ABSTRACT
Why did Serbia not impose sanctions against Russia following its aggression on Ukraine in February 2022? As a state seeking membership of the European Union (EU), Serbia’s reluctance to join the sanction regime is puzzling. This paper draws from the ontological security literature to show how Serbia, as a political community, is divided between East and West, that is, between a vicarious attachment to Moscow and a relationship with Brussels driven primarily by the prospect of joining the benefits of membership of the EU. The problem of sanctions brought to the fore the conflicted identity of Serbia, showing how Belgrade’s hedging in foreign policy reflects not only an attempt to extract concessions and advantages from both partners – the EU and Russia – but more fundamentally its efforts to come to terms with its liminal, ontologically insecure position within the international system.
Acknowledgements
Most of this work was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center (RSC) for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (2022–23). The RSC's support and hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. Previous iterations of this paper were presented at the 2023 IPSA World Conference of Political Science in Buenos Aires and at the 2023 ECPR General Conference in Prague. Thanks to all participants for their comments and feedback. I also wish to express my gratitude to the anonymous referees for their very constructive criticism. Needless to say, all remaining errors are my own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).