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ABSTRACT
Intelligence is a practice that is becoming more frequently used within the conservation industry. This article examines the question of what role intelligence currently plays in counter-poaching within Protected Areas in Africa. Through research into existing literature, combined with interviews conducted in the field with practitioners active in 19 countries, it concludes that while intelligence practices have been randomly adopted by various conservation organisations in the past, and are currently being applied with varying degrees of success, they are fast becoming more professionalised and more effective.
Notes on contributor
Kurt Steiner is a dedicated conservation professional with over a decade’s experience in conservation law enforcement in Africa. After a career in the military Kurt trained law enforcement staff in Protected Areas across the continent, before being appointed as the first Head of Law Enforcement for the African Parks Network, standardising counter-poaching practices in projects across eight countries. Kurt has an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies, and now works as an independent consultant providing guidance and support on law enforcement aspects of conservation for numerous NGOs and national law enforcement and nature conservation agencies.
Notes
1 In this paper ‘counter-poaching’ refers to initiatives that fight the illegal killing of wildlife, as opposed to wider conservation issues such as land encroachment, illegal grazing or timber harvesting, etc, or the trafficking of such wildlife. It also denotes the active measures taken to combat poaching, as opposed to ‘anti-poaching’ which is felt to imply simply being against poaching.
2 Warchol, ‘The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade’; Yeo, McCrea, and Roberts, ‘A Novel Application of Mark-Recapture to Examine Behaviour Associated with the Online Trade in Elephant Ivory’, e3048; South and Wyatt, ‘Comparing Illicit Trades in Wildlife and Drugs’.
3 Lemieux and Clarke, ‘The International Ban on Ivory Sales and its Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa’; Harvey, ‘Risks and Fallacies Associated with Promoting a Legalised Trade in Ivory’.
4 Humphries and Shaw, ‘Militarised Responses to the Illegal Wildlife Trade’, 27.
5 Ibid., 31.
6 Messer, ‘The Poacher’s Dilemma’, 55; Knapp, ‘Why Poaching Pays’, 435.
7 Crayne and Haenlein, ‘Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Conflict’; Nahonyo, ‘Assessment of Anti-Poaching Efforts in Ruaha National Park, Tanzania’; Cumming, Performance of Parks in a Century of Change; Kyando, Ikanda, and Roskaft, ‘Hotspot Elephant Poaching Areas in the Eastern Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania’.
8 A-4.
9 Rosen and Smith, ‘Summarizing the Evidence on the International Trade in Illegal Wildlife’, 24.
10 Messer, ‘The Poacher’s Dilemma’, 51.
11 Shepard, Gray, and Nijman, ‘Rhinoceros Horns in Trade on the Myanmar-China Border’, 2.
12 B-1.
13 Rosen and Smith, ‘Summarizing the Evidence on the International Trade in Illegal Wildlife’, 25.
14 Wilke, Carpenter, and Zhang, ‘The Under-Financing of Protected Areas in the Congo Basin’. Challender and MacMillan, ‘Poaching is More than an Enforcement Problem’, 485.
15 Critchlow et al., Improving ‘Law-Enforcement Effectiveness and Efficiency in Protected Areas Using Ranger-Collected Monitoring Data’, 572.
16 Cumming, Large Scale Conservation Planning and Priorities for the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, 59.
17 Messer, ‘The Poacher’s Dilemma’, 55.
18 Kyando, Ikanda, and Roskaft, ‘Hotspot Elephant Poaching Areas in the Eastern Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania’, 366. Cumming, Performance of Parks in a Century of Change.
19 Crayne and Haenlein, ‘Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Conflict’, 56.
20 Nahonyo, ‘Assessment of Anti-poaching Efforts in Ruaha National Park, Tanzania’, 13.
21 Cumming, Performance of Parks in a Century of Change.
22 Schneider, ‘The Criminal Intelligence Function’, 403.
23 A-1.
24 Matey, ‘The Use of Intelligence in the Private Sector’, 273.
25 Conway, Yule and Verster. Anti-Poaching Training Manual, 10.
26 Young and Alekseyev, ‘A Field Manual for Anti-poaching Activities’, 38.
27 Greef, Anti Poaching Manual, 7.
28 Endangered Rhino Trust, Rhino Security Booklet, 35.
29 Lotter et al., ‘Anti-Poaching in and Around Protected Areas’, 64.
30 African Parks Network, internal document.
31 HUMINT refers to Human Intelligence, the practice of collecting intelligence from human sources.
32 Van Niekerk, ‘Counter Wildlife Crime Manual’.
33 Van Niekerk, ‘Informants and Cultivated Sources’.
34 A.J. Conway, T.M. Yule & A.A. Verster had all served in the South African Defence Force, Rory Young served with the French Foreign Legion, Jack Greef was a highly respected South African Reconnaissance Commando officer, four of the nine authors of Anti-Poaching in and Around Protected Areas were military veterans, African Parks Network’s first Head of Law Enforcement served in the Australian Defence Force, and the second served with the United States Navy.
35 Gustafson, Sandstrom, and Townsend, ‘The Bush War to Save the Rhino’.
36 Cooney et al., ‘From Poachers to Protectors’, 370.
37 See Duffy, St John, and Brockington, ‘Toward a New Understanding of the Links between Poverty and Illegal Wildlife Hunting’, 14–22. Hübschle, ‘The Social Economy of Rhino Poaching’, 427–47.
38 Moreto, ‘Introducing Intelligence-Led Conservation’.
39 Hass and Ferreira, ‘Federated Databases and Actionable Intelligence’.
40 Fahlman, Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment.
41 Ayling, ‘What Sustains Wildlife Crime?’ 77.
42 See Masse and Lunstrum, ‘Accumulation by Securitization’, 227–37. Duffy, ‘War By Conservation’, 238–48. Marijnen and Verwijen, ‘Selling Green Militarization’, 274–85. Hübschle, ‘The Social Economy of Rhino Poaching’, 427–47.
43 Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology, 680.
44 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, 77.
45 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Index Report, Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2018), 18.
46 Whether being apolitical undermines counter-poaching or not is unclear, though not being associated with any particular political party has in most cases been a positive thing. An example would be Emmanuel de Merode negotiating a truce with rebel militias around the gorilla habitats of Virunga National Park, something he was able to do as he and the ICCN team were seen to be conservationists first, rather than supporters of Kabila.
47 Matey, ‘The Use of Intelligence in the Private Sector’, 273.
48 A-2.
49 B-2, B-3.
50 C-1.
51 Epstein and Welch, Secret SAS Squadron Sent to Spy in Africa. B-4.
52 A-3.
53 A-4.
54 B-2.
55 B-5.
56 B-6.
57 B-7.
58 B-6.
59 C-2.
60 C-3.
61 C-4.
62 B-8.
63 D’Udine and Malpas, ‘Murchison Falls National Park Recovery Program 2010–2017’, viii.
64 B-9.
65 C-5.
66 B-10.
67 A-4.
68 C-3.
69 Cooney et al., ‘From Poachers to Protectors’, 370.
70 B-11.
71 C-6.
72 A-1, A-4, B-2, B-4, B-8, B-10.
73 Lotter, et al., Anti-Poaching in and Around Protected Areas, 18.
74 Schneider, ‘The Criminal Intelligence Function’, 407.
75 Harris, Basic Elements of Intelligence, Revised Edition.
76 B-9.
77 Evans, ‘Law Enforcement Intelligence’, 264.
78 A-4.
79 B-8.
80 C-5.
81 C-1.
82 B-10.
83 C-6.
84 Bullock, ‘Community, Intelligence-Led Policing and Crime Control’, 127.
85 See: A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. US Government Document (March 2009); Heuer Psychology of Intelligence Analysis; Hedley, ‘Learning from Intelligence Failures’, 435–50.
86 B-13.
87 B-5.
88 A-1.
89 A-4.
90 Stouder and Gallagher, ‘Crafting Operational Counter Intelligence Strategy’, 586.
91 A-2, A-4, A-5, B-11, B-12, C-6.
92 B-12.
93 Messer, ‘The Poacher’s Dilemma’, 55.
94 A-5.
95 See: Board for Professional and Occupational Regulation, Study of the Utility and Validity of Voice Stress Analyzers; Elkins, Burgoon, and Nunamaker, ‘Vocal Analysis for Security Screening’; Haddad et al., Investigation and Evaluation of Voice Stress Analysis Technology.
96 A-2, B-6, B-7, C-4.
97 Gentry and Spencer, ‘Colombia’s FARC’, 453.
98 A-5. ‘Cellebrite’ refers to a forensic extraction tool used to recover information from mobile devices.
99 A ‘cover legend’ refers to a fictitious alibi created to conceal a person’s true intent or purpose.
100 A-1, B-2, B-4.
101 Schneider, ‘The Criminal Intelligence Function’, 402.
102 Gustafson, Sandstrom, and Townsend, ‘The Bush War to Save the Rhino’, 283.
103 B-11.
104 B-4. ‘Jam-stealer’ is slang within Southern Africa for someone that claims the credit for another person’s work.
105 A-4.
106 Fahlman, Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment, xiii.
107 B-2, B-7.
108 B-8.
109 Gentry and Spencer, ‘Colombia’s FARC’, 475.
110 DemMars, ‘Hazardous Partnership’, 198.
111 A-1.
112 A-5.
113 B-4.
114 Heaton, ‘The Prospects for Intelligence-Led Policing’, 338.
115 Fahlman, Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment, 9.
116 ‘Maguire, ‘Policing by Risks and Targets’, 319.
117 Critchlow et al., ‘Improving Law Enforcement Effectiveness and Efficiency in Protected Areas Using Ranger-Collected Monitoring Data’, 572.
118 Matey, ‘The Use of Intelligence in the Private Sector’, 272.
119 A-1, A-3, B-5, B-13.
120 Personal communication, Eeben Barlow, Chairman of Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP) International.