ABSTRACT
This analysis aims to address certain shortcomings found within securitisation theory and its practical usage. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine necessitates a profound transformation of the research vocabulary of security studies, as well as an expansion of its scholarly instruments. This article investigates the potential modifications and adjustments of the concept of securitisation, which due to its broad explanatory scope could be recalibrated to reflect the radically altered security landscape in Europe. In this context, three ancillary concepts are introduced as extensions to the original terminology of the Copenhagen School: primary self-securitisation, secondary securitisation and counter-securitisation. The analysis seeks to move beyond the theory’s traditional emphasis on speech acts, to more precisely define the interplay between securitisation and the agency, and to expand the role of the audience beyond merely affirming or disputing securitising moves.
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Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 For example, see: Hammes (Citation2023) and Heusgen (Citation2022).
2 In words of CS’s founder O. Wæver “we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act” (Waever Citation1995, p. 55).
3 The B9 is a mechanism of partnership between those NATO members who are more directly affected by Russia’s war and who are the most active promoters of all forms of security assistance to Ukraine - from military supplies to the future NATO membership. As for the UDCG, it is a platform for bringing together NATO member states and non-members who are committed to contribute to the defense of Ukraine against Russian military intervention.