Mutual complicity, state irrelevance, and restorative justice: Dagbon’s future in dire need of reciprocal royal forgiveness

ABSTRACT

This article is a phenomenological account of the grievances that the two royal gates openly express as the main issues that have cumulatively shaped the conflict and which may decide the future contours of the conflict. It relies on the findings from the qualitative interviews conducted with the key protagonists of each gate, their sympathizers, and the custodians of the kingdom. Having acknowledged the intractability of the conflict and its complications, it explains the study’s methodology and the colonial roots of the conflict. The article also analyses how the post-colonial state mismanaged the Dagbon crisis with its centralist intrusions. Moreover, it reviews the literature on restorative justice highlighting its conceptualisation, dimensions, relevance, status vis-à-vis the criminal justice system, and its challenges in conflict resolution. Also, it explores the core grievances of the two royal gates in the light of cultural interpretations and the apparent contradictions. Furthermore, while it investigates the prospects of a traditional dispute resolution mechanism in a bid to restore justice and set the kingdom on the path of sustainable peacebuilding, it questions the excitement that accompanied the 2019 instalment of a new Yaa-Naa and warns about the dangers of a politically motivated conflict settlement that may backfire.

KEYWORDS:

• Dagbon
• victims
• customs
• chieftaincy conflicts
• dispute/conflict resolution
• restorative justice

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Dagbon refers to the traditional political governance of the Dagbamba (adulterated as Dagomba) people in the Northern Region of Ghana. Yaa-Naa is the king of the kingdom who sits on the skin in Yendi, the traditional capital city in the eastern part of the kingdom. However, the kingdom also houses non-Dagbamba people such Konkomba, Basare, and Ckosi, and minority immigrant groups.

2. Given the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force over its societies in maintaining law and order, the state becomes irrelevant when it cannot demonstrate the capacity to lead, direct and mobilize its constitutent groups towards development and when it cannot also demonstrate the capacity to manage and/or resolve conflicts between and among its constitutent groups. For more information on the thesis of irrelevant state, see Ihonvbere (1994).

3. In contradiction to southern Ghana where chiefs and queen mothers sit on stools, the northern chiefs sit on skins and their chiefly position is referred to as skin. For example, reference can be made to the Yendi skin when referring to the authority of that office whose occupant is the Yaa-Naa.

4. The interviews took place between December 2016 and September 2017. The paper also complements the data from the interviews with secondary data and the electronic news on later events.

5. In geographical terms, Kampakuya is a village near Tuusani which is located on the Yendi-Gushegu road before Sakpegu. However, this title has come to symbolize the chieftaincy title of the regent of a deceased Andani Yaa-Naa. When Yaa-Naa Yakubu Andani II served as a regent to perform his funeral in 1969, he was also given the title Kampakuya-Naa.

6. Bolin refers to a stool in the Katini Duu (enskinning room) in the Gbewaa Palace on which a new Yaa-Naa is asked to sit to finalize the enskinning rituals. However, this has come to signify the chieftaincy title of the regent of a deceased Abudu Yaa-Naa.

7. Yani skin, which is also called Yendi skin, refers to the skin of the overload of Dagbon.

8. These are mini states that are skin gates to the Yendi skin, the seat of the overload of Dagbon.

9. For more information on some critical omissions, see Bolaji (2016).

10. In Dagbon, chieftaincy titles go with any of the following: Naa (Chief) or Lana (Owner) or Dana (Possessor). They come after the name of the place on which the chieftaincy reigns, for example, Nanton-Naa (the Chief of Nanton), Yelzorie-Lana (the Owner of Yelzorie), and Gagbindana (the Possessor of Gagbin).

11. Some of the chiefs who were deskinned by Yaa-Naa Yakubu II in 1974 included: Yelzol-Lana, Alidu; Gulkpe-Naa, Alhassan Iddi; Gushe-Naa, Bawa Andani Yakubu; Sang-Lana, Alhassan Abudu Ziblim; Boɣn-Dana (Bogn-Dana), Alhassan Bukari Harunah; Kuɣloɣ-Lana (Kuglog-Lana), Ashetu Abudu (Female); Kpatu-Naa Zenabu Alhassan (Female); Kutunŋ-Lana; Nyol-Naa Salifu Yakubu; Tuɣu-Lana Issah; Duɣu Iddrisu Alhassan; Balo-Naa Abdulai; Zohe-Naa, Abudulai; Mba Kpahagu, Alhassan; Mba Malle, Mahama; Worvi-Lana, Alhassan; Gundowaɣri-Naa, Yakubu; Bin-Dana, Seidu Salifu; Zalinko-Lana, Iddi Iddrisu; and Namo-Naa, Issahaku. Also, included in the list were Kum-Lana Yakubu and Zohe Limam Amadu, the father of Hon Abdul-Malik (former MP of Yendi) and the father of Alhaji Aminu Amadu, respectively. Alhaji Abdul-Malik Yakubu was the interior minister while Alhaji Aminu Amadu was a special adviser to President Agyekum Kufuor Yaa-Naa Yakubu Andani was killed. They were among the people the Andani accused of masterminding the killing of Yaa-Naa Yakubu Andani II. Alhaji Abdul-Malik and Andani Imoro (the Northern Region Minister) later resigned from their posts.

12. Duncan-Johnstone and Blair (1930) documented the eligibility criteria.

13. The actual number of people who died is disputed; some sources suggest between 40 and 70 people.

14. Transformative mediation seeks a lasting resolution of a conflict through a third party who empowers the parties to explore how best they can actualize their needs and interests while recognizing and understanding the views and needs of the other party. This approach to mediation seeks a complete removal of the conflict by addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. The mediator serves as a facilitator of the process and allows the parties to constructively design the outcomes of the mediation. For more information see, Bush and Folger (2004).

15. Facilitative mediation involves the use of a third party who is concerned with unearthing the positions, interests and needs of the parties in conflict and assists them in arriving at options for resolving the conflicts. The mediator facilitates the process of mediation and leaves the determination of the outcomes to the parties. For more information on this, see Foster (2003)

16. In settlement mediation, the role of the mediator is to encourage the parties in the conflict to compromise their earlier positions in order to settle the conflict. More often than not, the mediator has some legal backing to enforce compliance with the settlement agreement. For more information on this, see Foster (2003).

17. In evaluative mediation, the mediator by applying his/her expertise is able to express the relative weaknesses and strengths of the positions, interests and needs of the parties in conflict. Based on extensive knowledge of the subject matter, he/she makes recommendations for resolving the conflict. For more information on this, see Foster (2003).

18. In the pursuance of dynastic politics, particularly to influence dynastic politics to their advantage, both royal gates have always courted the friendship of political parties and politicians. After joining Nkrumah’s party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in the 1950s for a while to avert deskinment of their king, the majority of the Abudu went back to the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Since then, they have been supporting parties of the Danquah/Busia tradition such as the Progressive Party (PP), the Popular Front Party (PFP), and now the National Patriotic Party (NPP). For the majority of Andani, they give their support to the parties that are inclined to the socialist orientation of Nkrumah such as the CPP, the Nationalist National Alliance for Liberals (NAL), the Social Democratic Front (SDF), and now the National Democratic Congress (NDC).

19. The interviews were conducted when Dagbon had no substantive Yaa-Naa.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

M. H. A. Bolaji

Mohammed Hadi Abdul-Ganiy Bolaji is a Senior Lecturer at the University for Development Studies (UDS). He holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from SPIRE), Keele University, the United Kingdom. He specializes in Peace and Conflict Studies and focuses on: Ethnicity and Nationalism; Religion and Politics in Africa; Post-Colonial State Formation; State/Society Relations; Social Movements; Chieftaincy Conflicts, and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. He has published on Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria and Ghana in internationally refereed journals such as:Publius: Journal of Federalism; Africa Today; International Journal on World Peace; Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law; Journal of Black Studies; African Sociological Review; African Affairs; and Journal of Religions in Africa among others.