Abstract
Civilian control of the armed forces is an essential element in the democratization of formerly authoritarian or totalitarian states. Yet Russia has failed to achieve such control either under Yeltsin or under Vladimir Putin, its current president. This failure endangers both Russian democracy and Russian security as it creates auspicious conditions for continuing domestic authoritarianism and internal war at home as well as foreign adventurism.
This article traces the consequences of that lack of democratic civilian control in the Russian armed forces from the Kosovo descent of mid-1999 until the tragic sinking of the Kursk submarine in August 2000. It assesses the reason behind the Kosovo operation as well as the Chechen war that began August-September 1999. Despite the undoubted Chechen threat, this war goes far beyond a riposte to that threat. Indeed, it reflects all of the pathologies inherent in the failure to achieve democratization and it has contributed as well to the hardening of Russia's posture vis-a-vis the West and to the failure to achieve democratic reform in the armed forces. Until and unless Russia overcomes those impediments to reform, it will be internally anti-democratic or incompletely democratic, prone to military adventures, and anti-Western in its overall security policies.