiu and Wohlforth 2018). Hence, the comprehension and governance of security could be grounded in multiple logics at once – security logic being the interplay of discursive practices on the constructions of identity, security governance and the perception of threats (Wæver 1996, Barnutz 2010). This entanglement generates ambiguity both in theory and in practice. Concrete examples are the emergence of extensive concepts such as hybrid or grey zone warfare, which defence strategies need to cater for (Wirtz 2017, Caliskan and Liégeois 2021, Janičatová and Mlejnková 2021); whereas the comprehensive deterrence policies, such as total defence principle, of small states illustrate the presence of various logics in practice (Trapans 1998, Matthews and Zhang Yan 2007, Wivel et al. 2014, Aaltola et al. 2018, Larsson and Rhinard 2021). While existing scholarship offers valuable insights into the meaning of security and enhances our understandings of policy demands within the field, it is often evolutionary in nature, tracing decision-makers’ discourses in various forms and over time. It does not adequately stress the practical consequences of entangled logics at the levels of governance where the concepts that underpin security policies are interpreted and ultimately implemented.

This study shifts the focus from decision-makers’ discourses to decision-takers’ interpretations. Motivated by the assumption that decision-takers’ interpretations of policy discourses are instrumental as these are ultimately what sets the course for policy actions, implementation and outcomes (Hjern 1982, Lipsky 2010), this article uses Swedish civil defence policy as the case in point and asks: How is the broad conceptualisation of civil defence (the decision-makers’ discourses) interpreted by the decision-takers? The latter is defined as practitioners who have wide discretion over the policy enactment (Lipsky 2010), which in this case are government agency officials. The case of Sweden is selected because total defence, which consists of military and civil defence, provides a fitting illustration of the entangled characteristics of contemporary security (see Larsson 2020), and while the logic on the military side is relatively straightforward, it is precisely the civil defence that is puzzling due to the entangled conceptualisation in decision-makers’ discourses (see also Stiglund 2021). How is such an ambiguous concept interpreted by those enacting it?

In order to disentangle civil defence and make sense of the empirical data, gathered through semi-structured interviews with 21 national agency representatives organised under five societal branches, the study deals with two differing security logics – the territorial and societal – that provide suitable theoretical lenses not only to contextualise the emergence and importance of the civil defence concept, but also to conceptualise the empirical findings. Accordingly, the analysis distinguishes between “territorial civil defence” and “societal civil defence”, featuring the differences in the respective interpretations and the potential consequences thereof. What is more, the findings indicate that divergent interpretations surface not only across sectors but also within them, possibly challenging agency collaboration and eventual policy coherence.

The article principally contributes to the security literature with practitioner-focused research by shifting the focus from policy production to policy implementation as well as bringing forward the specific case of Sweden, but it also speaks to broader discussions on European security. By disentangling the logics behind the concept of civil defence, the article highlights the kinds of rationales that exist behind security policies and the challenges that surface when these logics diverge, potentially threatening the efficiency with which the various demands of contemporary security can be met.

This being said, the article unfolds as follows. The first section traces the academic discussions on the broadening of security – from narrow territorial to all-hazard societal security logics – simultaneously drawing parallels to the evolution of the civil defence concept and Swedish background. Then, a brief discussion follows on the importance of going beyond decision-makers’ discourses and studying decision-takers’ interpretations thereof – an argument that is rooted in policy implementation theory. A review of the methods and material precedes the empirical analysis, which first provides an overview of how the civil defence concept is conceived in official documents, that is the decision-makers’ discourses, and then moves to presenting the decision-takers’ interpretations. The study concludes with a final discussion.

From territorial to societal to entangled security logics

It is important to examine the notion of security as it is constantly used by governments and other actors to “justify suspending civil liberties, making war, and massively reallocating resources” (Baldwin 1997, p. 9). Therefore, discussions on the concept of security, its complexity and the dominating logics behind security actions never really disappear from the political discourse or the radar of international relations scholarship, surfacing for air every once in a while, in connection to (shifts in) global politics. While security is about survival and managing threats, the meaning of the concept is assigned by the logics behind it. Hence, as discussed by Wæver, when talking of security,

We are dealing with a specific logic which usually appears under the name security, and this logic constitutes the core meaning of the concept security, a meaning which has been found through the study of actual discourse with the use of the word security, but in the further investigation, it is the specificity of the rhetorical structure which is the criterion – not the occurrence of a particular word. (Wæver 1996, p. 107)

To this end, the logics of security have their own characteristics, each with its own language and justifiable moves (Wæver 1996). In order to capture these logics, Barnutz (2010) proposes a methodological approach that identifies the interplay between discourses in the construction of identity, threat perceptions and security practices. Considering the focus of this study on highlighting individual interpretations and official discourses, the security logic idea is applied as it captures the contradictory practices and beliefs inherent in practitioners’ views on civil defence, which, in turn, influence their perspective and behaviour.

If we go back to the Cold War era, the dominant views on security originated from realist perspectives, putting the state in the centre of the international arena and its territory at the heart of its survival, hence the territorial security logic (Buzan 1991, Buzan et al. 1998). Sweden, being in the shadows of the constant nuclear war threat figuratively and in the geographical centre of the US’s and the Soviet Union’s power struggle literally, tried delicately not to tip the balance and adopted a total defence policy, “a concept that developed in the twentieth century as a solution for non-aligned states against threats from larger and military [sic] stronger powers” (Bērziņa 2018, p. 71).

Total defence, “a whole of society approach to national security intended to deter a potential enemy by raising the cost of aggression and lowering the chances of success” (Wither 2020, p. 62), which could also be found in Finland, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, consisted of military and civil defence. Although civil defence was mainly directed at protecting citizens and property in case of a (nuclear) attack, by providing shelters and rescue planning,¹ it was still closely linked to military statecraft (Dulić and Kostić 2010, Lindgren 2015, Larsson 2019, 2021, Wither 2020). Therefore, it can be concluded that most of the twentieth-century security landscape was characterised by the territorial security logic, which was also true for civil defence.

Nonetheless, this narrow security perception was overrun by more liberal voices once the Cold War ended and the world order shifted towards a more multi-polar system, extending the concept of security by widening the threat spectrum and departing from state-centrism. Contributing to this shift, naturally, were also rapid technological developments, globalisation and privatisation. Now that the threat of a military attack by another state was deemed less imminent and the security notion was expanded to the economic, individual,² cyber and societal domains, discussions on hybrid warfare³ were ignited, where threats were characterised as transboundary, interconnecting national and international security (Smith 1999). As a countermeasure, resilience, defined as “societies’ ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks and stresses, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors” (Wither 2020, p. 62), became the buzzword both in academia and in policy circles, bringing crisis and risks into the security sector (Chandler 2012, 2020, Tocci 2020). In this study, resilience is considered to be a strategy embedded in the societal security notion.

In the light of this extended view on security, defence strategies were modified. Consequently, many states, including Sweden, moved their eyes slightly off territorial security and focused on international missions instead, while domestically, crisis management practices were being established and strengthened to meet the various threats and crises that could affect the functioning of society. In Sweden, this meant that the total defence principle was dismantled to the extent that military conscription was abandoned while international missions were prioritised and civil defence was set aside to give space to crisis preparedness practices in its place (Sundelius 2005, 2016, Larsson and Rhinard 2021). This shift inspired the societal security concept, with its focus on the preservation of the vital functions of society, which became “a kind of natural successor to the total defence concept” (Rhinard 2021, p. 33). A parallel can be drawn between the notions of societal security and civil defence, where the latter came to be ignored in the public discourse in Sweden.

When it comes to societal security, two understandings of the notion developed in the beginning of the 1990s. On the one hand, societal security was understood in terms of threats to national identity (coined by the scholars of the Copenhagen School, more specifically Buzan and Wæver), meaning that “matters of language, religion and local cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of the state, and may need to be defended or protected against seductive or overbearing cultural imports” (Buzan 1991, p. 123). On the other hand, the societal security concept took on a more practical connotation and was defined in line with functional security (as opposed to territorial security), making the concept more policy relevant (Sundelius 2005, 2016, Larsson and Rhinard 2021, see also Olsen et al. 2007 on societal safety).

The concern is now also with the security of critical functions of society. It is not the territory that is at stake, but it is the ability of the government and civil society to function, critical infrastructures to be maintained, the democratic ability to govern, to manifest certain basic values. (Sundelius 2016, p. 159)

The societal security logic, thus, developed a broad, all-hazard approach to security and focused on the preservation of life-giving functions, which is the robustness of various sectors’ supply chains and infrastructures, such as in the energy, food, economic, health or IT sectors. Furthermore, considering the transnational nature of threats and interdependence, it is no longer solely the central government that steers society, highlighting the importance of collective governance both internationally and on various levels and across sectors nationally. Consequently, a wide range of actors are involved in providing security, both public and private, thereby ending the defence ministry’s monopoly when it comes to national security concerns. The interaction between these many actors occurs through processes of networking, collaboration and information, indicating “a move from formal to informal, network-based governance” (Sundelius 2016, p. 164).

Within the societal security logic, civil–military dependency is recognised, which is why the concept never lost its relevance even after the harsh reminders of the essence of national security that came with Russia’s growing aggression in Europe a decade after the millennial shift (Stiglund 2021). Similar to the concept of resilience, the societal security concept is now used as a complement to military defence, bridging crisis and defence studies as well as theory and practice. Many empirical examples come from the Nordics, probably because of the conceptual link to Nordic practices. Larsson (2020), for example, looks at the new role ascribed to citizens in this shift from state defence to societal defence in Sweden, claiming that crisis and war preparedness are closely connected. Larsson and Rhinard (2021) focus on the emergence of the concept through discourses and the divergent policy approaches taken in the Nordic states. A similar examination is made within the Baltic Sea region states by Aaltola et al. (2018). What these authors have in common is the focus on the evolution of the societal security concept, but they do not zoom in on the practical implications of this logic, a gap that this study attempts to fill.

The entangled conception of security has also breathed life into “old” defence concepts such as total defence, a principle many states have revived now that national security is concerned with such a wide range of threats, recognising it as a useful deterrence policy, especially for small states (Wither 2020). Take for example Singapore, where total defence aims to unite all sectors of society and consists of five elements: psychological, civil, social, economic and military defence (Matthews and Zhang Yan 2007). In Sweden, total defence is described as a coin with two sides, with military defence on the one side and civil defence on the other, meaning that civil defence embodies everything from psychological to economic defence and beyond, as opposed to its previous strong military character (Larsson 2019, 2021).

From discourses to interpretations

All things considered, what should be extracted from the above-mentioned discussion is that the security logics that dominate the official discourses also set the tone for the preferred policy, such as having a total defence in place against military and nuclear attacks; or a focus on crisis preparedness practices once the military threat is no longer imminent; or to try to combine both when the military threat is yet again possible but threats to disrupt the functioning of society go beyond the fear of war. Hence, the contemporary security field is characterised by entangled logics, giving leeway to a broad conceptualisation of policy that aims to cater to all possible threat scenarios. This, however, can potentially pose challenges not least to the implementation of policy, which is why it is important to raise awareness of the ways in which these broad conceptualisations are interpreted by those enacting the polices, an argument that can be found in the policy implementation literature.

Indeed, with the emergence of implementation studies came the discovery of the importance of clear and consistent communication from the top down for an effective policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). In order to best reach policy objectives and goals – which are seldom entirely met anyway – the policy decisions taken from the governmental level need to reach the actual implementors (referred to in this study as the decision-takers) in a clear and structured manner (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, Sabatier 1986). Therefore, having conceptualisations of policy (objectives) that are too broad within the decision-makers’ discourses potentially come with great challenges to implementation. As Eller and Wandt (2020) highlight in their study, the divergent policy fields that could fit under the homeland security policy umbrella, following the very broad definition of homeland security’s mission, represent significant challenges to policy implementation and influence strategic funding, networking and coping with (transboundary) events. Similarly, O’Sullivan and Ramsey (2015, p. 59) conclude that the overlap between the homeland, national and environmental security fields creates challenges, as “definitions matter to government policymaking institutions’ mission statements, jurisdictions and practice. Despite the fact that there is clear overlap between civilian domestic ‘homeland’ security and ‘national’ security, the two are ultimately not the same”. Thus, a clear delimitation of policy fields is important for policy success, not least when it comes to defence policy. To this point speak De Spiegeleire et al. (2019), who find that a limited number of goals translated into concrete actions within defence policy facilitates successful implementation. A similar argument is made in this study on the Swedish civil defence policy that embodies broad and vague objectives, contextualised here as entangled security logics, but this is further discussed in the first part of the analysis.

In order to assess whether the official discourses on goals and objectives have been understood by the implementors, scholarly attention should focus on bureaucrats and their interpretations, in a bottom-up approach. This is because policy success is first and foremost dependent on the actual implementors rather than central government officials; hence it is their choices, goals, strategies and activities that are essential (Hjern 1982, Sabatier 1986, Hill and Hupe 2002, Lipsky 2010). In a similar way, Ingesson (2016, p. 2) argues in his dissertation for the relevance of the lower-level military leaders in defence policy implementation as “they have a direct impact on the implementation of policies related to the security of the nation-state, and because their decisions can have exceptionally far-reaching political consequences”. In the case of civil defence, this responsibility falls, among other actors, on government agencies, which is why it is essential for the success of total defence policy in general and civil defence policy in particular to acquire an understanding of the decision-takers’ interpretations of the civil defence concept, most importantly where the discrepancies lie and what their potential consequences are.

Capturing discourses and interpretations

In order to fulfil the aim of this study, this article makes use of a discursive approach. Discursive approaches have gained prominence in foreign policy and security studies for decades now (see Larsen 1997, Hansen 2006). Focusing on language serves the purpose of the underlying thesis of the article as “the productive nature of language implies that policy discourse is seen as relying upon particular constructions of problems and subjectivities, but that it is also through discourse that these problems and subjectivities are constructed in the first place” (Hansen 2006, p. 15). Hence, the language used both in official documents and in the statements made by decision-takers will reveal the subjective understandings of the concept of civil defence, simultaneously shedding light on the construction of these conceptualisations. It is through language, after all, that meanings are constructed, and in order to study the meaning of civil defence, that is where one needs to look.

This approach is applied to both official documents and interview materials with emphasis on the conceptualisation of civil defence, and this is how the concept is understood and referred to in both text and speech. Drawing from the definition of security logics, the analysis, thus, tracks discourses regarding the ways in which threats are perceived and civil defence practices – governance and cooperation – are described. With this in mind, with regard to decision-makers’ framing of the concept of civil defence, this article zooms in on three official documents. The first is the government defence bill (Prop.2014/15:109) on the direction of Swedish defence policy for 2016-2020.⁴ The other two are reports from the Swedish Defence Commission⁵ that together “are to be considered as two parts of a unified whole” (The Swedish Defence Commission 2019b, p. 1). These are titled Resilience: The total defence concept and the development of civil defence 2021-2025, published in 2017, and The Swedish Defence Commission’s white book on Sweden’s Security Policy and the Development of the Military Defence 2021-2025, published in 2019.

While the decision-makers’ discourses provide context, it is the decision-takers’ interpretations that are at the heart of this study. As discussed before, the decision-takers in this case are the practitioners, who ultimately put into practice the conditions and abstract formulations set in motion on a central level (Lipsky 2010). In the case of civil defence, there are numerous such actors – public, private and individual. This study concentrates on one specific group, which is the government agencies, with special responsibility⁶ to ensure the functioning of society in case of crises. Consequently, the decision-takers then are officials working with various aspects of civil defence. The positions represented, depending on the agencies’ internal organisation, include civil/total defence coordinators or special investigators, heads of security and crisis management units or departments, and even the director generals in some cases.

The motivation behind this choice is the rather unique Swedish public administration model where the central government consists of relatively small ministries and autonomous government agencies. It is the latter that is largely responsible for the implementation of policies and providing expertise on specific topics, as opposed to most other countries where these competences reside within ministries (Hall 2016). This means that some of the agencies can contribute to decision-making, while having relatively great freedom when it comes to implementation. This unique governing context implies the need for and significance of coordination across agencies in order to make a coherent policy. Therefore, accumulating knowledge on policy interpretations at an agency level is perhaps even more crucial in the Swedish case, as these interpretations might have consequences not only for policy implementation but also for its production.

In order to ensure that the only recently revived subject of civil defence is actually on the agenda of agencies represented in the study, selection was based on the Swedish government’s request⁷ to 20 agencies to undertake an internal inquiry regarding planning for civil defence. These agencies belong to the transportation, finance, security, energy, communication and food sectors. In addition, the two agencies coordinating the respective sides of total defence – the Swedish Armed Forces for the military side and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency for the civilian side – were also included. A total of 21 (out of 22) agencies⁸ took part in this study (for a detailed overview of sectors, agencies and interviews, see Appendix 1).

The material on decision-takers’ interpretations was gathered through semi-structured interviews. The latter method was deemed most appropriate because “this [semi-structured] interview seeks to obtain descriptions of the interviewees’ lived world with respect to interpretations of the meaning of the described phenomena” (Kvale 2007, p. 9) – the phenomenon being civil defence in this case. The interviews,⁹ held in the framework of a larger project dealing with the international aspects of civil defence and conducted from March to June 2020 via phone or digital means, focused on the respondents’ descriptions of civil defence. Accordingly, the respondents answered a series of questions, starting with (1) their understanding of the concept of civil defence, and (2) the meaning of civil defence for their respective institution’s work, and followed by inquiries to describe both (3) the national and (4) international work and cooperation within the field, naming both opportunities and challenges. These particular questions were posed in order to encourage respondents to more deeply reflect on the concept and, therefore, gain a better understanding of their interpretations of civil defence (for a similar approach, see Caliskan and Liégeois 2021 on hybrid warfare). Topics of a more operational nature and the specific planning for civil defence were not discussed due to the confidentiality surrounding these matters.

Relatedly, due to the sensitive nature of the subject, the respondents were assured anonymity. Therefore, their contribution to the study is presented in a matter that conceals their identity. To this end, the analysis of the material will be structured focusing on the above-mentioned sectors instead of the specific agencies. However, given that the communication sector consists of only one agency, this agency has been placed within the security sector. The two total defence agencies are considered individually, partly because their stances are quite straightforward due to the institutional priorities of these agencies, as well as their size, which facilitates anonymity for the participants.

Decision-makers’ discourses on civil defence

This section will provide a brief overview of the discourses that can be found in the official documents regarding civil defence,¹⁰ thus offering context to what the decision-takers must make sense of and put into practice. The overview demonstrates the ambiguous nature of the concept of civil defence and by showcasing the traces of entangled security logics in the decision-makers’ discourses.

Since the end of the Cold War up until the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the security concept in the Swedish official documents was “arguably as broad as it gets” (Stiglund 2021, p. 212) and the military threat was not given much attention. Since then, however, the security situation is perceived to have worsened and an armed attack on Sweden is no longer discounted, suggesting the existence of both the narrow and the broad security logics within the discourse.

Threats to our security can be both antagonistic and non-antagonistic. Typical antagonistic threats to our security can be wars, campaigns of influence and information warfare, cyberattacks, terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, there are a number of other challenges and threats to our security that can have both antagonistic and non-antagonistic elements; for example, organized crime, disruption of vital systems and flows, disintegrating states, economic crisis, political and religious extremism, threats to democracy and the legal system, threats to human rights and freedoms, social exclusion, migratory flows, threats to values, climate change, natural disasters and pandemics. (The Swedish Defence Commission 2017a, p. 15)

Consequently, a military threat is yet again considered real, and although “a single military armed attack directly on Sweden remains unlikely … it is impossible that military conflicts in our close proximity would only affect one country” (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 46). Therefore,

An armed attack on Sweden cannot be excluded, nor can the use of military measures against Sweden or threats thereof. A security crisis or an armed conflict in our neighbourhood would inevitably also have an impact on Sweden. The total defence concept will be developed and designed in order to meet an armed attack against Sweden, including acts of war on Swedish territory. (The Swedish Defence Commission 2019b, p. 2)

Although Sweden is expected to build its defence together with other (neighbouring) states and intergovernmental institutions (the European Union (EU), NATO, etc.), it first aims to possess the capacity to defend itself independently (The Swedish Government Office 2015, The Swedish Defence Commission 2017a, 2019a). Therefore, in order to tackle the above-mentioned challenges and the now real military threat, Sweden wants to reinforce and strengthen its total defence principle, with the military defence on one side of the coin and the civil defence on the other (The Swedish Government Office 2015). To this end, “Ultimately, the Swedish total defence must therefore have a credible war-fighting capability, with both military and civil defence components” (The Swedish Defence Commission 2019b, p. 2), indicating the presence of a strong territorial security logic for both the military and the civil defence.

However, when it comes to the objectives of civil defence, they are to be threefold as of 2016: “to protect the population; ensure the functioning of vital societal infrastructures; and to contribute to the capacities of the Swedish Armed Forces in case of armed attack or war in Sweden’s close proximity” (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 59). These civil defence objectives are spelled out in various places in the official documents, but the formulations differ: on most occasions, “in Sweden’s close proximity” is not mentioned – instead, it has been replaced by a heightened state of alert¹¹ or nothing at all. Moreover, additional types of wording can be found with regard to the planning of civil defence: “In order to cope with a situation that leads to heightened state of alert, preparations and planning with a focus on the protection of the population, the protection of essential functions and support for the Swedish Armed Forces are required” (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 107).

Furthermore, it is also mentioned in the official documents that civil defence planning should therefore be resumed and implemented on the basis of a holistic approach where the threat scale includes both peacetime crisis situations and heightened state of alert. The holistic approach also applies to which actors should be involved in the planning. The planning should therefore take place in collaboration between state authorities, municipalities, county councils, NGOs, private industry and others involved (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 104).

In other words, the civil defence should plan for “war in Sweden’s close proximity”, a “heightened state of alert” as well as “a situation that leads to heightened state of alert”. Simultaneously, the planning should be in accordance with the Swedish Armed Forces’ defence planning and the planning for peacetime crisis preparedness (The Swedish Government Office 2015, pp. 104–105).

While the three objectives of civil defence are mutually reinforcing, the third objective should be prioritised for now, according to the documents. This is because with regard to the objectives of protecting the population and ensuring the functioning of vital societal infrastructures, the capacities with crisis preparedness overlap, whereas for cooperation with and contribution to the Swedish Armed Forces’ capability in the event of an armed attack, more specific measures are emphasised and these must be further developed (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 107). Therefore, the civil defence is to be built on the basis of crisis preparedness capacities but must be complemented by measures that are necessary in war (The Swedish Defence Commission 2017a).

As stated, the civil defence should be planned so that it can fulfil its objectives in case of war for five to ten days. However, the planning for the first two objectives should be made in a manner that resilience is maintained for a considerably longer period (The Swedish Government Office 2015, p. 108). For the total defence planning in general, the aim is to “resist serious disturbances in the functionality of Swedish society for three months, where there will be war part of this time. In a situation of war or when there is a risk of war, the total defence efforts will be focused on military defence” (The Swedish Defence Commission 2017b, p. 2).

Decision-takers’ interpretations of civil defence

The following analysis attempts to untangle the tensions in the decision-takers’ interpretations of civil defence in relation to territorial and societal security logics. This analysis is structured by first applying the territorial logic, in which case civil defence is interpreted as an instrument in war or serious threat thereof and linked to military practices and central governance. This interpretation is conceptualised as “territorial civil defence”. One would expect that the Swedish Armed Forces (referenced as AF) and perhaps even the agencies in the security sector would lean this way. In case of the societal security logic, however, civil defence is associated with various types of vulnerabilities, both man-made and natural, and, thus, extended to peacetime crisis management functions, allowing for collective governance. Hence the conceptualisation of “societal civil defence”. This logic is most likely to be observed among the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (referenced as MSB¹²) and the other sectors. The discussion will address the advantages and disadvantages of both sides. Additionally, it will show that many decision-takers are caught in the limbo between the two, with views that are not as clearly distinguishable, shedding light on the confusion and challenges that the ambiguity of the concept of civil defence implies.

It is to be noted, though, that across sectors no confusion was expressed when the respondents reflected on the objectives of the civil defence. Instead, they largely agreed that the objectives – the protection of the population and essential societal infrastructure, as well as assisting the Swedish Armed Forces in case of a heightened state of alert – are rather well-defined and clear. Therefore, when asked to define civil defence, the majority of the respondents answered by saying that civil defence is a part of the total defence, embodying all activities that contribute to achieving the aforementioned goals, while adding that the work of civil defence is largely based on crisis preparedness capacities.

This consensus, however, does not necessarily indicate a unanimous interpretation, as different interpretations of the conditions in which civil defence is enacted emerged among the decision-takers. In most cases, these differences had to do with what the heighted state of alert entails and what the role of crisis preparedness is within the civil defence, raising questions about where crisis preparedness ends and civil defence starts and vice versa. According to official documents, it is precisely the heightened state of alert that determines the borders of civil defence policy; yet many threats do not reach the threshold of activating the heightened state, which, in turn, brings into question whether these threats are concerns of civil defence policy or of crisis preparedness in practice. Consequently, confusion arises with regard to what civil defence prepares for – crisis or war. This brings me to discuss the territorial and societal meanings of civil defence.

Territorial civil defence

Certainly, for many practitioners, across all five sectors and the Swedish Armed Forces, civil defence is about planning for war. More precisely, they interpret civil defence as the societal activity that is to be enacted in case of war (Transport #7; Food #3). One respondent expressed it as “civil defence feels more like a concept connected to war” (Security #20), whereas another elaborated that “civil defence means we have to plan for things other than peacetime activities” (Transport #7). Therefore, “civil defence is all activities that society carries out in order to prepare for facing an armed attack together with the Armed Forces” (AF). Thus, in contrast to the extensive official discourse presented previously, the logic of territorial civil defence brings the third objective of civil defence to the forefront.

Behind this rationale is the view that civil defence aims to address threats of war and armed attacks in Sweden or in its proximity (AF; Finance #23; Security #25,), and these attacks can be of different natures, including biological or cyber warfare (Energy #19). This association with warfare is best illustrated in the way a respondent described the aims and the (non-) functioning of civil defence in relation to the current COVID-19 pandemic,

if we would play with the idea that the corona crisis was not a pandemic … that it was an attacker who infected us, then we could draw parallels to some sort of biological warfare. Already now we can observe that some functions maybe do not work as they should (AF).

What matters is that the threats are deliberate and come from an enemy (mostly external) and hence resonate in line with the more traditional territorial security by identifying another state or actor as the antagonist and by making territorial security the main concern of civil defence.

Furthermore, in this case, the concept of civil defence is often isolated from other concepts, as one respondent explains: “Civil defence is a part of Sweden’s defence capacity handled by civilian actors … in many ways it is a contingency work we do but the aim is different. Hence, there are no other concepts [used in the agency’s work with civil defence]” (Energy #9). Yet, considering that the civil defence concept in this case is so closely intertwined with military defence, in two cases, it was expressed that civil defence is ignored from the agency’s daily vocabulary and one talks of total defence instead (Transport #5; Food #17). The respondents also underline that civil defence takes precedence only when the Swedish Government decides to heighten its state of alert, consequently triggering special sets of laws that provide the total defence (alias the Armed Forces) with the mandate to defend Sweden (Food #17; Security #20), which in many ways makes the civil defence policy clearer, more robust and straightforward. This is so not least because certain agencies receive new tasks in a heightened state of alert (Security #18 & #20). Moreover, some feel that the task of assisting the Armed forces comes with rather clear guidelines from the government, making it easier to plan for civil defence (Energy #8). Therefore, in their interpretation of civil defence, they draw from the parts of official discourses that define civil defence in a more closed formulation, with a specific focus on war or threat thereof, as well as assisting the Armed Forces.

The territorial conceptualisation also seems to provide more clarity to resource allocation, confidentiality and cooperation. Considering that the funding of civil defence comes from the state budget, viewing civil defence in the light of (the threat of) war makes it easier to distinguish between general preparedness capacities and those of civil defence as the former does not need to be financed publicly. As an example of this situation, one respondent elaborates that the civil defence, being a public policy, requires equipment and personnel to be funded by the national budget – something that is yet to happen – while in some agencies, the preparedness structures can be (and indeed are) financed by companies from the private sector, and a clear separation between the two sources is essential as private companies should not finance national defence in that way (Energy #8). Furthermore, defining civil defence as “territorial” comes with an apparent confidentiality clause that challenges and limits the possibilities of cooperation, both nationally in relation to the private sector and internationally with other actors. Indeed, respondents highlight that due to the sensitive nature of defence information, potential cooperative initiatives are, in fact, limited (Finance #11; Security #21). Yet, this is not considered an issue per se, as civil defence is first and foremost a national policy, governed by central government and ruled by domestic factors (Transport #5 & #6), indicating a rather state-centric reasoning that is characteristic of territorial security.

Notwithstanding, the military alliance NATO is perceived as the most relevant international actor when it comes to the Swedish civil defence, as its civil preparedness structures are used as blueprints for the rebuilding of the policy and because the organisation represents the Western defence model that is easy to relate to (AF; Transport #6; Security #21). However, Sweden is not a member of the alliance, and, therefore, bilateral relations are thus far prioritised, especially with Finland, with whom Sweden shares its threat and non-alignment preconditions and already has an established military cooperation (having signed the mutual defence cooperation agreement called “Memorandum of Understanding” in 2018) that extends to civil defence (AF; Food #3; Transport #5 & #6).

To summarise, the interpretation of civil defence in line with territorial security can be found in all sectors and, of course, in the Armed Forces. Yet, the security, transport and energy sectors stand out in being largely dominated by this conceptualisation, which seems to provide clarity in terms of dealing with war, prioritising assistance to the Armed Forces, allocating resources, steering from central government and drawing on the existing military cooperation.

Societal civil defence

If “territorial civil defence” distinguishes threats, resources and governance, a slightly more confusing picture surfaces in the case of societal civil defence. This has mainly to do with interpreting civil defence in terms of not only war but also various types of crises and vulnerabilities that affect the functioning of society as a whole, enabling a more collective governance and a broader view on security and threats. Note that the territorial aspects of civil defence do not disappear but are extended to various vulnerabilities. As described by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, “It [civil defence] is about society’s resilience and ability to handle serious crises, including armed attacks” (MSB). This puts civil defence on the same step of the ladder as crisis preparedness practices or slightly above them (Transport #1 & #15; Food #14 & #16; Finance #24). Accordingly, one respondent explained that civil defence is “about having a strong ability to cope with everything from environmental impacts to of course threats and so on. But also, above all, it is about robustness within the crisis preparedness system” (Transport #1). This means that civil defence and crisis preparedness are intertwined to the extent that civil defence builds on the existing crisis preparedness and is seen as “the total sum of all actions taken to meet crises” (Finance #12). Therefore, one can view crisis preparedness as “a peacetime civil defence”, whereas in case of war, it turns into the civil part of the total defence (Finance #23).

This all-hazard conceptualisation of civil defence also means that the lines between different concepts are blurred, a tendency that is typical of the societal security logic. The respondents admit that concepts such as crisis preparedness/management, civil preparedness, continuity planning and societal resilience are often used interchangeably (Transport #1 & #15; Finance #4; Food #17). Some even find that the concept of civil preparedness is more suitable to use in practice as the work of civil defence spills over to various areas and it is not possible, in practice, to keep the civil defence isolated (Transport #6 & #15; Food #16). This concept mixing is even seen as a benefit and deemed necessary as it is all about dealing with the unknown; thus, the term needs to be inexplicit (Energy #19). Therefore, as expressed by one interviewee, “It is a bit like never mind what we call it, everyone knows that it [civil defence] is precisely continuity planning, crisis preparedness planning, crisis management and incident planning as well, as everything is connected” (Finance #10), while another admits that the practitioners who do not specifically work with civil defence use different concepts interchangeably because they are simply ignorant:

We mix concepts because we are ignorant and then we imply the same thing when we talk of defence, total defence, civil defence … we mean civil defence all the time and then maybe we throw around slightly different concepts. It is not our specialty (Finance #24).

At times, the use of the term total defence instead of civil defence is justified not by linking it to the territorial defence, but rather because in this case it represents the holistic approach, very much in line with the official discourse that includes the wide threat spectrum to the civil defence aims:

The word total gives a good picture of [the idea] that it is the whole of society that needs to function. I think that by using the word total that we capture the whole crisis preparedness system, including regular crisis preparedness, grey zone problems as well as the outlying preparedness. So, I talk a lot about total defence, almost never use the word civil defence. And if I do, I will only do so if I need to state particularly that the military side is not included (Food #17).

From the policy implementation point of view, the mixing of concepts is problematic as using different concepts and gathering various policy fields under the civil defence umbrella blurs policy lines and can lead to problems in resource allocation, networking or simply when coping with threats. This point is illustrated by Eller and Wandt’s (2020) study on homeland security that was mentioned earlier and also by the respondents in this study. Indeed, which concepts are used is important because “words influence the course of action taken as well as send a message to the public” (Security #20). In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the latter statement has proven to hold true: it really matters what the government agencies communicate to the public as it effects the trust that people have in them. Hence, “whether you claim that you are in a crisis management mode – which does not always sound so good – or just dealing with an isolated incident sends a strong message to the public” (Security #20). Furthermore, according to an MSB representative, the subject of proper terminology is a reoccurring topic with regard to international cooperation, as one needs to decide which terms to use in English. Therefore, “Do you talk of civil defence or which concepts are used in English? Within NATO it is civil preparedness, whereas within the EU we work with civil protection. But it incorporates various kinds of questions within the EU” (MSB).

On this note, it matters whether civil defence is broadly or narrowly defined as it affects the coordination and governance of a coherent national defence policy. For example, if civil defence is broadly defined and linked to crisis preparedness, there are more opportunities to make use of other (international) actors through bilateral agreements or through the EU’s civil preparedness resources and capacities (Transport #1). This, however, gives space for European governance as many sectors involved in Swedish civil defence are already highly dependent on EU regulations and directives. This is true for the transport sector where there is “extremely close cooperation with the EU and European organisations¹³ for aviation safety, within which we discuss issues, such as continuity or such that become part of the civil defence, of course” (Transport¹⁴). To this end, agency representatives report that “we are extremely controlled by the EU when it comes to aviation. We have many regulations that we need to stick to and we have also collaborations below the level of regulations, so to speak” (Transport). We can observe similar dynamics in the energy sector, which “in general is increasingly governed by EU regulations”, yet problems can surface if the EU demands certain solutions that are not fit for the Swedish context (Energy #13).

To summarise, societal civil defence counters a wide spectrum of threats, both natural and man-made, and is the interpretation of civil defence that dominates the finance and food sectors. Yet, this interpretation is also somewhat represented in transport, energy and security sectors, showing that diverging interpretations occur both across and within sectors. Here, the concept of civil defence is intertwined with many others, especially with crisis preparedness, to the extent that it is not conceivable to some decision-takers to distinguish between the two. This is not necessarily a problem in practice as the agencies’ work in the area overlaps to a great extent. The broad conceptualisation also enables collaboration and expands the pool of resources. However, problems may surface when certain sectors are reliant on European governance and the demands coming from the international level do not fit with the Swedish context. Furthermore, mixing concepts challenges policy implementation, as words have an effect on actions and can influence trust towards agencies when communicating with the public.

Interestingly, these critical points have been made by the sectors (security, transport and energy) that exhibit territorial civil defence interpretation. Therefore, two possible explanations to why civil defence is understood in line with the territorial logic can be identified. First, perhaps the strong presence of the EU’s influence in agencies’ daily work calls for a more explicit separation between national defence matters and other policy fields. Second, while public’s trust in agencies is generally important, it is especially instrumental for agencies in the security sector, which is why policy separation is essential, and hence, concept mixing is frowned upon.

The complexity of tangled logics

It would be too simplistic to believe that the complexity of contemporary security in general and the conceptualisation of civil defence in particular could be captured through the lenses of the two security logics explored here alone. Nor is it feasible to expect clear-cut interpretations, not least due to the spread of ambiguous security concepts both in theory and in policy circles. To this complexity speaks the way in which most sectors exhibit the existence of both logics, and many of the decision-takers’ interpretations of civil defence fall into the middle ground between the territorial and the societal logics, highlighting the uncertainties that characterise the field. To this end, civil defence is occasionally perceived not only in terms of war but also in a somewhat broader sense, yet not quite as openly as societal civil defence. The most obvious illustration thereof is when the respondents make use of the grey zone concept, while dissociating civil defence from crisis preparedness practices.

With this in mind, according to one respondent, the grey zone concept is used instead of war because it is the discourse of the Swedish defence industry,¹⁵ understood as a pre-war condition but not yet a heightened state of alert, and “is a broad concept that in our agency work is considered to be a situation with an increased threat picture” (Security #21). Similarly, several other respondents identify the grey zone concept as being directly related to civil defence, involving various types of threats and actors (Food #17; Security #18), and meaning that nowadays the threats are coming from different directions, both from abroad and from within the state, calling for a more extensive defence approach (Finance #24). This indicates that the civil defence needs to prepare for very divergent types of threats, as well as for the unexpected, and situations that are neither peace nor war – an ambition that has also been articulated in official documents.

The widening of the threat spectrum by including the notion of the grey zone indicates a shift from territorial towards a broader societal security, but it also implies implementation challenges as the policy now needs to address various, unknown threats, thus setting practical limitations to the actual planning for civil defence. Also, considering that grey zone threats do not necessarily constitute a serious threat of war, it is unclear whether or not the Swedish government officially would heighten the state of alert and, thus, activate its total defence. As one respondent explained,

We, like many others [agencies] follow the staircase from isolated incident … to the next step where we differentiate whether it is a case of the so-called grey zone problem or a case for the Armed Forces, meaning that something is happening or we are getting a message from the Government on heightened state of alert … it is, after all, different laws that enter into force (Security #18).

Moreover, some threats that are included in the grey zone, such as terrorism or (international) crime, for example, are not perceived as matters of defence but instead identified as issues for law enforcement authorities (Security #25). Therefore, concerns arise with regard to authorities’ responsibilities in case of grey zone threats. Surely, the uncertainty of how grey zone threats develop and are played out complicates the planning for defence, yet the agencies need to plan so that resilience to any types of vulnerabilities is maintained at all times, be it an isolated incident or an early stage of war. Needless to say, it is a challenging task involving overlapping responsibilities, policies and restraining resources.

Conclusion: a call for disentanglement

This article has argued that contemporary European security is characterised by entangled security logics, which bring about ambiguity both in theory and in practice, challenging the implementation of coherent defence policies. In contrast to the existing scholarship that traces decision-makers’ discourses over time in order to shed light on the meaning of security, this study has shifted the focus from decision-makers to decision-takers and asked how the broad conceptualisation of the Swedish civil defence is interpreted by agency officials hence, the security practitioners at the receiving end of the policy process.

Based on interviews with 21 national agency representatives, the study has found that diverging interpretations of civil defence emerge, conceptualised in the analysis as territorial and societal civil defence, linked, respectively, to the territorial and societal security logics. In doing so, the analysis has focused on the characteristics and potential challenges of each conceptualisation, concluding that the interpretation of territorial civil defence, dominant (but not exhaustive) in security, transport and energy sectors, provides clarity in terms of policy objectives, central governance and resource allocation. In the case of societal civil defence, however, uncertainties arise regarding the role of other policy fields’ issues, such as crisis preparedness, governance and resources. Considering that this divergence in interpretations occurs not only across societal sectors but also within them, the study has argued that this poses many potential problems for reaching a coherent policy, challenging, in particular, inter-agency collaboration as well as central coordination and steering.

While directly relevant to the Swedish case, the findings speak to the wider trend of combining military and civilian practices in order to counter the uncertainties of contemporary security, which is especially evident in the Nordic context where states have returned to a total defence principle. However, the ways in which the respective countries have interpreted contemporary security are divergent and so are their approaches to defence policies (see Larsson and Rhinard 2021). Total defence today, it has been argued, embodies blurred distinctions between war and peace as well as between crisis and security (see Larsson 2020, Stiglund 2021), and the findings presented in this article are much in line with these claims. However, this study has moved past central government and offered instead a practitioner-focused analysis of the potential consequences on policy coherence and implementation in case of domestically divergent interpretations. In doing so, the article contributes with new insights into the practical challenges to the making of (civil) defence policy in the context of entangled security and highlights the complex constraints that it sets on domestic policy implementation.

It has also been discussed that the complexity of contemporary security in general and the concept of civil defence in particular cannot be entirely captured by the two logics investigated in this study, as there are seldom clear-cut interpretations and much is to be found in the middle ground. This seems to be especially true on the levels of governance where security discourses are put into practice, indicating a need for further investigations into the logics and meanings of contemporary security and its concepts among decision-takers. Therefore, this article concludes with a call to security studies to seek to disentangle contemporary security and its constituent concepts in order to help to identify and address the ambiguity both in theory and in practice.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jana Wrange

Jana Wrange is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Lund University. Her research interests include small state security and defence issues. Her PhD project concerns international preconditions for Swedish civil defence.

Notes

1 France, the UK and West Germany also had civil defence during WWII and beyond but they did not adopt the total defence concept in the same manner as the Nordics, Switzerland and Yugoslavia (see Grant 2009 on UK; Biess 2009 on West Germany).

2 A concept of human security emerged and opened for a whole new type of security discussion, often sparked by the international interventions and peacekeeping matters, placing individuals” “freedom from fear and want” in the center (see King and Murray 2001–2002, p. 585; Chandler 2012).

3 The hybrid threat/warfare discussion is not a new one but definitely gained momentum in the end of the twentieth century and beyond (see Caliskan and Liégeois 2021, Janičatová and Mlejnková 2021, Rostoks 2019).

4 A new defence bill for 2021–2025 (Prop. 2020/21:30) was recently published, in which the objectives of civil defence were redefined. However, this bill was still in preparations during the period of data collection, which is why it is excluded from this study.

5 The Swedish Defence Commission, consisting political party representatives aided by experts, is a forum for consultation between the government and the parliament. It aims for reaching agreements in regards to the formation of Swedish defence and security policy. Their reports are used as basis for government proposals. Read more: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/forsvarsberedningen

6 According to the Regulation (2015:1052). More: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/forordning-20151052-om-krisberedskap-och_sfs-2015-1052

7 Link to the request: https://www.regeringen.se/4a6795/contentassets/c61440061e464a6e9e1025e9178b8b0e/uppdrag-till-bevakningsansvariga-myndigheter-att-inkomma-med-underlag-for-den-fortsatta-inriktningen-av-det-civila-forsvaret_

8 The Swedish Coast Guard is not represented.

9 Prior to the interviews, which lasted from 30 min to an hour, the respondents signed a letter of consent. By signing the document, a consent to audio recording, later used for transcripts, was given. All but one agency representative consented to the recording. For the exceptional case, extensive notes were taken that were later shared with the respondent. Considering that some agencies were represented by two officials, interviewed either together or separately, a total of 25 interviews were conducted. All were held in Swedish language, by the author. Ergo, all citations of empirical material have been translated by the author from Swedish to English.

10 All citations extracted from documents published in Swedish are translated to English by the author.

11 If Sweden is in war or faced with the threat of war by war in its proximity, the government may decide on increased or maximum state of alert. In that case the whole or part of total defence are to be mobilized. (3 § in law (1992:1403).

12 MSB is the Swedish acronym for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap).

13 Organizations that are referred to are EuroControl and European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

14 Interview number is extracted in order to ensure anonymity.

15 The Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut), a governmental agency overseen by the Defence Ministry, frequently applies the grey zone notion in their reports, which is why the concept often reoccurs in defence circles.

Appendix

Table A1. Sector, agency and interview overview.

Table

Sector	Agency	Interview Date	Number of Participants	Comments
Transport	Swedish Transport Administration	2020-04-02	2
	Swedish Transport Agency	2020-03-27	1
	Swedish Maritime Administration	2020-03-23	1
		2020-03-27	1
	Sweden’s Civil Aviation Administration	2020-03-27	2
Finance	Sweden’s Financial Supervisory Authority	2020-04-17	1
	Swedish Social Insurance Agency	2020-03-26	1
	Swedish Pensions Agency	2020-03-31	1
	Swedish Tax Agency	2020-03-31	1
		2020-03-31	1
	Swedish National Debt Office	2020-04-17	1
Energy	Swedish Energy Agency	2020-03-31	1
		2020-04-06	1
	Swedish National Grid Authority	2020-03-30	1
	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority	2020-03-30	1
Food	Swedish National Food Agency	2020-03-26	1
	Swedish Board of Agriculture	2020-04-03	1
		2020-04-03	1
	National Veterinary Institute	2020-04-01	2
Security	Swedish Police Authority	2020-04-06	1
	Swedish Security Service	2020-06-17	1
	Swedish Customs	2020-04-06	1
	Swedish Coast Guard	N/A	N/A
Communications	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	2020-04-08	2	No audio recording Placed within security sector in the analysis
Total defence	Swedish Armed Forces	2020-03-24	1	In-text interview reference: AF
	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	2020-04-09	1	In-text interview reference: MSB
Total number of interviews: 25	Total number of participants: 29 … of whom 11 were female